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5ABSTRACT
Immigrant labourers in Ceylon were wholly Indian and were 
predominantly plantation workers. The rapid expansion of plantation 
agriculture in our period, which was spearheaded by British capital and 
enterprise, took place under a supply of immigrant labour, which was 
on the whole favourable to the industry. The planters were tapping a 
free labour market in South India, for India did not impose restrictions 
on migration to Ceylon so long as the immigrants were on monthly 
contracts with the facility to return to their villages periodically.
The planters preferred free as against indenture labour, for it opened 
up a chronic surplus of labour in a poverty-stricken condition to the 
free market forces of supply and demand. They, on the whole, concentrated 
on improving the methods of recruitment and transportation of labour so 
as to increase the inflow. The planters' problem was not so much the in­
adequacy of the labour supply as the problem of labour instability— of 
keeping the labourers on the estate for long periods. The coffee 
planter's technique v/as to withhold part of the wages until the end of 
the crop season. But the tea planter, with a year round demand for 
labour, required a longer holdc His technique was to place the labourer 
under a dead-weight of indebtedness to the estate. This was done by
9
giving out indiscriminate cash advances, with a low wage scale where 
the wages were inadequate to work off the debt. The planters preferred 
to compete for labour on advances than on the wage scale. The cash 
advances, therefore, came to play the role which the wages play in a 
present-day labour market. With a low and a stagnant wage scale, the 
labourers turned to the advances to meet the gap between inadequate 
wages and the rising cost of living, but in the process got steeped
in indebtedness. Being familar with indebtedness in South India, the 
immigrant acquiesced. The system brought about little economic progress 
for the labourer. The migratory nature of the labour population and 
the kanganies1 hold over the labour gangs contributed to the overall 
poverty. Government policy was one of non-interference into planter-labour 
industrial relations. However, in those other spheres in which the 
Colonial Government opted to interfere, viz., in providing transport 
facilities for the immigrants and also labour welfare schemes, labour 
conditions saw some improvement. But these measures did not bring about 
a striking progress in labour life partly because these schemes were 
not sufficiently far reaching in a period of rapid expansion of the 
immigrant labour population and more important, because of the overall 
impoverished and debt-ridden state of the labour community.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTORY 
ORIGINS 0? INDIAN IMMIGRANT PLANTATION LABOUR
IN CEYLON
Immigration from India to Ceylon was as old as the history of 
Ceylon itself. But the movement in the nineteenth century was sharply dis­
tinct in character from the earlier ones. While the earlier movements were 
primarily of political and cultural nature, the nineteenth century influx 
was predominantly an economic movement set off mainly the need to 
provide wage labour for the coffee plantations. Beginning as a mere trickle 
in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, this agricultural labour 
migration soon gathered momentum and assumed the proportion of a major 
flood. For almost a century the stream never completely ran dry. Finally, 
when it did run dry it was due to the policy of the Government of India 
in the 1930 which prohibited further emigration to Ceylon from India.
The quantitative proportion of the stream narrowed and broadened each 
year depending largely on the economic "pull” factors in Ceylon and the 
economic "push” factors in India. In this chapter we will look into these 
two sets of factors as they operated during those decades of the 
mid-nineteenth century which saw the origins of Indian plantation labour 
immigration to Ceylon.
1. The growth of capitalist plantation agriculture in nineteenth 
century Ceylon
The "pull” from Ceylon came about due to the radical economic 
changes which took place in the Island during the nineteenth century—  
changes which eventually resulted in creating a dualistic economy in the 
Island. From about the 1830 a capitalist economy began to grow rapidly
12
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in Ceylon,'1' It is interesting that this process took place in the heart 
of the Island where the traditional subsistence economy prevailed in its 
most unmixed form —  namely the Central or the Kandyan regions of Ceylon. 
The Kandyan peasant lived within a typically traditional socio-economic 
framework. Living in the lower terrain of the hill country^ they cultiva­
ted rice mainly for their subsistence and had little, if any, cash 
transactions. They bartered most of their produce with their own country­
men and lived mostly in virtually self-sufficient villages, with few 
necessities other than the basic ones. An occupational caste structure 
with a fairly rigid social stratification characterised their social 
organisations. Considering the land-population ratio the region was not 
densely populated.
In the 1840°, when coffe e plantations began to emerge 011 the 
scene, the Kandyan regions were being slowly opened up to outside influen­
ces. For nearly three centuries up to 1815, during which time the socio­
economic fabric of the Kingdom took shape, the Kandyans held their own
against intermittent military expeditions directed against them by the
2
European powers who occupied the maritime regions of the Island.
During these centuries the Kingdom was by no means a "closed polity”.^
The South Indian Nayakkar rulers who ascended the Kandyan throne in the 
seventeenth century brought numerous South Indian cultural, economic, 
and political influences into the region. The European domination in
1. I. H. Vanden Driesen, 1953a and 1953b.
2. From the end of the sixteenth century, the maritime regions of the
Island were ruled by the Portugese (to 1658), the Dutch (I65S-I7 9 6), 
and the British (from 1796).
3. The Kandyan Kingdom originated in the late fifteenth century. After
the maritime belt of the Island fell under European rule from the
sixteenth century, the Kandyan Kingdom remained as the bastion of 
Sinhalese independence till its final conquest by the British in 
1815.
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the Maritime areas since the sixteenth century, especially their persis­
tant military excursions into the Kandyan regions, introduced certain 
foreign elements. But those consit United very limited outside infil­
trations, mere trickles with hardly any significant impact on the basic 
structure. It was only after the British conquest of the Kandyan 
Kingdom in 1815, especially with the stabilization of British power
after the crushing of the independence revolts of 1818, that outside
4influences began to penetrate in any effective manner. ' Even thereafter 
little socio-economic infiltration of European Imperialism took place 
up to about 1835* -te only notable changes up to this time were three-fold. 
Firstly, the imposition of a unified administrative end legal super­
structure manned by British officials over the traditional Kandyan 
Sinhalese officialdom. In this process the political power of the 
latter were greatly mutilated, thereby ensuring for the British the 
political hegemony and stability so necessary for economic infiltration. 
The second significant reform during this period was the abolition of
Rajakariya—  the traditional compulsory gratuitious services which
5every inhabitant of the Kandyan region had to perform. Rajakariya
being a strong semi-feudal tie, its abolition had the effect of
loosening the traditional bonds. However, its effects did not immediately
bring about any radical change in the socio-economic behaviour of the
«
people. Thirdly, the construction of the Colombo-Kandy road in the 
1820 opened up the central hill capital for strategic and administrative
4. On the British conquest of the Kandyan Kingdom and the suppression 
of the independence revolts of I8l8, see Colvin R. de Silva, 1942, 
chaps. 5 an{i 6.
5. The system of Rajakariya was two-fold. First, all inhabitants who 
held land from the king, the nobles, and the priests had to perform 
certain services in return for the tenure of land. Secondly-, 
independent of the land holdings, all inhabitants had to perform 
gratuitious services by way of construction and repair of the 
village roads, bridges, and irrigation works.
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purposes and prepared the way for subsequent economic infiltration.^
In.spite of these changes the peasant still lived in a traditional 
setting, except for the economic emancipation of a sort received with 
the abolition of Rajakariya. The abolition was effected primarily in 
the hope that the Rajakariya-freed peasant would readily avail himself 
of wage-labour in the event of a labour market coming up in the wake of 
British economic enterprises in the Kandyan areas.
British private capital and enterprise began to flow into the 
Kandyan areas from about 1835 with the rapid growth of coffee 
plantations. This was a direct result of the economic factors at work 
within the British Empire at this time. The most formidable coffee
supplier within the Empire the British West Indian colonies —  found
the ground under its economic feet disastrously cut, firstly, with the 
abolition of slavery within the Empire which deprived the West Indian 
coffee planters of their source of cheap labour, and secondly, by the 
gradual revision of the Mercantalist system of tariff protection which 
had hitherto accorded preferential treatment to the West Indian colonies 
--a revision which eventually culminated in the equalisation of the
liBritish custom tariff on West and East Indian coffee entering Britain. ' 
The decline of West Indian coffee plantations coincided with a period
g
of increased demand for coffee in Europe. British private capital
6. The Kandyan.Kingdom was a thickly fohested and mountainous country, 
a veritable natural fortress. It was this geographical situation 
which protected and nurtured the Kandyan seclution, independence, 
and patriotism for several centuries against Portugese, Butch,and 
British invasions from the maritime areas of the Island.
7. The import dpty on coffee in England stood at 6^ per pound for West 
Indian and 9 per pound^for East Indian coffee. In 1835 the import 
duty was equalised at 6^ per pound.
8. L. A. Mills, 1933, p. 227.
I. R. Vanden Driesen, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1954, P» 20.
Vanden Driesen gives the following statistics on coffee imports 
to England from West Indies and Ceylon (weight in pounds).
Year West Indies Ceylon
1327 29,419,593 1,792,443
1337 15,577,888 6,756,843
1847 5,259,449 19,475,904
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sought new land for investment. Politically stable, administratively
unified, climatically suited, and hopeful of obtaining Rajakariya-freed
labour, Ceylon appeared an appropriate land for investment on coffee.
Consequently, coffee was the dominant economic influence from about 1835 
o
to about i860. It introduced to Ceylon a plantation economy based on a 
cash crop and linked Ceylon closely to the world market. Capital, land, 
and labour came to be assembled and organised under modern enterprise.
The growth of capitalist enterprises in Ceylon was part of a 
broader transformation that was taking place in the nature of the 
European economic activities throughout their colonies in the East.
Since the arrival of the European powers in the East in the sixteenth 
century their interests were confined mainly to commercial activities, 
purchasing the tropical products produced by the indigenous people.
When in the nineteenth century there grew an increasing demand for the 
existing tropical products the interests of the Imperial powers were 
gradually extended from purely commercial activities to the direct 
production of export commodities. Thus, the colonies began to experience 
the growth of plantations and mines, organised, financed, and managed 
by the Europeans. The problems of obtaining capital, land, and labour 
which this new type of economic activities brought about became 
remarkably alike in most of the European colonies in the East. A study 
of any aspect of these problems in any one of the colonies, broadly 
speaking, reveals similarities with the rest of South Asia.
In the process of the growth of the plantation sector in 
nineteenth century Ceylon, capital, and enterprise came at first from 
the British officials in Ceylon and subsequently from the British 
entrepreneurs."^ The early plantations were established in the regions
9. For the origins and the growth of the coffee industry in Ceylon, 
see I. H. Vanden Driesen, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1954*
10. K. !-:. de Silva, 1964a, pp. 28-29.
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neighbouring the peasant villages. Consequently, there was encroachment
of the village waste land and chenas traditionally utilized by the
peasants.^ The villages became hemmed in amidst plantations. However,
it was soon discovered that coffee grew best on cleared forest land
rather than on abandoned chena land, particularly on land situated
12above 1700 ft. contour. The Government was willing to sell these 
forest lands at a nominal rate of five shillings an acre to the planters. 
The entrepreneurs* main problem regarding land was the need for clear 
freehold legal titles to the holdings they bought so as to ensure the 
security of their investments. This need was fulfilled by the Government
by the enactment of the Land Ordinances No. 12 of I84O and No. 9 of
13 sI84I. The "coffee mania" of the early I84O0 saw vast extents of Crown
forest land being sold to the planters and land speculators.. The
large-scale sale of Crown land continued during the succeeding decades
with the progress of the coffee industry.
2. The labour problem and the beginnings of labour immigration
The operations in the plantation economy naturally created a
heavy demand for plantation workers. Labour was required for felling 
and clearing forests and setting up plantations. Once the plantations 
were set up, there was a heavy demand for labour for picking and
S 4*transporting of coffee. During the 1830 there was much sanguine hopes 
that the Kandyan peasant could be persuaded to sell his labour. It was 
the desire to obtain labour from among the Kandyan peasants towards the 
creation of a plantation economy which prompted Colebrooke to recommend
11. Chenas were patches of jungle land which the peasants cleared for 
themselves to cultivate dry grains periodically. Once the soil was 
exhausted after several harvests they shifted to other jungle patches, 
and the abandoned chenas were re-cultivated after a lapse of about 
two or three years. This type of shifting cultivation vras undertaken 
by the peasants in addition to the cultivation of their paddy fields.
12. K. K. de Silva, 1964b, p. 152.
13. K. K. de Silva, 1964a.
X. H. Vanden Driesen, 1957*
the abolition of Rajakariya. Colebrooke*s line of thinking was that once 
the traditional socio-economic ties of the Kandyan society are loosened, 
the Kandyan peasantry could he appended to the money economy which the 
British private ca,pital would create and that the Kandyan peasantry 
while providing wage labour would also provide a valuable market for 
British manufactures. Colebrooke was, in fact, recommending for Ceylon 
the new British attitude which was currently taking shape towards forced 
labour in the various British colonies. At the time the Europeans came 
to the East they found a tradition of unfree labour, utilized mainly 
for building and maintaining such public works as roads and irrigation 
schemes well established. These systems ranged from outright slavery to 
the attachment of bonded workers and differed from country to country. 
While the traditional systems of compulsory labour served many worthwhile 
purposes, especially in building and maintaining public \;orks and 
irrigation schemes, these systems seldom proved useful as a means of 
achieving the economic objectives of the nineteenth century colonial 
powers. It was gradually realised that a new approach to the problem of 
labour was necessary in order to attain their economic objectives. A new 
solution became all the more necessary because of the new type of 
economic activities, namely, the European-financed and European-managed 
plantations and mines. Throughout the Empire, systems of forced labour 
were either adapted or totally abolished in the hope that indigenous 
people would come forward for wage labour.
In Ceylon, during the early stage of the coffee industry in the
183QS when there were only a few plantations, the Sinhalese in some
areas did sell their labour. There were instances when the Kandyans as
14
well as the low-country Sinhalese worked on plantations. But this
14* M. VI. Roberts, 1966a, pp. 1-2.
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proved to be only a passing episode. Soon they withdrew into their
traditional socio-economic framework and confined themselves to engaging
in "piece work" such as contract for weeding and felling forests. They
did not respond to the demend for regular work on estates. The British
planters'Were confronted wit h the acute problem of a shortage of labour.
They found it hard to get even the poorest strata in the countryside to
15accept regular wage employment on the estates.
This was not a problem peculiar to British Ceylon. Virtually all
European powers were confronted with this problem in their efforts at
economic penetration and exploitation of their colonies. During the
age of Mercantalism the problem was solved with African slave-labour.
The abolition of slavery was a very important factor creating a heavy
demand for new sources of labour5 for it appeared that after their
emancipation the former slaves were not prepared to work on plantations
and mines as wage labourers."*" This situation was best illustrated in
the British West Indian colonies. When slavery was abolished in the
British Empire in 1833? the emancipated Negro slaves of the British
West Indies refused to work as wage labourers on the coffee and sugar
plantations and migrated to jungle areas to eke out an existence as
peasants. The planters were left with a steadily diminishing labour
force. Similar problems occurred in the French and Dutch colonies when
slavery was abolished in their respective Empires in l86l and in 1868.
Colonies in which a shortage of labour took place can be
17grouped under two theoretical models. First, the problem came up in
situations where the location of natural resources required the mines
and plantations to be set up in countries which had sparse population
15* Ibid.
16. N. Gangulee, 1947? P* 21.
Hugh Tinker, 1974? PP* 2, 18.
17. H. Myint, 19&5? chap. 4.
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in relation to the available resources. This was the situation in Assam 
and some of the African colonies. Secondly, the problem of procuring 
labour arose in the case of countries which were well populated; but 
their indigenous people would not come forward to work on plantations 
either because the peasants found the cultivation of cash crops more 
attractive or because they had no need to labour for wages, living as 
they did in a virtually self-sufficient traditional socio-economic frame­
work. By and large, this was the situation in countries like Burma,
Malaya, and Ceylon.
Efforts to remedy the labour shortage were attempted in two ways. 
In situations where the enterprises came up in the sparsely populated 
regions like in some of the African colonies, the ’migrant labour’ 
system vras experimented with, with considerable success. In analysing 
the system Professor Myint points out that
Under this system, those who come to work in the mines and 
plantations still retained a foothold in the subsistence economy.
They regarded their wage-earning activity not as a permanent 
full-time employment but as a periodical spare-time activity to 
earn a certain amount of money in addition to their claims on 
the subsistence economy.18
In the ca,se of other colonies like Burma, Malaya, and Ceylon where migrant
labour of the African type vras not available on a sufficient scale or
where the peasants would not come forward for wage labour, a different
*
solution vras adopted. This vras to import immigrant labour on a large- 
scale from the relatively over-populated regions of either India or China.
Just as the African coast supplied slave-labour for the economic 
development of the First British Empire, India and China turned out to 
be the greatest reservoir of wage-labour for the economic progress of 
the Second British Empire. To Ceylon, Malaya, Burma, West Indies, Fiji, 
and East Africa wage-labour were engaged from either India or China to 
work on mines, plantations, railway projects, a-nd other public works.
Ibid., p. 58.
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It is said,
Indeed, the immigrant labour from India and China was recruited on
so large a scale that it has been said that these two countries,
together with Britain, were the ’three mother countries’ of the 
British Empire.19
It is interesting to analyse the curious factors which prompted
one set of the British colonial people, to hire their labour even in
distant countries away from their homeland with all the attendent risks
of long voyages and an uncertain future, while the indigenous people
living in the country of the location of the natural resources refused
to work on the plantations and mines almost bordering their villages# In
analysing the reasons in relation to the Kandyan regions in Ceylon much
has been said of the conservatism of the Kandyan Sinhalese and their
laziness and indolence and the relative capacity for hard work in the 
20
South Indians. This explanation originated with the British officials
and the British planters of Ceylon in the mid-nineteenth century. Once
propounded, the theory remained an article of faith among the British
21
circles in Ceylon throughout the colonial rule. Conservatism was no
less conspicuous among the South Indians than among any other indigenous
people in the Empire. In fact, in comparison with the Sinhalese, some of
the traditional ideas and values were much stronger in South India than
in Ceylon. For instance, nowhere in Ceylon was the caste structure as
«
rigid as in South India. As for the theory of laziness and the indolence 
of the Sinhalese, it is worth noting that much of hard work connected 
with the opening up of the plantations— the clearing of forests and 
transporting commodities were performed by the Sinhalese. Besides, the
19. H. Myint, 1965? P* 63.
A lr.rge migration of Chinese labour took place in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries mainly from the Kwantung province of southern 
China to particularly West Indies, Australia, South Africa and M&laya. 
On Chinese labour emigration within the British Empire, see P. C. 
Campbell, 1971•
20. K. U. Roberts, 1966a, p. 2.
21. Ibid.
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accounts of the ill-fed and the disease-stricken nature of the South
Indian immigrants recorded by the contemporaries, and more significantly,
the high rate of mortality among the immigrants of the mid-nineteenth
century do not speak of them as a race -with an above the average degree
of physical endurance in comparison with the other indigenous people of
22the British colonies.
Basically the explanation is economic and partly social. The
immigrants (South Indians) and the indigenous people (Sinhalese, Burmese,
Malayans) both lived in a peasant society, characterised by a
subsistence-economy but in two vastly different economic situations. The
economic situation of the great majority of the South Indians compared
gravely ill with the indigenous people of the recipient countries. In
the case of the latter there was no heavy over-crowding on lend and the
people were, by and large, self-sufficient in their basic necessities.
In South India a considerable section of the population lived at a minimum
level of subsistence. The interplay of several economic factors during
the preceding century or so had driven the majority of, especially the
low-caste, South Indians to the fringe of economic peril. This provided
the main "push” factor which prompted them to undertake the dangers of
the long journeys and the uncertainties of the future in spite of their
innate conservatism. This economic "push" factor was absent in the case
«
of the majority of the Kandyans. Unlike the South Indians, the Kandyans 
were nowhere near economic peril though in a stagnant economy and with 
a low standard of living. Their necessities were few end in these they 
were virtually self-sufficient. The climate was relatively favourable 
and the soil fertile; natural calamities like persistent famines and 
epidemics, which frequently devastated South India in the nineteenth 
century and endangered the economic conditions of the people thera rarely
22. K. K. de Silva, 19&5? P* 300.
I. H. Vanden Driesen, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1954?
pp. I86-I8 7.
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occurred in the Kandyan regions. Economically the Kandyans vie re in a 
situation which enabled them to live their traditional form of economic 
life within the traditional economic framework. There was no heavy 
population pressure and no large surplus of unemployed man-power. Dr. 
Roberts points out that in the Kandyan areas the people had no need for 
wage labour. To quote him
... none who were so poverty stricken as to tie themselves to the 
wage-strings of, what was to them, a rather strange person, the 
white pl-anter.23
Problems of land throw valuable light on at least some asnects 
of the wage—labour problem in Ceylon. The traditional system of land 
holdings assured those of the agricultural classes a claim over some piece 
of land, however small his share. Even if one’s hereditary land was 
inadequate, the practice of chena cultivation gave the peasants the oppor­
tunity to undertake extensive cultivation on plots of land cleared from 
the forest. Those who belonged to non-agricultural castes had their 
hereditary occupations since caste stratification was of occupational 
origin. The availability of land to subsist on was a significant factor 
which dissuaded the Kandyan peasants from going to the estates as wage 
labourers. This becomes clear when one realises that at times when some 
section of the peasantry lost their land holdings either due to mortgage 
or due to forfeiture by the Government for the default#of tax payments,
they drifted to the estates in search of employment. This took place in
s 24some Kandyan areas in the 1880 . However, there was no large-scale 
displacement of the peasantry from their traditional lands as in the 
period of the Enclosure Movement in England when the uprooted English 
farmers had no choice but to drift to industrial areas in search of 
employment. This raises the interesting question as to how the Kandyan
23. M. W. Roberts, 1966a, p. 1.
24. D. Wesuraperuma, 1967? P« 142.
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peasants retained their land in the wake of the plantation surge in the
Kandyan regions. Recent research has shown that the growth of plantations
in the Kandyan regions did not result in the creation of a landless
class in that region and that the effect of the British land policies
in Ceylon resulted mainly in preventing the further expansion of the 
25
villages. It is not correct to conclude that all Kandyans possessed
land. There was a landless section. But in the Kandyan economy they
worked not as agricultural labourers as did the great majority of the
landless agricultural population in South India, but as sharecroppers.
Although the sharecropper did manual labour, he was distinct from an
agricultural labourer in that he did hi3 manual work for himself and
vjas under no one*s command like the agricultural labourer.
Apart from the general economic situation, the availability of
lard, and the absence of agricultural labour castes, several other
factors militated against the peasants going to the estates for wage
labour. The Kandyans regarded manual work, performed under the supervision
and control of another person, as a most degrading stigma. They
detested the arbitrary hand of a foreign employer. Caste conciousness
contributed to strengthen their antipathy to hired labour. They depised
hired labour as mere servitude. It is possible that the bitter memories
of the way in which the system of compulsory labour (Rajakariya) vras
*
utilized by the British to serve imperial interests in Ceylon played 
some part in shaping this attitude. There vras a sense of hostility to 
the presence of estates. In fact, the spread of plantations seems to 
have driven the peasants avray from the planters. The hostility vras the 
result of several factors. The Kandyans resented the loss of their 
village wasteland and chenas to the estates. The British superimposed 
freehold property rights on a society which knew no other than
25* L,R.*Iayaward©na, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1963*
2o. I. H. Vanden Driesen, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1954*
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traditional concepts of land holding. The peasants resented the introduc­
tion of alien concepts of land ownership by the Government in the interest 
of the planters# Extention of villages was hampered. Kandyans regarded 
the planters as having intruded on to their privacy. Further, though 
some Kandyans did accept wage labour in the early years of coffee planting 
in Ceylon, the treatment meted out to the labourers by the early planters 
made them reluctant to return to work. The able and the most notable 
Colonial Secretary in Ceylon during the nineteenth century, Sir James
E. Tennent, held that the Kandyans were put off by the brutalities of
27
the superintendents and by the non-payment of wages. The level of
wages itself was not attractive. The planters wanted cheap labour and
offered rates which the Kandyans would not accept. It was only in times
of very acute shortage of labour would the planter try to experiment
with the wage scale.
Besides, the Kandyans of mid-nineteenth century did not have
any great need for cash. Living in a traditional set-up, there was little
use of money. The taxes were mostly paid in kind. While there was no
general land tax in Ceylon like in India, the peasants had to pay two
major direct taxes— the paddy tax and the road tax. In the method of
collection, both taxes worked on the same principle where the payment
could be made either in cash or in kind. In case of the paddy tax, which
roughly approximated one-tenth of the produce of the peasant paddy
fields, a system of compulsory commutation of the tax into money
28
payments was introduced only as late as 1878. Even then, the system 
was only gradually extended in the Kandyan regions and it was rigorously 
implemented only for a relatively short period of about five years 
during the early 1880 . The tax itself was eventually abolished in I892. 
The road tax introduced in 1848 obliged the adult males between ages of
27. M. W. Roberts, 1966a, p. 1.
E. F. C. Ludowyk, 1966, p. 66.
28. D. Wesumperuma, 1969*
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18 and 55 years to pay three shillings per year for the upkeep of roads,
but the people were given the option of commuting the tax in manual
29
labour for six days a year on the roads.
The spread of plantations in some ways, in some areas at least, 
helped the peasants to improve their economic position xvithout tieing 
themselves to the wage strings on the estates. The growth of plantations 
opened up subsidiary avenues of income. These became more attractive to 
the peasants than regular work on the estates. Besides, the peasants 
themselves began to grow coffee on their own plots of lands as a spare­
time activity in addition to their normal agricultural work. When the 
taxes were commuted for money payments, it was mainly with the earnings 
of "peasant coffee" that the peasants paid their taxes.^
Even if the Kandyans were ready to accept regular work on the 
estates, it is doubtful whether Kandyan areas had a sufficient population 
base to provide an adequate labour force for the plantations. The 
Kandyans, when they did come for work, were ready only to perform casual 
labour which would enable them to get back to their villages by night.^^ 
They were not willing to reside on the estates. The planters, on the other 
hand, wanted a stable and a certain supply of labour, resident on the 
ests-tes at least during the heavy coffee picking season. To the planters 
the small number of Kandyans who came for work appeared as too
9
precarious a supply of labour.
When threatened with labour shortage, the trend of the day in 
the British colonies was to turn to India. The planters in Ceylon too 
fell in line. It was to their advantage that Ceylon lay so close to 
South India. While the demand on the plantations provided the "pull" 
factor, the economic situation of the agricultural labourers and the
29. T. G. I. B. Kunasinghe, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1972, 
pp.3
30. D. Wesumperurna. 19^7, pp. 134-135•
31. See below, pp. 145~347»
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32small-scale peasants in south India explains the "push" factor.
Economically there were wide disparities and regional varations in South
India. However, it is possible to disentangle certain broad trends in
the economic history of South India during the nineteenth century, most
of vjhich point towards an economic deterioration.
A primary fa.ctor relevant to our study is the presence of a
considerable class of agricultural labourers in South India during the
nineteenth century. The South Indian agricultural labourers present an
extremely wide variety of types. They have been differently defined by
various writers on the subject. Broadly, this population embraces those
sections of the society whose major source of livelihood was working in
the lands of others. They were either landless or had only minute
holdings too small for their subsistence and therefore had to offer their
manual labour to make a living. They may have been either fully employed,
under employed, or unemployed for part of the year depending on the
nature and the extent of the demand and supply of labour in the
agricultural sector.
The origins of the agricultural labour population in India, the
growth rate of the class, and the relative impact of the factors which
shaped their fortunes during the nineteenth century ha,ve aroused much
controversy among the writers on modern Indian economic history. This
*
debate, which still continues, is of importance to U3 in that it reveals 
some aspects vitally relevant to us on the fortunes of the Indian 
agrarian society during the nineteenth century— the source from which 
the immigrant plantation labourers were drawn. In the following analysis 
we will confine our attention to these crucial aspects.
Recent research has demolished the traditional theory that the
growth of a landless agricultural labour population in South India was
32. Immigrant labourers to Ceylon were drawn mainly from these two
groups of the people in South India,. See below, pp. 109-111.
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predoiainent ly a nineteenth century phenomenon."^ Even in pre-British
days there appears to have "been a sizable group of people in South
India who performed agriculture,! labour— people who belonged to several
castes such as Palli, Pallan, Paraiyan, and Cheruman, which were in fact
agricultural labour castes.^ These agricultural labourers were landless
because economic and social factors debarred the low caste labourers
acquiring land. Evidence as regards the size of this class in early
nineteenth century is far from conclusive. As regards South India, the
most recent estimate places the size of this class to approximately
10-15 per cent of the total population at the beginning of the nineteenth 
35century.
During the nineteenth century the South Indian agricultural
labour population seemsto have increased both in its absolute numbers
as well as in its proportion to the total agricultural population. First,
the natural growth of population in India in the nineteenth century
36contributed its share. Though during famines and epidemics, so frequent 
in nineteenth century India, the population decreased, the recovery of
33* The traditional theory supported by most of the Indian writers holds 
that the landless agricultural labourers in India were a creation 
of British rule. They argue that in pre-British India there was no 
significant class of landless labourers; that the people lived a 
corporate life in self-sufficient villages of peasant proprietors 
and village artisans; that the socio-economic changes introduced by 
the British in the nineteenth century destroyed the basis of the 
self-sufficient village economy and left the arisan3 and the peasants 
dispossesed of their handicraft industries and lands; that these 
groups had no choice but to resort to agricultural labour for their 
livelihood. (For a clear presentation of this theory, see, S. J. 
Patel, 1952). The basis of the above theory has been contested by a 
more recent writer, Dharma Kumar. She contends that "... there was 
a need for agricultural labourers even before the impact of the 
British rule was felt" and that in pre-nineteenth century India 
there was sizable group of landless agricultural labourers; that 
the changes during the nineteenth century "... could hardly be 
regarded as a radical transformation of the agrarian economy"
(Dharma Kumar, 1965? P* 182); that the growth rate of the landless 
agricultural labour population was a slow one. (ibid., chaps. I-VI 
and X-Xl). See also, Morris D. Morris, 1966, pp. 185-209.
34• Dharma Kumar, 1965? chaps. Ill and IV.
35* Ibid., pp. 62, 181.
36. Kingsley Davis., 1951? PP* 73-74*
Radhakamal Mukerjee, 1926, p. 30.
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•the population appears to have been quite rapid. It is important that
the natural rate of population growth was relatively high among the
agricultural labour castes. Secondly, the landless agricultural labour
population was augmented by others entering this class from outside its
own ranks. This was partly the result of the disintegration of the Indian
village handicraft industries consequent on the flooding of the Indian
market with cheaper British manufactured articles. The unemployed village
artisans began to turn to agriculture for sustenance and. without any
37capital they had no choice but to be agricultural labourers. On this 
point the following quotation is typical in the works on modern Indian 
history.
The growing competition from machine-made goods dealt a heavy blow 
to the traditional means of livelihood of the village artisan, 
particularly weaver, who for want of better alternative turned to 
agriculture for earning his living as landless labourer.33
Thirdly, the agricultural labour population was replenished by those of 
the peasant proprietors who in the course of the nineteenth century found
39
themselves gradually dispossesed of their landholdings. This process
of the disintegration of a section of the Indian peasantry has been
attributed to the monetization of the agrarian economy, the groi-jth of
peasant indebtedness, and the consequent transfer of peasant lands to
their creditors. The rudimentary beginnings of the monetization of the
«
peasant sector took place in several ways. The system of land settlement 
which the British introduced to South India made the cultivator pay a 
fixed rate of land revenue to the government in cash.^ In case of 
failure to pay the land revenue, his land was liable to be forfeited
37. S. J. Patel, 1952, pp. 38-40.
38. B. M. Bhatia, 19°3, p. v.
39. S. T. Patel, 1952, pp. 48-56.
Dharma Kumar, 19&5? P« 101.
40. S. J. Patel, 1952, pp. 49-50.
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and sold by the Government for the recovery of arrears. Besides, x-rith
the decline of the village handicrafts, the peasants had to purchase the
foreign manufactured articles in the market. To meet these monetary
exigencies and others caused by economic crises such as failure of crops,
the peasants from time to time raised cash loans with their land as
security. Land itself was acquiring a new economic value as a source of
investment for the money-lender and the landlord in return for rents and
interests on loans. Where the cultivator failed to repay their cash
loans he had no choice but to transfer the title to his land either
41voluntarily or forcibly through the law courts to his creditors.
Factors such as heavy rates of interest and unforeseen natural calamities 
tended to make the repayment of loans extremely difficult. The law 
recognised the transfer of land; and the legal machinery enabled the 
creditors to acquire the property of the defaulting debtors. Radhakamal
Mukerjee has pointed out that
... a rigid and elaborate legal system too often h?-s proved only 
an additional instrument of oppression in the hands of the more 
xvealthy or better instructed litigants and an additional cause 
of ruin to the impoverished agriculturists. 42
The extent to which the natural growth of population and the 
disintegration of the domestic handicrafts and the peasantry contributed 
to increase the agricultural labour population in South India is not 
clean. But two factors relevant to our study emerge from the above 
stated developments— first, that the economic changes which occurred in 
nineteenth century South India tended to augment the agricultural labour 
population, and secondly, that the cash nexus was making inroads into 
the agrarian society. These are factors conducive to the growth of a 
wage labour system
While the above structural changes were taking place in the 
agrarian sector in South India the genera.1 economic conditions,
41. Ibid., p. 53.
42. Radhakamal Mukerjee, 1926, p. 28*
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particularly of the agricultural labourers, assumed a distressingly
downward trend during the course of the century. Whereas the population
increased, South India failed to maintain even the prevailing economic
standards. There was no large-scale development of alternative employment
opportunities capable of absorbing the rising landless labour population
in the country-side. All new avenues of employment were restricted to a
relatively small demand for labour to do works such as construction of
roads and irrigation facilities. While the population pressure on
agriculture was rising agricultural productivity itself lagged."^ In
fact the acreage under cultivation in South India decreased during the
first quarter of the nineteenth century. The problem was not so much a
lack of land. Extensive arable land was available for cultivation. But
several factors retarded extention of agriculture. The heavy land taxes
restricted cultivation throughout the first half of the century. In
raiyatwari as well as in zamindari areas heavy collection of taxes sent
s s A Amany holdings out of cultivation,. especially in the 1830 and I84O •
In fact, in some areas the raiyats had to be compelled to cultivate 
their land. Dharma Kumar concludes that cultivation would have undergone
45further decline had the raiyats not been forced to cultivate their lands.
Factors such as lack of capital partly due to heavy taxes, poor
agricultural equipments and techniques, unseasonable and uncertain
»
rainfall, and the general economic position of the cultivator, 
especially his indebtedness, all contributed to arrest the pace of 
agricultural progress. Besides, the intensity and frequencs' of famines 
and epidemics seriously impeded steady economic growth and deepened the 
general impoverishment of the people. It is worth noting that, except 
for the 1880°, there was no decade in the nineteenth century which was
43* Dharma Kumar, 1965? chap. VII.
B. H. Bhatia, 1963, p. vi.
44• Dharma Kumar, 1965? PP» 108-109*
45- Ibid.
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untouched by famine or scarcity and that there was no district unaffectedf^
A3 Radhakamal Mukerjee observed "famines and diseases work havoc and
47reduce them to a state of complete disorgamsation". The agricultural 
labourers appear to have suffered most during the famines, for they 
were the first to be paid off and they had little resources to resist 
these calamities.
The growth of agricultural labour population outstripping that
j O
of agricultural productivity reacted in depressing agricultural wages.
At best, wages fluctuated around subsistence level, falling especially
in times of famines. Conversely, prices of foodgrains assumed an upward
trend partly due to relative slow progress in agriculture and partly due 
49to exports.
It is relevant to our study that South India, was among the regions
50
wnich had the highest proportion of the agricultural labourers in India.
Besides, it was also a region which experienced the dire impact of the
changes which occurred in India in the nineteenth century with all its
vigour for it was "... in nineteenth century Madras that the raiyatwari
form of settlement was most rigorously carried through that the rate of
51revenue extracted were highest, that land transfers were easiest..."
Just as the absence of traditional agricultural labour castes in
the Kandyan areas was a vital factor in explaining the lack of a supply
«
of plantation labour from the Kandyan areas, the presence of such a class 
in South India was an equally vital factor in explaining the supply of 
wage labour from the region. Being a traditional agricultural labour 
population, they did not attach a sense of social stigma for manual work
4 6. R. C. Dutta, 1900> PP* 1-20.
B. M. Bhatia, 1963, pp. 7-9•
47* Radhakamal Mulcerjee, 1926. p. 209*
48. Dharma Kumar, 1965> chap. IX.
49- B. M. Bhatia, 1963, pp. 9, 38-39.
50. S. J. Patel, 1952, pp. 63-68.
Morris.Dv.Morris, 1966, p. 193.
51. Ibid.
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under supervision. Employment as agricultural workers on plantations did
not involve a sacrifice of social status or breaking through customary
52social values and institutions. To the South Indian labourer,
agriculture.! labour was the traditional caste occupation. For him engaging
in plantation labour did not necessitate a change of the social position
and the social values. In contrast, in the Kandyan areas there was no
large group of landless agricultural labourers. The majority of the
population were either peasant cultivators or sharecroppers. For them to
work on the plantations as wage labourers, they had to break through
the entrenched social values which held manual wage labour as degrading#
The interplay of these several factors— the growth of population,
especially the landless agricultural labour castes, the relative decline
of agricultural productivity, frequent famines, and the downward trend
in wages, and the high foodgrain prices— contributed to reduce a considerable
population in South India to a level of chronic poverty, debt bondage,
53and even conditions nearing semi-starvation. It was this increasing 
economic peril and distress which prompted a section of the South Indian 
agricultural labourers to look elsewhere for a living#
The planters seized the opportunity. They saw several advantages 
in recruiting South Indians^—advantages which the planters would not 
gain by employing the Kandyans. First, the Indians would reside on the 
estates at least for several months and the planters could rely on their 
labour during that period. Secondly, Indian labour was cheap. The lower 
social position associated with wage employment among the Kandyans would 
make it necessary for the planters to offer somewhat higher economic 
rewards in order to attract them for hired labour in sufficient numbers.
52. On the social castes and economic background of the immigrants 
to Ceylon, see below, pp. 109-111.
53. S. S. Raghavaiyangar, I892, p. 97*
B. M. Bhatia, 1963, pp. v-vi.
34
Thirdly, the Indian labourers moved away from their homes, were more
amenable to discipline. As Dr, Myrdal has pointed-out, "Foreign labourers,
isolated in unfamiliar surroundings were more docile, more easily
54organised for effective work, and v;ere permanently attached," Once 
the planters found that the import of South Indian labourers was in 
their interest, they made no serious attempt to harness any possible 
sources of indigenous labour. They continued to build the image of 
laziness of the Kandyan peasant and concentrated on devising means of 
recruiting an abundant supply of South Indian labour.
54. Gunnar Kyrdal, 1968, p. 971*
CHAPTER II
RECRUITMENT AND CONVEYANCE OF IMMIGRANT PLANTATION 
LABOURERS, 1880-1910
In the recruitment of immigrant labourers, Ceylon followed a
system distinct from the general pattern of Indian labour emigration
overseas. The main difference lay in emigration from South India to
Ceylon being free of the restrictions v/hich the Indian Government had
imposed on the labour recruiting activities of the other recipient
countries. Consequently, there was virtually unrestricted migration of
Indians to Ceylon in contrast to the regulated migration to most of
the other countries. In section 1 of the present chapter we will focus
our attention on this fundamental divergence and account for its
prevalence. Though free of Government restrictions, the migration of
Indian labourers to the plantations in Ceylon was not a spontaneous
movement where the immigrants came on their own in response to the demand
for labour in the Island. The bulk of the immigrants were from among
the most inarticulate, illiterate, and the poorest section of the
population in South India.^ They could not afford to undertake the
cost of the journey to the plantations on their own. They had to be
induced to migrate and eventually transported to the plantations.
«
Thus, a whole mechanism grew up for the recruitment and transportation 
of the immigrant labourers to the plantations. In this mechanism, the 
planter, the labour recruiter, and the Colonial Government in Ceylon 
each played significant roles. Sections 2 and 3 of the chapter will be 
devoted to a study of the system of recruitment and conveyance of labour 
and the structural changes which it underwent during our period. We will 
first confine our attention in section 2 to the two major immigration
I. See below, pp. 109-111, 276-277*
35
36
routes between South India and Ceylon with a view to bring out the hazards
of the routes to the immigrants and the efforts made in our period to
minimize these hazards. The main development was the decline and the
eventual closure of the immigration route which was in use from the
inception of plantation labour immigration to the Island in the 1830s
and the growth of a new route* which while enhancing the cost of transport
did, nevertheless, contribute to reduce the hazards to the immigrants in
their journey between South India and the estates. In section 3 we will
take a close look at the institutional changes brought about in our periad
in the recruitment and conveyance of labour. At the beginning of our
period the labour recruiter— the kangany— had a virtual monopoly over
the supply of labour. The institutional changes brought about by the
planters during our period were primarily aimed at loosening the kangany*s
monopolistic hold over the supply of labour. From the point of view of
the labourers the most crucial feature in the entire system of recruitment
and conveyance was the method developed by the planters to finance the
poverty-stricken labourers to get to the estates. The planters paid cash
advances to the labour recruiter to finance recruitment and transportation,
and the estates recovered these advances from the labourers* wages by
debiting their amounts to the labourers* estate account. Consequently,
every immigrant labourer began his life on the plantation with an initial
<•
burden of debt. The presence of this feature can be partly attributed to 
the exemption of migration to Ceylon from the operation of the Indian 
Emigration Ordinances; for one of the cardinal stipulations in these 
Ordinances was the obligation of the employer to provide transport free 
of cost to the immigrant labourers between India and the work-pla.ce abroad.
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"Free" lapout migration
Indian labour migration to Ceylon was unique in being a migration 
of ’’free" labourers in contrast to indenture labour migration to most of 
the other countries which obtained labour from India, particularly the 
West Indies, Mauritius, East and South Africa, and Fiji. Whereas the 
indenture labour system contractually bound the immigrant labourer to 
serve a particular employer for a specified period, which usually varied 
between three to five years, in Ceylon the Indian immigrant was considered 
a free labourer possessing the legal right to quit his employer’s service 
at a month’s notice. Besides, he was free to move between his homeland 
in South India and the work-place in the Island unrestricted by Government 
regulations on both sides except the bare quarantine procedure in Ceylon. 
Malaya and Burma shared this characteristic of Indian labour migration 
with Ceylon. Burma, however, was politically a part of British India up 
to 1537. Free labour migration to Malaya was allowed only in 1897*^ In 
case of Ceylon, on the other hand, from the inception of immigration in 
the 1830 up to 1923 immigration took place under a "free" labour system 
without any attempt at controls by the Indian Government. During this 
period of almost a century Ceylon evolved as the perfect example of the 
recipient countries of "free” labour migration from India.
In order to bring out the distinction between "Yree" and indenture 
labour immigration and also explain the prevalence of a "free” immigrant 
labour system in Ceylon, it is necessary to discuss the salient aspects
2. I have placed the word "free" within inverted comas because though 
the labourer was legally a free individual, in fact, as we shall 
show later on, the plantation labour system made him heavily indebted 
to the estate and reduced him to a state of debt bondage.
3- ’Straits Emigration*, Miscellaneous Papers, MPP, Vol. 5^41* Dis. No. 
292 of 26 February I896.
'Emigration*, ibid,, Vol. 5^42, Dis. Mo. 89O of 19 August I896.
Indian Government did not impose restrictions on Indian labour 
emigration to Malaya until 1872. However, the number of Indian labou­
rers who went to Malaya in the mid—nineteenth century was small. The 
restrictions of 1872 were lifted in 1897 and labour emigration to 
Malaya was placed virtually on the same footing as that to Ceylon.
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of the indenture labour system. Suoh a discussion will also help us to
grasp the factors which influenced the British Indian Government and the
Ceylon planters in deciding on a "free” labour system in case of Ceylon
as against the indenture system.
The legal structure of the indenture system evolved during the
course of the mid-nineteenth century with the enactment of a series of
Emigration Ordinances by the British Indian Government laying down conditions
4
for the recruitment and treatment of Indian emigrant labourers. This
body of legislation was originally enacted with regard to Indian labour
immigration to Mauritius and the West Indies which were the pioneers of the
recipient countries of indenture labourers from India. These Ordinances
were, in fact, the result of an effort to minimize the abuses connected
with the recruitment and treatment of Indian labourers while at the same
time ensuring a stable supply of labour to the British enterprises in
those parts of the Empire which faced acute shortage of labour.
Briefly, the crucial provisions embodied in these Emigration
5
Ordinances were as follows. The labourer and the employer had to enter into
a contract which mutually bound the two parties to certain conditions.
The labourer had to serve a definite period stipulated in the indenture
contract. He had the option of returning to India after the expiry of
the indenture or of entering into a fresh indenture contract to serve
«
a further period specified in the new contract. If the labourer failed to 
work during indenture without reasonable cause or if he absconded, he was 
liable to be punished. The cost of his passage abroad and his return 
passage to India had to be borne by the employer. The country recruiting 
Indian labour under the indenture system had to appoint a Protector of 
Immigrants to look after the interests and the welfare of the recruits.
4. I. M. Cumpston, 1953* chaps. 1 and 2.
C. Kondapi, 1951* PP* 8-29*
5* On the indenture system, see ibid., I. M. Cumpston, 1953 and 1956;
N. Gangulee, 1947; K. Gillion, 1962; K. S. Sandhu, 1969; Hugh
Tinker, 1974.
He was obliged to submit annual reports to the British Indian Government 
on immigration and conditions of the immigrant labourers on the plantations, 
particularly on matters such as health, mortality, treatment by the 
employers, and wage payment. The recruitment and conveyance of labour was 
sponsored and supervised by the Colonial Government of the country which 
imported labour. The recruiters were licensed by the Protector of 
Immigrants. Before their departure from India, the recruits had to be 
approved by an Indian Magistrate who was expected to explain to the recruits 
the conditions and stipulations enacted in the contract in order to avoid 
kidnapping and false representation of working conditions on the estates 
by the recruiters. The employer was under legal obligation to provide 
fixed rates of wages, free housing, medical attendance, and other amenities. 
There was to be periodic inspection of estates by the Protector of 
Immigrants. Where the above conditions were not satisfactorily fulfilled, 
the Indian Government reserved the power to suspend emigration. Time and 
again, as and when abuses became glaring, the British Indian Government 
appointed Commissions to investigate into the recruitment and treatment 
of emigrants under the indenture system and even temporarily disallowed 
emigration from India to countries such as Mauritius, West Indies, Fiji, 
and South and East Africa. In spite of the legal safeguards to protect the
laboxirers, in actual practice, the indenture system degenerated to near
£ *
slavery. Restriction of movement of the immigrants, employers* right of
private arrest, gross disproportion of the number of males and females
among indentured labourers, their illiteracy and poverty combined with
the employers* economic position among other factors contributed to
vitiate the working of the legal safeguards in the Indian Emigration
Ordinances. The indenture system prevailed from its inception in the 1830
up to 1915 when it was totally banned by the Indian Government due to the
7
pressure of the rising tide of Indian nationalist opinion.
6. K. S. Sandhu, 1969* P* 76.
Hugh Tinker, 1974, chaps. 8 and 9*
7. K. S. Sandhu, 1969, p. 145-
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Over the whole of this period, emigration from South India to 
Ceylon was exempted from the operation of the Indian Emigration Ordinances;
g
as the Madras Government wrote ”... freed from all legal restrictions.”
The first piece of Indian legislation affecting emigration to Ceylon was
enacted about fifteen years after the beginning of labour emigration to
the plantations in Ceylon. Even this Act No. XIII of 1847 made only one
stipulation— that the Ceylon Government should take adequate precautions
to prevent Ceylon becoming an entrepot for emigration of Indian labourers
9
to other countries. Otherwise, emigration from South India to Ceylon
was left uncontrolled, unsupervised, and unrestricted by the Indian
Government. When in i860, the Ceylon Government proposed so rudimentary
a system of control over the labour recruiters as licensing them by the
Indian authorities in order to bind the recruiters to their responsibilities
towards their labour gangs, the Madras Government firmly turned down
the suggestion and pointed out that
With regard to the general question of organizing recruiting for the 
Ceylon labour-market, this Government are disposed to doubt whether 
free action, such as has always prevailed hitherto, is not the most 
advantageous to the island and to the labourer.10
In the absence of control by the Indian Government, all
planter-labour relations in the Island were regulated by the ordinary
labour laws enacted by the Ceylon Government."^ The law in operation at
the beginning of our period as embodied in the Master-Servant Ordinance
8 . Government of India to Secretary of State for India, 28 July I896, 
IEP, Vol. 4981, p. 885.
*Emigrat ion*, Miscellaneous Papers, Dis. No. 89O of 19 August 1896, 
MPP, Vol. 5042,
9. I. M. Cumpston, 1953, p. 116.
10. Chief Sec. of Madras to Col. Sec. of Ceylon, No. 831 of 1 June 1880,
Pro. No. 6 of 1 June 1880, MPP, Vol. 1555, P. 239*
See also, Acting Chief Sec. of Madras to Chairman of the United 
Planters* Association of South India, No. 9^5 9 November 1904,
ibid., Vol. 6894, Pro. No. 905*
11. Officer Administering the Government of Ceylon to S of S., No. 242 
of 8 July 1899, C.O. 54/656.
Gov. to S of S., No. 250 of 16 May 1906, Coolie Labour in the
Colonies,TOPS, Vol. 371, P* 25.
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No. 11 of I865 provided for two types of contracts between employers and 
12
employees. Written contracts were valid up to a period of three years.
All verbal contracts were considered monthly engagements terminable by 
either party at one monthfs notice. If a labourer's wages for a month clear 
of all his debts to the estate remained unpaid at the end of the succeeding 
month, two days' notice was regarded as adequate for the labourer to 
leave the estate or refuse to work. A labourer found guilty of violating 
the contract was liable to a fine not exceeding £5 or imprisonment up to 
3 months or forfeiture of wages or a combination of these punishments. An 
employer guilty of violating the contract was liable up to three months' 
imprisonment or a fine of £5 or to pay an abatement. In practice, verbal 
contract meant the entry of the labourer's name in the estate Check-roll 
and the acceptance by the labourer of the quota of rice issued by the 
estate as part—payment of wages. This custom was given legal sanction by 
the Labour Ordinance No. 13 of l8&9.^^ Though the lav/ provided for three 
year contracts between employers and employees there is no evidence to 
suggest that the planters ever resorted to it; the monthly contracts being 
the only method pursued by the planters in engaging labour. In the 
following analysis we will examine why the Indian Government and the 
Colonial Government preferred unrestricted labour migration to Ceylon and 
why the planters preferred the system of "free" labour on short-term 
contracts to long-term indenture contracts.
The Indian Government explained its mild attitude partly on the 
ground that Ceylon had provided adequate protection and welfare facilities
12. Up to I865 the employer-employee relations in Ceylon were regulated 
by the Master—Servant Ordinances No. 5 °f* I84I and No. 20 of 1861.
After I865 all such relations were governed by the Ordinance No. 11 
of I865. See M..W. Roberts, 19&5*
13. Clause Ordinance No. 13 of 1889? A Revised Edition of the 
Legislative Enactments of Ceylon, VoL II, p. 377•
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for the immigrants.However, it is difficult to maintain this reason
as a satisfactory explanation for exempting labour migration to Ceylon
from the supervision of the Indian authorities. The Indian Government had
no clear knowledge about the nature and the extent of protection and
15welfare facilities made available to the immigrants in Ceylon. Nor did 
they make any serious attempt to ascertain what these were. Up to 1847 
the Indian and Madras Governments turned a blind eye on the movement of
16labour to Ceylon— a movement which infringed the Indian Emigration laws.
It has been pointed out that, in that yeai; the Indian Government raised 
the question with the Ceylon Government because it became impossible to 
ignore the movement of labour to Ceylon any longer as the question of 
labour migration had, in l847> become a matter of controversy in the Ceylon
17
press between the Ceylon Government and the planters. Even then,the
Indian Government merely went by the undertaking given by the Ceylon
Government to look after the well-being of the immigrants. As one writer
states, the Indian Government ”... did not raise awkward questions" with the
18Ceylon Government. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century 
and also during the first two decades of twentieth century there was very 
little correspondence between India a n d  Ceylon on the subject of
14* Order of the Madras Government, No. 117 of 4 February 1873, ISP,
Vol. 692, p. 125.
See also, correspondence of the Collectors of Tinnevelly, Tanjore, 
Madura, and Trichinopoly to Sec. to the Board of Revenue, Madras, 
ibid., pp. 121-124*
15. Ibid.
In 1872, with reference to the question of immigration to Ceylon, 
the Government of India wrote, ”... a migration of labor of the 
importance which the Government of India had not till now an 
adequate concention". Resolution of the Government of India, ibid., 
Vol. 691, p. 366.
16. According to the Indian Emigration Act No. XIV of 1839 it was illegal 
for persons to enter into contracts with natives of India for labour 
overseas except to countries specifically allowed by the Indian Gover­
nment. Ceylon was not in the schedule of countries thus allowed.
See, ibid., pp. 363-364*
17. K. M. de Silva, 1961, pp. 114-115*
18. Ibid., p. 115*
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immigration though the tide of immigration increased heavily with the
19progress of the plantation agriculture in the Island.
During the whole of the 30 years of our study only on five occasions
did either the Indian or the Madras Government initiate correspondence
with Ceylon on the subject of labour migration. The questions raised on
these occasions were mostly of small relevance to the problem of protection
and welfare of the immigrant labourers. Thus, in i860 and again in 1887,India
drew the attention of Ceylon to reported instances of re—emigration of
Indian labourers from Ceylon to Johore and to Sarawak respectively and
reminded the Colonial Government that such movement should be stopped
20
because it contravened the conditions laid by India in 1847* In 1896,
Madras suggested to Ceylon the idea of maintaining a register of immigrant
21
labourers transported by the Ceylon Government vessels. Again, in 1900,
19. Correspondence between -^ -ndia and Ceylon on the question of labour 
migration were few in the years l847~8 0. In 1859 Ceylon consulted 
Madras on the Ceylon Government project to employ steamers to import 
labourers. The project was eventually given up by the Ceylon Govern­
ment. Again,in the same year, when Ceylon sought to obtain labourers 
from the Ganjam District, Madras objected in ignorance of the India 
Emigration Act XIII of 1847 which allowed emigration to Ceylon free 
of restrictions. The Ganjam project too was given up by the Ceylon 
Government on its own accord. In 1872, the Government of India called 
for the immigration and labour laws which were in operation in the 
different British and foreign colonies which imported labour from 
India. This general circular was also sent to Ceylon. It was from 
Ceylon's reply to this circular that India came to learn about the 
Ceylon Master— Servant Ordinance IIo• 11 of 1865* India had no comments 
to make on the Ordinance. Again^in 1872, India inquired about the 
conditions of immigrant labour in Ceylon. This was in response to a 
despatch from the C.O. to India Office in which C.O. enclosed a copy 
of a report on the alleged high death rate among immigrants coining to 
Ceylon. India eventually accepted Ceylon's view that the death rate 
was not very high as given in the aforesaid report. It was only once 
in the entire period 1847~*80 that Madras expressed a view which had 
some important effect. This was in 1859 when it objected to Ceylon 
Ordinance No. 15 of 1859 making provision for the employers to enter 
into lengthened engagements of three years.
See 'On the conditions of Malabar emigrants in Ceylon', IEP, Vol. 691, 
pp. 363“366. Also, 'Coolie emigration from Madras Presidency to Ceylon', 
ibid., Vol. 69?) PP* 121—125.
20. Officiating Under Sec. to the Government of India to Col Sec. of Ceylon, 
No. 77 of 9 April 1880, MPP, Vol. 15555 P- 187-
Sec. to the Government of India to Col. Sec. of Ceylon, 10 January 
I887, IEP, Vol. 2975, P. 59-
21. 'Immigration from India to Ceylon', Miscellaneous Papers, MPP,
Vol. 5 04 2, Dis. No. 1171 of 3 November 1896.
India requested information on the wage rates paid to immigrant labourers
in Ceylon and was satisfied with a very brief reply from the Ceylon 
22
Government, In the same year, Madras requested Ceylon to improve the
sanitary conditions of Tataparai immigration Camp set up by Ceylon on the
23
South Indian coast to handle labour immigration. It was only in 1909 that 
a question pertaining to the protection and well-being of the labourers 
was raised with the Ceylon Government in our period. The problem was taken 
up when a Catholic priest in North Arcot submitted to the Madras Government 
a petition of several labourers alleging ill-treatment by a kangany who was 
in the employ of an estate in Ceylon. After an inquiry, the Colonial 
Government concluded that the complaints of the labourers were misleading
Q A
and some were even false. Madras raised no further queries. Even when the
Ceylon Government took the initiative to ascertain the views of the Madras
Government on the Ceylon Labour Ordinances enacted in I884 and I89O, the
Madras officials had little or no significant comments to make. More
important, on the latter occasion the Madras Board of Revenue was even
explicit that it had little knowledge on the actual situation of the
25
immigrant labourers in Ceylon. It is therefore difficult to conclude 
that the absence of intervention into labour migration to Ceylon was the 
result of the conviction on the part of the Indian authorities that the 
immigrant labourers were being well looked after in Ceylon. Though some of
the gross abuses and irregularities so notorious in the early years of
labour recruitment and labour management in the VJest Indies, Mauritius, and 
Fiji were not present in Ceylon with the same degree of intensity, yet the 
immigrants coming to Ceylon were subject to various irregularities,
22. Sec. to the Government of India to Col. Sec. of Ceylon, No. 325 of
9 February 1900, ISP, Vol. 5899* Pro. No. 48 of April 1900.
23» ’Emigration*, Miscellaneous Papers, MPP, Vol. 5990, Dis. No. 5^9- 
570 of 15 June 1900.
24* ’Emigration— Ceylon*, MPP, Vol. 8254? Pro. No. 626 of 21 August 1909 • 
Editorial, CON, 4 September 1909*
25. 'An Ordinance to amend the Labour Law', MPP, Vol. 2348, Pro. No.
1703 of 1 August I884.
’Immigration', ibid. , Vol. 35H, Pro. nos. 269~270,of 13 March 1889. 
^Ordinance amending the law relating to Indian emigrants in Ceylon’,
IEP, Vol. 3445, P. 157.
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especially long arrears of wages, even non-payment at times, and to frauds
and extortion by the labour recruiter. Besides, mortality among the
labourers both en route and on the estates was high in the mid-nineteenth 
26
century. These were problems which called for Government intervention.
But neither the Indian nor the Madras Government press the authorities in 
Ceylon to bring about measures to lessen the hardship the immigrants 
coming to Ceylon had to face.
The mild attitude of the Indian Government towards labour immigration 
to Ceylon has been ascribed partly to the absence of a tradition of 
widespread plantation slave-labour in the Island. In the West Indies and 
Mauritius, the Indian immigrant labour system replaced slavery and 
consequently there was a fear that if the fate of the immigrants were left 
entirely in the hands of the old slave plantation owners the new labour 
system would degenerate into what it replaced. The Indian Emigration 
Ordinances were partly meant to prevent such an eventuality. In the case of 
Ceylon such fears did not arise.
However, it cannot be ignored that the Indian Government enacted 
stringent laws regulating labour migration to Assam, Fiji, and for a time 
to Malaya though plantation slavery of the type which existed in the West 
Indies and Mauritius was absent in these places. There is no doubt that the 
labour background was among the strongest of forces .which influenced the 
formulation of the overall policy of the Indian Government towards labour 
migration to the West Indies and Mauritius in the mid-nineteenth century.
But once that policy was formulated it became the overall policy of the 
Indian Government towards all countries which sought Indian labour irrespective 
of whether these countries had a slave-labour background or not. But 
Ceylon was exempted from it.
26. K. M. de Silva, 1965, Appendix VII, pp. 299-300*
I. H. Vanden Driesen, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1954> PP* 186—187.
M. W. Roberts, 1966c, pp. 82-8 3.
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The system of recruitment of labour for Ceylon throws some light
in explaining why the migration to Ceylon was left free of control. The
Ceylon planters employed the more enterprising individuals in their immigrant
labour force to recruit labour. These individuals, who came to be known as;
kanganies, were not merely labour recruiters; they usually travelled with
their labour gangs from South India to the estates and eventually supervised
the labourers* at work. The system will be analysed in detail in the course
of the present chapter. Here it is sufficient to note that this system of
recruitment, with all its evils, had the virtue that the recruiter’s
dealings with the recruit did not end with the first stage of recruitment.
Instead, he lived on the estate with his recruits, as their immediate '‘head".
Besides, the kangany usually recruited from among his relation??, friends,
and his village-folk in South India. Thus, the immigrant labourer lived
with his familiar kinsfolk with one of their kind as the leader who naturally
had an understanding of their language, customs, and prejudices. The Madras
officials saw in this system of recruitment a reason for non-interference
27
into labour migration to Ceylon. The recruitment of labour to most of 
the other countries was done either by professional recruiters or speculators 
in the labour market. They handed over their recruits to the Recruiting 
Agent of the labour importing country concerned, who normally operated his 
activities from the Indian port of embarkation of the labourers. The 
recruiter’s dealings with the labourer ceased after handing over the recruit 
to the Agent and thereafter the labourer was in strange hands. The 
professional recruiter’s relationship with his recruits was a highly 
impersonal one, and on the whole the system assumed the character of a traffic 
in the sale of recruits more than the kangany system ever did. This method 
of recruitment gave the recruiter greater opportunities to indulge in 
kidnapping and deceit than the kangany system and therefore in the eyes of 
the Indian officials called for a certain degree of supervision and control.
?7. Acting Collector of Madura to Sec. to the Board of Revenue, Madras,
No. 352 of 2 December I872, IEP, Vol. 692, ppv 124-125.
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Furthermore, among the Madras officials, there was no doubt about the 
benefits to South India of maintaining a policy of unrestricted labour
pQ
emigration to Ceylon. In common with the other fields of migration, Ceylon 
helped in some ways to reduce the population pressure in South India. It 
also brought in remittance to India by way of savings of the labourers 
and cash advances paid to procure labour. There were also other benefits 
of a specific nature which labour emigration to Ceylon offered India as 
against the labour migration to countries such as the West Indies and
• • 29Mauritius. In Ceylon work was available for whole families. Besides,
during the famine years in South India, Ceylon served as an outlet for
30
some of the most depressed people in the Presidency.
It is also fundamental to the question under discussion that the
labourers who came to Ceylon were on short-term contracts and that they
had the facility to travel to and fro between their villages and the
plantations in the Island. The relative proximity and the high seasonality
of the demand for labour on the coffee estates were the decisive factors.
Until I865 the labourer had the right to quit his employer at a week’s
notice and thereafter, as we have seen earlier on, at a month's notice.
The coffee planter, however, successfully kept the labourers tied to the
estate during the peak season of work—load by withholding a part of the
labourers* wages•  ^But holding up wages until the end of the crop season
*
was not considered at the time as a gross irregularity5 it was quite common 
in the agricultural operations in India. At the end of the coxfee season
28c Order ' of the Board of Revenue, Madras, No. 117 dated 4 February 
1873, ibid., p. 125.
29. See below, pp. 111-113.
30. See below, pp. H 5 - H 7 ?  121-122, 124, 126.
31. Macter-Servant Ordinance No. 5 °f 1841, A Collection of the Legislative 
Acts of the Cevlon Government from 1796, Vol. II, pp. 122-124-
See above, p. 41*
32. See below, pp. 226-227.
33. Acting Collector of Tinnevelly to Sec. to the Commissioner of Land
Revenue, Madras, No. 117 of 19 February 1889, M3RP, Vol. 3533, Dis.
No. 156 of 2 March 1889. p. 2.
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the bulk of the labourers were laid off from work. Thus, they were free to 
return to South India seasonally and there was no danger of long-term 
bondage in the plantations in Ceylon, especially during the coffee period. 
Because of the proximity of the Island to South India, the question of the 
return passage was not regarded as a major problem. In fact, the British 
Indian Government viewed the movement of Indian labourers to Ceylon as 
something in the nature of an internal migration,^
Where short-term contract was the accepted form and where the 
labourers had the facility to return to their villages in India after a 
few months of work abroad, the Indian Government felt that the labourers 
could look after themselves; that stringent regulations were not quite 
essential for the protection of the emigrants and that if the conditions 
at the work-pla.ce abroad were intolerable or if there was gross ill-treatment 
these would soon react on the supply of labour. In 1873, when the Government 
of India for the first time made brief inquiries from the Madras Government 
about the conditions of immigrant labour in Ceylon, Madras resolved that 
there was no need for any interference because Ceylon was ",,, an easily 
accessible market for surplus labour with which intercourse is so constant 
and whence return is so easy,” Again in 1889, the Madras Board of Revenue 
wrote that the distance was so short and the passage so easy that ”,,, any 
general ill-treatment of the Indian coolies by the Ceylon planters would in
a
a short time be followed by a considerable decrease in the emigration to 
the i s l a n d , T h e  attitude of the Government of India towards labour 
migration to Ceylon was vividly seen in its reply to a proposal to place
Indian labour migration to British East Africa on the same footing as that
to Ceylon. In rejecting the proposal the Government of India informed the
34* Government of India to Secretary of State for India, 6 May 1909,
IEP, Vol. 8241, p. 521.
35* Order of the Madras Government, No. 117 dated 4 February 1873, 
ibid., Vol. 692, p. 125.
36. Resolution of the ^adras Government, No. 156 dated 2 March 1389,
MBRP, Vol. 3533, Bis. No. 156 of 2 March 1889.
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Secretary of State for India that,
The exemption which has "been allowed in case of Ceylon is due to
the existence of special conditions. Ceylon is geographically a part 
of India, and there is little intrinsic reason why emigration from 
one to the other should be subjected to special conditions any more 
than emigration from one district of Madras to another or to Mysore. 
... there is a comparative short sea voyage ... it had sprung up 
spontaneously as a natural result of easy inter-communication,,...
The term of contract where it exists is short, there is a constant 
stream of labourers going and returning between the two countries, 
the conditions in the country of emigration are completely known to 
the classes from ivhich emigrants are drawn, and any change for the 
worse in these conditions would instantly produce its effect upon 
the supply. 37
It appears that proximity, short-term contracts, and the facility
to travel to and fro were the most fundamental reasons for the genial
attitude of the Indian Government towards immigration to Ceylon; for where
Ceylon attempted to obtain labour from India in contravention of these
particular factors, India refused to allow unrestricted labour migration
to Ceylon. Thus, in l874> when the Ceylon Planters1 Association approached
the Indian Gbvernment through the Ceylon Government to obtain labourers
from Bengal for estate work, the Bengal authorities pointed out that labour
recruitment to Ceylon from Bengal should be placed under those Indian
Emigration Ordinances which regulated emigration to the West Indies and 
3 8Mauritius. The Bengal Government laid down the specific conditions on 
which it was ready to permit labour emigration to Ceylon. The labourers 
were to be indentured for a period of five years. The number of days of 
work, the hours of, work to be given to the labourers, and the wage rates to 
be paid were stipulated. The employers were to provide passage, dwellings, 
food, and medical care of th9 labourers free of charge. Ceylon eventually 
dropped the idea. Again, in 1897> when a suggestion was mooted to recruit 
labour for Ceylon from the North Western Province of India, the Indian 
Government replied that a special law for the regulation and protection of
37* Government of India to Secretary of State for India, 6 May 1909,
IEP, Vol. 8241, p. 521.
38. Sec. to the Government of Bengal to Sec. to the Government of India,
No. 2661 of 13 July 1874, ibid., Vol. 693, pp. 227-229.
Sec. of PAC to Col. Sec., 24 May 1897, PPAC 1898, Correspondence,
pp. xli-xlii.
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39emigrants was necessary if Ceylon was to obtain labour from that Province.
It was also made clear by India that even from the Madras Presidency
unrestricted migration to Ceylon was permitted only if the labourers weie
employed on short-term contracts. The problem came up in 1905 when the
Ceylon Government attempted to recruit a relatively few Indian labourers
to its Poineer Corp on indenture contracts. The Indian Government drew
the attention of the Ceylon Government to an Indian Government Order of
1877 which stipulated that recruitment to the Ceylon Pioneer Corp on
indenture basis should be done only under the conditions laid down by the
Indian Government. These restrictive conditions were distinctly stated.
However, where the Ceylon Government opted to recruit labour without
resorting to indenture contracts, such recruitment was exempted from these
restrictions.^ The importance attached by India to short-term engagements
as a condition for unrestricted migration was also seen in I896 in relation
to Malaya. When Malaya requested India to place labour migration to
Malaya on an unrestricted footing like in the case of Ceylon, the Indian
Government laid it down as a condition that the Malayan planters should
41offer short-term contracts to the immigrants.
We have also to examine why the Ceylon Government allowed 
unrestricted labour immigration to the Island. Indian labour migration
39* Sec. to the Government of India to Col. Sec. of Ceylon, Wo. 32 of 
17 March 1897, IEP, Vol. 5210, pp. 48I-482.
See also, Government of India to the Sec. of State for India,
6 May 1909, ibid., Vol. 8241, Pro. No. 3 of May 1909-
40. Officiating Sec. to the Government of India to Col. Sec. of Ceylon,
No. 134-8-3 of 14 February 1905, enclosure, General Order of the 
Government of India, MPP, Vol. 7144, Pro. ITo. 128 of 21 February 1905* 
The principal conditions were as follows. Labour recruitment was 
restricted to the districts of Trichinopoly, Tanjore, and iaadura. 
Pecruitment had to be done by licensed recruiters. Recruits were to 
be between 18 and 30 years of age. They had to be taken before the 
Deputy Collector of the district who had to ratify that the recruits 
understood the terms of the contract. The cost of transportation of 
the recruits and their families had to be borne by the Ceylon 
Government•
41. Officiating Sec. to the Government of India to Col. Sec. of Straits 
Settlement, IEP, Vol. 4981, p. 883.
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poised a threat to the health of the Island. Besides, in years of famine
in South India immigrants swamped the Island in large numbers in excess
of the demand for labour. During such times, the immigrants became a burden
to the resources of the Island. Largely due to the heavy influx of the
immigrants in the South Indian famine years of 1877-8, which strained the
medical welfare schemes in the planting districts to breaking point and
poised a major health hazard to the Island, the Ceylon Government proposed
a Destitute Immigrants Bill in order to prevent the sick and the destitute
from entering the Island. The measure was disliked by the Madras Government.
Finally, with the onset of the economic depression in the Island in the
early 1880 and the consequent decline in the inflow of immigrants, the
draft Bill was dropped by the Colonial Government. Thereafter, as we will
see later on, apart from the basic measures to safeguard the health of the
Island, nothing was placed by the Colonial Government in the way of free
and unrestricted entry of South Indian labour to the Island. More important,
the Colonial Government took steps to encourage the inflow of labour. The
Indian immigrant labourers in the Island were exempted from the poll tax
43imposed on the rest of the population in the Island. The Colonial
Government also assisted in the system of recruitment and conveyance of
labour, and the immigrant labourers were granted the previlage of conces—
44sionary fares on the Ceylon Government Railway.
The favourable attitude of the Ceylon Government towards unrestric­
ted labour migration was the outcome of its desire to see that the British 
planting enterprises in the Island obtained an adequate supply of cheap 
labour. Besides, the economic prosperity of the Island and the revenue of 
the colonial treasury hinged largely on the progress of the plantation
42. See below, pp. 60-75.
43. T. G. I. B. Munasinghe, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1972,
pp. £</ ^  /3 v.
44* See below, p. 72.
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sector. However, the Colonial Government in Ceylon unlike its counterparts
in the West Indies, Mauritius, and Fiji stopped short direct state-sponsorship
in the recruitment and the supply of labour to the planters. Partly, it
reflect the strength of the laissez faire inhibitions in the colonial
45administration of the day. The acute shortage of labour which occurred 
in Mauritius and the West Indies and the consequent threat to their economies 
compelled the administration of those colonies to breach the overall 
laissez faire policies to salvage the plantation sector there. In case of 
Ceylon the planters had a relatively easy access to a surplus labour market 
and the planters on the whole did not face a prolonged acute shortage 
of labour.
The Government policies alone do not explain the lack of indenture
labour arrangements in Ceylon, for the Ceylon planter had a choice in this
matter in the years after 1865* As seen earlier on, the Master-Servant
laws in Ceylon did in fact provide for indenture contracts for a period of
three year. But the Ceylon planters, at first of coffee and later tea and
rubber, turned down suggestions of recruiting labour on indenture. The
concensus of the contemporary planter attitude is seen in the following
statements made by the Labour Commission of 1908.
••• Your Excellency’s Commissioners desire once for all to record 
the emphatic opinion that the circumstances of Ceylon preclude 
the likelihood of any system of indenture for Tamil labourers 
proving even moderately successful. In our opinion the geographical 
position of the Island, the proximity to and easy accessibility 
of the Tamil districts of Southern India, and the family or 
patriarchal system, which is still the soundest basis upon which 
our labour force rests— conditions each one of which is advantageous 
to us so long as our supply of immigrants depends upon the 
individual volition of the coolies who compose it— all contribute 
to render probable the failure of any scheme of indenture of 
Tamil labourers,46
The planters* behaviour can be partly explained by looking into 
the nature of the plantation economy in the years of the
45* K. M. de Silva, 19o5> PP* 254-255> 269.
46* Cey. Lab. Com. 1908? Report, p. ix.
See also, Annual general meeting of PAC, 2 May 1903, YPAC 1903-1904? 
pp. 49-50.
53
origin and the evolution of the system of "free” emigration in the 
mid-nineteenth century. The plantation economy then depended entirely on 
the coffee culture where the crop was heavily seasonal and the hulk of 
the demand for labour on the plantations was confined to the several 
months of the coffee picking season. Indenture arrangements kept the 
labourers bound to the estate for several years and maintained a labour 
force during both the peak and slack season and as such the system was 
obviously uneconomical to the coffee planter. In the West Indies and 
Mauritius, where the planter had no choice but to adopt the indenture system, 
the problem of keeping the labour force employed during the slack season 
was met partly by providing the immigrants with land to cultivate their 
own food crops during the off season on the 'plantations. In Ceylon, the 
coffee planters did not have to resort to such an eventuality mainly due 
to three closely inter-related factors viz., the relative proximity of 
the Island to South India, the facility to enter into short-term contracts, 
and the desire of the immigrant himself to be back in his village during 
the slack season on the coffee estates so as to participate in the agricul­
tural work in South India— a factor which was made possible by the 
coincidence of the crop season in peasant agriculture in South India with
A r7
the slack season on the coffee estates in Ceylon.
The foregoing argument as regard the nature of the crop, however,
*
does not hold good in explaining the absence of indenture in our period 
of study, particularly in the years after 1890, when tea suppla.nted 
coffee as the major plantation crop in Ceylon. The tea crop was perennial 
in Ceylon, though seasonal fluctuations in the work-load on the estates 
did occur. On the tea estates, labourers were required throughout the year 
and therefore indenture agreements binding the labourers to serve the 
estate for a long term would appear to have been in the interest of the
47. The season of peak work-load in the coffee estates lasted from
mid-August to mid-November. This was, on the whole, a slack season 
in South Indian agriculture.
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tea planter who required a large resident labour force. Nevertheless, the 
tea planter preferred to maintain the system of free labour migration.
The tea planter inherited a system which had already functioned 
successfully in supplying labour for over half a century. His own 
experience under this system after 1890 was that a ra.dical change in 
the system of recruitment was not necessary to obtain an adequate supply
48of labour, though he did face temporary and periodic scarcity of labour.
Besides, the adoption of indenture system would have placed the 
entire system of immigrant labour in the Island under the Indian 
Emigration Ordinances and therefore under the control and supervision of 
the Indian authorities. The planters viewed with disfavour any attempt 
at Government interference were it to occur even at the level of the
Colonial Government. They wished for a free hand as far as possible in
49 . .labour matters. Indenture arrangements requiring licensed recruiters,
interrogation of the would-be emigrants by Indian magistrates, the
appointment of a Protector of Immigrants, periodic inspection of estates,
and the forwarding of annual reports on the conditions and treatment of
labourers on the estates would have meant scrutiny and control by the
Indian Government, As the editor of the Ceylon Observer, Weekly Edition
pointed out, "Prom the day of his arrival in the colony the indentured
cooly is subject to rules and regulations of every kind and a paternal
50 *
oversight is set up ...."
Besides, evidently free emigration was cheaper to the employer 
51than indenture labour. The latter obliged the employer to provide free
passage to the labourers. Of greater significance was the need to offer
relatively higher inducements to obtain labour under the indenture system 
because indenture arrangements spelled long-term servitude of the
4 8. See below, chap. 3.
49- See below, chap. 5»
50. Editorial, COW, 1 November 1904*
51. Ibid.
K. S. Sandhu, 19&9, P* 87.
AnR of CLC for 1907, YPAC 1907, p. 12.
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immigrants. This fact was clearly visible in case of recruitment to Malaga
where both the kangany and indenture systems were adopted. Here the
labourers recruited on indenture had to be given higher advances than
labourers recruited by the kanganies in order to induce them to emigrate.
Besides, it was believed that indenture arrangements would be
unsuccessful in Ceylon because the proximity would encourage frequent
desertion of the labourers from the plantations to their villages— a belief
borne out by facts in 1829 when the entire force of approximately 500
indentured Indian labourers recruited by Governor Barnes for his Pioneer
52Corp deserted within one year. In 1880, the Madras Government pointed
out the difficulty thus
The laws at present in force in this country for regulating the 
emigration of labourers to other colonies are not unfrequently evaded 
by emigrants ... in the case of a colony so near at hand as Ceylon, 
it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to devise 
measures for preventing such evasion of law.53
On the whole, where a potential and chronic surplus of labour was available
in relative proximity to the work—place, as in the case with the labour
situation in South India in relation to the Ceylon plantations, it appears
that a free labour market was basically in the interest of the employer,
for in such a context competition occur among the labourers for employment.
While the above stated factors more specifically explain the
absence of restrictive legislation on labour immigration into Ceylon, in
the final analysis the crucial importance of the wider colonial context
of the two countries cannot be ignored. In fact, it is important in
explaining the absence of restrictive legislation as regards Malaya and
Burma as well. Between these four countries they covered practically the
whole of the British Empire in Asia. While British India had a chronic
surplus of labour in each of the other three countries the British
enterprises faced problems of labour shortage. In Ceylon it was a
52. G. C. Mendis, 1944? P* 23*
53* Chief Sec. of Madras to Col. Sec. of Ceylon, No. 831 of 1 June 1880, 
MPP, Vol. 1555, Pro. No. 6 of 1 June 1880, p. 239*
"preferential” shortage; in Burma a relative and in Malaya an absolute 
shortage of labour. The colonial power naturally opened the frontiers of 
these four countries for unrestricted labour migration in order to 
maintain an equilibrium between the supply and demand of labour. India 
considered short-term contracts together with the facility for the 
labourers to travel to and fro between India and the work-place abroad as 
adequate guarantees of fair treatment. Whether the Indian Governments 
approach was sufficiently effective to ensure the protection and the well­
being of the labourers is a question which calls for intensive analysis. 
The question is particularly important for, above all, taking the absolute 
numbers of labourers involved, the unrestricted movement of labourers to 
Malaya, Burma, and Ceylon was of far greater importance in the history 
of Indian labour migration overseas than the regulated movement of 
indentured labour to other parts of the world. In the course of our study 
we will examine how far the so called system of "free11 labour migration 
guranteed the protection and the well-being of the labourers who came 
to Ceylon.
The importance of the colonial context in explaining the 
presence of the open-frontier situation as regards labour migration from 
India to Burma, Malaya, and Ceylon was clearly seen in the course of the 
twentieth century. With the emergence of nationalism in South Asia, the 
indigenous leadership of the four aforesaid countries viewed the process 
of unrestricted labour migration with dismay. With the gradual transfer 
of government responsibility and state power into their hands, they 
sought restrictive legislation. India herself led the way. The first step 
was to bring the system of ’’free" labour migration under the supervision 
and control of the Indian Government. As regards Ceylon, this was seen in 
1923 when for the first time the Indian Government intervened on
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54a significant scale to regulate labour migration to the Island. As 
the nationalist surge forged ahead and as the transfer of state power 
to the indigenous leadership increased, the intensity of restrictive 
legislation too became greater. The process finally culminated in the 
total prohibition of labour migration to Ceylon by the Indian 
Government in 1939*
2. The immigration routes
The routes taken by the South Indian labourers to get to the 
estates in Ceylon deserve our special attention. The planters were 
tapping a free labour market and the migrant labourers moved constantly 
between South India and the plantations. The supply of labour therefore 
hinged partly on the nature of transport facilities available to the 
labourers. Besides, the question of immigration routes was one of the 
major fields relating to the immigrant labour supply to the Island which 
called for effective Government intervention. The planters agitated for 
cheap and expeditious means of transport for their labourers. But they 
were not ready to assume direct responsibility in this respect. The 
maintenance and the improvement of immigration routes was viewed by the 
entrepreneur as another of those public works which should be undertaken 
by the Government to foster private economic enterprise^ in this case to 
provide the routes in order to facilitate the supply of labour to the 
plantations. The Colonial Government fell in line with this view. Besides, 
there was a wider question of Government responsibility viz., the
54* Indian intervention came with the Indian Emigration Act No. VII of 
1922 which led to the Ceylon Labour Ordinance No. I of 1923. The 
two Ordinances brought about several important changes in the 
immigrant labour system in the Island. Among these were the appointment 
of an Indian Agent in Ceylon to look after the welfare of the 
immigrants, setting up of an Indian Immigration Fund financed by the 
employers to provide free passage to the immigrants, and the 
repatriation of immigrants free of cost.
See, The Report of the Controller of Indian Immigrant Labour,
CAR 1923, pp. R1-R8.
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protection of the public health of the Island. The source of the labour 
supply to the Island was also a source of deadly diseases, cholera, 
smallpox, and plague in particular. These diseases were not endemic in 
the Island. Every one of the outbreaks of cholera and smallpox which 
occurred in Ceylon in our period of study could be traced to South India. 
The migrant labourer was major source of introduction of these diseases 
to the Island. As regards the other countries which imported Indian 
labour the distance from India made the travel time act as a sort of a 
period of quarantine. On the other hand, the proximity of Ceylon to 
South India and the existence of free migration between the two countries 
held out a constant threat to the public health of the Island. The 
colony had therefore to be protected against epidemics without 
jeopardising the supply of South Indian labour to the plantations. As 
the editor of The Ceylon Observer, Overland Edition stated, the problem 
was
... how best to reconcile an unimpede immigration of Indian labour, 
with all legitimate efforts to exclude the terrible and fatal 
Indian epidemics which has never appeared as a destroyer in Ceylon 
except when brought on the person or in the clothings of the 
immigrants from India— specially immigrants of the cooly class.55
This responsibility fell on the Colonial Government which therefore
began to play an effective role in the question of the transportation of
labourers. The two objectives turned out to.be irreconcilable particularly
during the years when cholera ravaged South India. The efforts on the
part of the Government to impose quarantine restrictions, which naturally
affected the free flow of labour to the Island, led to recurring clashes
between the Government and the planters. It will be our endeavour in
the present section to show the routes taken by the immigrants and reveal
the drawbacks and hazards of the respective routes and finally to see
how and with what effect the Colonial Government moved into discharge
its responsibility.
55- Editorial, COO, 17 June 1890.
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At the beginning of our period two routes were in use. There was
the North Road, used since the commencement of immigration to the Island
in the 1830s. The Ceylon Government Immigration Service (inaugurated in
1862) operated ferries between Paumben on the South Indian coast and
Mannar in Ceylon— a stretch of about 20 miles# In Mannar the landing
station was changed with the monsoons, Pesalai in the north-east monsoon
and Vankalai during the south-west. From Mannar the immigrants had to
walk approximately 150 miles across an arid country to reach Matale
which was the northernmost point of the Ceylon Government railway in 1880.
From Hatale most of the immigrants travelled to the planting districts
by rail while those who lacked sufficient funds continued to walk their
way to the estates. The alternative was the sea route from Tuticorin in
South India to Colombo from whence the Ceylon Government railway facilities
were available to the planting districts. The Tuticorin-Colombo immigrant
traffic was principally in the hands of the British India Steam
Navigation Company which in the 1880 operated weekly steamers between
Tuticorin and Colombo while the Asiatic Steam Navigation Company also
plied steamers less frequently.
To the planter and the immigrant the two routes appeared to have
their relative merits and drawbacks. On analysis, however, it appears
that the G0i0mbo route out-merited the North Road. The latter apart from
»
involving only a short sea voyage also had the advantage of low cost.
The Paumben-Mannar crossing on the Government immigration vessels cost
only 25 cents per adult while the steamer fare between Tuticorin and
86Colombo was Rs.3. Besides, the relative proximity of Matale on the 
North Road to the planting districts meant lower rail fare to the 
immigrants coming down the North Road than those coming by the sea route
56. AR of AGA, Mannar District, CAR I89O, p. N31.
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57who had to catch the train to the planting districts, in Colombo.
The North Road,however, suffered from several important drawbacks.
The immigrants coming down the North Road had to travel a long distance
on foot in South India from their villages to Paumben and also in Ceylon
from Mannar to Matale due to lack of rail facilities on both sides.
Consequently, the journey took a long time— approximately 7 to 9 days
53to reach the estates. On the Tut ic or in-Colombo route, on the other hand,
rail facilities were available up to Tuticorin from the interior of
Trichinopoly, Madura, and Tinnevelly* and travelling on foot was confined
to a._ relatively short distance. The entire journey from South India to
the estates did not exceed 3 days except during such times when quarantine
measures were in force in Colombo. Immigration via North Road therefore
resulted in a loss of several days of labour to the planter and a
corresponding loss of wages to the labourers. This latter factor together
with the cost of food en route for the greater number of days the labourers
using the North Road had to travel vitiated the advantage of the low
transport cost on this route.
The biggest drawback,however, was the hazards of the North Road
to the immigrants and to the inhabitants of the regions through which
the route lay. The long walk was tedious and left the immigrants exhausted
59and enfeebled on arrival at the estate. The immigrant travelling on 
the Colombo-Tuticorin route, on the other hand,were in better physical 
condition.^ Of greater consequence was the exposure of the immigrants
57. Reoort of the Public Expenditure Committee, Proceedings, Cey. SP 
VIII of 1895, P- A17.
In 1888 the rail fare from Matale to the heart of the planting districts 
varied between 25 cents to Kandy and 83 cents to Nanuoya whereas the 
the fare from Colombo ranged between 30 cents to Kalutara and Rs.l. 36 
cents to Nanuoya. ’Cooly Labour Supply for Ceylon Estates’, Memorandum 
of Suggestions and Information issued by PAC, PPAC 1888. p. 155*
58. Chairman of PAC to Col. Sec., 16 July I89O, ibid. l891«
Correspondance, pp. xlvi-xlvii.
59. AR of GA. NCP, CAR 1889, p. H4.
80. AR of PCMO, Report of Port Surgeon, Colombo, ibid. I8 98, p. A50.
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and the local inhabitants in villages bordering the North Road to frequent 
outbreaks of epidemics, cholera and smallpox in particular.^ These 
diseases frequently appeared along the North Road being introduced on 
most occasions by the immigrants coming from infected villages in South 
India. These frequent visitations of diseases together with the fatigue 
caused by the long walk across an unhealthy and a parched-up country 
through which the North Road passed had in the mid-nineteenth century
6 2resulted in heavy mortality among the immigrants coming down this route.
In response to the continuous agitations by the planters, the Colonial 
Government, particularly after 1855? took steps to improve the conditions 
on the Road. By 1880, there were six immigration hospitals, and a chain 
of dispensaries, cooly sheds, and drinking water wells along the Road 
provided and maintained by the Government. ^ There was also a regular 
patrol service along the Road mainly for the purpose of taking to the 
hospitals the destitute and disease-stricken immigrants found abandoned on the 
roadside. These steps helped to bring down the heavy rate of mortality 
which prevailed in the mid-nineteenth century among the immigrants using 
this route. But frequent outbreaks of epidemics persisted throughout the 
century threatening the lives of the immigrants and the local inhabitants 
alike, though due to the vigilant efforts of the medical officers 
stationed along the route, the spread of disease was checked and heavy 
mortality averted in our period. North Road was, in fact, considered as 
the main source of introduction of cholera and smallpox to the Island.^
The crux of the problem was the lack of effective quarantine 
arrangement for the immigrants disembarking at Mannar. Though the question 
of providing quarantine facilities at Mannar was more than once 
investigated, the question was never taken up by the Government with the
61. S. A. Meegama, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1968, pp. 18, 21, 24.
62. M. VI. Roberts, 1966c, pp. 82-83*
63. M. W. Roberts, 1966a and 1966b.
64. ARs of PCMO and ARs of AGA. Mannar District, CAR (annualseries, 
1880-1910).
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65degree of seriousness that it deserved. According to the officials
the main dissuading factor was the problem of finding adequate drinking
water in Mannar for a large number of immigrants who would have had to
66be detained for serveral days if quarantine was organised in Mannar.
The Government instead of providing quarantine facilities looked upon
the long march on the North Road as the best means of quarantine. As the
Colonial Secretary wrote ”... there is great advantage in the practical
quarantine where the immigrant undergo in the 130 miles of the
6 7
comparatively uninhabited North Road from Mannar to Matale...*
Consequently, when cholera and smallpox appeared on the North
Road it was found difficult to isolate the diseased until the disease
had made some progress and taken several lives. Along the route the gangs
of labourers mixed up among themselves. When cholera broke out it was
usual for the victims of the gangs to be abandoned on the roadside and
the rest to move on. The unfortunate victims were either picked up by
the Government officers on patrol duty or they often succumbed to death 
68by the roadside. Those abandoned in this manner were a source of
contamination to the other gangs coming down the Road.
Mortality eji route can partly be ascribed to the physical
conditions and the habits of the immigrants themselves. Those using the
North Road were the most poverty-stricken and the destitute of the immi—
69
grants. They took this route primarily because of the low cost. Annually 
a number of deaths occurred along the Road due to causes such as general
65* Quarantine measures were observed in Mannar during serious outbreaks
of cholera in South India. But these measures were not very effective.
Cholera Commission Report, Cey. SP II of 1867*
AR of GA. NP, CAR I896, p. D7-
66* AR of GA. HP, ibid'. I898, p. D5-
AR of GA. NP, ibid. 1%99, P* D4-
67. Col. Sec. to Chairman of PAC, 10 July I89O, PPAC 1891,
Correspondence, p. xlvi.
The AGA. Mannar referred to-the North Road as "the cooly filter".
AR of AGA. Mannar District, CAR 1890, P» D33«
6 8. AR of PCMO, CAR 1880, p. 224c.
AR of PCMO, ibid., 1882, pp. 170B, 183D.
AR of GA. NR, ibid., 1899, p. D5.
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debility, diarrhoea,and fevers. Often the immigrants neglected their
diseases at the early stage. As a rule they sought relief only when the
71complaints became chronic and were no longer bearable. The influence
of the tv/in factors of the strain of the walk and the habits of the
immigrants in increasing the rate of mortality on the Road is best revealed
by the fact that mortality was relatively higher during the latter stage 
72
of the journey.
The consequences of immigration via the North Road on the health
of the inhabitants of the regions through which the Road passed, viz.,
the Mannar District, the North Central Province, and the Matale District,
were equally alarming. Outbreaks of cholera and smallpox on the North
Road often spread in epidemic form in these districts resulting in heavy
mortality. The villages situated near the Road were often deserted during 
73epidemics. The immigration route was in fact one of the major reasons 
vfhich made Mannar the unhealthiest district in the Island and the one with
*7 A
the highest death rate. Speaking about the effect of the route on the 
Mannar District, Governor West Ridgeway pointed out that
70. ARs of PCMO, enclosures, Reports of the colonial surgeons in 
the Districts through which the North Road passed. CAR, (annual 
series, 1880-99)*
71 * AR of PCMO, ibid. 1882, p. I84D.
72. A study of the number of deaths which annually occurred in the six 
immigration hospitals on the North Road reveals thdt mortality 
was heavier in the three hospitals situated in the second half of 
the journey than in the hospitals in the first half of the journey 
from Mannar.
73* AR of GA. NCP, CAR_1§90, p. H6.
AR of GA. NP, ibid. l8~91, P* D7*
74* AR of AGA. Mannar District, ibid. 1892, p. D27*
Immigration and consequent introduction of cholera was, however, 
not the main cause for the decline of population in the Mannar 
District. The main reason was the desolate condition of the District 
due to such factors as famines, failure of monsoons, disruption of 
irrigation works, lack of development of agriculture, and low 
productivity. Besides, malaria was endemic in the District. The 
North Road made the situation still worse.
See S. A. Meegama, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1963, 
pp. 46ff.
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... it was the Mannar route that acted to a certain extent as a 
preventive and saved the estates froin frequent visitations of cholera, 
hut when the system on which this route was worked was considered 
it will he seen that certain districts in the Northern Province 
were sacrificed— unnecessarily sacrificed, as we know now— to secure 
the safety of the planting district s. ...- Upon the inhabitants of 
the districts through which the coolies passed, the results, ... 
from the constant passage of infected gangs through uninfected 
villages, were very disastrous. It is not too much to say that the 
country along the cooly route was depopulated. The abandonment of 
the sick which was the coolies1 safeguard was the villagers1 ruin; 
what the former escaped by constantly moving on the latter retained.'75
It is difficult to obtain accurate statistics on the mortality 
among the immigrants on the North Road during the entire period from 1880 
to 1899? "the year on which the Road was finally closed for immigrant 
traffic. The Government administrative and medical officers who were in 
charge of the immigration route maintained detailed records of the extent 
of the outbreaks of epidemics, treatment rendered, and mortality on the 
route. Being vigilant to arrest the outbreak of disease, these officers 
were closely familiar with the conditions on the route. The information 
provided by these officers can therefore be regarded as fairly reliable. 
However, they erred on the side of omission. With the help of the 
information scattered in the records of these officers an attempt is made 
in Table 2.1 to give some idea about the extent of mortality among the 
immigrants travelling on the North Road. Though detailed data are available 
on mortality in the Immigration Hospitals, unfortunately the information 
on the number of death among the immigrants up to I89O are grouped 
together with those of the local inhabitants. Mortality among the 
immigrants are seperately available only for the years after I89O. The 
available statistics on death due to cholera are also somewhat confused. 
During the period from 1880 to 1899 cholera appeared on the Horth Road 
on a total of 10 years (l884> 1888-95* 1897—8 However, the total 
number of deaths on all these outbreaks were not fully recorded. At times
75. Extract from the Review of the Administration of the Affairs of Ceylon, 
1896-1903, by Sir West Ridgeway, Fiftieth AnR of PAC, Appendix D,
PPAC 1903-1904? no pagination.
76. ARs of AGA. Mannar District, GA. NCP. and AGA. Hatale District,
CAR, (annual series, 1880-99)•
■the victims of cholera disappeared into the jungle and these deaths escaped 
official attention. Sometimes outbreaks of cholera on the North Road 
were merely mentioned without giving any statistical information on the 
number of deaths. Of the number of deaths on record due to cholera a clear 
distinction between those among the immigrant and the local population is 
not always possible. Table 2.1 below gives the number of deaths in 
the immigration hospitals from all causes,and the number due to cholera 
among the immigrants and the local population as far as can be identified 
from the records. The number of deaths due to cholera which cannot be 
identified as belonging to either group is set out seperately.
TABLE 2.1 Mortality in the immigration hospitals, and mortality due 
to cholera in the Mannar District, North Central Province, and Matale 
District, 1880-1900.
Year Immigration Hospitals Death due to cholera 
Central Province and
in Mannar, North 
Matale
Total
deaths
Deaths among 
immigrants Immigrants Villagers Unidentified
1880 131 119 N N N
1881 170 ) N N N
1882 125 ) N N N
1883 80 ) N N N
I884 105 ) Not possible N N N
I885 185 ) to identify the N N N
1886 152 ) number of death N N N
1887 129 ) among immigrants N N N
1888 155 ) 22 N 52
1889 141 ) N N 303
I890 125 ) 70 4 167
I89I 148 90 60 107 275
1892 185 133 138 314 202
1893 201 139 3 4 N
1894 129 82 9 5 N
1895 106 75 57 13 N
I896 99 61 N N N
1897 123 79 3 N N
1893 N 199 40 149 N
1899 188 78 N N N
1900 79 34 N N N
Sources: ARs of PCMO, AGA. Mannar District, G.A. NCP, and AGA. 
Matale District, CAR, (annual series, 1880-1900).
N:- No information available.
66
In contrast to the North Road, quarantine measures were enforced
by the Government in Colombo for the immigrants coming by the Tuticorin-
Colombo route. The importance of Colombo as the political and administrative
capital of the Island cannot be over emphasised in this respect. Colombo
was also the commercial hub of the Island where the bulk of the
77export-import trade of the Island took place. The outbreak of epidemics 
in Colombo would have compelled the authorities to declare the port as 
an infected port causing thereby a disruption in the shipping and 
commercial links of the Island with the outside world. Besides, the city 
itself was densely populated unlike the Mannar District. An outbreak of 
disease in Colombo was bound to spread into the provinces without much 
difficulty. The Colonial Government therefore undertook measures to protect 
Colombo from the outbreaks of contagious diseases.
Prior to I89O quarantine was done on board the ship. Ships 
coming with a "clean Bill of Health" or a bill to the effect that cholera 
existed only in sporadic form in and around the port of embarkation- 
were placed under observation for twenty four hours while ships coming 
from an infected port with a "foul Bill of Health" were placed under
•y O
quarantine for a period of 5 days more. When cholera was widespread in 
South India, as in the year I89O, these quarantine measures were 
rigorously enforced.
The above arrangement, however, suffered from three major drawbacks. 
First, though the quarantine measures were vigorously enforced by the 
Ceylon Government when cholera and plague ravaged South India, at other 
times these measures were not adequately maintained. Labourers at times 
succeeded in evading the quarantine measures by entering the Island
77* Editorial, COO, 23 January 1891.
In fact the importance of safeguarding Colombo from health hazards 
was considered so important that the press advocated that labour 
immigration should be restricted to the Mannar route.
78. Col. Sec. to Messrs. Alston, Scott & Co., Colombo, 5 May I89O,
PPAC 1891, Correspondence, p. xliv.
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disguised as traders. At times bodies of those who died of cholera or
smallpox on board the steamers were dumped into the sea and the outbreaks
79were not reported on the arrival of the ships in Colombo. Secondly, on
arrival in Colombo the immigrant labourers had to stay several hours
resting and also preparing their food before en—railing for the planting
districts. During this time often they were distributed by the kanganies
all over the commercial section of Colombo— the Pettah—  particularly in
80
the various rice boutiques. This situation held out a threat to the
public health of Colombo and its environs. Besides, the lack of proper
accommodation for the immigrant labourers in Colombo exposed them to
considerable extortion and crimping. Thirdly, the quarantine on board
the ship caused inconvenience to the shipping companies transporting
immigrants from South India because it meant an indefinite delay in
Colombo when the ships arrived with a "foul Bill of Health". Consequently,
when "clean Bills" were not procurable the shipping companies refused to
ply between Colombo and South India in order to evade prolonged quarantine.
This at least once caused almost a total suspension of immigration of
labour via the Tuticorin-Colombo route. While the labour supply to the
plantations was thereby affected, the shipping companies had to undergo 
8lpecuniary loss. Consequently, the shippers and the planters repeatedly
urged the Government of the need to set up a quarantine station in Colombo
*
to place the immigrants under observation ashore instead of on board the 
ship. In this agitation they found a strong ally in the Madras Government 
which objected to the strict enforcement of the quarantine regulations 
in Colombo for ships plying from Tuticorin because such restrictions
______________________________________________  s_____________________
79. AH of PCMO,, CAE I876, p. 128. 
AR of PCMO, ibid., 1877, pp. 128, 214, 216.
80. Alston, Scott & Co., to Chairman PAC., 8 September 1890, PPAC 1891, 
Correspondence, p. liv
81. Alston, Scott Sc Co., to Col. Sec., 22 January I89I, ibid., p. lxxv.
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impeded the trading activities of the port of Tuticorin with Ceylon. *"
During the 1890"' the planter-shipper agitation together with the 
concern of the Government over the public health of Colombo resulted in 
setting up facilities ashore in Colombo for the quarantine and the 
accommodation of the immigrants. The increasing popularity of the Colombo
c*
route among the immigrants during the 1890 was the underlying factor. In
I89I5 a quarantine station was inaugurated at Maligawatte to accommodate
up to 500 labourers when prolonged quarantine was necessary. When a vessel
with cholera on board arrived in Colombo the sick were isolated in the
hospital ship "Serendib" and the others who were possibly infected were
removed to the quarantine station.
The most ambitious project both in respect of accommodation and
quarantine facilities was undertaken by the Government in 1897 with the
8?
establishment of the Eagama Camp. J The immediate cause which prompted
the Government to move in this direction was the ravages which bubonic
plague was making in India in 1896-7* Faced with the new danger the entire
quarantine policy of the Island was subject to intense re-thinking by the
Government. The main idea of the Eagama scheme was to segregate all estate
labourers arriving in Colombo and provide them with accommodation and
essential facilities during their stop over in Colombo for the train to
the planting districts. When immigrants arrived from South Indian districts
«
which were infected with cholera and smallpox the Camp was used for
82. Chief Sec. Madras to Gov. of Ceylon, telegram, No. 96 of 11 February 
1890, MPP, Vol. 3746.
Chief Sec. Madras to Gov. of Ceylon, No. 117 of 14 February 1890, 
ibid.
In I89O,the Madras Government was so keen in getting the quarantine 
regulations relaxed that having failed in its* attempt to get the 
Ceylon Government to relax its regulations,it approached the C.O. 
through the India Office. But the C.O. replied that "... The Secretary 
of State for the Colonies does not consider that the matter is one 
in which Her Majesty’s Government can overrule the discretionary 
action of the Government of Ceylon". Secretary of State for India to 
Gov. in Council (Fort St. George), enclosure, E. H. Meade of C.O. to 
Under Secretary of State for India, 1 January 1891, MPP, Vol. 3971 > 
Dis. No. 203, of 14 March 1891, p. 7*
8 3. Forty-sixth AnE of PAC, PPAC 1900? PP* 27-28.
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quarantine purposes. Five seperate camps each capable of accommodating 
700 labourers were established. The Camp was a sort of a lodging house.
On arrival in Colombo the immigrant labourers were marched direct to a 
special train which took them to Eagama. Here they were provided with 
facilities for bathing, cooking, and lodging. The ill were hospitalized.
The day after the arrival of a gang of labourers in Eagama they were 
despatched to the estate by rail. The cost of maintaining each gang of 
labourers was recouped from the planters who in turn added the amount 
thus spent to the estate advances account of the labourers.
The Camp was a boon to the immigrants, planters, and the inhabitants 
of Colombo. The immigrants were saved of the inconveniences and extortion 
which they had hitherto faced in Colombo. Medical attention in the Camp 
helped to arrest the outspread of disease in the city and also to the 
plantations. During the decade after 1899, 63 attacks of cholera with 53- 
deaths took place in the Camp. ^  These cases would have other-wise escaped 
to the city or the plantations. In the Camp every one of these cases were 
isolated, death confined to the first victims, and the outspread was 
rigorously avoided. Consequently, mortality on the Tuticorin—Colombo 
route fell far below the rate of mortality which had occurred on the North 
Eoad in the preceding decades. Besides, mortality was confined to the 
immigrants. The total number of reported deaths on this route during the
o
whole period from 1880 to 1910 approximated 100 in striking contrast to 
the death toll on the North Eoad. The Camp, however, did not make the 
Island immune to the introduction of cholera by the immigrant labourers.
The immigrants could still escape the Camp by entering the Island 
disguised as non-estate labour immigrants. Besidqs, the segregation of 
gangs took place only when the disease actually occurred either on board 
or in the Camp. Some carriers of the disease could have escaped to the 
estates because where there was no outbreak of cholera en route the
8 4. JLEs of G.A. NP, enclosure, AnE of the Superintendent of Eagama 
Camp, CAE, (annual series, 1899-1909).
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maximum number of days a gang stayed on board and in the camp was four. 
That the quarantine arrangements were not completely effective is seen 
in the outbreaks of cholera which occurred on the estates after the estab­
lishment of the camp, though these outbreaks were not as virulent or 
widespread as those which brokeout prior to the establishment of the Camp.
As regards the immigrant traffic on the two routes, the main 
development in our period was the decline in the use of the North Road, 
particularly after I89O and its eventual closure in 1899* The Tuticorin- 
Colombo route which was considered only as an alternative in the period 
before I89O became the njajor route thereafter, and since 1899 "to "the end 
of our period it remained the sole immigration route. Table 2.2 
reveals the trends in the use of the two routes.
The use of the North Road in the years before I89O can be 
attributed to several factors. First, the North Road almost exclusively 
served the emigrants of those South Indian villages which were situated 
nearest to the Island. Thus, the emigrants from the villages in the deep 
south-east (from the districts of Madura, Trichinopoly, and Tanjore) 
preferred to walk to Paumben and cross to Mannar rather than travel a 
long distance from their villages to Tuticorin to get the steamer to
85
Colombo. Secondly, the desire of the poverty-stricken immigrants to
obtain an immediate gain by stinting on travelling expenses made them
86 *
blind to the disadvantages of the North Road. Thirdly, there was the 
influence of the kangany whose aim was to spend as little as possible on 
the labourers* journey in order to retain for himself a portion of the 
advances given by the planters to procure labour. Finally, it is also 
likely that the North Road was the traditional route which was best known
1
8 5. Alston, Scott & Co., to Chairman of PAC, 8 September I89O,
PPAC 1891; Correspondence, p. lii.
AR of GA. NP., CAR 1897, p. D4-
86. Report of the Public Expenditure Committee, Proceedings, 
Cey. SP VIII of 1&95> P» Al7~
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to the immigrants and their conservatism kept them to it*
In the years after I89O three new developments seem to have 
affected the course of immigrant traffic* In that year the steamer facili­
ties provided hy the British India Steam Navigation Company were extended 
to link up Colombo with Paumben, Tondi, and Ammapatam in South India 
thereby enabling the emigrants of the South Indian villages who had 
hitherto travelled almost exclusively by the North Road to travel by the
O
Colombo route if they wished to do so. Secondly, most of the new
plantations which came up during the tea boom of the I89O were in the
low-country districts of Kelani Valley and Kalutara situated nearer to
Colombo. Thus, the immigrants coming to work in these plantations found
the Colombo route to their advantage. Thirdly, due to the overtures of
the planters a system of through booking of the labourers between the
88railway stations in South India and Ceylon was inaugurated in 1892. The
idea was to get the South Indian Railway Company, the British India
Steam Navigation Company, and the Ceylon Government Railway to work in
conjunction in the conveyance of labourers. The planters now found it
possible to send a portion of the coast advances in through booking
tickets. Besides, the system made the journey convenient to the labourers
and also helped to curtail extortion of the labourerfen route. The three
factors mentioned above resulted in increasing the immigrant traffic on
*
the Colombo route.
However, in spite of the increased facilities on the Colombo 
route a considerable number of labourers continued to use the tedious
8 7. Alston, Scott & Co. to Chairman of PAC., 8 September I89O,
PPAC 1891, Correspondence, p. liii. ,
Hitherto BISN Co. Steamers to Colombo from South India plied 
only from Tuticorin, carrying immigrant labour traffic.
88. Minutes of a meeting at Trichinopoly between E. J. Young (PAC 
Commissioner), H. B. Mactaggart (of BISN Co.) and W. S. Betts 
(of South Indian Railway Co.) on 19 February 1892, PPAC 1893, 
Correspondence, pp. xxv-xxix.
CGG., No. 5134 of 4 November 1892.
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North Road right up to its final closure in 1899* It is likely that the
hulk of the labourers coming to work in the northern planting districts
such as Matale and Kandy still preferred to travel by the North Road.
In this respect it is important that the most prominent among the planters
who took a keen interest in maintaining and improving the North Road
were the planters of these districts. Besides, throughout the 1890s the
steamer from Paumben, Tondi, and Ammapatam to Colombo plied only once
a week. The labourers seem to have preferred the Mannar crossing to the
long delay for the Colombo-bound steamer.
The planters on their part were aware of the clear advantage of
89the Colombo route over the North Road. They repeatedly attempted, though
without success, to get the major drawback of the Colombo route, viz.,
its cost of passage reduced by approaching the British Indian Steam
90Navigation Company. However, the planters were successful in their 
effort to obtain concessionary fares for the immigrant labourers 
travelling on the Ceylon Government Railway. In spite of the growing 
popularity of the Colombo route and the hazards of the North Hoad, the 
planters firmly insisted on maintaining both routes. They believed that 
the restriction of labour immigration to the Colombo route would seriously 
hamper the labour supply to the plantations— a conviction not entirely
cj
without justification, for even in the late I89O a substantial section
*
of the immigrant traffic took place along the North Road. The fact is 
that in spite of the relative advantages of the Colombo route, the 
planters were not prepared to rely on one route alone. Even were the use 
of the North Road to decline the planters still wanted it to be maintained 
as an alternative route which they thought will be invaluable in times of
I
8 9. Chairman of PAC to E. B. Creasy, 5 September 1889, PPAC 18C-JQ, 
Correspondence, pp. xliii-xliv.
90. Bois Brothers & Co. to Chairman of PAC., 24 May 1892, ibid. 1893? 
Correspondence, pp. xxxii-xxxiii.
Sec. of PAC to Messrs. Bois Brothers & Co., 5 February 1897, 
ibid. I8 9 8, Correspondence, p. xxxi.
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91 stemporary hazards on the Colombo route. In the early I89O when a
virulent cholera outbreak in South India had caused the Colonial
Government in Ceylom to suspended its Immigration Service between Paumben
and Mannar which temporarily shut the North Road, the planters and the
pro-planter press were very strong in their condemnation of the action of 
92
the Government, Next year, when the Government inquired from the planters
their preference between the Colombo route and the North Road, the
planters viewed the inquiry with deep suspicion. They refused to be
explicit on their preference of the Colombo route and insisted on the
absolute necessity of maintaining both these routes. In the succeeding
years the planters strongly supported by the local press repeatedly
pressed the Government for a northern railway, and if possible an
93Indo-Ceylon rail connection via Mannar, In every one of the Annual 
Reports of the Planters* Association after I89O this need was emphasised.
91* Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 February 1897> PPAC 1898, 
pp. 30-32.
In fact the planters examined at length the possibility of setting 
up a third route by sea from Negapatam in South India to Hamban- 
tota in the south-east coast of Ceylon and from thence by land, to 
cater mainly to the planting districts of ^adulla, Passara, and the 
environs. The project was eventually dropped because the cost 
of inauguarating the new route was found on estimation to outweigh 
the value of immigrant traffic by the route. Besides, the proposal 
to construct the Uva railway was being seriously considered during 
this time. On the proposed Hambantota route, see the thirty-seventh 
AnR of PAC, PPAC 1891, p. xxx.' Q
92. A general meeting of the Dolosbage and Yakdessa DPA, 22 March 
1890, COO, 25 March I89O.
A general meeting of Dikoya DPA, 12 May I89O, ibid., 15 May I89O. 
Editorial, ibid., 24 April 1890.
Chairman of PAC to Col. Sec., 27 February 1890, PPAC 1891, 
Correspondence, p. xxxiii.
93. Editorial, COW, 24 December 1906.
Editorial, ibid., 3 January 1907*
A general meeting of PAC, 31 January 1898, PRAC 1898, pp. 142-158.
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TABLE 2.2 Labour immigration via the North Eoad and the Tuticorin- 
Colombo route, 1880-1910. (in round numbers)
Year North Eoad
Tuticorin-Col- 
ombo route
Percentage via 
Tuticorin-Col- 
ombo route
1880 20,800
1881 27,400
1882 2.6,600
1833 15,600
1884 20,500
I885 24,000 '
1886 18,000
I887 24,000
1838 51 ,800
1889 34,100 4,970 13
1890 40,700 15 ,000 27
1891 47,700 26,000 36
1892 45,600 37,300 46
1893 34,500 20,400 36
1894 29,100 21,100 42
1895 31,400 50 ,200 61
1896 28,300 60,500 68
1897 27,500 95,600 78
1898 17 ,400 73,800 84
1899 3,500 23,700 85
1900 • • 128,700 100
Sources: Betums of Immigrants in the Port of Colombo, showing
their destination, trade, and occupation,(published 
by-annually), by the Superintendent of Immigration, 
Colombo, CGG, (1889-1900)
AEs of AGA, Mannar District, OAB, (annual series, 
1880-1900).
In spite of the planters1 agitation for maintaining and improving 
the North Eoad, the end came in 1899 when Governor West Eidgeway decided 
to shut the Road for immigrant traffic. Particularly in the context of
e*
the late I89O" the Governor's decision was undoubtedly a -wise step. 
Eidgeway was influenced primarily by the danger of the introduction of 
plague from South India to the Island. In 1897, there was a virulent 
outbreak of plague in India and several British territories which imported 
Indian labour totally suspended immigration. In Ceylon the Government
decided to keep plague at bay without jeopardising the immigrant labour 
supply to the plantations. Immigration was restricted to the Colomoo route
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and quarantine arrangements and plague precautions on the Colombo route
were improved and rigorously enforced. A specially instituted plague
committee was entrusted with the work of framing and enforcing precautionary
measures. The closing of the North Eoad was in fact done on the strong
recommendations of this committee. Governor Ridgeway’s views are worth
quoting in extenso. He wrote,
I felt that it was impossible, with due regard to the safety of the 
Island, to treat plague as cholera had been treated, mainly because 
it was apparent that the two diseases were in some essential respects 
very different. Cholera, it has been found by experience, inevitably 
wears itself out, becomes less virulent, and ultimately vanishes, 
even without remedial measures. The inhabitants of the districts 
along the cooly route had indeed suffered from frequent outbreaks, 
but when the disease had exacted a certain number of victims it 
disappeared, and its ravages did not extend to other parts of the 
country. Not so with plague} the history of the disease shows that 
once it has established itself human efforts are almost powerless 
either to eradicate or prevent it from spreading. Whatever the results 
of restriction might be, it was impossible to sanction a system by 
which gangs of coolies, some of them probably plague-infected, would 
keep travelling along a hundred and thirty miles of road, leaving 
behind on the road such of their members as might be attacked by 
the disease. Such a course could have had but one endings; the plague 
would have obtained a footing in the Northern Province, and once it 
had obtained a footing ... other parts of the Island must sooner or 
later have been attacked in consequence, and our ports proclaimed 
as infected.94
The closing of the North Eoad for immigrant traffic was facilitated
by the increasing popularity of the Colombo route among the planters as
well as the immigrants during the 1890s. As seen already, Colombo had by
1899 become the main port of disembarkation of the immigrants and the
«
arrivals by the North Eoad had declined. Besides, the Government was 
incurring expenses on maintaining two routes. In view of the decline of 
the immigrant traffic on the North Eoad it was difficult to justify the 
expenditure on the North Road when at the same time the Government was 
incurring a heavy expenditure on improving the Colombo route.^5 
Ridgeway's action was vindicated by the results. Closing of the North
94- Extract from the Review of the Administration of the Affairs of 
Ceylon, 1896-1903, by Sir Nest Ridgeway, Fiftieth AnR of PAC, 
Appendix D, YPAC 1903-19049 no pagination.
95- Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 February I9O4 , ibid., p. 5 5.
Road, the establishment of Ragama Camp? and plague precautionary measures 
helped to keep plague out of the Island. The almost annual outbreaks of 
cholera in the Mannar District and the North-Central Province came to 
an end.
The planters acceded to the closing of the North Road only in the
hope that it would be a temporary measure. Once the danger of plague
subsided the planters concentrated their efforts to get the North Road
re-opened minus its major drawback, viz., the long walk, by getting a
railway extent ion northward connecting the railway network in the planting
96districts with Mannar. During the first decade of the present century, 
encouraged by three factors, the planters pushed their agitation ahead. 
First, with the onset of the post-1904 rubber boom the planters faced 
the problem of procuring an adequate supply of labour, particularly during 
the peak seasons. The construction of a railway to Mannar came to be 
viewed by the planters as one of the effective means of solving this 
problem. Secondly, in 19^5 'tk-6 South Indian Railway was extended up to 
Paumben and Rameswaram and a further extention of this line to Dhanuskodi 
was being undertaken. On the sub-continent, Dhanuskodi was the nearest 
point to Mannar. These developments on the South Indian Railway brought 
the question of railway connection with South India within the realm of
reality if the Colonial Government in Ceylon could be persuaded to
97 *construct a railway to Mannar. Thirdly, the decision of the Government
in 1902 to construct the Northern Railway to Jaffna aroused the interest
of the planters to obtain rail facilities to Mannar. The Northern Railway
branched off from the Colombo-Kandy railway which extended to the heart
of the up-country tea planting districts. When the project of the NorthernI
96. AnR of Pussellawa DPA for 1899, COW, 2 February 1900.
Editorial, ibid., 7 February 1900.
97* Annual general meeting of PAC, 8 February 1907, YPAC 1906, p. 82.
’The Northern Route1, Report of the Cooly Routes Commission, 
ibid., Correspondence, pp. 161-168.
AnR of CLC for 1907, YPAC 1907, p. 14-
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Railway was still in the blue-print stage the planters attempted to
persuade the Government to have Mannar rather than Jaffna as the terminus
of the new line. Compared with Mannar, which was the nearest point on
the Island to South India, Jaffna was ill-suited as an immigration port.
The planters viewed with dismay the Government decision to overlook
Mannar as the terminus. Nevertheless, the construction of the Jaffna
line made the Mannar link-up, relatively, an easy task. Henceforth, the
planters concentra,ted on obtaining a branch rail from either Vavoniya
98
or Madaviachchi on the Northern Railway to Mannar. The Mannar-
Vavoniya extention was eventually completed only in 1913 after which
immigration resumed via Mannar. Thus, during the last decade of our period
Mannar route remained shut.
The immediate effect of the closing of the North Road in 1899 on
the immigrant labour supply to the Island was confused by the unprecedented
influx of immigrants in 1900 due to the major famine which affected
India. It is, however, likely that the non-existence of the North Road in
the post-1904 years would have contributed in some measure to aggravate
the problems of procuring an adequate supply of labour which the planters
99faced, particularly in the peak seasons in the years of the rubber boom.
But the effect could have been merely marginal. By the end of the I89O
the North Road was already suffering in comparison with the Tuticorin-
«
Colombo route in the eyes of the labourers. The cost of transportation 
no doubt increased under the new arrangement. But this was adequately 
compensated by the relative comfort and the swifter means of transport 
which the labourers obtained on the Tuticorin-Colombo route. Besides, the 
changes in the system of labour transport brought about in our period
I
98. A general meeting of PAC, 13 Jnly 1906, ibid..■1906, pp. 27-31.
The Ceylon Labour Commission in Trichinopoly repeatedly urged 
the re-opening of the North Road.
99* See below, chap. 3.
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made the entire system of conveyance more organised, dependable, and smooth 
in its working. The fear of the recurrence of an abrupt interruption of 
the labour traffic, as the one which occurred in 1890, became very remote* 
The hazards of the route on the immigrants were reduced and the threat 
which immigration held to the health of the Island was curtailed.
3* Institutional arrangements for the recruitment and conveyance of 
immigrant labour
In the recruitment of labour from South India the tea planter of
the 1890s inherited a system developed by the coffee planters of the
previous generation. Under this system the recruiter, the kangany, was
usually the more enterprising element among the immigrant labourers
themselves. The planters made no organised effort either individually or
collectively to undertake direct recruiting. Instead the individual
planters entrusted the work of recruitment solely in the hands of the
kanganies of their choice. These kanganies were given cash advances by
the planters to cover the preliminary expenses involved in the recruitment
and transportation of labourers to the estates. These cash advances were
entered in the estate "Debt Account" as a charge against the kangany and
his gang.^^ In selecting their kanganies the planters were primarily
guided by the trust and the ability shown by these men in matters pertaining
»
to labour. It was the kangany who publicised the working condition on 
the plantations among his less articulate fellow-men in South India and 
induced the latter to migrate.^0'*'
The kangany*s role did not, however, end with procuring labour 
for the plantations. The entire labour force was prganised under the 
kanganies, each kangany with his gang of labourers attached to him. He
100. Cey. Sab. Lab. Com. 1915> para. 17*
101. The best description of the kangany system as existed at the 
beginning of our period is found in P. D. Millie, 1878, chap. III.
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supervised, the field work of the labourers and conducted all plant er-lab our
negotiations and transactions. The estates were almost completely dependent
on the kanganies for the supply of labour. Thus, to the planter the
kangany was sort of a labour contractor, and to the labourers he appeared
as their immediate employer. The incentive for the kanganies to engage
in recruitment was the fact that,initially, he obtained a sum for every
new recruit to the estate, and thereafter his regular income depended
on the number of labourers in his gang who turned up for work.
The planters on their part desired a supply of labour with the
least amount of direct involvement in recruitment partly because of the
personal difficulties and inconveniences such work involved and more
particularly because of their conviction that it would be extremely
difficult for a white employer to induce the South Indians to migrate to
the plantations for work— a conviction confirmed in ample measure by the
totally unsuccessful experience of those few planters who made attempts
102at direct recruitment. The kanganyfs personal ties with the South
Indian villages, his influence (for many a kangany were heads of
joint-families), and his knowledge of the indigenous customs and the
attitudes of his fellow-men enabled him to undertake succesfully the
recruitment and transportation of Indian labourers. Besides, it was both
convenient and less risky for the planters to deal with the kanganies in
«
giving out advances than deal with each individual labourer seperately.
The planter, therefore, gave a lump sum of money to the kangany to 
be given to the recruits and held the kangany resposible to the estate 
for the entire sum. Where the labourer was tied by debt to the kangany, 
the risk of the former absconding was less, for the labourer was normally 
personally known to the kangany. Besides, the kangany’s influence in his 
community and his customary hold over the labour gang were important 
factors which checked any inclination on the part of the labourers to
102. AnR of GLG for 1915? YPAC 1915? PP. 55~56.
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bolt. The crucial position thus held by the kangany in the recruitment
and conveyance as well as in the management of the labour force explains
the reluctance of the part of the planters to do away with the kangany
system despite the abuses perpetrated by the kangany to the detriment of
both the planter and the labourer*
In the recruitment of labour, the evils of the kangany system
were largely associated with the disbursement of cash advances. The
kanganies strove to retain the greater share of the advances for their
personal benefit*^^^ The labourers were paid the minimum by way of advances,
and they also stinted on the travelling expenses and the food of the
labourers _en route* Little attention was paid to the comfort of the
labourers on the journey* However, evils such as kidnapping, enticing, •
and misrepresentation of working conditions which were widely practised
by the professional labour recruiters working for the West Indies,
Mauritius, and Fiji were not very common in the recruitment of labour for
Ceylon in our period. This was partly because of the practice of recruiting
fhiends and relations, and partly because the conditions in Ceylon were
not completely alien or unknown to the agricultural population in the
104
southernmost districts of the Madras Presidency.
105Ideally, the kangany system comprised two types of kanganies.
On the one hand, there was the sub-kangany with a relatively small labour
gang consisting of mainly his family members and close relatives. On the 
other hand, there was the head kangany with several sub-kangany gangs 
under his control and supervision* The number of head and sub-kanganies
103. 'The Reduction of Estate Expenditure. No. I', by M. P.,
WCO, 11 June 1880. 4
Superintendent of Immigration. Report of his trip over the
Immigration Routes in connection with blackmailing &c', PPAC 1897, 
Correspondence, p. cxlvii.
104. Correspondence of the Collectors of Tanjore, Madura, and Trichinopoly 
Districts,and the Master Attendent of Tuticorin to Sec. of the 
Board of Revenue, Madras, IEP, Vol. 692, pp. 121-124*
Resolution of the Madras Government, No. 156 dated 2 March 1889,
M3RP, Vol. 3533, Dis. No. 156 of 2 March 1889, pp. 3-4*
IO5. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Report, p. vii.
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on the estates varied with the requirements of each plantation. The 
size of a gang under a kangany depended largely on his enterprising skill, 
his influence among his fellow-raen, his financial resources, and his 
contacts with the planters. Particularly, the head kanganies* gangs varied 
widely in their numerical size. Table 2.3 gives some idea of the size of 
the head and sub-kangany gangs.
TABLE 2.3 A select list of head and sub-kanganies.
Head kanganies
No. of sub- Total labour No. of lab­
kanganies force under ourers in Caste of
Name of head under head head head kangan- head
kangany kangany kangany y's own gang kangany
Veeren 2 37 N Vellala
Aravandy 12 58 23 N
Veeren 11 136 60 N
Vatha Mooto N 143 N N
Marie 14 157 32 IT
Selle N 206 N N
Sinniah N 476 N N
Sub-kangarli e s
Name of sub- No. of labourers in Caste of
kangany sub-kangany*s gang sub-kangany
Carupan 4 (one family) N
Manicutty 5 ( "  ) N
Pelli Cooty 8 t 11 ) 1 N
Palani 4 ( "  > 11
Raman 13 Pariah
Sellan 15 N
Source: Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Appendices.
IT:- No information available.
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The distinction between the head and sub-kanganies was an 
important one in the entire organisation of the labour force. The 
sub-kanganies normally worked in the field with their gangs drawing daily 
wage rates like all other labourers. In addition, he received a commission 
known as ’'pence money" at the rate of 4 cents per day for each labourer 
of his gang who turned up for work each day. The head kangany, on the 
other hand, did not normally take to field work. His work was mainly 
confined to the supervision and organisation of the labour gang for which 
he was normally paid a monthly wage by the estate. In addition, he
it
received a commission known as "head money at the rate of 2 cents per
106labourer of his gang who turned up for work each day. Both the
head and the sub-kanganies who went to South India to recruit labour got
the opportunity to augment their income by retaining a part of the cash
advances paid by the estates to obtain labour. It is important to note
that the evils of the kangany system were associated more with the
head kanganies than the Sub-kanganies, the latter been heads of several
107related family units. The head kangany, on the other hand, was less a
paternal head and more a labour contractor. In fact, the sub-kanganies
108
themselves were exploited by the head kanganies.
The only institutional arrangement in South India at the beginning
of our period which dealt with labour migration to Ceylon was the Ceylon
«
Government Immigration Agency at Paumben. The Agency was set up with
very restricted objectives. Its main functions were to subject the
immigrants to a medical examination prior to embarkation and to organise
the Government Immigration Service between Paumben and Mannar. However,
due to lack of any other suitable organisation in South India to look
«
after the planters1 interests relating to the supply of labour several
106o Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Report, p. viii.
107. *Head and Sub-kanganies’, by XYZ, WCO, 15 July I885.
108. AnR of Badulla DPA for 1895, _C00, 27 February I896.
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109other functions devolved on the Agency. Those kanganies and their
gangs who were at times held up in South India due to lack of sufficient
funds to travel to the estates were initially financed by the Agency and
the money subsequently recovered from the planters. In most cases the
Agency helped the kanganies to get in touch with the planters to obtain
the necessary finances. The cases of bolting labourers and complaints
against extortion en route were also dealt with by the Agency. However, the
organisation was too small to cope with these f u n c t i o n s . B u t  the
coffee planter made no serious effort to set up an organisation in South
India to look after the recruitment and conveyance of labour. The
kanganies were left free of any control or supervision in their recruiting
activities in South India. As a result the kanganies had almost a monopoly
over the supply of labour to the coffee plantations.
In the 1890.J with the heavy demand for labour due to the rapid
expansion of the tea industry, the kanganies' monopolistic control over
the supply of labour came to be most adversely felt by the tea planters.
There was an unprecedented rise in the rates of advances demanded by the
s
kanganies to procure labour from South India. In the I89O the average
s 111rate of advances doubled that of the late I87O • As we have seen 
already, the heavy coast advances obtained by the kanganies were not always 
utilized for the legitimate purpose of recruiting labourers. The tea 
planters gradually felt the need to set up an organisation in South India 
to supervise the activities of the kanganies and also to undertake the 
responsibility of disbursing the coast advances. The change in the 
planter—kangany relationship from that which prevailed in the coffee 
period is also important in this respect. Most of the coffee estates
—  — — — — — — — —  ■ - -» ■ *■■■— «   - ■ ■■■■—  _    - _ —          ■  
109. Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 February 1897* PPAC 1898, p. 33*
AR of AGA* Mannar District, CAB 1892, pp. D29-D30,
110. In 1899, a Sub-Agency was set up in Tuticorin with a medical officer 
in charge. But both the Agency and the Sub—Agency were under­
staffed.
111. See below, pp. 148, 154*
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were managed by proprietor-planters and they had a relatively close
personal relationship with their kanganies. In fact, most of the coffee
estates had their own favourite villages from which they annually obtained
labour with the help of the kanganies who had long established contacts
with these estates. This situation had changed by the 1890s. The depression
in the coffee industry during the 1880 disturbed this relationship to
some extent. Of greater significance was the change in the management of
the tea plantations. The bulk of the tea estates were owned by Companies
and were managed by superintendents appointed by them. These superintendents
were shuttled between Company estates from time to time and were less
personally committed to the estates than the proprietor-planters of the
coffee period. It also appears that the tea planter was, on the whole,
a busier person than the coffee planter. The tea planters began to look
for administrative measures to bring about some control over the activities
of the kanganies. Besides,the general increase in migration during the
1890s tended to increase the incidence of abuses such as kidnapping,
extortion, and bolting of labourers. Extortion was heaviest in South
India where the subordinate Government employees such as police constables,
railway station masters, ticket office clerks, and porters frequently
indulged in the practice of extorting money from the labourers who passed
between the villages in South India, and the plantations in Ceylon.
«
Furthermore, some organisation was necessary to check bolting of kanganies
and labourers from the estates to South India. It was also felt that
once some organisation was set up in South India.it could also do the
work of providing the planters with periodic information on the prospects
of recruiting, publicise the conditions of estate^ work, examine the
prospective emigrants on their suitability for agricultural work, and
also undertake the conveyance of labourers to the estates. There was the
wider factor that on the whole the tea industry, particularly with the
formation of the limited liability tea companies in the late I89O0, became 
a more organised venture than the coffee industry of the previous decades.
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Besides, the demand for labour throughout the year on the tea plantations 
made the setting up of a permanent organisation in South India to deal 
with the supply of labour an essential and a worthwhile undertaking. It is 
also worth noting that the absolute number of workers in demand for the 
tea enterprise was greater than the demand for labour in the coffee
industry in the Island.
Encouraged by the above stated factors, the idea of setting up
a labour organisation in South India was considered by the planting circles
s 112from time to time throughout the 1890 • However, it was only with the
turn of the century that the planters made a determined effort to
inaugurate an institution with a view to increase the supply of immigrant
labour to the plantations. Three factors were particularly responsible
in firmly committing the planters to evolve such an organisation. After
1900 the Malayan rubber planter became a serious competitor for South
Indian labour. The Malayan planters were setting up their own organisation
in South India to intensify their labour recruiting activities. It became
clear to the Ceylon planters that the absence of a labour recruiting
organisation of their own in South India tended to hamper the supply of
labour to the Island and that this situation would eventually lead to a
further increase in the rates of advances paid to the kanganies to procure
labour— rates which had already taken an upward trend during the "tea
s 11 3boom" in the I89O . Secondly, in the years after 1897> ihe iea industry 
in the Island was in state of slump. Consequently, the need to obtain 
cheap labour was most strongly felt by the planters. Finally, the condition 
of the tea industry together with the occurrence of a series of favourable 
agricultural seasons in South India in the years from 1902 to 1904
112. 'Cooly Labour1, by Hints, COO, 6 May 1895-
'Coolies and their Advances', by South of Kandy, ibid.,
23 April 1895*
A general meeting of Ambegamuwa DPA, ibid., 18 May 1895-
113. See below, pp. 153-155.
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discouraged labour migration to the Island.Consequently, the planters
faced the problem of scarcity of labour particularly during the pealc
season on the estates in the years 1902-4 at a time when they could
ill-afford to bear a high cost of labour. The problem became all the more
acute in view of the gradual increase in the acreage under a new
crop— rubbe^ and the planting circles appear to have been beset with a
gloomy future as regards their supply of labour.
Inspired by these factors two major institutional changes were
brought about in our period. The first of the these changes was introduced
by the Colonial Government in 1901 when it began the Tin Ticket System
with a view to solve at least some of the problems connected with the
conveyance of immigrant labour. The essence of the system was the assumption
by the Government of the responsibility of conveying the immigrant
labourers from the Government Immigrant Camp at Tataparai in South India
to the railway station nearest to the plantation of their destination.
The expenses involved in the transportation of the labourers were initially
incurred by the Government and were subsequently recovered from the
IT 5
planters. The planters in turn debited the cost to the labourer.
The scheme was optional to the planters. Every estate which 
joined the scheme was allotted a number. This number together with a 
letter denoting the planting district in which the estate was situated 
was punched on a small metal disc known as the Tin Ticket. Thus, the 
Tin Ticket virtually contained the address of the estate to which the 
Tin Ticket belonged. The Tin Tickets were supplied to the planters by 
the Government and were available at the provincial Government Kachcheries. 
The planters issued the Tin Tickets to the kanganies going to South India 
to recruit labour and also to the individual labourers going on short
114. See below, pp. 124, 126-127, I58-I59.
115. Forty-seventh AnR of PAC, PPAC 19Q1, PP* 19-21.
Forty-eighth AnR of PAC, YPAC 1901-1902, pp. 15-16.
'The Tin Ticket System', ibid., Appendix D, pp. 39-41«
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visits to India. Every labourer travelling on the scheme had to carry
his Tin Ticket on his person. On his journey from South India to the
estate each immigrant labourer had to present his Tin Ticket at Tataparai
Gamp. On the strength of the Tin Ticket he was despatched by steamer to
Colombo where he was met on board by the Government Immigration Agent,
who forwarded him to the Ragama Camp. On his arrival at Ragaraa, the
Camp despatched a telegram to the Superintendent of the estate to which
the immigrant was destined to travel notifying the immigrant's departure
from the Camp two days later. During the two days the immigrant was
detained under observation at Ragama. He was provided with a rail ticket
to travel from Ragama to the planting district. Each gang of Tin Ticket
labourers was entrusted to the care of a special peon who was responsible
for the safe delivery of the gang at the rail station nearest to the
estate. Throughout the journey from Tataparai the Tin Ticket immigrant
was fed and maintained by the Government. Thus, the mere possession of
the Tin Ticket enabled the immigrant to reach the estate without any
financial transaction on his journey.
The scheme spelled several merits both to the planter and the
labourer. It enabled the planter to keep a check on the advances given
117out to the kanganies going to South India to fetch new labourers. 
Henceforth, cash advances had to be given to the kanganies only for the 
purpose of recruiting and conveying the labourers up to Tataparai. To 
cover the rest of the journey the kanganies were not given cash but the 
Tin Tickets instead. Thus, the system helped to curtail the abuses 
practised by the kanganies to retain a portion of the travelling expenses 
of the labourers. The system secured the safe arrival of the labourer 
on his estate with the minimum delay. The planters paid the travelling
116. Forty-seventh AnR of PAC, PPAC 1901, PP* 19-21.
The system was described as one of 'value-payable post', the labourer 
being the package to be delivered and his address being contained 
on the Tin Ticket.
117. Forty-ninth AnR of PAC, YPAC 1902 -d.90 3f p. 12.
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expenses only for those labourers who were actually obtained by them on
the system and therefore had no risk of incurring unnecessary expenditure.
Since the system enabled the labourers to travel without themselves
indulging in cash transactions in buying steamer and rail tickets, it
minimized the risk of extortion en route. The kanganies who had now to
handle a portion of the coast advances in Tin Tickets were disgruntled
118with the nevj system. The decision of the Government to restrict the
concession rates on the Ceylon Government Railway to the Tin Ticket
• f 1 1 9
immigrants effectively circumvented the kanganies opposition to the system.
120The Tin Ticket system was enthusiatically taken up by the planters..
Within months of its introduction the number of immigrants travelling
121on Tin Tickets increased heavily. The success of the scheme is revealed
in the statistics on the progressive increase in the use of the system
as set out in Table 2.4*
The second major institutional change in our period was the 
inauguration of the Ceylon Labour Commission in South India in 1904*
This was a private organisation set up at the initiative of the Ceylon 
Planters' Association. The operation of the Commission was directed by a 
Commissioner with the headquarters at Trichinopoly and sub-agencies 
scattered in the South Indian districts which supplied labour to the
plantations. At the inauguration of the Commission in 1904 five sub-agencies
* 122were established in TInnevelly, Madura, Dmdigual, Atur, and Mayaveram.
By 1910 the work of the Commission had expanded so rapidly that there 
were 23 sub-agencies in almost all the Tamil districts of the Madras
118. 'Tin Ticket System', by the Col. Sec., COW, 25 July 1902.
Editorial, ibid., 27 July 1902. t
13.9. Ibid.
'The New Regulations', YPAC 1902-1903, Appendix D, pp. 37-40.
120. AnRs of DPAs published in the COW from 14 January 1902 to 
24 February 1902.
121. According to Governor Ridgeway, the number of estate labourers 
travelling on Tin Tickets rose from 2 per cent of the total 
number of immigrants in January 1902 to 38 per cent in June, to 
59 per cant in November and to 75 Per cent in July 1903.
122. Fifty-first AnR of PAC, Appendix D, Report of CLC from June to 
December 1904, YPAC 1904-1905.
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123Presidency. The Commission was financed by a cess of 10 cents per
acre subscribed by the estates which joined the scheme and an annual
Government grant of one-fourth of the total cost of maintenance of the 
Commission.
The main object of the scheme was to supervise and assist the
kanganies in the recruitment and conveyance of labour and provide them
with the necessary finances for these act ivit ies. All cash advances
sent to South India by the estates subscribing to the Commission were
handled by the Commission. It is important to describe the system by which
125these functions were carried out. Money intended to be given out as
advances were sent by the estates direct to the Commission. The planters
had to provide the Commission with the necessary information regarding
the kanganies and also inform the amount of advances to be given to them.
When leaving the estate for South India the kanganies were given only a
small sum of money sufficient to cover their actual expenses. On arrival
in South India the kanganies had to present the employers* instructions to
126the sub-agency nearest to their village. The kanganies were thereafter
issued with recruiting certificates and also small amounts of money as
preliminary advances. On the return of the kanganies to the sub-agency
with their recruits, the kanganies were given the full amount of the advances
which their employers had instructed to be paid to them. In the presence
«
of the Agent of the Commission each kangany had to pay his recruits what 
was due to them. The recruits signed Promissory Notes in favour of their 
kangany and the latter gave a Promissory Note for the full amount given 
to him in favour of the Commissioner who sent both the Promissory Notes
123. AnR of C1C for 1910, YPAC 1910, p. 6 .
124* Col. Sec. of Ceylon to Chief Sec. of Madras, 20 June 1904, MPP,
Vol. 6894) Pro. Nos. 567-568 of 1 July 1904*
125. 'Labour Scheme', YPAC 1904-3905) PP- 50d-50e*
Fifty-first AnR of PAC, Appendix D, Report of CLC from June to 
December 1904? ibid.
AnRs of CLC, (annual series, 1905-1910), YPAC.
126. These instructions were set out in a printed form known as the 
'A' Form. See Appendix B.
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to the estate superintendent in Ceylon, Thus, the scheme was primarily 
meant to keep a check on the disbursement of coast advances in South 
India— a task which had hitherto remained exclusively in the hands of the 
kanganies much to the detriment of both the planters and the labourers.
The Ceylon Labour Commission also had to perform several ether 
127functions. The Commission undertook the task of disseminating 
information among the South Indian villagers on the conditions of work in 
the plantations in Ceylon. Leaflets printed in the vernaculars were 
periodically distributed. The Commission also took steps to curtail the 
extortion of labourers en route and to prevent the recruits from being 
misled. The Agents examined the labourers to ascertain that the labourers 
understood the conditions of work on the estates and also to check 
whether the law against kidnapping and abduction had been infringed by 
the recruiters. The Commission also undertook the task of tracing and 
recovering those kanganies and labourers who had deserted to South India 
without paying off their debts due to the estates.
The statistics on the working of the Commission in the period 
from 1904 to 1910 reveal a gradual increase in the number of labourers 
recruited by the kanganies working under its supervision. However, until 
1910 a substantial number of the labourers were still recruited by the 
kanganies working independent of the control of the Commission. The 
relatively slow progress of the Commission in the early years of its 
existence was not due to any inherent virtue of kangany system though 
some planters who had fairly long established personal contacts with their 
kanganies found them trustworthy and capable of doing the necessary 
recruiting independent of the Commission. A large^ number of the new 
rubber estates planted in the post-1904 rubber boom was still not bearing 
and therefore the rubber planters were not very eager to join the 
Commission the membership of which entailed the payment of an annual
127. AnR of CLC for 1906, YPAC 1906, p. 15-
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TABLE 2.4 Plantation labour immigration to Ceylon under the Tin 
Ticket System and the Ceylon Labour Commission up to 1910.
Year
Percentage of the 
Tin Ticket labourers 
to the total estate 
labour immigrants
Percentage of the Labour 
Commission labourers 
to the total estate 
labour immigrants
1902 40
1903 71
1904 80
1905 86 31
1906 81 34
1907 79 41
1908 83 53
1909 85 44
1910 85 70
Sources: AR of Superintendent, Ragama Camp? (1902-1911),
CAR.
AnR of CLC (1905-1911), YPAC.
acreage cess. Besides, the Labour Scheme had to get itself organised in 
South India. The kangany system was well entrenched in the field. It is 
likely that some of the kanganies would have resisted coming under the 
new scheme. The period from 1904 to 1910 was in fact one of transition 
when the kangany system was gradually brought under the control of the 
Commission. By 1910> 70 per cent of the immigrant estate labourers were 
coming under the Labour Scheme and in the decade after 1910 the average 
annual immigration under the Scheme increased to 85 per cent of the total 
estate labour immigration to the Islandc
The Tin Ticket System and the Ceylon Labour Commission undoubtedly 
brought about improvements in the methods of recruitment and conveyance 
of labourers. Nevertheless^the fundermental problem of the labourers in 
this respect, namely, the debiting of the cost of the recruitment and
transportation of the labourers against their estate accounts persisted.
IJo effort was made to relieve the labourers from the initial burden of
debt with which they started their lives on the estates. Besides, the
amount debited in this manner against each labourer was the total amount
per recruit handed to the kangany out of which only a portion was actually
spent on each recruit. The liability of the immigrant labourers who came
to Ceylon to pay back the cost of recruitment and conveyance contrasted
with the position of the immigrant labourers who migrated to other countrie
The planters of the countries which recruited under the indenture system
were bound by the Indian Emigration Ordinances to provide free transport
to their recruits. The only country outside British India which imported
immigrant labour on an unrestricted basis, besides Ceylon, was Malaya. In
1907, the Malayan employers of free Indian immigrant labourers inaugurated
a scheme to recruit and transport labourers from India free of cost
to the labourers. The Malayan scheme aroused interest among several
planters in Ceylon who suggested a similar scheme for immigrants coming 
128to Ceylon. But the suggestion was eventually dropped. Thus, outside
British India, the Ceylon planters were the only employers of Indian
labour who charged, directly the cost of passage from the labourers.
The relative proximity of the Island to South India made the
problem of the cost of passage financially less burdensome in case of
•»
Ceylon than in other countries. The employers*however, were disinclined 
to provide free transport to the labourers. This attitude of the planters 
could be attributed to two factors. First, under the system of "free 
labour" which existed in Ceylon where the labourer unlike under the 
indenture system had the right to quit his employer at one month’s notice, 
the only practical hold the employer had over his labourer was that of
128. Fifty-fourth AnR of PAC, YPAC 1907* P» 99•
AnR of CLC for 1908, ibid. 1906, p. 18.
Annual general meeting of PAC, 14 February 1908, ibid. 1907? 
pp. 8^-8 5.
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the latter's debt to the former.. Free passage would have done away with
the initial debt of the labourer to the employer and thereby undermined
the employer's only effective hoLd on the labourer. This explanation is
supported by the views expressed by some planters of their willingness
to provide free passage on condition that the immigrant labourers were
129bound to serve the employer for a specified period. Secondly, on the
whole,the employers of immigrant labour in Ceylon did not face an acute
shortage of labour for any prolonged p e r i o d . T h e y  found in South India
a potential source of surplus labour and had less to worry about their
labour supply than the employers of Indian immigrant labour in other
countries which were situated at a distance from India. Thus, whereas
the question of providing free passage to the labourers with a view to
give them the opportunity of beginning their lives on the estates free
of debt was openly debated towards the later years of our period, the
suggestion did not find strong support among the employers. When a scheme
providing free transport facilities for the labourers was finally adopted
in Ceylon at a much later date, in 1923, it was mainly due to the
intervention of the Indian Government which acted under the pressure of
Indian nationalist opinion to safeguard the interest of the Indian
emigrant labourers and to improve their conditions. ^
It could be concluded that in the sphere of recruitment and
*
conveyance of labour no serious effort was made by the planters to tackle 
the basic problem of the labourers. Instead, all institutional changes 
brought about by the planters were directed at obtaining their supply of 
labour as cheaply and as expeditiously as possible. To this end, schemes 
were formulated to check the rise in the rates of coast advances, to improve 
the means of conveyance,and to bring the kangany*s monopoly over the
129. Ibid., pp. 86-87.
130. See below, chap. 3*
131. Report of the Controller of Indian Immigrant Labour, CAR 1923,
pp.
supply of labour under institutional control and supervision. These in 
turn no doubt had the effect of improving the position of the labourer, 
particularly vis-a-vis his kangany. Though some irregularities in recrui­
ting labour, especially as regards the payment of coast advances' to 
recruits still persisted yet these abuses were kept under restraint, But 
the basic weakness of the system of recruitment and conveyance of binding 
the immigrant labourer to an initial dead-weight of indebtedness persisted.
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CHAPTER III 
THE SUPPLY OF IMMIGRANT PLANTATION 
LABOUR, 1880-1910
In section 1 of the present chapter we hope to analyse the 
available data on the numerical size and the composition of the immigrant 
labour force in the Island. This will be followed in section 2 by an 
attempt to explain the cyclical and annual fluctuations in the migration 
of labour, by relating these fluctuating trends to the economic 
background in South India and the plantation sector in the ^sland.
Section 3 will be devoted to the overall state of the demand and supply 
of immigrant plantation labour in our period. We will at the outset 
explain the methods we hope to utilize in analysing the adequacy of the 
plantation labour supply. Thereafter we will apply the aforesaid methods 
of analysis to the period 1880-1910 in chronological order. An examina­
tion of these factors leads us to the conclusion that the plantation 
sector in the Island did not suffer a permanent shortage of labour.
Labour scarcity, when it did occur, was seasonal. Such seasonal shortage 
of labour was, by and large, confined to the years of good agricultural 
harvests in South India, suggesting that the plantation labour system in
the Island depended to a substantial extent on the agricultural distress
*
in South India for an adequate supply of labour.
1• Components of immigration
A major problem besetting a researcher on plantation labour 
migration to Ceylon is that of ascertaining the numerical components of 
migration. For our period it is impossible to obtain accurate statistical 
information on the migration of Indian plantation workers between South 
India and Ceylon. By contrast, in countries where the labourers were 
recruited on an indenture basis, fairly accurate statistics were
97
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maintained under the Indian Emigration Ordinances. Where migration was 
unrestricted as between Ceylon and India, there was no official stipulation 
obliging the maintenance of seperate statistics on the migration of Indian 
labourers. Nevertheless, from the available statistical data it is 
possible to delineate the general pattern of the immigration of labourers 
from South India to the plantations in the Island. We hope to devote 
some attention in the present section to sort out the complicated plethora 
of statistical material available to us.'*'
All available statistical information on the migration between 
Ceylon and South India can be placed in four broad categories. The annual 
Administration Reports of the Madras Emigration Department and the annual 
Administration Reports of the Registrar General, on Vital Statistics of 
Ceylon up to 1907 (after 1907 "the latter seems to have confined its data 
to the estate labourers) contain the grand totals of all types of immigrants 
and emigrants who passed between Ceylon and South India, viz., plantation
2
labourers, non-plantation labourers, traders, and miscellaneous passengers. 
Since these reports do not distinguish between the different categories 
of migrants, these two sources are not of much direct use for our study.
1. In the past, writers on Indian labour migration to Ceylon have paid 
little attention to the quantitative aspect of the plantation labour 
migration. (I. H. Vanden Driesen, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 
1954; S. Rajaratnam, unpublished M.Sc. thesis, London, 1961: C. Colaco, 
unpublished M.Sc. thesis, London, 1957; Benedicte Hjejle, 1967;
Donald R. Snodgrass, 1966). They have tended to take the gross migra­
tion figures of practically all types of migrants between India and 
Ceylon as given either in the ARs of the Registrar General, on Vital 
Statistics of Ceylon or in Ferguson's Ceylon Directory and Handbook 
(series). There isaconsiderable gap between the gross migration figures 
and the plantation labour migration figures that a researcher could 
get into serious analytical difficulties by making use of the gross 
migration figures to analyse problems relating to plantation labour 
migration. For an intensive study of the question of plantation 
labour migration, especially the supply-demand situation of labour, 
the statistical picture needs to be placed in a more realistic form. 
The discussion in the present section is an attempt in this direction.
2. ARs of the Madras Emigration Department, (annual series, 1885-1910), 
in ISP and MBRP,(Seperate Revenue Proceedings).
ARs of the Registrar General, on Vital Statistics of Ceylon, (annual 
series, l88Q-1910)j CART
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Secondly, monthly statistics compiled by the Assistant Govern­
ment Agent, Mannar, are available on the arrivals and departures of
3Indian men, women, and children via Mannar. These statistics are fairly 
reliable because the Immigration Establishment at Mannar took an interest 
in the migrants, particularly with a view to minimize the threat which 
the immigration of South Indians poised to the health of the Island. 
Besides, the Paumben-Mannar ferry transport service run by the Ceylon 
Government was a source of revenue to the Immigration Department. The 
need to collect ferry fares influenced the Mannar officials to maintain 
fairly accurate statistics. However, all the migrants who passed Mannar 
were not estate labourers. Some of them came to participate in the pearl 
fishery off the north-west coast of the Island. A few travelled by this 
route to work on the Ceylon Government public works, particularly 
irrigation works in the North Western and North Central Provinces of the 
Island. It is not possible to know the precise number of immigrants who 
travelled via Mannar to the plantations. However, it is clear that the 
number of non-estate labourers who passed Mannar were not very large 
and that the bulk of the immigrants who took this route were plantation 
workers. Therefore, the Mannar figures can be reckoned as fairly indicative 
of the general pattern of migration of the estate labourers using this 
route.
The Principal Collector of Customs also maintained statistics 
on the number of arrivals and departures of Indian men, women, and 
children via Colombo.^ Here again, like the Mannar statistics, the 
Colombo statistics do not distinguish between the estate labourers and 
the other migrants. But, unlike the Mannar statistics, the totals of 
Colombo statistics cannot be utilized in a study of the trends of
3. ARs of AO A, Mannar District, (annual series, 1880-1910), CAR.
Monthly Statistics of Arrivals and Departures of Coolies, by the 
Principal Collector of Customs, Colombo, CGG.
4. Ibid.
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migration of estate labourers because the number of non-estate immigrants
5
who entered the Island in Colombo was fairly heavy. However, with the
help of three other groups of statistics it is possible to identify the
approximate number of estate labourers who arrived in Colombo in the
years after l889« (a) From I889 the Superintendent of Immigration, Colombo,
published bi-annual statistics on the number of Indian immigrant men,
women, children, and infants who went to the estates via Colombo.^ (b)
From 1900 we have the statistics maintained by the Ragama Camp on the
total number of Indian immigrants who passed through the Camp to the
7
plantations each year. Since all immigrant plantation workers had 
compulsorily to go through the Camp these statistics can be regarded as 
fairly accurate, (c) The Ceylon Government Immigration Agents at .Tuticorin, 
Tondi, Atfimapatam, and Paumben kept records of the number of people
g
who embarked at these ports for the plantations in Ceylon. These figures 
closely tally with the statistics given by the Superintendent of Immigra­
tion, Colombo, and the Superintendent of the Ragama Camp. However, it is 
not possible to obtain statistics on the number of estate labourers who 
returned to South India via Colombo. Only the totals of all types of 
people who went from Ceylon to India are available except for the years
1900-1 for which the number of estate labourers who returned to India via
9
Colombo is available.
Finally, at the minor ports of Negarabo and Kalpitiya, the 
Sub-Collectors of Customs maintained data on immigration and emigration
5. Returns of Immigrants in the Port of Colombo, showing their 
destination, trade, and occupation^ (published bi-annually), 
by the Superintendent of Immigration, Colombo, CGG.
6. Notes and Comments, COO, 19 January 1891.
Editorial, ibid., 23 January 1891.
7. ARs of GA. WP., enclosures, AnRs of the Superintendent of Ragama 
Camp, (annual series, 1900-10y 7~CAR^
8. Returns of Estate Coolies shipped to Colombo during each half year, 
showing the ports of embarkation, compiled by the Assistant 
Superintendent of Immigration, Paumben, CGG.
9. Weekly Returns of Immigration and Emigration at the Port of Colombo, 
'by the Acting Master Attendent, (published weekly, 1900-1), COG.
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via -these two p o r t s . B u t  the number of migrants who travelled through 
these ports were negligible, hardly aggregating a couple of hundreds in 
any year in our period. Besides, these statistics do not distinguish 
between estate and non-estate migrants. With the restriction of Indian 
labour migration to the Tuticorin-Colombo route after the establishment 
of the Ragama Camp in 1897 > immigration via these minor ports became 
virtually non-extinct. Due to these reasons we have omitted immigration 
via these two minor ports in compiling our Table 3.1 on the immigration 
of plantation labour.^
For purpose of analysis, in Table 3.1, we have set out, in round 
figures, the approximate number of adult Indians who came to the Island 
to work on the estates. The statistics after 1900 can be reckoned as fair 
indicators of the trend. In the statistics up to 1899 there is a certain 
percentage of error which cannot be accurately determined. But the error 
does not seriously handicap our analysis of the trends of plantation 
labour migration in these years, because the points at which the error 
occurs are of relatively minor significance. The error occurs at two points. 
The statistics for the years 1880-99 include non-estate immigrants 
who entered the Island via Mannar. But this section, as we have seen 
earlier on, was relatively small. Secondly, up to 1888, Table 3.1 
does not include the estate labourers who arrived in Colombo, for 
it is not possible to obtain seperate statistics in this respect. But 
here too, the number o f estate labourers who used the Colombo route in 
the years up to I89O was not large. For instance in I889 at a time 
when the Colombo route was beginning to be popular only about 4000 estate 
labourers came via Colombo as against 34>000 By the Mannar route.
10. Monthly Statistics of Arrivals and Departures of Coolies, by the 
Principal Collector Of Customs, Colombo, CGG.
11. There is the possibility that some immigrants would have escaped 
official attention. However, such unrecorded migration could not have 
been very large in the years 1880-1910, for it did not attract serious 
official attention at a time when the Ceylon Government was watchful 
about the danger of the possible introduction of small pox, cholera, 
and plague from India.
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TABLE 3.1 Approximate number of adult plantation labour immigrants, 
1880-1910
Year Immigrants Year Immigrants
1880 20,300 1896 74,500
1881 26,800 1897 100,900
1882 25,900 I898 75,700
1883 15,200 1899 20,300
I884 19,900 1900 101,600
I885 23,000 1901 39,100
1886 17,400 1902 28,600
1887 2 2 ,800 1903 40,100
1888 50,000 1904 51,400
I889 36,900 1905 109,200
1890 50,400 1906 70,900
1891 65,700 1907 N
1892 71,400 1908 73,800
1893 47,900 1909 66,700
1894 43,600 1910 N
1895 67,500
Sources: ARs of AGA. Mannar District, (annual series, 1380-
1900), car!
Monthly Statistics of Arrivals and Departures of 
Coolies, by the Principal Collector of Customs,
Colombo, CGG*
Returns of Immigrants in the Port of Colombo, 
showing their destination, trade, and•occupation, 
published bi-annually, by Superintendent of Immigration, 
Nj- No information available.
A certain number of labourers trekked back to their villages 
in South India, some of them on temporary sojourn. There were no legal 
impediments for the labourers to do so except giving one month's notice 
to the employer. But for most of the labourers there was a practical 
difficulty because of their debts to the kangany and the planter. However, 
it was possible for at least a section of the indebted labour force to 
go back to South India, particularly during slack months in the estates. 
For the employer there were two sources of security for such indebted
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labourers who went to South India on short visits. First, there was the 
kangany. The kangany was legally hound to the estate for all advances 
given by the employer- and the personal relationship between the kangany 
and the outgoing labourer and the customary sanctions ensured the latter’s 
return to the estate. More important, there was a generally accepted 
arrangement that only some members of the indebted families should be 
allowed to go on short visits to South India to ensure their return. The 
debt of a labourer was considered as a collective debt of the family or 
the labour gang and not an individual debt. Even when a labourer died 
his debt was added to the total debt of his family. The planters had 
no serious objections to some of the labourers going to the "Coast” 
particularly during the months of "short work" in the estates. In fact, 
the planters correctly viewed the facility for visits to South India as 
a major attraction of the Ceylon plantation labour system— a facility 
which they felt should not be disturbed.
The available data on the back-flow of immigrant labour from 
Ceylon is incomplete. The cumulative totals of the Ceylnh Government gross 
emigraticn-imraigration statistics on all types of Indian migrants for 
the period from l8?0 to 1910 show a migrational surplus of about 26 per 
cent in favour of Ceylon over the entire period.
As regards plantation labour migration, the above trend of the
*
back-flow can be known only by comparing the annual immigration statistics 
with the available statistics on the annual growth rate of the work 
force. Some idea of the latter can be known from the Quarterly Returns 
which the planters were obliged to submit to the Government on the 
numerical strength of the labour force on each estate. The District-wise 
totals of these Returns were consistently published in the Ceylon Government 
Gazette. The Quarterly Returns were underestimates for these did not include 
two groups of labourers. First, the basis of the Quarterly Returns was 
estate Check-rolls which did not include statistics on contract- and 
child—labour• Secondly, only the estates of 10 acres and above were
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expected, to submit such Returns. However, these two groups who happened 
to be omitted from the Quarterly Returns were not numerically large, 
and the great majority of the immigrant plantation workers were registered 
in the Check-rolls. Besides, the Quarterly Returns are the only consis-
1 2tently maintained data available to us on the growth of the labour force.
On the basis of the data available in these Returns we have compiled 
Table 3.2.13
While the average annual inflow of adult labourers to the planta­
tions during the period 1880-1910 approximated 50*000 the average annual 
increase of the immigrant plantation work force in the same period 
appears to have been about 9*000. The latter included additions to the 
labour force by natural increase of the Indian labour population in the 
Island.3 "^ However, the gap between the labour immigration rate and the 
labour force growth rate should, in fact, be less than indicated above. 
This is partly because of the omissions from the Check-rolls (as indicated 
in the previous paragraph) and partly because the average annual number
of immigrants given above as 50*000 includes the kanganies who went to and
15fro between South India and Ceylon to fetch new gangs of labourers. Death 
accounts for a certain percentage of the difference between the rate of
12. Statistics on the wage earning classes on the plantation are also
available in the Census Reports. But the census returns of the immigrant 
plantation workers fell short of the statistics in the Quarterly 
Returns. This difference can be explained on two .grounds. It is likely 
that the Check-rolls included the names of kanganies and labourers who 
were away in South India on short visits. Besides, the size of an estate 
was differently defined in the collection of the two sets of statistics. 
Quarterly Returns were collected from estates of 10 acres and above 
whereas the census statistics were collected from estates of 20 acres 
and above.
13• Quarterly Abstracts of Cool.y Labour on Estates in the several provinces 
compiled by the Col. Sec., published quarterly in CGG.
14* According to census statistics, in 1901 and 1911* the Ceylon b o m  Indian 
Tamil estate population approximated 14 and 20 per cent respectively to 
the total Indian Tamil estate population in Ceylon.
Ceylon Census Report, 1901, Vol. II, pp. 620ff.
Ibid., 1911, Vol. on population by sex etc., pp. 368ff.
15. According to the evidence available for the years 1912-20, it appears 
that approximately 15 -20 per cent of the adult plantation immigrants 
were kanganies.
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TABLE 3.2 Estate Check-roll returns of the number of immigrant 
plantation labourers in the Island, 1880-1910
Year
Number of 
labourers
1880 101,488
1881 99,593
1882 85,948
1883 86,475
1384 96,913
I885 87,192
1886 114,690
I887 143,053
1388 163,389
1889 163,963
I89O 186,840
I89I 194,321
I892 235,117
1893 231,550
1894 219,206
1895 236,640
I896 257,256
1897 298,405
I898 306,272
1899 296,900
1900 337,278
1901 308,925
1902 300,857
1903 299,908
1904 309,964
1905 362,914
1906 372,195
1907 366,148
1908 371,797
1909 404,739
1910 409,914
Source: Quarterly Abstract of Cooly Labour on Estates in the 
several Provinces, compiled by the Col, Sec,, 
published in CGC.
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immigration and the labour force growth rste. But the loss on this account 
is difficult to appraise due to the lack of satisfactory data on the crude 
death rate among the immigrants workers.^ However, the main reason for 
the gap between the annual rate of immigration and the annual growth rate 
of the labour force was the return of a certain percentage of the immigrant 
labourers to South India. Despite this back-flow, there was a large 
increase in the work force in our period. The annual growth of the labour 
force was steady, except for the years 1880-5 when the economic catastrophe 
which occurred in the Island in these years placed net-migration in favour 
of India. Those who remained in the Island during 1880-5 did- so under 
harsh economic circumstances in the plantations and despite relatively 
favourable agricultural conditions in South India in these years. The 
Indian labourers who remained in the Island during these hard times can 
be generally regarded as those who had by then developed some permanent 
association with the planting districts.
It is difficult to know the proportion cf the "old” immigrants 
among those who annually arrived in Ceylon. Qualitative evidence available 
towards the end of our period suggests that a considerable number of
17immigrants at that time were those who had been in the Island previously.
The earliest year for which statistical data are available on this count
is 1917* In that year it was recorded that approximately 63 per cent of
18
the labour immigrants were "old” immigrants.
The bulk of the immigrant plantation workers appear to have come 
from the southernmost Tamil districts of the Madras Presidency, viz., 
Trichinopoly, Tinnevelly, Madura, and Tanjore. There are very few statistical
16. See below, p. 258.
17* AR of GA. WP., enclosure, AnR of Superintendent of Ragama Camp,
CAR 1904? p. 47.
Ibid., p. A6.
18. AnR of CLC for 1917, YPAC 1917, p. 21.
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data in this respect up to 1905* Our conclusion for the period up to 1905
is substantially based on the qualitative evidence available in contem-
19
porary Madras and Ceylon documents. For the period after 1905 statistical 
data on the district-wise origin of the immigrants are available as 
regards those labourers who arrived in Ceylon under the Labour Scheme of 
the Ceylon Labour Commission. From 1905 to 1910, the number of labourers 
who came under this Scheme approximated 45 Per cent to the total number 
of plantation labour immigrants in these years. The regional-wise origin 
of this group is given in column 2 of Table 3.3 below. More comprehensive 
information is available for the decade after 1910 when approximately 85 
per cent of the total plantation labour immigration took place under the 
Scheme. This information too is set out in the Table. The predominance of 
immigrants from Trichinopoly, Tinnevelly, Madura, and Tanjore was largely 
due to the relative proximity of these district to the Island. Besides, 
the planters, on the whole, concentrated their recruiting activities in 
these districts. Evidence reveal that the economic factors which propelled 
emigration from India wa3 considerably strong in these districts. It is 
evident that with the progress of the tea industry in the Island efforts 
were made to extend the field of recruitment of labour beyond the tradi­
tional districts which supplied labour. Consequently, towards the end of 
our period a certain percentage of immigration took place from Salem and 
North and South Arcot. Immigration to Ceylon from the other South Indian 
districts was negligible.
Some idea of the socio-economic background of the immigrant planta­
tion workers can be gleaned from the statistics maintained by the Ceylon 
Labour Commission on the South Indian castes to which the immigrants 
belonged. Here again, we are beset with the problem that this information 
is confined to the labourers despatched under the Labour Scheme of the 
of the Commission. However, since the information for the period 1905-10
19* A general meeting of PAC, 13 June 1891, PPAC 1892, p. Jl,
ARs of the Emigration Department, Madras, (annual series, 18SO-1910), 
IEP.
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can "be checked against the more satisfactory data available for the period
1910-20, all available statistics up to 1920 on the caste composition of
the immigrants are set out in Table 3*4*
Table 3.4 reveals that a substantial number of the immigrant
labourers were drawn from the traditionally landless agricultural labour
castes of Pariah and Palla. In the nineteenth century, these castes were
increasingly becoming agriculturally unattached and therefore, economically
all the more depressed. The Arnba1 ah:arans and Vellalas appear.to have
formed an equally important section of the migratory stream. The members
of these two castes were considered, economically and socially, superior
to those of the Pariah and Palla castes in that fhe former were, by
tradition, agriculturists who had hereditary rights of owning land. The
Ambalakarans and Vellalas were mainly small-scale peasant proprietors
whose main traditional economic activity was the cultivation of their own
land holdings. In the nineteenth century, some members of these castes
either lost their land holdings or found their holdings too small to sustain 
20their families. Either the family as a whole or some members of the 
family took to part-time work as agricultural labourers. This was parti­
cularly so during the off-season in their own plots of land. Information 
available in the Madras Government documents confirm that the unattached 
landless agricultural labourers and the small-scale peasants who practised
as part-time agricultural labourers formed the most significant segments
21of the labour emigrants from South India. It is likely that the Vellalas 
and the Anb a1akar an s would have formed the bulk of those immigrant 
labourers who took time off from their work in the plantations to period­
ically visit their villages in South India. Among the immigrants, the 
others of numerical importance belonged to the Kallar and the Sakkili
20. See above, p. 29-30.
21. Collector of Madura to Sec. to the Commissioner of Revenue Settlement, 
Madras, No. 47 of 5 July 1888, MBRP, Vol. 3319, Pro. No. 345 of
24 July 1888, p. 1.
Report of the Acting Collector of North Arcot, ibid., Vol. 6?22,
Pro. No. 167 of 5 August 1901, PP* 3-4*
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TABLE 3-3 The South Indian districts from which the immigrant labour 
was drawn for the plantations in Ceylon, 1905-20.
District
For 45 pei' cent of 
immigrants in 
- the years 1905-10
For 85 per cent 
of immigrants in 
the years 1911-20
Trichinopoly 29 40
Tinnevelly 21 6
Madura 16 13
Tanjore 18 8
Salem 6 5
North Arcot 4 7
South Arcot 2 6
Other districts 4 15
Source: AnR of CLC (annual series, 1905-1920), YPAC.
TABLE 3-4 Showing the percentage distribution 
immigrants, 1905-20
of the castes of the
For 45 per cent For 85 per cent
of immigrants in of immigrants in
Caste the years 1905-10 the years 1910-20
Vellala 21 . 17.5
Ambalakaran 16 17
Pariah 20 23
Pallas 11 15-5
Kallar 6 5.5
Sakkili 3 4
Others (mainly 
Channar, Vannan, 
Oddas, and Ambatta)
23 17.5
Source: AnR of CLC (annual series, 1905-1920), YPAC.
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castes. These two were among the most depressed castes in South India*
While the majority of the immigrant labourers came from the six above
named castes, they 'were supplemented in lesser numbers by others from
the lowly South Indian castes such as Channar (toddy taper) Oddas (dhoby)
and Arab at t a (barber). It appears therefore that the great bulk of the
immigrants were drawn either from the lowest wrung of the peasant castes
or the economically and socially depressed castes in South India.
Ceylon had the distinct feature among the Indian immigrant
receiving-countries of having a system of family migration. In practically
all the other countries, including Burma and Malaya, labour migration was
22predorainently a movement of adults, largely of males. The greater distance
from South India* the fairly long sea voyage, and the system of recruitment
by professional recruiters deterred female migration to other colonies.
Besides, in the predominantly sugar and rubber colonies there were only
limited employment opportunities for women and even less for children.
Recruitment of families involved heavy transport costs and the employers
were keen to invest the fairly high travelling expenses of labour on
able-bodied males. The predominance of males among the labour immigrants
to the distant colonies inevitably created a grave disproportion in the
sex composition of the labour community which eventually prompted the
Indian Government to introduce legislation in order to ensure a stated
23 «
sex ratio in the recruitment of immigrant labour. Nevertheless, it was 
found difficult to recruit individual adult females, for the class of 
unattached women were relatively few in the Indian society where women 
married quite early in life. Besides, the unattached Indian females were 
less prone to migrate in large numbers. The married women were disinclined 
to migrate to foreign land leaving their family behind. Thus, even if the 
employers required female labour it would have been difficult to procure
22. K. S. Sandhu, 1969, pp. 97-99*
C. Kondapi, 1951> PP* 88-92.
E. J. L. Andrew*, 1933, chap. XXI.
23* Ibid
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them in adequate numbers without an overall system of recruitment of labour 
families.
In contrast, in Ceylon, family migration was the back-bone of the 
system of the recruitment and the system of labour organisation in the 
plantations. The factors which militated against family migration to other 
countries did not operate so effectively in case of Ceylon. The distance 
was short and the travelling expenses were much less than to the other 
countries. Besides, such expenses though pre-paid by the estates were 
eventually recouped from the labourers unlike the indenture system. Further­
more, unlike rubber and sugar plantations in places like Malaya, Mauritius, 
and the West Indies, in the tea plantations in Ceylon work was available
for a large force of female and child-labour, especially in tea plucking 
24
and weeding. In fact, in such work, the tea planter found female and
child-labour cheaper, more efficient, and amenable than male labour. Women
formed the main section of the tea plucking labour force and the Ceylon
planter unlike his counterparts in other countries encouraged family
migration. The system held out sevsal advantages to the immigrants as well.
It augmented their family income; and the pooling of family earnings was
25an important factor which helped them to subsist on a low income. The 
system naturally meant that the family could live together, besides working 
under a family head as the sub-kangany. In most of the Indian labour 
communities abroad there were high incidence of immorality and venereal 
diseases consequent on the gross disproportion of sexes which prevailed 
among them. But these problems did not figure among the Indian labour 
community in Ceylon to the extent they did elseidiere. The labour families 
arrived in Ceylon with their infants and even with the aged and infirm 
relatives whom they were accustomed to support. Because of the advantages 
which the system of family migration held out to the immigrants, the 
system had a favourable effect on the supply of labour to the estates.
24. See below, chap. IV.
25. See below, pp. 254-255*
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Family life also had a stabilising effect on the labour force on the 
estates* Table 3*5 gives some idea of the sex-wise composition of the 
labour population in Ceylon in comparison with several other principal 
Indian immigrant receiving-countries.
TABLE 3*5 Sex-wise composition of the plantation labour population in 
Ceylon, Fiji, and Malaya. (Females per 1000 males).
Year Ceylon Fiji Malaya
1901 804 506
1911 873 545 308
Sources: Ceylon figures are calculated from the Ceylon Census
Report. 1901» Vol. II, pp. 598ff and Ceylon Census 
Report, 19111 Vol. on Population by sex ets.
Figures for Fiji are from C. Kondapi, 1951? P* 90*
For Malaya the figures are from U. Mahajani, i960.
2. Fluctuating flow of labour migration and its economic background, 
1880-1910-
The fluctuations in the migration of plantation labour, indicated 
in Table 3.1 of the preceding section, were the outcome of the effect of 
two broad economic factors, namely, the vicissitudes of the extent of 
employment opportunities in the plantations and also 01 the fortunes of 
the economic activities of the peasant agricultural sector in South India. 
The object of this section is to analyse the nature and the intensity 
of the impact of these economic factors in shaping the cyclical and annual 
variations in the migration of labour.
The emigration of Indian labour to the Island, as discussed 
earlier on, was not a spontaneous movement where the immigrant labourers 
came on their own. It was rather an organised movement where the estates 
recruited the prospective emigrants by the offer of monetary advances as 
inducements to emigrate and thereafter transported them to the estates.
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Thus, the migration of labour.was closely affected by the state of demand 
for labour which manifested itself in the recruiting activities of the 
planters. While the recruiting efforts were intensified in seasons of 
heavy demand for labour, such activities subsided during the slack seasons 
in the plantation agriculture in the Island.
The response of the prospective emigrant to the overtures of the 
recruiter hinged largely on the strength of the current economic pressures 
on him, which determined the attraction of accepting the monetary advances 
in return for performing manual labour in a foreign land and of the pros­
pect of returning home with some savings after a period of employment 
abroad. The small-scale peasants and the landless agricultural labourers, 
from among whom the estate labourers were recruited, were engaged mainly 
in the cultivation of food-grains, especially paddy, cholam, curnbu, and 
ragi. Their economic situation depended primarily on the fortunes of these 
crops. The small-scale peasant, with little or no moneta.ry resources of
his own, cultivated his land with capital borrowed against his prospective 
26
crop. In case of the agricultural la/bourers their employment opportunities 
depended largely on the prospects of the harvests. But the prospects of 
peasant agriculture in South India depended mainly on the precarious and 
uncertain conditions of the monsoon rains,to the extent that it has been
aptly pointed out that "the cultivation in India was a gamble in the
27 *monsoons." The consequences of the failure of rains were distressing.
As the Commissioner of Revenue Settlement, Land Records and Agriculture
in the Madras Presidency pointed out
... an extensive failure of crops of even a single year is sufficient 
in this Presidency to deprive the majority of the land-holders (who 
are mostly petty proprietors) and the labouring classes (who are mostly 
field-labourers) of their ordinary means of livelihood.28
26. Resettlement Report of Salem District for 1905, MBRP, Vol. 7176, 
Pro. No. 212 of 15 July 1905, p. 29-
27• M. Arokiaswarai and T. M. Royappa, 1959, p* 8 3.
28. Order of the Revenue Department, Madras, on the Report on Agricultural 
Distress in the Madras Presidency in 1891-1892, MRP, Vol. 4633,
Pro. No. 302 of 4 May 1894, p. 97*
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The failure of a single monsoon was had enough. But protracted drought and
the consecutive failure of monsoons was a common occurrence in South India
during our period. Agricultural crop failures inevitably brought about
scarcities and at times culminated in widespread famine. As the Resettlement
Officer of the Chingleput District wrote, *>Phe chief feature of the rainfall
in both monsoons is its extreme uncertainty. North-east monsoon is
especially liable to fail completely. If this happens in two years in
succession, famine, or in these days, extreme scarcity, is certain to 
..29
follow. In times of crop failure, the small-scale ryots found themselves 
getting deeper into indebtedness. The effect of agricultural distress on 
the different categories of agricultural labourers show some degree of 
variation. Where the small-scale ryots were engaged in part-time agricul­
tural labour work, they lost this source of income and at least some members 
of their families found themselves redundant. The permanent farm labourers 
who were attached to richer ryots in some sort of servile bondage x^ ere 
looked after by their masters during good as well as bad agricultural 
seasons. The worst hit were those casual agricultural labourers who were 
also landless. In times of agricultural distress, this class lost virtually 
their only means of livelihood. With little or no resources to resist such 
calamities, they x^ ere threatened xtfith virtual starvation. It was precisely
this class, unlike the class of permanent farm labourers, that x^ as
*
numerically on the ascent during the nineteenth century. Of the casual
agricultural labourers, the Collector of Nellore x-rrote in 1900 that
Formerly, the ryot with his cultivating labourers was the agricutural 
unit. The labourers were attached to the soil and looked to their 
masters for support in good and bad seasons.... bond or self-interest 
kept the ryot and his labourers together.... The ryot h as now no 
anxiety about securing labourers, and therefore no necessity to 
maintain them in hard times, and has less inducements to do so,...
He employs large numbers at the time of sowings and harvest and then 
dispenses with their services. On the failure, therefore, of a single 
monsoon, all these labourers who, in former times, would naturally
29- Resettlement Report of Chingleput District for 1907? M3RP, 
Vo. 8OI4 , Pro. No. 349 of 11 September 1908, p. 27.
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look to and be maintained by their masters, are now thrown adrift 
without any means,... These people have no resisting power.... These 
are in the lowest social scale.... The main effect of distress on 
economic conditions seems to be the deterioration of the daily 
labourer,....30
Apart from depriving a considerable section of the agricultural population
of their means of livelihood, the crop failures also increased the local
food prices.^ When the agricultural labourers were in such an economic
and psychological condition of distress the offer of cash advances by the
labour recruiters appeared a tempting source of relief for them. Thus,
particularly in times of crop failures, labour migration inevitably
increased, subsiding in times of favourable agricultural seasons. While
labour emigration in any event took place even during favourable agricultural
seasons due to the abject poverty of the agricultural labourers and the
prospects of obtaining cash advances, recruitment became relatively easy and
the supply of labour abundant, particularly in times of agricultural
distress. Thus the cycles of harvests, crop conditions, and food-grain
prices in South India were major factors causing sharp fluctuations in
migration. In fact, in times of acute distress and famines, labour
migration to the Island took place independent of the recruiting efforts 
32
of the planters.
In the period from 1880 to 1910? it is possible to discern four 
major cycles of labour migration corresponding to the periods of economic 
fluctuations which the planting industry of the Island passed, viz., the 
depression from 1880 to 1886, the years of prosperity from 1887 to 1896, 
the years of slump in the tea industry from 1897 "to 1904? the period
of revived prosperity after 1904«
30. Report of the Collector of Nellore, MBRP, Vol. 6019, Pro. No.
489 of 25 October 1900, p. 15.
31. Apart from the local output of food-grains the demand for grains 
from beyond the ^residency, especially where famines had taken 
place, also affected local prices.
32. Col. Sec. of Ceylon to Sec. to the Government of India, No. 16 
of 8 May 1880, MPP, Vol. 1555? Pro. No. 35 of 14 June 1880.
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The quinquennium preceding i860 was one of heavy migration due to 
the expansion of the coffee acreage and the output in the Island and more 
particularly because of agricultural distress in South India which culmi­
nated in the major famine of 1876-7 * In the period from 1880 to 1886, 
however, there was a steep downswing in Indian labour immigration to the 
Island mainly due to the sharp decline in the demand for labour on the 
estates following the unprecedented economic depression in the planting 
sector during this period. These years saw the final eclipse of the 
mono-culture of coffee which was the mainstay of the economy of the Island. 
While the main cause of the depression was the rapid spread of the coffee 
leaf disease, the situation was aggravated by financial difficulties of 
the planters and the decline in the price of coffee in the world market. 
The output of the coffee estates and the earnings of the planters declined. 
The planters found it unprofitable to maintain the coffee estates. Some 
estates were abandoned while others lay in a semi-abandoned s t a t e . A  
large number of estates changed hand at comparatively low prices. Some 
planters left the Island withdrawing the capital invested in Ceylon.^ The 
planters who remained in the Island, realising the danger of the exclusive 
dependence on a single staple, took steps to diversify their planting 
enterprise in an attempt to get over the depression. During 1880-2 some 
progress was made in the cultivation of cinchona. Experiments in the 
cultivation of tea and cocoa were also carried out. However, till I885 
these attempts could not offset the loss incurred due to the decline in 
the coffee industry. Consequently, in spite of the attempts to diversify 
the economy, the decline of the coffee industry dominated the years of 
the depression.
The depression had its inevitably adverse effect on the labour 
situation in the Island. Because of the scarcity of capital, the
33* D. M. Forrest ? 1967? P» 99
J. Ferguson, 1892, p. 29* 
34« lbid., pp. 17? 27.
E. Gunewardane, 1965? P* 24*
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unreraunerative coffee crops, and the financial commitments in the struggle
against the leaf disease, the planters effected economy to the extreme
possible extent. Retrenchment became the order of the day. J A large
number of Indian labourers who had come over during the 1870s were thrown
out of employment. Some were absorbed in the planting of new crops. But
this absorption could not keep pace with the exit of labourers from the
abandoned and the low-yielding coffee estates. Since most of the tea. and
cinchona were planted interspersed in the existing coffee estates, there
was no need for extensive clearing of virgin forest land during these
years. By 1882, the demand for labour for the cultivation of cinchona
declined, following the decline of that product. Tea, planted during the
period 1880 — .5 , did not create an immediate demand for a considerable force
of regular labour for gathering and manufacturing of tea. The estates
planted during these years were still not in yield as the tea plant
required approximately 4“5 years to flush for harvesting. The demand
during these years was mainly for casual labour for initial planting and
a small labour force for the maintenance of the unbearing tea estates.
Plantations apart, the only other avenue of employment for the unemployed
labourers was the Public VJorks Department of the Ceylon Government. The
Government, from time to time, engaged a few hundreds of casual labourers
from among the Indian immigrants for road and railway construction works.
«
But it had never been a large-scale employer of Indian immigrant labour.
In normal times, however, some of the dislodged labourers could have 
obtained employment in Government works. But in the early 1880 , the 
depression badly affected the revenue of the Government. Consequently, 
Governor Longden launched a policy of retrenchment in public works which 
closed this limited, opening for employment.
The result of the depression was to create a glut in the labour 
market. Those who got work on the estates had to offer their labour on
35. Annual general meeting, 17 February 1880, PPAC l88l, p. 13.
The Tropical Agriculturist, 1881-2, pp. 190, 456.
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terms dictated by the employers. Wages were reduced.^0 Planters could not
afford to pay even these low wages. Though the planters continued to provide
their depleted labour force with rice and cloth, which constituted the
basic necessities of the labourers, there is clear evidence that some
37planters failed to pay the labourers their balance of wages. These 
balances constituted the savings of the labourers. The prospect of taking 
these savings to their villages was the major attraction of emigration.
The years of the depression saw a heavy accumulation of arrears of the
O
balance of wages. Besides, the change in the ownership of coffee estates* 
which took place on an unusually large scale during these years of the 
depression, spelled disaster for the labourers. There is evidence that 
the new owners did not honour tjie arrears of wages left behind by the 
previous management. The immigrants found work on the plantations in 
Ceylon unremunerative and insecure. Large numbers who had come to Ceylon 
during the 1870^ walked back to their villages in South India.
The agricultural situation in South India gave an additional 
impetus to this trend. During the period 1880-6 the Madras Presidency 
experienced a series of favourable seasons which helped the area to recover 
from the distressing conditions left behind by the major famine of 1876-7* 
From 1880 to 1886, except during 1884* on the whole there were fairly
satisfactory rains during the months of south-west as well as north-east
39 *monsoons. There was an increase in the local output of food-grains.
The prices of these commodities rated low when compared with the prededing
years. Thus, the early 1880 presented conditions which enabled the
South Indians to earn a livelihood in their villages without any
large-scale emigration. The urge to emigrate was, consequently, less
pronounced in these years.
36. See below, pp. 171-173.
37. 'Our Labour Supply and the Tundu System1, by Agricola, COO, 22 May 1895*
38. See below, pp. 227-228.
39* LRSRI-IP for 1881-2, MRP, Vol. 2135, Pro. No. 799 of 2 July 1883.
LRSRHP for 1882-3, ibid., Vol. 2368, Pro. NQ. 89O of 28 July I884.
LRSRMP for 1383-4, ibid., Vol. 2835, Pro. No. 575 of 25 June 1886.
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The contraction of employment opportunities on the estates in 
Ceylon appears to have coincided with a period of coraparatively favourable 
agricultural and food situation in South India, While the arrivals in 
Ceylon declined sharply, for the first time in the history of Indian 
Immigration to the Island the departures of Indian labourers from Ceylon 
exceeded the number of arrivals.
In contrast, the decade after 1887 saw a heavy demand for planta­
tion labour in the Island due to the rapid expansion of the tea industry 
during these years. Between 1883 and 1897* there was a five-fold increase 
in the acreage under tea. The tea acreage which stood at 32,000 in 1882 
increased to 35°j0°0 by 1897*^° Thus, nearly one-Half’ of the Island's
total tea acreage of 636 ,230 (according to the estimates of 1971) were
41planted during these years. With the onset of the tea boom, capital and
enterprise were not slow in forthcoming. The capital invested in the
uneconomic coffee, cocoa^and cinchona plantations was steadily transferred
to the cultivation of tea. A considerable number of planters who had left
42the Island during the coffee depression returned to the Island. A large 
number of new planters also invested capital.
The expansion involved the conversion of a large number of aban­
doned coffee estates to the cultivation of tea and also the opening up of
43virgin forest land in both low and up-country areas. The clearing of 
land and the subsequent lining, holeing, and planting of tea created a 
demand for casual male labour. After the initial planting, the demand for 
labour continued for the maintenance of the yet unbearing tea estates.
This was also a period of heavy flushing of tea bushes. Estates 
planted before I885 began to flush out. Those planted after I885 began to
40. See Appendix D .
41. Statistical Pocket Book of Ceylon, Ceylon. Department of Census 
and Statistics, 1971, P* 59*
42. J. Ferguson, 1891-92, p. 27.
J. Ferguson, 1893, p. 116.
43* Ibid., pp. 27, 36, 38.
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flush out after 4 or 5 years. In parts of the low lying areas in the
Western, Southern, and Sabaragamuwa Provinces, where virgin lands were
cultivated with tea, the tea bushes flushed out faster than on the hills.^
Further, as a means to compensate against the fall in tea prices which
gradually took place in the I89O , the planters were over-anxious to
increase their production and hence took to coarse plucking of even
immature bushes. The overall result of the state of the tea industry during
this period was a progressive increase in the demand for labour with the
annual increase in the tea acreage reaching the bearing stage.
Besides, the tea estates required a new type of labour quite
unlike the coffee estates. In contrast to the production of coffee, the
tea leaves were transformed into a final consumer article on the estates.
The leaves were withered, rolled, and finally prepared and packed in the
45factories on the estates. All large estates had factories for the
manufacture of tea. The small-scale growers of tea sold their leaves to
the factories of the large estates in the neighbourhood. Thus a new demand
for factory workers arose.
While the demand for labour in the Island was on the increase
after l886; the "push” factors at work in South India induced the out flow.
The spell of satisfactory agricultural seasons which had begun in i860
in South India came to a halt in 1886. Though the year I887 saw a fairly
«
well distributed rainfall in most of the South Indian districts, in Madura 
and Tinnevelly, which were among the main sources of labour supply to 
the Island, the failure of rains caused critical economic conditions for
44* In the estates lying in low elevation, the tea bushes matured
within 2-3 years of initial planting. But "low grown tea" is
of low quality.
45* J- Ferguson, 1887, PP« 347ff»
In case of coffee, the production process of cleaning, preparing,
softing, and packing for shipping etd. were done in Colombo. 
Therefore, there was^demand for factory workers on the coffee 
estates.
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46
the poorer classes. Though Tanjore and Trichmopoly fared better, the
A *-1
out-turn of crops fell very much below the average. Besides, the year
also witnessed a heavy outbreak of cholera and smallpox. The economic
situation did not improve until 1893* Throughout these years the Madras
48Presidency experienced agricultural distress. The rainfall remained 
below average, the food-grain crops were short, and the food prices ruled 
high. To escape from the consequent economic peril, some section of the
49 onpoorer classes in South India became more inclined to emigrate. In 1887,
the year which saw the first of the protracted unfavourable agricultural
seasons in South India since 1880, the number of immigrant estate labourers
who arrived in the Island was double the number of the previous year.
Thereafter, the annual stream of labour immigration assumed an upward
trend. The year 1889, however, saw a drop in migration despite the rising
food prices in South India. The tea acreage in production not being heavy
as yet, the planters apparently relaxed their recruiting efforts in I889
after the increase in immigration in the two preceding years. A large tea
acreage came into production in I89O. The consequent increase in the demand
for labour together with the persistence of bad agricultural seasons in
South India brought about an increase in labour immigration in that year.
50
This upward swing reached its peak in the famine years of 1891-2. In the 
years 1893-4 , the flow began to ebb despite the progress of the tea
4 6. AH of the Board of Revenue for 1886-7, HBRP, Vol. 3080, Pro. No.
347
LRSRMP for 1886-7, ibid., Vol. 3306, Pro. No. 753 of 1 November 1888. 
ML1PRI for 1887-8, p. 10.
47* Ibid.
48. LRSRMP for 1888-9, MRP, Vol. 3764, Pro. No. 613 of 5 August I89O, p. 95. 
LRSRMP for 1889-90, ibid., Vol. 3989, Pro. No. 827 of 4 September 
1891, p. 117.
LRSRMP for I89O-I, ibid., Vol. 4219, Pro. No. IO75 of 20 October 1892. 
’Agricultural Distress in the Madras Presidency in 1891-2’, ibid.,
Vol. 4633, Pro. No. 302 of 3 May 1894, pp. 93-100.
49« Collector of Madura to Sec. to^the Commissioner of Revenue Settlement, 
Madras, No. 47 of 5 July 1888'^Vol. 3319, Pro. No. 345 o f 24 July 1888.
50. ’Agricultural Distress in the Madras Presidency in 1891-2’, MRP,
Vol. 4633, Pro. No. 302 of 3 May 1894, pp. 93-100.
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industry. The decrease was mainly due to the relatively favourable
51agricultural seasons which occurred in South India in these years. It
is also likely tha.t the increase in immigration in the years 1887-92
would have influencedthe planters to slacken their recruiting efforts.
When immigration took a downward trend after 1893 the planters intensified
their recruiting activities, leading to an increase in immigration in
the years after 1894 in spite of the persistence of favourable seasons
52in South India in these years. This upward swing reached its peak in
I897— a year of deficient rains, failure of crops, and high food prices 
53in South India.
Prom 1897 to 1904j the tea industry in the Island passed through 
a slump. The progressive downward swing in the U.K. tea prices, which 
had for several years narrowed the profit margin of the Ceylon tea planters, 
continued to descend to an unremunerative level after 1897* T3ie extensive 
cultivation and the consequent over-production of tea in India and Ceylon 
during the preceding decade made such an eventuality almost. unavoidable.
The slump discouraged further extension of tea cultivation in Ceylon.
The desire to combat over-production led to finer plucking of tea bushes. 
The total tea acreage which stood in 1897 at 404*574 remained at a 
virtually stagnant level. Unremunerative prices compelled the planters 
to curtail maintenance work to the minimum. All this resulted in a decline 
in the demand for labour.
However, the downward swing in the demand for labour did not 
descend to the level which prevailed during the years I88O-5 . The slump
51. AR of the Collector of Trichinopoly for 1892-3, HBRP, Vol. 4644*
Pro. No. 275
LRSRMP for 1893-4* MRP, Vol. 4839* Pro. No. 643 of 23 September 
PP. 359-360.
LRSRMP for 1894-5* ibid., Vol. 5293, Pro. No. 612 of 23 July 1897*
52. AR of the Collector of Trichinopoly for 1895-6, ibid., Vol. 5070,
Pro. No. 146 of 26 June I896, p.2.
AR of the Collector of Tanjore for 1895-6, ibid., Pro. No. 162 of 
11 July 1896, pp. 1-2.
53. LRSRMP for 1897-8, ibid., Vol. 5745* Pro. No. 409 of 28 June I899.
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was nothing like the depression of the i860 in its magnitude. The initial
overhead capital investment for the tea industry was relatively high.
Therefore, the unremunerative tea prices were not immediately followed hy
a discontinuance of production on the existing estates. Instead the
planters kept their estates going, looking ahead for better days rather
than incur capital losses. Though further extension of cultivation was
stopped, yet there was a demand for labour for the maintenance and
production processes on the large acreage of tea brought under cultivation
during the preceding period.
On the whole, the period of the slump saw a sustained decline in
immigration to Ceylon. But the downward swing did not proceed without
sharp fluctuation. The year 1899 saw a steep drop in the number of arrivals.
Apart from the decline in the demand for labour after 1897 the heavy
immigration during the four preceding years which created a situation of
surplus labour in the Island, the decline in 1899 was the outcome also of
the economic situation in South India. The years 1898 and 1899 witnessed
very favourable agricultural seasons in the Madras Presidency due to
54abundant and x*ell distributed rainfall. There was a clear drop in food
prices. But the year 1900 was one of famine. There were extensive crop
55failures and high food prices throughout the Presidency., To escape 
from this distressing condition, a large number of immigrant labourers 
swamped the Island in 1900 in spite of the lack of a heavy "pull” on the 
demand side of labour. Most of the spill-over from the estates were 
absorbed in the construction of the Kelani Valley and Udapussellawa 
railways which were started in 1900. With the return of favourable agri­
cultural seasons in South India in the years 1902-3 emigration subsided, 
for the tea industry which was still in a state of slump failed to attract
54. LRSRMP for 1898-9, MRP, Vol. 6OO5 , Pro. No. 462 of 14 May 1900.
MMPRI for 1898-9, p. 106.
55. LRSRMP for 1899-1900, MB HP, Vol. 6222, Pro. No. 160 of 2 August 1901.
LP.SRMP for 1900-1, MRP, Vol. 6444, Pro. No. 485 of 3 June 1902.
Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1901, P * 4•
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56additional labour.
The recession in the tea industry came to an end in 1904. The 
quinquennium after 1905 was one of prosperity in the plantation sector in 
the Island, The tea industry which re-emerged from the slump took on a 
more stable character than before. Improvement in the quality of tea, 
stable and remunerative prices, an increase in world demand, and the tea 
planters* experience during the slump— all helped to revive the industry. 
Though the total tea acreage did not undergo a substatial increase, the 
industry became remunerative and production increased.; The period from 
1904-10 also witnessed the rapid growth of a new commercial crop, rubber, 
largely due to the increase in world demand consequent on the progress 
of the motor car industry. The increase in rubber prices set-off an 
international rubber mania. Heavy investment in rubber planting in the 
Island increased the total acreage from 25,000 in 1904 to 203,000 by 1910.^ 
These developments inevitably led to an increase in the demand for labour 
after 1904*
The planters were fortunate in that the series of favourable
agricultural seasons which occurred in South India between 1902 and 1904
soon came to an end. 1905 was a year of near famine and recruiting of
58
labourers became relatively easy. The number of labourers who arrived
in the Island for estate work in 1905 exceeded even the heavy 1900 mark.
«
Though the annual immigration in the period from 1906 to 1910 fell below 
that of the year 1905? yet the total arrivals during the quinquennium 
exceeded that of any preceding quinquennium in our period. This heavy 
increase in immigration reveals the impact of the heavy demand for labour 
in the Island as well as that of agricultural distress in South India in
56. LRSRMP for 1903-4, MBRP, Vol. 7163, Pro. No. 269 of 21 March 1905. 
MUPRI for 1902-3, p. 103.
Ibid., for 1903-4, PP* 105, 168.
57• See Appendix D.
58. AnR of CLC for the eleven months ending 30 November 1905, YPAC, p. 12.
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89these years. Though the near famine condition of I905 terminated hy 
the end of that year, the subsequent years, except 1907, did not witness 
any conspicious improvement in the agricultural conditions in the 
Presidency. The rainfall, during both the south-west and the north-east 
monsoons were deficient, resulting in short outturn of crops and heavy 
food prices. 1907 was the only exceptional year when good harvests and 
a decline in the prices of food-grains in South India brought about a 
drop in the number of immigrants arriving in the Island.
The impact of the two above stated broad economic factors operating 
in South India and Ceylon on the trends of labour migration is also seen 
in the seasonal fluctuations of immigration. The detailed monthly 
statistics on immigration available for our period do not distinguish 
between the different types of immigrants except for the years 1900—1. ^
The monthly trend of labour immigration for the years 1900-1 appeared to 
have run parallel to the gross monthly statistics on all types of immigrants 
from South India. The bulk of the latter were plantation labourers. The 
trends shown inFi5ure3*3 reveal that labour immigration took an upward 
spurt in the first half of the year rapidly increasing in the months of 
March to June . Thereafter, immigration took a downward trend.
On the side of labour supply, the months from January to June 
formed the slack season in agriculture in South India. January to March 
was the driest quarter of the year. April to l4ay witnessed some rainfall 
but it was insufficient for extensive cultivation purposes. The main form 
of cultivation which took place during the first half of the year was 
"dry” cultivation. The second half of the year was the main monsoon 
season in South India? the south-west monsoon usually occurringfrom June 
to September and the north-east monsoon from October to December.
AnR of CLG for 1907, ibid 1907
AnR of CLC for 1908, ibid 19 08
AnR of CLC for 1909, ibid 1909
60. Weekly Returns of Immigration and Emigration at the Port 
of (JoHonbo, by the Acting Master Attendent. Published 
weekly), COG.
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i
Figure 3.3 The average monthly South Indian 
immigration into Ceylon, 1880-1910
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The south-west monsoon was usually deficient and the main source of rains
in South India was the north-east monsoon. It was during the months of
the north-east monsoon that "wet” cultivation of food-grains took place.
The quarterly rainfall statistics for Trichinopoly, Tanjore, Madura, and
Tinnevelly reveal the above stated trend in the rainfall rhythm in these
districts.^ The bulk of the cultivation in these districts were done
during the months following June.
On the tea plantations in the Island, April to June were the months
of heavy yield when the demand for labour was at its peak. During July
to September, the work-load on the estates was at its minimum and it
compelled the planters even to cut down the weekly quota of work given
6 2to the labour force. The rest of the months witnessed an average level 
of production onihe tea estates. The conclusion then is that the season 
of peak work-load on the estates coincided with the slack season in South 
Indian agriculture.
It is difficult to assess the differential impact of the two 
above stated variables on the migratory flow. On the whole, while the 
long term cyclical fluctuations corresponding to the periods 1880—5,
1886-97, 1898-1904? and 1905-10 appear to have been predominantly influenced 
by the major fluctuations in the demand for labour, within each major 
cycle, the short term annual waves of migration seem to have been affected 
more by the seasonal fortunes of the agricultural situation in South India.
The entire process reveals the responsiveness of the migrants to 
the economic opportunities available to them. When the problem of labour
61. For eg. during the period I898—1902 the average quarterly rainfall 
in Trichinopoly, Tanjore, Tinnevelly, and Madura districts were 
as follows.
January-March 3 .4
April-May 5 .8
June-September 8 .9
October-December 19 .8
See also, AR of the Collector of Trichinopoly for 1888-9, MB HP,
Vol. 3541, Pro. No. 327 of 3 July 1889.
62. See below, pp. 180—183*
131
redundancy affected the plantation sector as in the years 1880-5, the 
Island was spared the burden of the upkeep of the dislodged labour families, 
for they returned to their villages in South India. Similarly, when 
agricultural distress struck South India to the point of famines, the 
Island served as an outlet for some of the distress-stricken populace of 
South India. For the labourer, it was fortunate that more often the years 
of slump in the plantation sector (1880-5 and I898-I9O4) coincided with 
fairly good agricultural seasons in South India (1880-4, 1899, and 1902-4). 
For the planter, the years of the most rapid expansion of the tea industry 
(1886-97) and the rapid expansion of rubber planting (1904-IO) more 
often coincided with the years of agricultural distress in South India 
(1887-92, 1896-7> 1905-6, and 1908). Thus, the expansion of tea and 
rubber planting seems to have taken place under favourable conditions 
in that the years of expansion of the industry coincided more often 
with the years when the impact of the major economic factor in South 
India inhibiting the flow of labour, viz., good agricultural seasons, was 
less intense and less frequent.
3. The adequacy of the plantation labour sunply
In the following analysis we will try to find out how fa.r the 
supply of immigrant labour met the demand on the plantations in our period. 
Evidence lead us to the conclusion that the planters did not face a 
permanent scarcity of immigrant labour and that the shortage of labour, 
when it did occur, was confined to the months of heavy tea yield. Nor did 
this seasonal labour shortage become an annual feature. Barring I89O, it 
was felt mainly in the years of good harvests in peasant agriculture in 
those South Indian districts which supplied labour to the estates and also 
during the years when there was heavy labour emigration to Italaya— the 
major competitor of Ceylon for South Indian emigrant labour. When these 
two factors occurred simultaneously, the Ceylon planters got into serious 
difficulties in procuring an adequate supply of labour, suggesting that
132
the Ceylon plantation labour system suffered in comparision with the 
alternative opportunities for employment when the latter were available 
to the poorer classes in South India on a satisfactory scale.
The information at our disposal is inadequate for a systematic
statistical analysis of the demand and supply of immigrant plantation 
labour in the Island, We have based our analysis of the adequacy of the
labour supply on two types of sources. First, we have made use of the
trends in the rates of cash advances paid to the kanganies by the planters 
to procure labour. Secondly, we have utilized the available qualitative 
evidence in the form of the planters* comments on the adequacy of the 
labour supply. In applying the scale rates of advances as a major indicator 
to the analysis of the adequacy of the labour supply, we need at the 
outset explain our decision to do so.
Of the various inducements held out by the planters to procure
labour, the most effective initial offer was the cash advance. The daily
wage rates of the labourers remained virtually static over the entire 
period of our study and the point of competition between the supply and 
demand of labour appears to have centred on the rates of advances. ^ 
Therefore, as between the wage rates and the rates of advances, it was 
the latter which responded to the supply-demand situation of labour. It 
is important to see how the system of advances came to play this vital role.
The term "coast advances" at first, in its strict sense, meant 
the cash advances paid to the kanganies to obtain labourers direct from 
South India.^ However, subsequently, in actual practice the term assumed 
a wider connotation covering all types of money advanced by the planters 
to the kanganies such as advances to maintain the gangs of labourers on 
the estates or to obtain "local" labour gangs in the Island by way of 
"crimping” from other estates or to obtain from those estates which had
6 3. See below, chap. IV.
64* In the planters* jargon, South India was often referred to as the
"Coast".
excess labour. Thus, both strictly "local” and "coast" advances came to
be commonly referred to as "coast advances" by the planters. These advance
as we have seen earlier on, were given to the kanganies on Promissory
Notes. The kangany had the right to shift his labour gang from the estate
at one months* notice to the employer provided he repaid the total
remaining debt of the gang to the estate. The shifting of gangs between
estates was facilitated by what was known as the "tundu system" whereby
a kangany could obtain from his employer a note, generally referred to
as a tundu, stating his total debt to the estate, offer his gang to any
estate in need of labour for the amount stated in the tundu or for better
terms to the kangany depending on the state of the labour market at the
time, settle his former tundu debt with the fresh cash advance obtained
65from the new employer and move his gang to serve the latter. The
system therefore allowed the labour gangs some freedom of mobility. The
"tundu system11 was originally evolved by the planters as a method
convenient for themselves to transfer labour gangs from the estates with
excess labour to others in short supply on the payment by the latter of
the gang's debt to the former. Thus the system as originally envisaged
helped to transfer surplus labour gangs without a loss to the estate on
its coast advances a c c o u n t T h e  system was, therefore, a source of
security to the planters for all out-going advances. However, during
•»
seasons of labour shortage the kangany began to use the "tundu system" 
to his advantage by demanding the tundu from the employer and transferring 
the gang to an estate willing to pay an advance in excess of the gang's
Jf
debt to the former employer, that is for a "transfer price" well above the 
"tundu price". ^
6 5. For a specimen tundu, see Appendix B.
66. 'The Labour Question Memorandum', by the Chairman of PAC, FPAC I896, 
Editorial, COO, 7 June I89O.
6 7. Planting Notes from Dolosbage, CON, 3 February 1902.
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When supplying labourers to the estates either direct from South
India or by way of transferring "local gangs" the kangany sought to obtain
68
the highest possible advance from the planter. Out of the advances, 
the kangany met the initial cost of recruitment and transportation of 
labour in case of new gangs from South India or met the local financial 
encumbrances in case of "old gangs" already in the Island. The amount of 
money remaining, if any, after meeting these expenses was retained by 
the kangany. This was an important source of his income. Available evidence 
conclusively proves that while, on the one hand, the kangany tried to 
obtain the highest possible advance from the planter, on the other hand, 
he tried to spend as little as possible of it on the labourers in order 
to enhance his own margin of profit in the transaction. The kangany*s 
personal income being thus directly tied up with the rates of advances, 
it was inevitable that he should bargain for heavy advances rather than 
for an increase in the daily wage rates, which though benificial to his 
labourers would bring no immediate personal income to him. Thus, the 
key position occupied by the kangany in the supply of labour partly explains 
why competition for labour centred on the rates of advances rather than
69
the wage rates.
The planters, on the whole, were keen to maintain both the daily
wage rates and the rates of advances at a minimum. However, where
«
competition for labour became inevitable, the planters preferred to offer 
higher rates of advances to procure labour rather than increase the wage 
r a t e s . T h e  planters were of the view that wage rates, once increased, 
would be difficult to reduce if and when periods of depression in the
68. A. Thomsom to Sec. of Ceylon Association in London, 9 July 1897?
PPAC 1898, Correspondence, pp. ccx-ccxi.
69* An advertisement in the COO by a Ceylon planter read, "50 coolies 
with a good kangany— very good advances given". The advertisement 
met with strong criticism on the ground that such advertisements oriLy 
tended to create more competition among the planters for labour 
already in the Island without in any way helping to increase the flow 
of fresh labour from South India. COO, 1 November I89O.
70. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Proceedings.
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planting sector were to occur. Their fear of a slump was particularly 
acute because the trend in the price of tea since the early I89O0 was 
one of decline. Besides, advances unlike wages were not outright payments. 
The advances were regarded as recoverable assets. These were deducted 
periodically from the wages of the labourers. The failure to repay 
advances taken from the estate placed the kangany at the mercy of the 
planter because the law provided for imprisonment in case of non-payment 
of debt. Because the advances tied the kangany to the estate by debt, the 
system enabled the planters to maintain a hold over the kangany and his 
labour gang.
However, the planters were not ready to let the rates of advances 
increase indiscriminately. In spite of the advantages which the system of 
competition of advances gave the planters over the system of competition 
of wage rates in the procurement of labour, the former was an evil one 
for him all the same. Handing out lump sums as advances in the hope of 
obtaining labour had the attendant risk of loss. In fact, some kanganies 
disappeared with such advances. Though lega.1 provision was available to 
the planter to obtain warrants for the arrest of defaulting kanganies, it 
was difficult and expensive to get a runaway kangany arrested, particularly 
if he had bolted to South India. However, the evidence of the planters 
reveal that the cases of runaway kanganies were rare because bolting 
meant loss of his means of regular income. The system worked partly out 
of necessity and pa.rtly out of a certain degree of mutual trust. The 
worst evil to the planters was that, at times, advances given to the 
kanganies got accumulated beyond any hope of recovery. Evidence reveals that 
while the planters did periodically recover a part of the outstanding 
advances, they had at times to write off heavily accumulated advances as
irrecoverable debt. Besides, heavy advances meant a heavy outlay of
7 1  T •working capital on labour. Puthermore, the increasing offer of advances
71. Editorial, COW, 13 December 1902.
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encouraged the kanganies to constantly shift gangs "between estates thereby
creating a state of instability in the labour force in the Island,
Competition of local advances also tended to discourage the kanganies
from recruiting labour in South India. With a-vlewto avoid these eventualities,
the planters at times attempted to fix a ceiling to the rates of advances
payable to the kanganies and thereby tried to avoid the competition of
advances. There were times when the planters mooted schemes to combine
72themselves and act m  unison to keep the rates of advances low. The 
failure of these attempts to check the rise of rates of advances reveal 
the intensity of the competition for labour among the planters in times 
of boom.
The amount of advances a planter was prepared to accede to a
kangany depended on the extent of the demand for labour on his estate. An
estate faced with an acute shortage of labour was prepared to pay a
relatively higher cash advance to engage a gang of labourers than an estate
73with a marginal demand for labour, A state of surplus labour kept the 
rates of advances relatively low while scarcity of la.bour encouraged the
74
kanganies to press for higher advances. The daily wage rates hardly entered 
into negotiations between the planters and the kanganies at the time of 
recruitment of labour to the estates. The point of all negotiations and 
bargaining between the planter— the purchaser of labour, and the kangany—  
the supplier of labour, was the rate of advances. The amount of advances
which the planters were prepared to pay and xfhich the kanganies were
prepared to accept at a given time in a given district reveal the state 
of the labour market in that district.
A certain degree of circumspection, however, is necessary in 
applying the movement of the rates of cash advances as a barometer to 
test the demand-supply situation of the labour market. Data on rates of
72. See below, pp. 155-160.
73. A general meeting of G of C, 15 January I885, VJCQ, 16 January I885.
74» Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Report, pp. xi.xii.
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advances are scattered and incomplete, Kost of the available information
are on the amount of debt of the labourers to the estate, that is, the
estate advances account of the labourers. The temptation, therefore, is
to take the debt account of the labourers as roughly synonymous with the
rates of advances and utilize the amount of the labourers* debt to analyse
75the state of the labour market. The debt a labourer was able to obtain 
at a certain time was certainly an indication of his worth to the creditor 
and therefore shows his value in the labour market at the time the debt 
was obtained. But, on the other hand, due to two reasons the debt account 
is not always a satisfactory indication of the adequacy or otherwise of 
the supply of labour.
It will be shown in chapter V that the total amount an average 
labourer was able to work-off per year against his estate debt account 
was small. Therefore, the labourer’s debt to the estate underwent only 
a small reduction in any one year. Thus even if the following year 
happened to be one of surplus labour, the "tundu price” of the labourer, 
that is his total debt to the estate, would remain high all the same as 
a long term repercussion of the previous year’s labour shortage.
Secondly, it is also necessary to understand how far the rise in 
the rates of advances was a function of the rise in the cost of living 
of the labourers and the increase in the cost of transportation of 
labourers from India to the estates independent of the demand-supply 
situation in the labour market. In chapter V we shall develop the theme 
that the period after I89O was one of rising cost of living and that one 
factor which reconciled the labourers to the rise in the cost of living 
in a context of static daily wage rates was their ability to obtain cash 
advances from time to time from the estates; that these advances helped 
them to bridge the gap between the rising cost of living and a lagging
75. This approach has been adopted by L. R. Jayawardana in his analysis 
of the plantation labour market,
L. R. Jayawardena, unpublished dissertation for research fellowship, 
Cambridge, i9 6 0, pp* 63-6 5,
138
daily wage rate though at an annually increasing rate of indebtedness*
Therefore, even under conditions of an adequate supply of labour, the
"tundu price" which usually indicated the total indebtedness of the gang
to the estate could still be high. This is precisely v/hat happened, for
*76
instance, in the year 1906.
Therefore, the satisfactory test of adequacy is not the estate
advances account but the rate a planter actually paid at a given time to
obtain labour. At best the total indebtedness of the labourers reflect
the cyclical state of the demand and supply of labour over a period of
years and it is a poor test to analyse the annual trends in the seasonal
adequacy of the labour supply.
Even after eliminating the debt accounts and taking strictly the
rates of advances paid by the planters to test the adequacy of the labotir
supply there is still another problem. As indicated above, the rate of
advances could be a mere reflection of the rise in the cost of living and
the cost of importing labour. For example, as we will see later on in
detail, during the early I87O the planters paid an average rate of
Rs.5-Rs.10 per labourer. In 1905* Ihe average rate of coast advances
approximated Rs.30. The increase in the rate does not necessarily mean
that there was a relative shortage of labour in 19^5* ln fact, the labour
77supply was as abundant in 1905 as in I878. Our problem is to find out
«
how we could assess whether a particular rate of coast advances reasonably 
reflected the supply-demand situation of labour independent of the impact 
of the rise in the cost of living and the rise in the cost of importing 
labour.
There is one way in which the above stated limitation could be 
minimised. The planters at different times during our period held out 
different scale rates of advances as the current moderate scale to procure
76. See below, p. l6l.
1906 was a year when the supply of labour was adequate but the "tundu 
price" of labour gangs was heavy.
77• See below, p. 161. See also, Figure 3.4 (p. 166)
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labour. Thus, in the late 1870s and 1880s they viewed Rs.5-Rs.10 as the 
moderate rate; in the 1890‘ and during 1904-10 the planters considered
•JO
Rs.10-Rs.15 and Rs.30 as the moderate rates respectively. At any of 
these above stated periods if the rates paid by the planters exceeded the 
rate considered by the planters as moderate it can be reasonably regarded 
as an indication of a scarcity of labour. Similarly, if the rate paid by 
the planters fell below the current moderate rate it can be regarded as 
a reflection of an adequate supply of labour. Therefore, in our analysis 
of the adequacy of the labour supply it would be more realistic for us 
to use the current moderate rate as the base rather than use onerate as 
the base for the entire period 1880-1910.
Due to the lack of consistent data on the annual and seasonal 
changes in the trends of the rates of advances we hope to supplement the 
available evidence on the rates of advances with another group of evidence, 
mainly qualitative, which reveals the planters* behaviour towards the 
question of the labour supply during each year. This category mainly 
consist of the annual reports of the Ceylon Planters* Association and the 
District Planters* Associations. Besides, there are other evidence such 
as discussions in the press, speeches of the leading planters, passing 
of resolutions, mooting of various schemes, and the appointment of labour 
commissions, each reflecting the general state of the labour market during
o
the respective years. We will look into all this evidence in the following 
analysis.
There is hardly any detailed statistical information on the 
monthly or the seasonal movement of rates of advances paid to attract 
labour. However, evidence is overwhelming that it was during the months 
of high yield of tea that the kanganies demanded high advances and that
78. * Labour Supply*. Extract of a paper read out at a meeting of the 
Northern Districts Planters* Association, COO , 8 May 1895*
Also see below, pp. 148-161.
140
79the planters were receptive to the demands of the kanganies. The
proceedings of the Ceylon Planters* Association and the District Planters*
Associations reveal that the outcry of the planters against heavy advances
80was mainly confined to the season from April to May of the year.
Passing of resolutions and the mooting of various schemes with a view to
keep the rates of advances at a low level always took place during these
months. Thereafter such activities subsided only to recur again in the
next season of high yield. A correspondent to The Ceylon Observer,
Overland Edition succintly pointed out the situation when he wrote at the
end of the spring of 1895 that, "We shall probably go to sleep over the
81labour question now until next spring when we shall wake up again,"
During the rest of the year the planters found the available supply of
labour adequate to cope with the average work-load on the estates. In
fact, in a few months, particularly from July to September, the planters
found it difficult to provide a full working-week for their labour force
either due to bad climatic conditions or due to low yield of tea during 
82these months. This seasonal fluctuation m  the work-load on the tea 
estates was the major problem which the tea planters had to face with 
their labour. The overall problem of the planters was aptly stated in the 
Annual Report of the Ceylon Planters* Association for the year I896— a year 
of labour shortage. According to the Report
*
During the heavy flushing spring months of the year there was perhaps 
an unusual outcry raised as to the shortness of the labour supply. 
Your Committee thinks that during these months there will always be 
some difficulty in coping with the flush, because if the supply of 
labour were sufficient to easily cope with the flush during these 
months, it would be more than can be economically employed during 
the remainder of the year.83
79. Circular on *Coast Advances and the Labour Supply*, issued by PAC and 
C of C, PPAC 1891? Correspondence, p. xxix.
80. ’The Cooly Labour Supply and Crimping*, by X, COO, 20 March I89O.
81. 'The Labour Question*, by UNITAS SALUS NOSTRA, ibid., 24 May I895.
See also, 'Labour and Ceylon Products*? by A Thirsty World, ibid.,
28 May 1895.
Sub-editorial, ibid., 23 May 1895*
8 2. See below, pp. 180-183*
83. Forty-second AnR of PAC, PPA.C 1896» P* xxxiii.
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The planters were normally inclined to maintain a labour force sufficient 
for the the average requirements of the estates and they sought to obtain 
casual labour to cope with the few peak months of activity on the esta/tes. 
They preferred to lay-off such casual labour at the end of the season,^ 
The problem of the Ceylon planters was, therefore, the need of a pool of 
extra labour from which they could draw during the months of heavy work.
How did the planters react to this seasonal shortage of labour?. 
The planting region of the Island consisted of approximately 2,000 
estates of varying sizes in acreage and in their labour requirements.
Some estates were managed by proprietor-plamters. But this type of 
plantations, which was the dominant one in the coffee period, was on the 
decline in the tea period. The bulk of the tea acreage was organised in 
the form of limited liability companies. Private enterprise and competition 
was the theme. The superintendents and the planters had their organisa­
tions— the District Planters' Associations and the Ceylon Planters* 
Association— for themselves to act in concert in matters of their common 
interest. The great majority of the planters were in these organisations. 
But these voluntary organisations could not bind their members to the 
decisions of the organisations and the success of the decisions depended 
mainly on the degree of voluntary adherence and unanimity shown by the 
members. In those aspects of the plantation sector where competition 
among the planters was rife and voluntary adherence to common rules 
was difficult to achieve, individual planters and superintendents were 
inclined to go their ovm way to attain their immediate economic objectives. 
The question of the labour supply was one such aspect where competition 
among the employers was heavy. Whereas, from time to time, common rules 
of conduct with regard to the labour problems were framed by the planters, 
these rules were flouted by at least some members of the planting 
community when they were pressed for labour. The absentee proprietors
8 4. Planting Notes from Kotmale, COO, 21 February 1891.
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living in England and their Colombo Agents were the only ones who could
have prevailed on their estate superintendents. But they, on the whole,
left the task of procurement of labour in the hands of the superintendents
so long as the company estates showed dividends and the latter had to
85
find labour somehow to safeguard their billets. The ultimate result
was that when labour shortage did occur, the reaction of the planters
varied depending on the economic situation of each planter. On the whole,
the planters seem to have adopted four different means to meet the
seasonal shortage of labour.
Some planters took steps to obtain fresh supplies of labour from
South India during the peak months on the estates as seen in the upward
spurt of labour immigration during the second quarter of every year. There
were others who showed a reluctance and an indifference to recruit such
extra hands from the "Coast11. The inevitable tendency of the latter was
to engage "local" labour gangs during the peak months by the offer of
86high cash advances. Some planters even sought to crimp labour from other 
estates by inducing their kanganies to approach others employed in the
o7
neighbouring districts. Recruitment from South India was uncertain and
8 5. ‘Labour via Tuticorin for Estates’, by Crops, ibid., 9 August I89I.
From time to time the Agents and the proprietors were urged to influence 
their estate superintendents with a view to keep a check on the 
competition of advances. In 1904> the PAC adopted a resolution in which 
the Agents and the proprietors were requested to prevail on their 
superintendents to prevent the latter exceeding Rs .30 per labourer as 
advances. But there was little response to the request. In fact there 
were frequent allegations that during times of labour shortage, the 
proprietors and Agents were inclined to privately inform their super­
intendents to procure labour irrespective of the rate of advances. The 
conduct of the Agents and the proprietors could be partly attributed to 
the fact that out-going advances were entered in the estate accounts
as recoverable assets.
86. ‘Current Topics’, ibid., supplement, 15 May 1895*
8 7. While some planters bribed the kanganies to get labour from other 
estates there were allegations that some planters after paying off their 
gangs on tundu tried to get their gangs to desert back. In the heat
of the labour shortage of 1907 one planter castigated the fellow 
community in the following words. "Tie are all ... a set of crimps".
YPAC 1907y a general meeting of PAC of 14 February 1908, p. 86.
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time-consuming. Particularly, when faced with a large yield, the 
temptation was to engage a "local" gang which had skilled hands unlike
89
a fresh gang from South India,. Besides, sending cash advances to the
90
"Coast" was risky and required trustworthy kanganies. But all employers 
did not have the same reliable connections with the labour-supplying 
villages of South India. The personal link which existed in the coffee 
period between the kangany, his labour gang,and the planter tended to 
decline in the tea period with the relative decline in the number of 
proprietor-planters and the rapid growth of large-scale tea companies.
The general reluctance of the planters to recruit from South India for 
the peak season on the estates is seen in the repeated requests embodied 
in the various resolutions and circulars of the Planters* Associations 
urging the planters to recruit their own supplies of labour from the 
"Coast" without resorting to the practice of taking up "local" labour 
gangs. Such resolutions vie re passed and circulars were sent out to the 
planters by the Planters* Associations virtually at every time when the 
labour shortage was felt. For instance, in I89O,the Planters* Association 
and the Chamber of Commerce in a joint circular to all planters pointed 
out that
... it is desired to impress on all employers of labour the necessity 
for NOT increasing local advances during the busy season.
Particularly during March, April, and May Canganies take advantage 
of the demand which arises for labour to obtain large extra advances 
not to be sent to the Coast but for local purposes, and it is most 
necessary that all employers should combine in refusing any extra 
local advance at that season. 91
The planters* preference to take up "local" gangs during peak
seasons set off a state of competition among them for immigrant labour
8 8. *The Labour Question*, The views of the Chairman of PAC, ibid.,
13 May 1895.
8 9. *Labour Question*, Eeport of the special Committee of PAC,
YPAC 1902-1903, p. 12.
90. !The Cooly Labour Question and Crimping*, by X, COO, 20 March 1891*
91. Circular on *Coast Advances and the Labour Supply', issued by the 
PAC and C of C, PPAC 1891, Correspondence, p. xxix.
144
already in the Island. The shifting of gangs between estates by the
kanganies naturally had an unsettling effect on the labour force.
Absenteeism and labour turnover became high. Apart from travel time
between estates, a gang usually stopped work a few days prior to their
exit from one estate and took some time to settle down in the new estate.
What is important is that this vicious circle became highly operative at
the very season of peak work-load on the estates when the estates not only
required more hands but also required a greater degree of work commitment
92from the existing labour gangs. Even when a fair minority of estates 
or districts were short-supplied with labour, it inevitably had a wide­
spread unsettling effect on the labour force in general.
Apart from importing labour and also competing for local labour 
gangs, the planters adopted two other methods to overcome their heavy 
seasonal labour requirements. An attempt was made to get the Sinhalese 
to work on the estates during the busy months. By the time of the tea 
period, several factors had tended to abate the mid-nineteenth century 
aversion to estate work at least among some sections of the Sinhalese 
villagers. They were a new generation born and bred in the colonial 
socio-economic context. The stunting of village expansion in some areas 
with the growth of plantations together with the natural growth of 
population inevitably had their impact on the village economy. At least 
in some districts, the British land revenue administration in the 1880 
rendered some Sinhalese peasants landless and thejr tended to drift to the 
estates in search of employment. Besides, most ofxthe new plantations
from
which were opened up in the period i860 to 1910 were in the Sabaragarauwa 
and the Western Provinces and a few in the Southern Province— in areas
Q -3
nearer to the low-country Sinhalese villages.However, the impact of
92. 'Mr. Charles Young’s Opinion*, COO, 14 May 1895*
93. According to Ceylon Census returns a greater number of low-country 
Sinhalese worked on the estates than Kandyans. The Census Reports of 
1901 and 1911 reveal that in these years the percentage of the low- 
country and the Kandyan Sinhalese to the total estate labour force 
approximated 5 and 2 .5 respectively.
these factors were not sufficiently powerful to induce the Sinhalese to
offer themselves for wage labour in any significant numbers. It is
difficult to get precise information on the turn up of the Sinhalese for
plantation work in our period. At the census counts of I89I, 1901, and
1911, it was found that approximately 19,500, 24,500, and 38,500 Sinhalese
94worked in the estates in the respective years. These figures, however,
were underestimations, for the number of Sinhalese who were permanently
resident on the estates were small. Most of those who worked in the
estates were non-resident labourers who preferred to travel daily from 
95their villages. Qualitative evidence reveals that even as day-labourers 
the Sinhalese formed only a small section of the plantation labour force. 
Most of the Sinhalese males who had permanent association with the estates 
were skilled men such as carpenters and masons. The aversion of the 
Sinhalese to reside in the estates and the poor means of transport contri­
buted to hinder a steady flow of village labour to the estates. At any 
rate, even in our period the basic economic factors did not operate so as 
to attract a large number of Sinhalese for estate work. It was mainly the
plantations bordering the Sinhalese villages which succeeded in obtaining
a
indigenous labour to work on the estates on significant scale. By and 
large, this situation existed mainly in the planting districts of Kegalle,
96
Kalutara, Ratnapura, Badulla, Matara, and Galle. Several planters in
«
these districts established contacts with the Sinhalese villages. Two 
factors, however, interrupted the flow of Sinhalese labour even in these
94- According to these figures the percentages of Sinhalese to the total 
plantation labour force in the years 1891, 1901? and 1-911 were
6 , 7.5, and 7*5 respectively.
Ceylon Census Report, 1891, Vol. II, p. 249*
Ibid., 1901, Vol. II, pp. 598ff.
Ibid., 1911? Vol. on population by §ex etc., p. 360.
95- Ibid., 1891, Vol. I, p. 42.
96. AnR of Sabaragamuwa DPA for 1907? COW, 8 February 1908.
Editorial, ibid., 22 February 1908.
AnR of Udapussellawa DPA for 1891, . CQQ , 17 February 1891.
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districts during the peak season on the estates. First, the traditional
Sinhalese Hew Year started in mid-April. For the Sinhalese it was a season
of social and religious activities. They usually kept away from all
occupational work for at least one week. Secondly, the peak season of the
97labour demand m  the paddy fields was from February to early April.
However, where estates had established regular contacts with the
villages in the neighbourhood, the Sinhalese turned out to be a useful
source of labour for the tea planters as a supplementary labour force to
98
cope with the work-load during the peak seasons. It was possible to
lay-off easily Sinhalese labour at the end of the busy season. The problems
of providing cash advances, transport costs, estate medical care, and
accommodation facilities did not exist to trouble the planters in case of
Sinhalese labour. These factors and the relative inaccessibility to sources
of labour explains the offer of relatively high daily wage rates and also
99the weekly payment of wages to the Sinhalese. Especially, in years
of widespread shortage of immigrant labour, as for instance in 1907* a
keen interest was shown by the planters to explore the possibilities of
obtaining Sinhalese labour.^0 The Labour Commission appointed by the
Government in 1907 to inquire into the plantation labour_problems had as
one of its terms of reference the task of examining the question whether
it was desirable to take any measures to promote and encourage the
*
97* Planting Notes from Rakwana, ibid., 16 April I89I.
Planting Notes from Haputale, ibid., 29 January 1892.
Planting Notes from Neboda, ibid., 2 February 1892.
98. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Report, pp. xvii-xviii.
99- The Sinhalese tea pluckers were paid approximately 40 and 35 cents 
per day for male and female labourers respectively as against the 
daily wage rates of the immigrant tea pluckers which stood at an
• average of 33 and 25 cents.
100. Editorial, CON, 20 January 1908.
Annual general meeting of PAC, 14 February 1908, YPAC 1907> PP* 80-82. 
Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Report, p. v.
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employment of Sinhalese on the estates. The Commission found "... no 
evidence to show that there is any portion of the Sinhalese population 
which is desirous of obtaining work upon estates and is unable to obtain 
it."'^^ On the whole, the supply of Sinhalese labour was found to be 
numerically small, less dependable, irregular, and entirely a question 
of locality.
On the other hand, especially in the years after 1902, the
planters began to adopt widely a policy of offering incentives to their
immigrant labour gangs to get them to do extra work during the peak 
102season. Some planters offered higher wage rates for evening work
beyond the routine hours and also for Sunday work. Others paid their
labourers by piece-work, for instance according to the number of pounds
of tea plucked. As inducements, the planters began to pay the labourers
their extra earnings weekly. At times, the labourers worked on Sunday
for the higher Sunday wage and were inclined to skip a day mid-week. But
the system worked satisfactorily because it augmented the total earnings
of the labourers and also helped the planters to cope with excess work.
But during 3ome years, the available peak season labour force was found
to be inadequate even with overtime work and it became necessary for the
planters to obtain fresh labour gangs.
In the following pages we will attempt a Chronological survey of
*
the available data— that is, the rates of advances and qualitative 
evidence— on the adequacy of the labour supply with a view to find out 
the frequency with which the seasonal labour shortage occurred in the 
planting sector in our period. The bulk of the qualitative evidence for 
the years after 1896 is found in the Annual Reports of the District 
Planters Associations. These reports invariably included a brief account 
of the state of the labour market in each district. For convenience of
101. Ibid., xvii.
Editorial, COO, 16 January 1892.
Editorial, loia., 20 February 1892.
102. See below, pp. 188-190.
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analysis the available qualitative evidence in these reports is set out in 
the form of a chart at the end of the chapter*
In the years 1878-9, the District Planters’ Associations 
maintained details of the prevalent rates of advances paid to the kanganies 
to procure labour in the various districts*^ Prom this set of infor­
mation it is possible to draw a scale of rates which is useful as a base
i s
to compare subsequent movement of the rates of advances* It seen from
these reports that the highest advances given out in the late 1870s was
Rs.10 per labourer. While Rs*5 to Rs*10 was regarded as moderate, less
than Rs*5 was considered as low. The same reports show that the estates
in most districts paid the low rate and that payments of Rs.10 per head
was very rare. The districts which paid the moderate rates reported
that these rates were undergoing further reduction. Some of the estates
found the offer of advances hardly necessary to procure labour. Some
planters totally refused to give out advances. Of the 22 District Planters'
Association only one— Madulsima and Hewa Eliya District Planters’
Association— reported that the advances were inclined to be heavy thus
revealing the regional state of the labour market in the locality. The
overall downswing in the rates of advances in these years was the result
of the presence of an adequate supply of labour due to the heavy influx
of the immigrants into the Island to escape from the virulent Indian
famine of 1878-7* The planters were quite outspoken abctat their satisfactory
supply of labour during the late 1870 and the planting reports from
both up and low-country districts were virtually unanimous on the abundant
supply of immigrant labour.
In the years 1880-5, these scale rates underwent further
reduction. At times the system of advances was abandoned altogether.
104
More often the planters refused to give advances. Resolutions were
103. Quarterly District Reports for 1877, PPAC 1878, pp. 131-161.
Quarterly District Reports for I878, ibid. 1879* PP* 1-78.
104. A general meeting of Badulla DPA, 31 May I89O, COO, 7 June I89O.
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passed by several -tea Companies and District Planters* Associations 
advising the planters to discontinue the practice of giving out advances,*^ 
J. Ferguson, one of the well-informed contemporary authorities on the 
planting sector, aptly pointed out that "the superabundant supply of 
coolies led to the complete abandonment of the Advance S y s t e m . T h o u g h  
a large number of immigrant labourers returned to South India and the 
tide of immigration declined during these years of economic depression 
in the Island, the immigrant labour force appears to have been adequate 
to meet the depressed demand for labour on the plantations during this 
period. Even after a reduction of the daily wage rates of the labourers, 
the planters had little to complain about their labour supply because 
the relative decline in the demand for labour in these years appears to 
have been greater than the decline in the supply of labour over the period. 
Where labour shortage did occur, it was isolated and spasmodic.
The state of surplus labour began to change with the revived 
prosperity of the plantation sector after 1886. The state of the labour 
market during these years fluctuated almost annually and it is not possible 
to identify the times of labour scarcity and its causes without virtually 
a year to year analysis of the data on the supply and demand of labour.
The signs of the approaching rise in the demand for labour were
seen as early as I885 when the rates of advances began to take an upward
«
drift. In the years 1886-9, the planters paid rates of approximately 
Rs.10 per head— a rate considered fairly high in the late 1870S."^^ But 
the payment of Rs.10 does not necessarily mean that the planters were
105. ’Coast Advances and Coolies' Pay1, Circular of 18 tea exporting 
companies in Colombo, ibid., 4 June 1880.
A general meeting of Rakwana DPA, 18 May 1880, ibid., 24 June 1880.
106. J. Ferguson, Ceylon Handbook and Directory, 1885, pp. 336, IO5 . 
Ibid., I887-8, p . 127*
107. 'Payment of Wages to Coolies— -Monthly or Quarterly. No. I 1, by 
Superintendent, COO, 2 June I89O.
Editorial, ibid., 6 June I89O.
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faced with a shortage of immigrant labour. During the late 1870° and
g
early i860 , the planters had virtually suspended recruiting labour from
South India. RsJ.0 was about the average cost of recruiting and
transporting labour from South India to the estates. Thus, the payment of
Rs.10 as coast advances in the years 1886-9 reveals rather the revival
of labour recruitment by the estates than a prevalence of widespread
labour shortage in the Island. According to qualitative evidence the
general state of the labour supply was satisfactory during these years
though some planting districts did feel some shortage of labour, especially
during the busy season of 1886— a year of downswing in migration due
largely to the favourable agricultural seasons which occurred in South 
108India. The slight upward swing in the rates of advances in 1886 
actuated the Planters* Association of Ceylon and the Chamber of Commerce 
to issue a joint memorandum requesting the planters not to exceed Rs.10 
per labourer as advances.
In spite of the fairly satisfactory state of the labour market 
the planters showed an intense concern over the question of labour supply 
throughout 1 8 8 6 - 9 * This concern reflectsan anxiety about the future
labour supplies rather than a current labour shortage. The planters of
s 111the late 1880" were annually extending their tea acreage. While the
tea acreage in yield was not large in the late 1880° a heavy demand was
«
bound to occur when the new acreage came into production in the near future. 
The overall attitude of the planters during these years is seen in the 
following extract from the Annual Report of the Planters* Association
108. A special general meeting of PAC, 18 September 1886, PPAC 1887? 
pp. 44-48
Sec. of PAC to Sec. of C of C., 15 November 1886, ibid.,
Correspondence, p. clxxi.
109. *Cooly Labour Supply for Ceylon Estates’, Memorandum of Suggestions 
and Information issued by the PAC and C of C , ibid., 1883, pp. 152-153*
110. A general meeting of PAC, 7 December 1888, ibid., 1889? pp. 60-68. 
Thirty-sixth AuR of PAC, ibid., 1890, p. xxv.
111. See Appendix D.
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for 1886. "A very large number of coolies must during the next few years
... be procured, and the necessity for a combined effort to start a fresh
112stream of immigration cannot be too strongly urged".
The planters' diffidence about the future labour supply was confirmed 
in 1890 when the young tea industry faced its first serious shortage of labour. 
There was a momentous outcry among the planters in the Press and in their 
Associations; and the central Association Reported that "... labour was 
greatly insufficient to the requirements, and a great loss of leaf, and 
consequently of money, was sustained by the Planting Community" While the 
usual rates of advances fluctuated between Rs.10 and Rs.l5> at times, it 
exceeded this amount. The Planters' Association and the Chamber of Commerce 
reacted in the usual manner of issuing a joint circular requesting the 
employers to limit the rate to Rs.10. The qualitative evidence on the
extent of the inadequacy of labour in I89O neecte to be viewed with some degree 
circumspection because the planters tended to exaggerate the problem of labour 
shortage in their fierce attack on the strict enforcement of the Ceylon 
Government quarantine regulations in that year. Due to a virulent cholera out­
break in India the Ceylon Government temporarily closed the iTorth Road for 
immigrant traffic and also subjected the ships arriving in Colombo to the 
letter of the regulations. The planters attributed the labour shortage to 
these measures, agitated to get the Government decisions rescinded, and in the 
process raised the issue of labour shortage to a hyperbole. There is no doubt 
that the planters faced a shortage of labour, though to a lesser extent than 
they contended. Neither was the shortage mainly due to the Government 
quarantine measures. Shipping between Tuticorin and Colombo was suspended 
only once by the shipping company as a protest against the Government 
decisions. The closure of the ITorth Road took place in the months when 
the seasonal migration to the Island usually assumed an upward trend 
and the news of the sudden stoppage of the Ceylon Government Immigration
112. 'Cooly Labour Supply for Ceylon Estates', Memorandum of Suggestions and 
Information issued by PAC and C of C , PPAC 1888, pp. 152-153*
113. Thirty-seventh AnR of PAC, ibid., I89I, p. xxviii.
114* Circular on 'Coast Advances and the Labour Supply*, issued by the PAC
and C of C, Ibid., Correspodence, p. xxviii.
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Service between Paumben and Mannar no doubt discouraged migration from 
the interior of South India to the sea port and also inconvenienced the 
immigrants _en route. But the North Road remained closed only for a 
maximum of two months and it cannot be accepted as a satisfactory explana­
tion for the overall state of labour scarcity throughout the planting 
115
districts. Neither is it possible to agree fully with the view that
the greater attractions of rival fields of labour emigration outside
Ceylon was responsible for the migrant labour shortage which occurred in
Ceylon in 1890.^^ The chief rival of Ceylon in South India, viz., Malaya,
did not offer overall conditions more attractive than the conditions on
117
the plantations in Ceylon until the dawn of the present century. At any
rate, the trend of labour migration from South India to other parts of
the world, besides Ceylon, did not register an appreciable increase in
1890. The main reasons for the shortage of I89O were two-fold. For the
first time in the history of the tea industry in the Island a large acreage
of tea came into production in 1889-91. Of this, the heaviest increase
ll8in any single year took place in I89O. Labour immigration itself was 
on the increase in response to the rise in demand and also because of the 
increase in the food-grain prices in South India in I89O. But, on the 
whole, the supply fell short of the demand because though the planters had 
shown great anxiety during 1886-9 about their future labour supplies they 
had not adequately intensified their recruiting activities nor had they 
brought about improvements in the method of recruitment and conveyance of 
labour so as to meet the relatively heavy demand for labour on the tea
115• Telegram from Col. Sec. to Chairman of PAC, 25 April I89O,
PPAC I89I? Correspondence, p. xxxvi. •
Col. Sec. to Chairman of PAC, 1 May I89O, ibid., p. xxxvi.
116. L. R. Jayawardena, unpublished dissertation for research fellowship, 
Cambridge, 19^0, chap. 4*
117. See below, pp. 163-164.
118. Between 1889-91? the tea acreage in yield increased by more than 
two and half times. Almost one half of this increase took olace 
in 1890.
See Appendix D.
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estates. It was the tea planters* first taste of a widespread shortage
of labour. Besides, it was only when a large acreage came into production
and the tea exports increase after 1890 that the tea planters were able to
plough back substantial finances by way of coast advances.to encourage
the inflow of labour. Secondly, the year I89O witnessed an outbreak of
an unusually heavy epidemic of influenza among the plantation labour
population which affected the out-turn of labour to some extent in most
119
of the planting districts.
The labour shortage of I89O was short lived. Though a few
districts felt some shortage of labour in the peak working months of 1891>
the supply on the whole was adequate. In the following year the Planters*
Association reported with satisfaction that "labour was plentiful in all
districts", and that a healthy state in regards to the labour supply had 
120come into being. The famine conditions which prevailed in South India
in the years 1891-2 together with the better mode of transport made
available with the improvement of the facilities by the British India
Steam Navigation Company helped the inflow. Even during the peak working
months of 1891-2 the planters found the available labour sufficient to
cope with the yield.
Despite the drop in immigration due to the favourable agricultural
season in 1893 the satisfactory state of the labour market continued
largely because of heavy labour migration xvhich had occurred during the
121two preceding years. Nevertheless, signs of a mild labour shortage
122
and rising rates of advances was felt in some districts in 1893* The
overall sufficiency of the labour supply in 1893 seems to have been achieved
119* Thirty-seventh AnB of PAC, PPAC 1891, p. xxviii.
The AnB states that, "In the months of April and May, owing in a 
great measure to the prevalence of influenza and the sickness atten­
dant on it, coming as it did when there was most leaf to be plucked, 
the labor was greatly insufficient to the requirements .
See also, Planting Notes from Matale, Nawalapitiya, and Haputale 
in COO, 19 April I89O.
120. Thirty-ninth AnB of PAC, PPAC 1893, p. xxv.
121. Fortieth AnB of PAC, PPAC 1894» P« xxix.
122. Ibid., p. xxviii.
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at the cost of increased advances^ which were obviously necessary to spur
the labourers to migrate in a favourable year in agriculture in South
India. Besides, the abnormal rise in the cost of living of the labourers
due to heavy increase in the price of rice in 1892-3 reacted in augmenting
123the demand for advances by the labourers. In the Press and in the
District Planters1 Association meetings, the increase in the rates of cash
advances figured as the most pressing grievance of the planters pertaining
to their supply of labour.
In 1894?the .seasonal shortage of labour was felt in several
planting districts and the rates of advances began to rise with the
planters paying between Rs. 20 to Rs.30 and infrequently paying even Rs.40 
124
per labourer. The shortage recurred during the spring of 1895 with
greater intensity and the rates of advances registered a new peak of
125
between Rs.40 to Rs.50. Though the situation improved in the spring of 
I896, the s u p p l y  continued to lag behind the demand and the advances 
remained high.
The 1894-6 labour shortage was, by and large, the result of the 
favourable agricultural seasons which occurred in South India in the years 
1893-5 at a time when the total tea acreage as well as the annual rate 
of tea production in the Island was on a rapid increase. The immediate 
effect of the good agricultural seasons in South India, was to cause a 
drop in the inflow of labour which compelled the planters to offer high 
rates of advances, especially in 1895-6 "t0 induce migration. The price of 
tea in the U.K. market was on the decline since I89O and the planters 
viewed the rise in the rates advances with apprehension. A plethora of
1
123* See below, Table 4 .7 (p. 200).
124* Planting Notes from Nawalapitiya, COO, 24 May 1894.
'Planting News from Central Province1, by Wanderer, ibid.,
26 May 1894*
Planting Notes from Kelani Valley, ibid., 31 July 1894.
125. Annual meeting of the Scottish Ceylon Tea Company, 3 June 1895. 
ibid., 4 June 1895-
Current Topics, ibid., (Supplement) , 15 May 1895-
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suggestions and schemes were mooted in the press and the planters’ 
associations in these years with a view to restrict the rates of advances 
and the planting opinion was steadily moving tov/ards combined action
lc>6among themselves to quell the demands of the kanganies. But in the 
context of the shortage of labour and intense competition among the 
planters, it was found impossible to get the planters to adopt successful 
combined action*
It was only in 1897 that a scheme for combined action was finally
127agreed by the majority of the planters. The year was conducive for
such an effort. On the one hand, the U.K* tea prices showed a further
decline in 1897 and the fear of a slump occurring in the tea industry was
in the air. The planters strongly felt the need to cut tea production costs.
More important, the year 1897 saw an adequate supply of labour and
128competition among the planters for labour became marginal. The general 
mood among the planters therefore was favourable to combined action, in 
order to avert a future repetition of the state of intense competition 
and rising advances which they had experienced in 1894-6.
126. fThe Labour Question1, by UNITAS SALUS NOSTRA, ibid., 25 May 1895-
127- Hitherto, combination among the employers was attempted at district 
level.
Annual general meeting of Kalutara DPA, 20 December I89O, ibid.,
23 December I89O.
128. There is one set of evidence which suggests that the year 1897 was one 
of a labour shortage. An official estimate of the labour force carried 
out by the DPAs at the request of the PAC revealed that there was a 
labour shortage throughout the planting districts (Forty-fourth AnR 
of PAC, PPAC 1898, p. xviii; Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 Feb­
ruary 1897) ibid., pp. 4“5)* It is, however, important to realise the 
purpose of this survey. The PAC in a circular to the DPAs pointed 
out that the aim of the survey was to utilize its data to submit to 
the Government with a view to obtain Government aid to bring about 
improvements in the overall system of recruitment and conveyance.
(A general meeting of the Kelani Valley DPA,*2 April 1897) letter from 
Sec. of PAC to Kelani Valley DPA, dated 25 March 1897)* Therefore, 
the DPAs were inclined to show that there was a general shortage of 
labour. It is important to note that the statistics on the size of the 
labour force given at the above survey fell short of the number given 
in the regular Quarterly Returns for the same year by nearly one-third. 
Besides, other available evidence reveal that the supply of labour was 
adequate to the demand in 1897* (see Figure 3-4)*
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At the initiative of the Planters1 Association, the Ceylon Labour
Federation was formed in 1897 with the main objective of avoiding
129competition among the planters for "local" labour gangs. Hitherto, all 
action to restrict the rise in the advances were confined to the issuing 
of circulars by the Planters* Association. But this step had proved 
ineffective and the planters attributed this to two factors. The Planters 
Association did not include all the planters in the Island. More important, 
it had no power to enforce its decisions and particularly when the planters 
were at variance in their views it could act merely in an advisory 
capacity. The Labour Federation was an attempt to get the planters to 
individually commit themselves firmly to specific rules and regulations 
framed by themselves to guide their conduct in giving out advances.
Thereby it sought to minimize the mutual suspicion among the planters in 
matters pertaining to their labour supply.
To attain their objective, the federated planters agreed that no 
member should pay in excess of the "tundu price" in taking up a local 
labour gang. The idea was to make the shifting of labour gangs unprofitable
»i
to the kanganies, for where the "transfer price was higher than the
"tundu price"' of a gang the difference partly represented the profit of 
130the kangany. Secondly, the members decided that no member should engage 
a "local" labour gang unless the gang possessed a discharge note issued 
by the former employer or without due reference to him. ^Phe aim of this 
clause was to tie the labour gangs to their estates until the employers 
decided to pay-off, for if the clause was strictly adhered to, a gang 
moving out of an estate without the employer*s consent would not be able 
to procure employment elsewhere in the planting districts.
129* A committee meeting of the PAC, 14 May 1897, PPAC 1898, p. 50.
For the correspondence on the formation of the Labour Federation, 
see ibid., correspondence, pp. xlii-xlvi, ccx-ccxii.
130. The Labour Federation of Ceylon, ibid., l899> Appendix B.
Sec. of PAC to Sec. of C of C, 4 November 1898, enclosure,
'Pules of the Labour Federation of Ceylon*, ibid., Correspondence, 
pp. 13-14.
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The initial response to the Labour Federation was encouraging. By 
the end of 1898 planters representing approximately two-third of the tea 
acreage had joined the scheme. But a substantial group of planters was 
still out of it and a recalcitrant minority could thwart the smooth 
working of the scheme. The scheme itself was defective in some ways. It 
ignored a crucial aspect of the plantation labour system. The difference 
between the ’’tundu price" of a gang and the "transfer price" did not always 
represent the kangany’s profit alone; it also included the gang*s debt 
to others, particularly to the shop-keeper and the money-lender, for loans 
raised by the kangany to maintain the gang. And the kangany had 
necessarily to obtain such debts partly because of the inadequate wage 
rates on the estates and also because of the method of deferred payment of 
the labourers’ wages by the planters, usually once in two or three months. 
Attempts to restrict the cash advances to the "tundu price" was 
unrealistic unless such attempts were accompanied by measures to bring 
about several other important changes in the plantation labour system so 
as to make outside credit superfluous to the labourers. Besides,- there 
is the basic question whether it is possible, in an economic context 
which permitted free enterprise and competition between approximately 
2,000 plantations,to side-track the basic laws of supply-demand by means 
of a voluntary scheme which did not find unanimous support from the 
entrepreneurs.
However, during the first four years of its existence the Labour
Federation appeared to the planters to be working satisfactorily, though
131
a few planters were found wanting in their adherence to its spirit.
But the fact is that during I898-I9OI the Federation was not seriously 
subjected to a test of its potentiality because these were years of an
131. A general meeting of the Dikoya DPA, 23 January 1900, COW,
24 January 1900.
Planting Notes from Dolosbage, ibid., 26 February 1900.
AnB of Pussellawa DPA for 1900, ibid., 11 February 1901.
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132abundant supply of labour. The South Indian famines of 1898 and 1900 
together with the recession in the tea industry in the Island \*ere the 
decisive factors. Large outstanding advances given out during the previous
133
period of the tea mania were gradually reduced during these years. The 
District Planters’ Associations reported that the rates of advances had 
decidedly decreased after I898 and expressed the belief that these would
T 0 A
continue to decline. It is significant that such reports should come
from particularly those districts situated a long way from the main network
of rail and trunk-road transport and therefore relatively inaccessible to
labour; districts such as Rakwana, Passara, Udupussellawa,and Nuwara Eliya.
In 1902, however, the planters began to experience a recurrence
of labour shortage despite the lack of an increased demand for labour due
to the persistence of the slump in the tea industry. The Planters*
Association pointed out that the labour question "would appear to be
causing some inconvenience to producers; many gardens are experiencing
some difficulty in obtaining an adequate supply! ^  In 1903, the situation
became worse and most of the planting districts suffered from labour
scarcity and widespread restlessness of the labour force. The rates of
advances which had reasserted an upward trend in 1902 registered a steep
137rise in 1903# Though some planters were able to procure labour at
rates below Rs.40, anything between Rs.4-0 and Rs.80 became quite common.
«
132. See below, Figure 3*4*
133. AnR of Passara DPA for I898, COO, 6 February 1899*
AnR of Maskeliya DPA for 1898, ibid., 9 February 1899*
AnR of Udapussellawa DPA for 189&» ibid., 18 February 1899*
134* AnR of Rakwana DPA for 1898, ibid., 28 January 1899*
AnR of Badulla DPA for 1898, ibid., 8 February l899»
AnR of Nuwara Eliya DPA for 1898, ibid., 13 February 1899*
135. Forty-ninth AnR of PAC, YPAC 1902-3, p. 5.
136. See below, Figure 3-4-
Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 February 1903» YPAC 1903-4» P* 4* 
Editorial, CON, 25 February 1903*
137* Planting Notes from Dolosbage, ibid., 3 February 1902.
'The Labour Question’, by Old fogie, ibid., 16 December 1902. 
Editorial, ibid., 21.January 1903-
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133Some planters even paid Rs.100 per labourer. The Planters'Association
pointed out that "... the reported scarcity of Tamil labour on the estates
and the reported excess of advances offered to gangs of coolies to induce
139them to move from estate to another, was again urgent."
In the years 1902-3 the Labour Federation faced the first serious
test of its strength. Confronted with the shortage of labour and intense 
competition among the planters, the Federation found itself torn asunder.
The planters began to search other alternatives for combined action
both to increase the flow of labour and to restrict competition of
advances. The need was strongly felt because of the persistence of the 
slump in the tea industry and the fear of the labour problem becoming acute 
in the wake of the growth of rubber planting in the Island as well as ih 
Malaya. More than, ever before, the labour recruiting activities of the 
Malayan planters were beginning to be felt by the Ceylon planters.
The planters1 reaction to the labour problems of 1902-3 was two-fold.
First, as seen earlier on, the Ceylon Labour Commission was inagurated in 
Trichinopoly in 1904 mainly for the purpose of handling cash advances
sent to South India, supervise and assist the kanganies in their recruiting
activities, and also to stimulate labour migration to the I s l a n d . T h e  
Commission turned out to be a big success in the ensuing years. Secondly,
tt u
to tackle the problem of rising local cash advances the Planters’ Association
■* 142
decided on a ceiling of Rs.30 per labourer on all cash advances. But 
the "30 rupees limit scheme" had all the weaknesses which its predecessor,
1 38. AnR of Pussellawa DPA for 1903, ibid., 23 March 1903- 
AnR of Rangala DPA for 1903, ibid.
139* Fiftieth AnR of PAC, YPAC 1903-4, no pagination.
140. Resolutions of Haputale and Rakwana DPAs, Committee meeting of 
PAC, 17 February 1904, ibid., p. 146.
141* See above, pp. 88-91.
142. Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 February 1904, Resolution 
adopted on the recommendation of the Labour Sub-committee of 
PAC, ibid., p. 67.
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143the Labour Federation, suffered. Both were fair-weather crafts and
collapsed at the sight of labour problems. The scheme was eventually 
144abandoned.
The "30 rupee limit scheme1* is important in that it reveals that
by 1903-4? the planters had officially accepted as moderate a scale rate
of advances different from the ones they had hitherto considered as too
high in procuring labour. Whereas in the I89O Rs.10 was regarded as a
moderate rate and Rs.30 as very high, it appears that by 1904 Rs.30 had
145come to be accepted by the planters as the moderate rate. Thereafter, 
to the end of our period, Rs.30 continued to be regarded by the planters
as the reasonable rate. Anything below Rs.30 was considered low and a sign
of an adequate state of labour and anything above as high revealing a 
proportionate increase in the demand for labour.
The new scale rate was an outcome of manifold factors. The scarcity 
of labour in 1902-3 had put up the total indebtedness of the labourers.
More important, the competition for labour was on the increase. Higher 
advances were required to obtain labour from South India partly because 
of competition from the Malayan labour recruiter and also because of the
increa.se in the cost of transportation of labour from South India
with the closure of the North Road for immigrant traffic.
The supply of immigrant labour in 1904 was, on the whole, better
o
than during the previous couple of years. Though several districts 
complained about a scarcity of labour the bulk of the planting districts 
appears to have had an adequate supply of labour. The rates of advances
143* AnR of Nuwara Eliya DPA for 1904? COW, 26 January 1905*
AnR of Pusseilawa DPA for 1904, ibid., 1 February 1905-
AnR of Ambagamuwa DPA for 1904? ibid., 2 February 1905-
The '*30 rupee limit'1 was even more defective than the Labour
Federation scheme because it laid down one limit for all planting
districts irrespective of the varying local circumstances.
144* AnR of Dikoya DPA for 1906, ibid., 18 January 1907*
AnR of Dimbulla DPA for 1906, ibid., 22 January 1907*
AnR of Pusseilawa DPA for 1906, ibid., 4 February 1907*
145• Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 February 1904? YPAC 1903-4? 
pp. 67? 74.
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recorded a slight fall but the rates continued to be well above Rs.30 and 
at times reached approximately Rs.60 per head.^^ The supply of labour
T A *7
registered a striking improvement in 1905-6 . While the demand for 
labour continued to increase in these years with the extension of the 
rubber acreage and the revived prosperity of the tea industry, virtually 
all the planting districts in the Island reported that the supply of 
labour was adequate even during the peak months on the estates. This was 
largely the outcome of near famine conditions in South India in 1905 which 
propelled heavy migration into the Island. Though the rates of advances 
paid to procure labour tended to decline the total indebtedness of the 
labour gangs remained fairly high because the kanganies had obtained heavy 
cash advances during the previous years of labour shortage— rates so high 
that the labourers failed to work-off their debt accounts in any substantial 
measure in a couple of years. Besides, the rising cost of living in a 
context of lagging wage rates left the labourers very little by way of 
balance of wages to pay off their debts.
The year 1907 witnessed a change in the demand-supply situation 
of labour for the worse. The year was one of good harvests in South India. 
Besides, there was an increase in labour migration to Malaya with the 
inauguration in that year of the system of giving free passage to the 
labourers travelling from South India to Malaya. However, with the increase 
in the food-grain prices in South India in the years 1908-10 the labour 
supply to the plantations in Ceylon improved. During these years the 
planters, on the whole, found the supply of labour adequate to meet the 
demand on the plantations.
We have seen so far that the seasonal shortage of labour which 
occurred in the Island was largely confined to the years of good agricultural 
seasons in South India. We have also seen that the shortage was due to
14 6. A general meeting of Haputale DPA, 10 December 1904, COW,
13 December 1904-
147. Fifty-second AnR of PAC, YPAC 1909, p. 78.
Fifty-third AnR of PAC, ibid., 19Q_g_? P» 100.
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the failure on the part of planters to increase the inflow of labour 
during such years of good harvests so as to adequately meet the demand on 
the plantations. There is also the hypothesis that the kangany played an 
important role in bringing about the seasonal shortage of labour in the 
Island. Information about the supply-demand situation of labour was imperfect 
on the side of both the planter and the labourer. To a large extent both 
sides depended on the kangany. Though the recruiting activities of the 
kanganies were subject to supervision with the inauguration of the Ceylon 
Labour Commission in Trichinopoly in 1904 ihe kangany continued to be the 
main supplier of labour to the estates. Because of his crucial position 
in the labour market it was possible for him to shift gangs from one estate 
to another and thereby create a state of labour shortage even when the 
overall supply of labour in the Island was adequate. Some planters alleged 
that the kanganies were reluctant to recruit fresh gangs of labourers 
from South India in order to maintain an artificial shortage of labour in
1 jO
the Island. While there is no conclusive evidence about any organised 
effort on the part of the kanganies to arrest the inflow of labour there 
is no doubt that the kanganies tried to create an artificial shortage of 
labour by shifting labour gangs between estates at peak seasons of activity 
on the plantations.
There is also another hypothesis that we need to examine in some 
detail, namely, that the shortage of labour in the Islahd was due to the 
greater attractions of other fields of labour migration from South India. 
Agricultural labourers migrated from South India to Malaya, Burma, Natal, 
Mauritius, and Fiji. However, the absolute numbers who went from the 
Madras Presidency to Natal, Mauritius, and Fiji, were very small. Labour
I
for the South Indian plantations in Mysore, Coorg, Nilgiris, and the 
Wynaad were drawn mainly from among the Malayali and the Canarese. Though
I48. A special general meeting of PAC, 18 September 1886, PPAC I687, p. 44*
*The Labour Question and Monthly Payment: No. I', by G. F. W.,
COO, 13 July 1890.
163
some Tamil labour was employed in these plantations in our period, the 
South Indian planters did not appear either in the records of the Ceylon 
Planters’ Association or those of the Ceylon Labour Commission in 
Trichinopoly as competitors of the Ceylon kanganies in the recruitment of 
labour. There were Burma and Malaya towards which together with Ceylon 
the Indian Government adopted an open-frontier policy as regards labour
migration. Burma drew a large number of Indian labourers especially to work
in the rice industry. But the bulk of the migrants to Burma was from
beyond the Madras Presidency. A sizable group of Tamils from South India
also went to Burma. Though some of them were from Tanjore, the largest 
number who went to Burma came from the northern districts in the Presidency; 
districts such as North Arcot, South Arcot, and Chingleput. Besides, the 
year round employment opportunities in the tea plantations in Ceylon, the 
relative proximity of the Island to south India?and the system of family 
recruitment spelled out important advantages to the migrants coming to 
Ceylon as against the high seasonality of the labour demand in the rice 
industry and the system of recruitment of adults to work in Burma.
According to the documents of the Ceylon Planters’ Association
and the Ceylon Labour Commission in Trichinopoly the one main competitor
of the Ceylon planter for South Indian Tamil labour was the labour recruiter 
149from Malaya. Malaya like Burma recruited large numbers from the 
northern districts in the Presidency. But at the same t'ime the Malayan 
planter was increasingly penetrating in our period into the southernmost 
Tamil districts of Trichinopoly, Madura, and Tinnevelly which the Ceylon 
planters had hitherto looked upon as their preserve. The progress of 
coffee planting in Malaya in the late nineteenth century resulted in an 
increase in labour recruiting in South India. However, up to 1897 "the 
Malayan planters were at a disadvantage due to the fact that until that 
year the Indian Government imposed certain restrictions on labour migration
149. AnR of CLC for 1906, YPAC 1906, p. 18. 
AnR of CLC for 1907, ibid.', 1907? P- H .
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to Malaya. It was mainly after 1897 a^d more particularly in the first
decade of the twentieth century with the rapid progress of rubber planting
in Malaya that the Malayan planters intensified their recruiting efforts.
Improvements were brought about in the method of labour recruitment,
shipping charges between South India and Malaya were reduced, wages in
Malaya were increased, and finally in 1907 the Malayan planters federated
themselves to provide free passage for the labourers going from South India.
These improvements had the effect of increasing the flow of labour
150
migration to Malaya. However, as with Burma, with Malaya too Ceylon 
had the distinct advantage of proximity and also of having a system of 
family migration with employment opportunities for practically every member 
of the family. There is no doubt that competition of the Malayan recruiters 
was felt by the Ceylon planters particularly in the first decade of the 
present century. But it is not possible to assess the extent of the impact 
of such competition on the supply of labour to the plantations in Ceylon. 
Among other factors such as the increase in the cost of labour transport 
to the Island and the rise in the cost of living, the Malayan competition 
also contributed to increase the rates of advances which the Ceylon 
planters had to offer to obtain an adequate supply of labour from South 
India.
However, the two explanations we have examined above, viz., the
role of the kangany and that of the Malayan recruiter, appear to be less
significant among the different variables available to us to explain the
fundamental causes of the periodic labour shortage which occurred in the
Island. The basic factors which influenced the supply-demand situation of
labour were the fortunes of the agricultural seasons in South India and
*
the demand price offered by the Ceylon planters. The influence of the 
kangany and the competit ion.of the Malayan recruiter was something which 
operated throughout the years when Ceylon planters experienced an adequacy
150. K. S. Sandhu, 1969* PP- 60-63.
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of labour as well as in the years of labour shortage. But the adverse 
influence of the kangany and the Malayan recruiter was felt by the Ceylon 
planter in those years when good agricultural seasons occurred in South 
India and when it became relatively difficult to increase the inflow of 
labour at the average rates of advances offered by the Ceylon planter.
What the planters were trying to do was to maintain the static 
wage rates and also low rates of cash advances in a period of rapid 
expansion and prosperity of the plantation industry in the Island. Their 
main grievance was not so much the inadequacy of labour but the rising 
rates of advances to procure labour in adequate numbers. But the problem 
of rising rates of advances was largely confined to the years of good 
harvests in South India. The average rates which they held out were the 
rates capable of supplying an adequate supply of labour only in the years 
of agricultural distress in South India. In the years of good seasons 
these rates obviously proved inadequate to procure an adequate supply of 
labour. When such good agricultural years coincided with the years of 
prosperity in the plantation sector, when the planters could well afford 
to increase the demand price of labour, they succeeded in increasing the 
flow of labour by increasing the rate of advances. This happened for 
instance in the years 1895-6 &nd 1907-8. But when good agricultural years 
in South India coincided with the years when the planters were in 
economic difficulties and could ill afford to increase b^he rates of 
advances, they faced the problem of labour shortage in an acute form.
But such coincidences were rare in our period. It occurred only once, in 
the years 1902-3— the worst years in the supply of labour to the 
plantations in the Island.
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CHARTER IV
THE WAGE RATES AND THE GROSS EARNINGS
An attempt will be made in the present chapter to ascertain and 
explain the trends in the wage rates paid to the estate labourers in our 
period. On examining the available data on the wage rates, we find that 
the daily wage rates remained relatively unchanged throughout. The period, 
as v/e have seen already, witnessed sharp fluctuations in the demand and 
supply of labour. In the context of the labour market it seems puzzling 
how the planters succeeded in their attempt to maintain a static daily 
wage rate. The reasons were three-fold. We have already seen in chapter 
III that the point of competition among the planters for labour was 
not the daily wage rate offered to the labourers but the amount of cash 
advances offered to the labour recruiters. The present chapter offers 
two additional explanations for the prevalence of the static wage rates.
On the one hand, the monthly wages of the labourers were calculated on 
the number of days the labourers worked; and the planters varied the 
number of work days offered to the labourers in the month according to 
the work-load on the estates. Thus, the demand for labour, in fact, 
affected the monthly income of the labourers. On the other hand, the 
planters claimed to have reconciled the labourers to tb%e changes in the 
cost of living by arranging for the estate to supply the labourers with 
their staple food— rice— at a constant price irrespective of the price 
fluctuations in the market. In our analysis of the gross earnings, 
attempted in sections 2-3 in the present chapter, we will confine our 
attention to the adult male and female labourers in the tea plucking 
labour force. They formed the bulk of the estate labour force. Desides, 
the data on the earnings of the other sections of the estate labour force are 
scanty. At the end of section 3 we will look into the earnings of these 
other groups of workers. Finally, in section 4 we will analyse the system
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"by which the estates supplied rice to the labourers- Our immediate 
attention will be devoted in section 1 to the nature of the data avail­
able to us on the wage rates paid in our period.
1• The nature of the available wage data
The wage rates paid to the immigrant labourers in the period 
1880-1910 are not available in any consistently recorded series maintained 
either by the Government or any other organisation. The Ceylon Government 
Blue Books of these years contain annual series of daily wage rates 
paid to the labourers of the different administrative district s.^ But 
this information, given under three broad headings— viz., praedial, 
domestic, and trade— is not directly useful in estimating the earnings 
of the plantation labourers* The district wage rates given under the 
heading praedial were the average rates paid to all types of agricultural 
labourers in the district. A comparison of the Blue Book data and other 
available data on wage rates paid to the agricultural labourers in a 
particular year in two select districts— an up-country district and a 
low-country district— is attempted below*
TABLE 4*1 Variations in daily wage rates (in cents)
District Information given by the planters on the daj.ly Average
rates paid to different categories; of labour rates
recorded
Sinhalese Factory Plucking Plucking in Blue
labour worker man woman Book
Kalutara 25-50 40 33 •25 40-50
Kandy N 37-40 33 25 50
Sources: Cey. Lab. Com. 1908? PP» 339? 403*
Cey. BB, 1903, p. v3.
N:- No information available
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The wide variations in the rates paid to different types of 
labour in each districts, as seen in the above Table, obviously make it 
meaningless to depend on the Blue Book average rate for each district in 
ascertaining the earnings of the estate labourers. Instead, an effort will 
be made in the ensuing pages to find out the different rates of wages 
paid to the different types of plantation workers. This x^ ill have to be 
done by scrutinizing scattered information. The data given in the Blue 
Books, however, being the only available continuous series of annual 
wage rates, is useful in indicating the broad trends in the movement of 
wage rates in each district. But for a detailed and a realistic 
understanding of the plantation wage structure, evidence has to be sought 
elsewhere. The bulk of this information is found in the records maintained 
by the planters.
In 1873, the Ceylon Planters* Association initiated an attempt
to collect information on the average daily wage rates prevailing in
each planting district in the Island. These data were published by the
Association. The relevant information was collected from the District
Planters* Associations. But this method of collecting wage data seems to
have been, unfortunately, discontinued in 1880. The available information
for the years 1878-9 form a useful starting point for our study. In I89I,
the Census Commissioner requested the Planters* Association to submit
*
the prevailing wage rates in the planting districts together with those 
of the year 1381 by way of comparison. This information too was collected 
from the District Planters’ Associations. In 1900, the Government of 
India raised the question of wage rates with the Government of Ceylon 
and requested information in this respect. The latter, on the authority 
of the Planters' Association, informed the Government of India about 
the average estate daily wage rates paid at the time. Towards the latter 
part of our period more data are available, for the Labour Commission 
appointed by the Government of Ceylon in 19^7 gathered information on
170
the current wage rates from the witnesses who appeared before the Commission, 
most of whom were planters. Thus, all the information we have are from 
the planters' records.
Another limitation of the available information 011 wage rates is 
that they are neither systematic nor strictly comparable. The I878-9  
statistics are fairly comprehensive and cover most of the planting 
districts. Those of 1881 and I89I cover only some of the more important 
planting districts. The 1900 information gives only the average 
all-island immigrant plantation labour wage rates paid to the male and 
female workers, and there is no detailed information on the variations 
in wage rates paid in the different districts. The information available 
for the year 1908 was supplied by those individual planters who appeared 
before the Commission. These wage rates related to their individual 
estates. In the absence of an annual series of wage data, we are driven 
to make the best use of the information given in the above mentioned 
sources. All the possibly comparable data on the average wage rates 
available in these sources are given in Table 4.2.
The problem of the lack of a comprehensive series of wage data 
for the period from 1830 to 1910 seems to be minimised by two factors.
First, the years for which the wage data are available fall into the five 
different stages which the planting industry of the Island underwent 
during our period. As seen earlier on,these five stages were the period
c*
of prosperity in the coffee industry during the I87O , the period of 
depression (188O-5 ), the decade of the tea mania (1886-97)j the period 
of the slump in the tea industry (1898-1903), and the subsequent period 
of the revival of its prosperity (1904-10). The information for 1878-9  
gives some idea about the wage rates during the last prosperous years of 
the coffee industry. The statistics of 1881 reveal the wage situation in 
the period of the depression during the early i860 • The years 1091 and 
1900 respectively fall into the period of the tea. mania and the subsequent
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period of the first serious slump in the tea industry. The detailed
information available for the year 1908 gives a comprehensive idea of the
wage situation in the yes.rs which saw the renewed prosperity of the tea
industry and the concurrent rapid spread of the rubber industry. Secondly,.
throughout the period from about 1880, the average regional daily wage
rates in various planting districts appeared to have remained quite
2
unchanged over long periods of time. Statistically, this is clear from 
the information given in Table 4*2. The discussion in the following 
section on the trends of wage rates will firmly' establish the conclusion 
that the daily wage rates remained quite unchanged throughout these years. 
Because of the constancy of the daily w a g e rates, the problem of the 
lack of an annual series of daily w a g e rates does not seriously handicap 
our study of the wage rates.
2. The trends in the daily wage rates, 1880-1910
g
Table 4*2 reveals that the daily wage rates during the late I87O
varied between 33-37 cents for men and between 25-29 cents for women field
workers. The majority of estates appear to have paid the higher of these
two scale rates during the late 1870°.^ In the early 1880*% these rates
declined to 33 for men and 25 for women, and remained virtually static
thereafter to the end of our period. An attempt will now be made in the
following paragraphs, first, to analyse how the standard wage rates of
s33 and 25 came into being in the early 1380 , and secondly, to see why 
these rates underwent little change during the succeeding 30 years.
The decision of the planters to reduce the wage rates to 33 and 25 
cents from the pre-depression rates was a direct result of the slump in 
the planting sector. With the depression in the coffee industry in the
CJ
early 1880 curtailment of estate expenditure became imperative. Hence 
2* Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, pp. 38, 373.
3. Quarterly District Reports for 1877» PPAC 1378, pp. 131-*6l.
Quarterly District Reports for 1878, Tbid., 1879? PP* 1-73.
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the planters, at the initiative of their Colombo Agents, decided on a 
general reduction of 10 per cent of the pre-1380 daily rates.^ In the 
mechanism of wage fixation there was no place for negotiation between the 
employer and the employee. The rates were decided by the planters 
unilaterally, particularly at their District Planters* Associations. One 
of the impelling motives of labour migration being the labourers* desire 
to return home with some cash savings, the planters had to offer rates 
which could ensure a margin over and above the cost of living of the 
labourers on the estates in Ceylon. It was imperative, therefore, for the 
planters to reckon the cost of living of the labourers in deciding on 
wage rates. They used the price of rice as a crude index of the cost of 
living of the labourers in fixing the daily wage rates.^ Cost of rice 
covered nearly three-fourths of an average labourer’s budget. In the early
g
1880"", the consensus of the planters' views was that a daily wage rate
of 33 and 25 cents with the opportunity to work for 5 t° 6 days per week
was sufficient to ensure a reasonable saving for the labourers, provided
rice was supplied to the labourers at Rs. 4 per bushel.
Table 4*2 reveals that the standard wage rates of 33 and 25 cents
were not adopted by the planters of all planting districts in the Island.
There were regional variations. The planting districts of Ba,dulla, Rakwana,
Haputale, and Pundaluoya paid a slightly higher rate varying between
«
33-37 for men and 25-29 cents for women. The adoption of the higher scale 
in these districts was largely due to the relatively higher cost of living
4* *Coast Advances and Coolies* pay*, Circular of 18 tea exporting companies 
to all DBAs. WCO, 4 June i860.
'Reduction of wages of the labourers', by a Proprietor,ibid., 3 June 1880. 
Proceedings of the general meetings of the Maskeliya, Dikoya, Rakwana 
and Dirabul'la DPAs published in ibid., 8, 12, 23, and 24 June i860.
5. AnRs of Dimbulla, Rakwana, Maskeliya and Dikoya DPAs for i860, 
published in ibid., 19 January 1831 and 1, 3, and 14 February 1881 
respect ively.
SCO, Proceedings, Cey. SP VI of l894i p. c26.
6. See below, pp. 193ff•
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7
and the relative inaccessibility of these districts. These districts
were situated at a higher elevation and away from the main network of
rail and trunk-road communication in the Island. This had two effects.
First, the labourers had to make a long and a tedious journey on foot to
reach these estates. More significant, the food prices in districts such
as Badulla and Rakwana were relatively high due to the higher cost of
transport of commodities to these districts. The higher cost of living in
these districts is seen in the regional variations in the price of rice
#
given m  section 4 of the present chapter. In order to compete for labour 
with the estates in the districts where rice and other food-stuffs were 
available at a lower price, the planters of the districts where the cost 
of living was relatively high, found it necessary to offer daily wage
g
rates above that of the standard rates of 33 and 25 cents.
On the other hand, at least until about 1904> the wage rates
paid in the low-country planting districts of Kalutara and Kelani Valley
were below the standard wage rate. In these districts the rates varied
between 30-33 for men and 20-25 cents for women. The lower rates offered
in the low country tea districts can be explained on two grounds. On
the one hand, the quality of tea produced in the low-country districts was
inferior to that produced in the up-country districts. Consequently,
"low gro\/nM tea fetched lower prices. On the other hand, the low-country
»
planter was in a position to offer a greater number of days of work in
the year than his counterpart in the up-country because the seasons of
inclement weather dissuading field work was relatively narrow in the
a
low-country regions. This, to a point, helped to offset the disadvantages 
of the lower daily wage rates in these districts. Besides, in the period
7. See below, pp. 201-204, 249.
8. A general meeting of Uva DPA, 3 June 1880, WCQ., 30 June 1880.
A general meeting of Udapussellavra DPA, 19 June 1880, ibid.,
24 June 1880.
9- See below, pp. 181-183.
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until about 1904> the demand for labour in the low-country districts was 
not heavy as in the up-country districts.
Prom 1904? however, the low-country planters of Kalutara and 
Kelani Valley began to raise their daily wage rates to the standard wage 
level of 33 and 25. This was mainly the outcome of the heavy demand for 
labour which took place in these districts with the rapid extension of 
rubber cultivation after 1904* This, together with the renewed prosperity 
of the tea industry brought about a period of intense competition for 
labour. Evidence reveal that the low-country planters were trying to induce 
the labourers in tjhe up-country districts to migrate to their districts 
by the offer of high cash advances. In this competition for labour, the 
low-country planters found it necessary to raise their daily wage rates.
The above discussion on the daily wage rates reveal that in the 
period 1885-1910, periodic changes in wage rates occurred only in the 
low-country districts; and that even in these districts it was only an 
attempt to level up the rates to the standard ones. Otherwise, the wage 
rates decided on in the early 1880 remained quite unchanged. The period 
from 1380 to 1910 was one of important economic changes affecting the 
plantation labour market. On the one hand, there were upheavels in the 
fortunes of the planting sector.1^ On the other hand, in the years after 
1889 there was an increase in the cost of living of the estate labourers."^ 
In spite of these crucial economic developments, the low rates of wages 
fixed during the depression of the early 1880 persisted. This apparently 
remarkable uniformity of wage rates in an economic background of rising 
cost of living and renewed prosperity of the planting sector was largely 
due to the efforts made by the planters to avoid a rise in the wage rates.
The planters were able to achieve this due to three important 
factors. Eirst, we have already seen in detail that the point of bargain
10. S ee above, chap. HI,
11. See below, pp. 207-210, 250-252.
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between the employers and the kanganies was not the wage rate but the 
rate of advances. Secondly, with the growth of the tea industry after 
I885 and the consequent increase in the volume of available work, the 
planters were able to offer a greater number of days of work per labourer
c»
per month than during the depression years of the early 1880 , As a result, 
the monthly gross earnings of the labourers increased though, in fact, 
the daily wage rates remained static. This increase in the gross earnings 
partly at least helped to counteract the effects of the rise in the cost 
of living of the labourers. Thirdly, the planters issued a weekly quota
of rice to the labourers as part—payment of their wages at rates within
fixed limits. This helped to offset the effects of any sharp fluctuation 
of the price of rice to the labourers when such fluctuations did occur.
In the following sections of this chapter we will devote our attention
to the last two factors mentioned above.
3. The monthly gross earnings of the estate labourers
The earnings of the labourers were calculated on a monthly basis
according to the number of days they actually worked on the estate. The
Labour Ordinance No. 13 of 1889 made it obligatory for the planter to
pay his labourer six days* wages per week as long as the labourer was
willing to work irrespective of whether there was work available on the
«
12estate or not. The Ordinance was defective in that it did not embody a 
penalty for the violation of this provision. The above provision remained 
a dead—letter throughout the period of our study.^ As before, even 
after the Ordinance, the monthly earnings of the labourers were calculated 
strictly on the number of days the labourers actually worked.
12. An Ordinance amending the Law relating to Indian Immigrant Goolies 
employed on Ceylon Estates, A Revised Edition of the Legislative 
Enactments of Ceylon, 1923, Vol. p'. 578.
13. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908? Proceedings, p. 14*
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It is important to understand the internal arrangement followed
in the estates to utilize labour to the best advantage of the estates at
the least possible cost. We have seen that the standard daily wage rates
of 33 ana 25 cents were fixed at the time of the depression in the early
1880 when the demand for labour was low and the planters were faced
with financial difficulties. During the subsequent years of prosperity,
the planters did not utilize the daily wage scale to attract labour.
Instead, in times of high yield and consequent heavy demand for labour,
the policy of the planters was to increase the number of work-days offered
per labourer at the same standard daily wage rates, viz., 33 and 25 cento.
During the times of low yield and the consequent slack demand for labour,
the number of work-days offered to the labourers was curtailed. Thus, the
gross monthly earnings of the labourers fluctuated though the daily wage
rate remained static. This policy naturally meant that the cost of labour
per pound of tea plucked remained almost unchanged both during periods
of high and low yield in the tea estates. Such an arrangement was decidedly
to the economic advantage of the planters because the rates paid by them
during the period of relative prosperity in the years from 1386 to 1910
were, in fact, the rates fixed by them during the depression in the early
1880 . And then, as we have already seen, these were rates which the
planters actually reduced from the pre-depression wage level in order
«
to curtail the working cost of the plantations. Thus, the labourers* 
income per unit of labour remained unchanged throughout the period 
1380-1910 at the low rates fixed in the early 1880°.
The method of calculating the monthly wage of the labourer on 
the actual number of days of work done by him makes it necessary for us 
to obtain detailed information on the latter point in order to know the 
trends of gross earnings of the labourers. There is no systematic data 
on the number of days of work performed by the labourers in the years 
from 1880 to 1910. Each planter maintained a record known as the
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"estate Check—roll” on the turn up of labour at muster each morning.
These daily records for our period are not available today. All available 
information is confined to the statements and evidence given by the 
planters as and when the question of the number of working days offered 
to the labourers v/as debated in public during these years. A scrutiny of 
this information leads us to acceptable conclusions on the average number 
of days of work offered to the labourers per month during each of the 
periods of depression (1880-55 I898-I903) and prosperity (1886-97; 1904-10)
j
in the planting sector in the Island in our period. This evidence has 
been made use of in the following pages in calculating the gross earnings 
of the labourers.
Clearly, three factors decided the number of work days available 
per labourer. First, the nature of the yield of coffee and later of tea 
was of primary importance. This was mainly influenced by the weather 
conditions. Secondly, the fortunes of the planting sector and their 
influence on the production policy of the planters naturally had their 
impact on the volume of work available per labourer. Thirdly, the 
available supply of labour had an important effect on the amount of work 
available per labourer. It is useful to note that in the planters* jargon 
the phrase ’’short work” denoted 3-4 days of work as against ’’full, work" 
of 5-6 days per week.
In the coffee plantations, the crop v/as heavily seasonal. The 
picking of the coffee berries was confined to about four months of the 
year, particularly from about August to mid-Uovember. During the rest 
of the months, the work in the coffee estates slackened and it was confined 
to mere maintenance of the estates. During these months, the planters 
were able to manage the estates with a comparatively small labour force 
and also offer work less frequently.
During the years of coffee prosperity vihen the planters maintained 
the estates at the maximum level of production, the labourers in the
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coffee estates were able to obtain 5~6 work-days per v/eek during the
14
coffee picking season. Thus, during these months, the monthly work-days 
of the labourers a-veraged approximately between 20 and 24. Available 
evidence suggests that this average was maintained in the years 1378-9* 
During the off season, maintenance work was done mainly by men. Women 
failed to get even "short work*' during this season of the year as their 
main employ was the picking of coffee berries. There is hardly any 
evidence on the number of days of work performed by the labourers during 
the slack season on the coffee estates.
During the period of the depression (1880-5), there is conclusive 
evidence that the planters followed a policy of "short work" by providing 
only 3 or 4 work-days per labourer in a week as against the pre-depression 
rate of 5 to 6 days.^° This meant that the labourers managed to obtain 
work only for an average of 12-16 days per month. The decrease was 
obviously due to the decline in the volume of available work consequent
t
on the economic catastrophe in the plantaion sector. The depression also
A
caused a substantial section of the labourers to return to their villages
in South India. But even so,a considerable body still remained and the
result was a state of surplus labour in the Island. It was this excess
supply of labour which enabled the planters to pursue a policy of
"short work". Such a policy would have been difficult under conditions
*
of a scarcity of labour.
We have so far seen the work situation of the coffee plantations, 
particularly in the period 1878-8$. The transition from coffee to tea 
brought about a significant change in the work situation in the plantation 
sector. Whereas the coffee crop was highly seasonal, the growth of the
14. Sec. of PAC to "A Planter", 9 September I869, PPAG I87O,
Correspondence, p. 25*
15. Planting Notes from Central Province, The Overland Ceylon Observer,
23 January 1879*
16. Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 February 1880, PPAC 1881, p. 14.
Gov. to S of S., No. 144 of 12 October 1883, C.O. '384/145.
'The Reduction of Estate Expenditure, No. 1’, by M.P., VIC0, 11 June lo80.
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tea leaf was perennial. Thus, work was available in the tea plantations
throughout the year. But the volume of work available per labourer
fluctuated from time to time depending partly on the climatic conditions
and the consequent seasonal fluctuations in the tea yield. There were
months of high, ordinary, and low yield. Statistics on the monthly yield
of tea is the best source of information to find out the extent of seasonal
fluctuations of the work—load on the tea estates. But consistent
statistical information on the monthly tea yield is locking for our period.
However, there is overwhelming evidence that in Ceylon during
the spring months of March to May, the growth of tea bushes was vigorous
and the yield abundant. T. C. 0wen and H. Rutherford, two leading
contemporary writers on Ceylon tea who were also veteran tea planters in
17the Island at the time, distinctly agreed on this point. The latter
estimated that 21 per cent of the annual tea crop was made in April and
May. Experience of those planters who gave evidence before the Labour
Commission of 1908 clearly vindicated the above conclusion on the question
l8of the monthly yield of tea. During the spring months the tea yield 
depended on the relatively regular and reliable south-west monsoon.
The seasons of low yield due to bad weather underwent considerable 
periodic and regional fluctuations. Bad weather meant either prolonged 
drought which hindered the tea flush or heavy rains which dissuaded the 
labourers from turning up for field work and also often caused wash-aways 
and slips on the hilly slops where most of the up-country tea estates
were. The evidence of the planters set out in column 5 in Table 4»3
reveals that interruption of work on the tea estates either by drought 
or by wet weather particularly affected the up and mid-country tea
17* T. C. Owen, 1886, pp. xxiii, 4*
H. K. Rutherford, 1889, P* 29*
On seasonal fluctuations in the yield, see also, ’Results of the 
Mariawatte Estate up to end of 1884, TJCO, 19 January 1885.
18. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Proceedings, pp. 59> 49°*
Ibid., Appendix HH, H. G. Bois to Sec. of Labour Commission,
8 June 1968y p. ~^43.
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TABLE 4.3 Showing the work situation on the tea estates during months of heavy and 
ordinary yield, and also during months of bad weather, 1907-8.
Planting
district
(1)
Average No. 
of days labo­
urers worked 
per month
(2)
No. of work 
days required 
for rice issue 
in season of 
ordinary yield
(3)
No. of work 
days required 
for rice issue 
in season of 
heavy yield
(4)
Available inform­
ation on season 
of short work
(5)
Badulla 2 0 -2 2 N 24 In very dry times 
in August & Septem­
ber 4-5 days per 
week.
Eaputale 20 22 N In dry weather in 
August & September 
4 or 5 days per 
week.
Pundaluoya 2 0 -2 2 20*22 N N
Rakwana 22 N N Short work during 
south-west winds.
Ambegamuwa 2 0 -2 2 20-22 24 Short, work in July- 
August due to bad 
weather.
Haturata 22 20 N Short work in mon­
soon after June.
Kandy 20 20 N Short time of 
short work.
Dimbulla 20-22 20 24 In dry times in 
March & in the burst 
of monsoon in June 
& July 4 or 5 days 
per week.
Dikoya 20 20 24 In June & July not 
more than 4 days 
per week due to wet 
weather.
Nilambe N N 24 N
Maskeliya 22 20 N In monsoon months 
4 days per week.
Talawakele 22 22 N Short work in weeks 
of bad weather.
Pussellawa N N N 4 or 5 days per week 
in July-September.
Knuckles 20 N 22 Short work in mon­
soon after June.
Dolosbage 22 22 N 4 days per week in 
4 weeks of dry wea­
ther in the year.
Lower Dikoya 20 N N Short work in 
inclement weather.
Gampola 20 N 24 Short work in poor 
plucking months.
Kalutai’a 22-24 22-24 S Never short work.
Kelani Valley 22 U N Never short work.
Source: Cey. Lab. Con. 1908, Proceedings.
N:- No information available.
182
estates in the Central and Uva Provinces. In the planting districts of
the relatively low elevation in the Sabaragarnuwa and Western Provinces,
bad weather was not as harsh as in the Central and Uva Provinces so as
to impede estate work. The planters of Sabaragamuwa and Western Provinces
who gave evidence before the Labour Commission in I9O8 were unanimous
19that they never had "short work11 during any time of the year. Some of
the up-country planters confirmed this view. In contrast, in the Central
and Uva Provinces,"short work" was unavoidable during several months of 
20the year. However, unfavourable weather affected the different planting
districts during different months of the year. Therefore, it is not
possible to categorise particular months in the year as bad weather months
common to the planting region. According to the detailed evidence
available for 1907-8 , it appears that whereas in the Badulla district
"short work" due to bad weather usually occurred in August and September,
in the planting districts of Dimbulla and Dikoya "short work" was
unavoidable during the burst of the south-west monsoon in June and July.
On the other hand, in Pussellawa "short work" due to heavy rains usually
lasted from July to September. The most acceptable conclusion is that
the up and mid-country planting districts experienced unfavourable
weather during an average of two to three months in the year and during
these months "short work" was unavoidable on the tea estates.
*
Thus, the following conclusions could be reached on the working 
of the tea estates. Heavy yield of tea took place in all the planting 
districts during the months of March, April, and May. Secondly, due to 
inclement weather, the up-country planting districts found it difficult 
to avoid "short work" for periods ranging from two to three months in 
the year. Thirdly, the rest of the year witnessed ordinary yield of tea.
Ibid.. Report, p. rvi.
Ibid., Proceedings, pp. 350, 355? 364? 375-
2°. Ibid., pp. 11, 152, 182, 300, 411.
Ibid., Report, p. xvi.
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Fourthly, since bad weather was not so common in the low-country planting 
districts as to impede work on estates, the planters in these districts 
found it possible to avoid "short x*ork" occurring virtually at any time 
of the year.
Details regarding the number of work-days offered to the labourers
during the three different seasons have been recorded by the Labour
Commission of 1908 from the planters who gave evidence. This information
gives us a reasonably good idea on the working of the tea plantation
sector. Therefore, we will now examine this body of evidence available
for the years 1907-8 and thereafter attempt a chronologica.1 analysis of
the average number of monthly work-days offered to the labourers in the
period 1886-1910, The information available for 1908 is set out in
Table 4*3* The statistics in columns 3 and 4 on the number of days of
x-j-ork which the planters required of their labourers for the latter to
be eligible for the weekly quota of rice issued by the planters is a
useful source of information to verify the planters* evidence on the number
of work-days performed by the labourers as set out in column 2. It was a
long established custom in all planting districts of the Island for the
planters to provide the estate labourers vfith a monthly quota of rice.
The planters as a rule required the labourers to turn up for a certain
number of days for work per week before they were eligible for their
«
quota. Where the number of days the labourers turned up for work fell
short of the required number, the quantity of rice issued by the estate
21
was proportionately curtailed. From the point of view of the planters, 
this limit could be regarded as the average number of days of work which 
they expected from the labourers during each week. In times of heavy 
xvork-load or scarcity of labour on the estates the number of days a 
labourer had to work to be eligible for the full quota of rice was raised
21. Supreme Court, Colville Vs Ramasami Kangani, The Overland Ceylon 
Observer, 24 June 1879*
IC. Thiargaraja, 1917? p. 181.
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while in times of low yield when the demend for labour was light the
limit was relaxed. Thus, during the high yielding months of March to May
the planters demanded either 6 days of work each week or 5 and 6 days in
alternate weeks; that is a total of 11 days a fortnight. In the months of
ordinary yield the usual number of days of work required of the labourers
was 5 Per week. In the months of low yield, this limit was not strictly
adhered to by the planters. For the labourers, the supply of the weekly
quota of rice was one of the major attractions of employment on the
22
estates in Ceylon. It effectively encouraged the labourers to work the 
stipulated number of days per week in order to obtain the full quota of 
rice. Thus, the limits imposed for the issue of the full quota of rice 
could reasonably be taken as indicating the standard number of days the 
labourers usually strove to turn up for work.
On the basis of the information in columns 2 and 3, it is possible
to conclude that during the months of ordinary yield, the average number
of days the labourers worked was either 5 Per week or 5 and 6 in alternate
weeks; that is an average fluctuating between 20 and 22 days per month.
During the months of heavy yield, it appears from column 4 that the
number of work-days increased to an average of 22 to 24» Column 5 reveals
that during the months of unfavourable weather when the crop was low
and the work on tea estates was slack, the average number of working days
*
dwindled to an average of 16 to 18 per month.
As indicated earlier on, the above conclusions are based on the 
evidence available for the years 1907-8 and are strictly valid for these 
two years. The overall policy of the planters then was to maintain the 
estates at the maximum level of production. 1907-8 were also years of a 
relative labour shortage. Such conditions did not prevail in the tea 
planting sector all throughout our period. It is necessary, therefore, for 
us to make a chronological analysis of the variations in the number of
22. See below, pp. 213-215*
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work—days offered to the estate workers in the period 1886-1910.
During 1886-97 not only did the tea planters maintain the tea
acreage in yield at the maximum level of production but they also annually
brought new land under cultivation. This state of the tea industry
enabled the planters to offer their labourers with "full work" not only
during the months of high yield but also during the months of ordinary
yield as alternative work was now found for the labourers in the opening
up of new land for tea. It was only when inclement weather precluded
regular field work that "full work" was not possible, and the monthly
average number of days of work declined to 16-18. Since unfavourable
weather did not seriously hinder the working of the low-country tea estates,
the planters of these districts were able to offer "full work" of 22 to
24 days per month throughout the year during the period from 1886 to 1897.
This situation changed in the years I898-I9OI. Available evidence
suggests that the volume of work per labourer declined in these years.
The slump in the tea industry virtually put an end to the earlier policy
of heavy production and also to the further opening up of new land for
tea cultivation. In an effort to curtail production cost all extra work
on tea estates such as manuring and weeding was reduced. The consequent
drop in the volume of work in the years I898-I9OI took place in a context
of an over-supply of labour. Experience of several planters reveals
»
that the supply of labour in e3:cess of the slumped demand in the estates
23in the years I898-I9OI resulted in a state of "short work". They were
quite out-spoken in stating that short and irregular shifts were widely
practised in the planting districts. T. N. Christie, a leading planter
and one time representative of the planting interests in the Legislative
Council wrote that, "It might be that, owing to periods of short flush and
24rather too large a labour supply ... too short work had been given."
23. Editorial, COO, 6 February 1899*
Report of the Special Committee on the Labour Question, Memoranda 
Re. Labour Question, PPAC 1903-19Q4? PP- 3-14•
24« Annual General meeting of PAC, 17 February 19^4? ibid., p. 71-
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While there is conclusive evidence that"short work" was widespread
in the years 1898-1901, there is some evidence which suggests that a
relatively higher average of five uorl:-days per week or 4 end 5 days in
alternate weeks were offered to the labourers during some months of the 
25
year. In the context of the slump and the overall surplus labour
situation of these years the only meaningful conclusion one could reach
is that the higher averages of 18 to 20 work-days per month were offered
during the high yielding months of March to May each year during
I898-I9OI. During the rest of the months the "short work" rate averaging
12-16 work-days was general in the planting districts.
Though the slump in the tea industry continued in the years
1902-3, the widespread shortage of labour felt throughout the planting
districts during these two years induced the planters to offer "full work"
2oespecially during the spring months.
The period 1904-10 witnessed an upward trend in the volume of 
work available in the planting sector. The revival of remunerative tea 
prices after 1903 encouraged the employers to maintain the tea plantations 
in yield at a high rate of production. In the up and mid-country districts, 
there was little opening up of new land for cultivation such as took 
place during 1886-97 • The work on the estates was mainly confined to 
the process of production of tea. The planters, therefore, found it 
difficult to maintain the "full work" rate except during the months cf 
high yield. This meant that during the months of ordinary yield during 
these years the labourers obtained only an average of 19-21 work-days.
During the months of bad weather, the average dwindled to the "short work"
rate of 16-18 days. In the low-country districts, the tea planters were
to
able offer "full work" of 22-24 days throughout the year partly because
A
25. Cey. Lab. Com. 1983, Proceedings, pp. 483, 500-501.
26. Editorial, CCv;, 9 September 1902.
•The Labour Question II’, by Yellantharie Doric, ibid., 19 December 1982.
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inclement weather was not so critical as to hinder field work in the 
low-country and also because the large-scale opening up of new land for 
rubber in these districts provided alternative opportunities for work.
and seasonal variations in the average number of work-days available in 
the planting districts in the period 1880-1910 are given in Table 4* 4 
below,
TABLE 4*4 The average number of days of work performed by the labourers 
per month, 1380-1910,
The conclusions reached in the preceding pages on the periodic
Period
Up and mid-cou- Low-country 
ntry districts districts
1880-5
In months of coffee yield 12-16 12-16
1886-97
(a) In months of high and ordinary yield 22-24
(b) In months of bad weather (2-3 months) 16-18
broughout
1898-1901
(a) In months of high yield (March-May) 18-20
(b) During the rest of the year (9 months) 12-16
18-20
12-16
1902-10
(a) In months of high yield (March-May)
(b) In months of ordinary yield
(c) In months of bad weather (2-3 months)
22-24
19-21
16-18
| Throughout
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Evidence reveals that in the months of high yield during the 
years 1907-10 when there was a relative shortage of labour, the tea 
planters of virtually all the planting districts failed to get the work­
load in their estates completed even at the "full work" rate of 22-2/; days 
27
per month. In order to get the estate work completed the tea planters
adopted a policy of offering incentives to encourage the labourers to
perform extra work in the months of peak work load in addition to the usual
number of work-days offered to them.
The type of incentives offered to the labourers differed from
estate to estate depending largely on the way each planter thought how
best the e:rtra volume of work on his estate could be completed. The most
?8
widespread types of incentives were as follows." "Cash payments", which 
were settled at the end of the day, vie re offered to the labourers who 
worked on Sundays. Secondly, a bonus was given to the labourers who turned 
up for work up to six days per week. Thirdly, when a labourer worked for 
more than a certain number of days per month specified by the employer, 
the labourer was given an extra day's pay. Usually, this number of days 
ranged between 24 and 26 depending on the pressure of work on the estate. 
Fourthly, "cash payments" were given when labourers worked overtime at the 
end of the normal day's work which usually lasted from 6 in the morning 
to 4 in the afternoon, or when they plucked more than a specified number 
of pounds of leaf. Usually, this number varied between 16 and 30 pounds 
per labourer depending on the extent and the urgency of the available work.
It is extremely difficult to calculate the effect of the earnings 
from these incentives on the gross earnings of the labourers. It was not 
a regular source of income for the labourers throughout the year. The 
incentives for extra work were offered by the planters only during the
27. Cey. Lab. Com. 19Q3, Proceedings, p. 769.
28. Ibid., evidence of all planting witnesses.
About 93 per cent of the planters who appeared before the Commission 
stated that they offered incentives.
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season of heavy tea yield or in times of acute scarcity of labour. Besides, 
the amount of wages held out for the different types of incentives varied 
widely# Not 02:ly did the amount so held out vary from estate to estate, 
there were variations even on the same estate from time to time depending 
on the ratio of the available volume of work to the available force of 
labour on the estate. For instance, a planter who offered 1-J- cents for 
every pound of tea leaf plucked by his labourers in excess of a stipulated 
limit would offer 2 cents the following week; or a planter who offered 
an extra pay of 50 cents for the worker who turned up 6 days in one week 
would offer one rupee in the next week. These wide and frequent variations 
made the working of the system of incentives extremely complex and not 
easily amenable to systematic study, particularly in its bearing on the 
gross earnings of the labourers. In Table 4*5 an attempt has been made 
to present the average rates of pay offered for extra work# It will give 
some idea about the available opportunities for extra work and the amount 
a labourer could possibly earn to supplement his regular monthly earnings.
TABLE 4 .5 Types of incentives offered and the amounts paid to the 
labourers for overtime work, I905-IO.
Tyne of incentive Average rate of payment
Sunday work
For plucking over a stipulated )
limit of pounds in ’weight (this limit ) 
varied between 16 to 30 pounds) )
For working 6 days
For working in excess of a stipulated )
number of days each month (usually )
varied between 24-26 days) )
75 cents
1 to 2y cents per pound
50 cents to Re.l
33 cents to Re.l
Sourcet. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Proceedings.
There are several contemporary estimates m de by the planters on 
the average supplementary earnings of their labourers from extra work.
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According to these estimates a labourer’s monthly income from the incentives
29seems to have varied Detween Rs.2 and Rs.2.50. These estimates have 
been adopted in computing Table 4*6 giving the total earnings of the 
labourers from their regular monthly income as well as their earnings 
from the incentives.
In Table 4-6 an attempt has been made to present the periodic and 
seasonal variations in the gross monthly earnings of the immigrant 
plantation labourers in Ceylon in the period from 1880 to 1Q10 on the basis 
of the daily wage rates given in Table 4.2 and the number of days of work 
performed by the labourers as given in Table 4*3. In doing so, the 
planting districts are divided into three sub-divisions. First, there 
were the up-country districts such as Badulla, Haputale, and Pundaluo.ya 
where relatively higher daily wage rates of 35-37 cents and 25-29 cents 
were paid to the male and female labourers respectively. Secondly, there 
were the mid-country districts which paid the standard rates of 33 and 
25 cents. Both these groups of districts had in common the problem of 
"short work" during some months in the year. But the gross monthly wages 
of the labourers were different in these two groups because of the 
variations in the daily wage rates. Thirdly, there were the low-country 
districts of Kclani Valley, Kalutara, and Ratnapura which paid wage rates 
similar to the districts situated at medium elevation but differed from 
the up and mid-country districts in being able to avoid "short work" 
the year round.
It should be emphasised that these findings on the gross monthly 
earnings of the labourers as set out in Table 4*6 are only the average 
limits within which the monthly income of the labourers fluctuated. In a 
context where, on the one hand, the workers were considered day labourers 
in the calculation of their wages, and on the other hand, the number of 
work-days fluctuated depending on the agricultural season, an accurate
^^* £ey» Bab. Com. 1908. Proceedings, p• 155*
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TABLE 4.6 The average gross monthly earnings of the immigrant plantation labourers in Ceylon, 
1880-1910.
Up-oountry Mid-oountry Low-c ount ry
districts distriots districts
Period
1880-5
For 12-16 work-days 4-20-5.60 3.00-4.00 3.95-5.30 3.00-4.00 3.60-5.30 2.4O-4.OO
1886-97
(a) In months of high and )
ordinary yield (22-24 work- j 6.60-7.90 4.40-6.00
days) 7.25-3.90 5.50-6.95 7.25-7.90 5.5O-6.OO ) (through out the
)  ^ year)(b) In 2-3 months of bad
weather (16-18 work-days) 5*30-6.65 4.00-5.20 5*30-5.95 4.00-4.50 )
1898-1901
(a) In months of high yield
(Karch-Kay; 18-20 work-days) 5*95-7*40- 4*50-5.80 5.95-6.60 4.50-5-00 5.40-5.95 3.60-5.00
(b) Rest of the months
(12-16 work-days) 3*95-5*30 3.OO-4.65 3*95-5-90 3.00-4.00 3.60-5.30 2.40-4.00
1902-6
(a) In months of high yield
(March-May; 22-24 work-days) 7.25-8.90 5.50-6.95 7.25-7.90 5.5O-6.OO 7.25-7.90 5.50-6.00
(b) In months of ordinary
yield (19-21 days) 6.25-7-75 4*55-6*10 6.25-6.90 4.55-5.25
(c) In 2-3 months of bad
weither (16-18 work-days) 5*30—6.65 4*00-5.20 5*30—5.95 4*00—4.50
1907-1910
(a) In months of high yield 
(March-May; 22-24 work-days)
with overtime wages 9.25-11.35 7*50-9*45 9*25-10.40 7-50-8.50 9.25-10.40 7-50-8.50
(b) In months of ordinary \
yield (19-21 work-days) 6.25-7-75 4.55-6.10 6.25-6.90 4.55-5.25 ) 7*25“7*90 5.50-6.00
, ) (throughout the rest
(c) In 2-3 months of bad ) of thg yQar)
weather (16-18 work-days) 5*30-6.65 4*00-5*20 5*30-5.95 4*00-4.50 )
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calculation is difficult. The lack of detailed information makes such a 
calculation impossible. The annual change in the weather, for example, a 
delay in the south-west monsoon, would affect the yield and eventually 
the prospective earnings of the labourers. However, on the basis of the 
available data, the only reasonably acceptable conclusions we could 
reach on the gross earnings of the labourers are those that are set out 
in Table 4*6.
Besides tea plucking labour gangs there were other categories of 
estate workers. Among these were two groups of skilled workers— the factory 
worker and the prunner. The factory workers who did the work of transform­
ing the green tea leaf into the final consumer article received the highest
daily wage rates. They were paid rates varying between 37 and 45 cents per 
30
day. lba bushes had to be prunned periodically to maintain them at a certain
height to enable the plucking of tea leaf. Besides, prunning encouraged
heavy flushing of tea bushes. The work of prunning required a certain
degree of skill in order to avoid the bushes getting harmed in the process
of prunning. The prunner*s wage ranged between 35-37 cents per day.^ Child-
labour was also utilised by the estates particularly in the work of weeding
and also in tea plucking during the season of peak work-1oad. The daily
32
wage rates paid for child-labour varied between 18 to 22 cents. Finally, 
there was a category of labour known as contract-labour. While the contract- 
labour gangs were also organised by the kanganies, such gangs were not 
directly and regularly in the employ of the estates in that they were 
not included in the estate Check-rolls. They worked for estates by contract 
to complete a stipulated piece of work and were paid on a piece-work basis. 
The contract-labour gangs were usually employed for work such as clearing 
land, weeding, manuring, end draining. ->->
30* Ibid., pp. 73, 201, 307, 650.
33.. Ibid., pp. 181, 191, 294, 475°
32. Ibid., pp. 9, 26, 201, 485*
33. Ibid., Report, p. viii.
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4* The price of rice issued to the labourers
We have seen so far that in the years 1880-1910 the daily wage 
rates paid to the plantation labourers remained unchanged and that the 
periodic and seasonal change in the demand and supply of labour found its 
expression in the rates of advances and the ra,tes of monthly wages. Another 
aspect needs to be examined, viz., the planters* claim that the fluctua­
tions of the daily wage rates were avoided by making use of the mechanism 
of the issue of rice to the labourers by the estates.
The following excerpts from two contemporary documents reveal the 
policy as expounded by the planting community. In 1384, the sub-committee 
of the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce appointed to consider the draft 
Labour Ordinance of that year pointed out that,
From the first introduction of the immigrant labour in the colony 
it has been the practice to avoid as far as possible any variation 
in the rates of wages paid to the labourers, the compensation 
rendered necessary by varying circumstances being by agreement 
effected directly in the stipply of rice.34
A planter giving evidence before the Ceylon Silver Currency Commission
of 1893 described the system thus,
When the prices(of rice) advance above what the cooly can afford to 
pay out of the usual wages, the planter issues rice at a fixed 
price, recouping himself by maintaining it for a time when the 
market price recedes. By this method fluctuations in the rates 
of wages are avoided.35
Thus, it was an important feature of the plantation labour system that
the planters tried to adjust wages by giving rice in part— payment of
wages at a fixed price irrespective of the cost.
Why did the planters pursue a policy of part-payment of wages in
rice in preference to the payment of the gross wages in cash?.
Historically, by the beginning of our period, the system was well developed.
34* WCO, 16 January 1834*
35- SCC, Written Answers, Cey. SP VI of 1394, P» c23.
See also, ibid., p. c26.
'The Coolies* pay Legislation', by A.M. W, WCO, 4 January I8S4 .
Editorial, £00,29 May 1390.
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It hcid been evolved by the coffee planters of the mid-nineteenth century
who found several advantages in this method of wage payment. The average
coffee planter was a proprietor planter and he frequently faced the
problem of obtaining working capital to finance the production of coffee.
In this context, he tried to postpone as much of his immediate financial
commitments as possible until his earnings actually reached him. The
part-payment of wages in rice turned out to be one way of accomplishing
this objective. The coffee planter found in the rice merchant, who was
usually a Chetty, a source from which he could obtain the labourers’
requirements of rice on credit to be repaid after he received his earnings 
36
from coffee. Apart from the rice trade, the Chetty pla.yed an important
role in the monetary market of the day. In the context of the mid-nineteenth
century Ceylon where the specie in circulation was relatively sparse and
banking facilities in the plantation districts were sporadic, the Chetty
played the role of the credit banker. It was from him that most of the
coffee planters cashed their cheques to obtain specie to pay the labourers’
37wages and also contracted occasional petty loans to tide over difficulties.
It was, therefore, found convenient and advantageous that the same Chetty
38should supply rice to the estate on c r e d i t , O n  the part of the Chetty 
trader-moneylender community, issuing of commodities as well as money 
to their customers on credit was a major strategy in their trading 
modus operandi. It helped them to keep their customers tied to them and 
also eliminate any possible rivals who may not have the same financial 
resources and trading connections to sustain a policy of trading on 
credit for a long time as the Chetties did. The Chetties with their 
organised network of trading and moncylending links among the members of
36. District Court, Kandy, Case Ho. 1210, Kumarappa Chetty Vs Tawalantenna 
Estate, £00, 7 February I0O9.
37. Editorial, £00, 19 February 1883.
District Court, Kandy, V.F.R. Paruvien Chetty Vs T. J. Grigg, ibid.,
9 February 1385 *
Appeal Court, T. R. walker Vs Moorman bouticue-keeper, CPU, 13February 1902.
33. Planting Rotes from Talawakelle, COO, 6 January 1893.
General meeting of Mcrawakkcralo DPA 30 July 1907, £Oi, 9 September 1902.
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their community in India and Ceylon were in a position to operate their
trading activities on a credit basis. However, the tea and the rubber
planters of our period had greater access to working capital than their
predecessors in the coffee period and were therefore less dependent on
the Chetty for credit transactions. But the system of part-paynent of
wages in rice held out other advantages common to coffee planters of the
mid-nineteenth century as well as the tea and rubber planters of our
period. These advantages explain why the tea and the rubber planters
continued the system.
First, the system was liked by the labourers. On the one hand,
the South Indian labourers were long accustomed to the system of wage
39payment m  kind m  their own country. On the other hand, tne system as
practised in the estates in Ceylon turned out to be beneficial to them.
These benefits to the labourers together with the way the rice issue on
the estates was organised helped the planters to obtain a steady turn-out
40of the labour force to work.
Secondly, the planters were obviously keen in maintaining the low 
wage rates paid to their labourers. For the low wage rates to be feasible, 
rice had to be made available to the labourers at a certain price. A heavy 
increase in the market price of rice was inevitable to react on the wage 
rates if the labourers’ were left to purchase their supplies in the open 
market. Therefore, if the planters’ cost of production was to be kept 
down with a low wage bill without at the same time jeorpadizing the supply 
of labour, the labourers• requirements of rice had to be supplied to 
them at a mutually acceptable rate.
The above stated factor leads us to the third important factor, 
namely, the nature of the import and the retail trade of rice in the 
Island. The import of rice as well as the retail tra.de in the plantation
39. LRSRKP for 1906, HBBP, Vol. 7446, Pro. No. 490 of 31 December 1906
40. See below, pp. 212-216.
A1
districts were monopolised by the Chetties* r The payment of labourers1
total wages in cash would have left them to purchase their requirements
of rice from the local rice merchants. The bargaining position of the
labourer vis-a-vis the rice merchant was a very weak one. But the planter
organ:sed and articulate as they were, were obviously in a stronger
bargaining position v.is-a-vis the rice monopoly of the Chetty. Therefore,
the employers directly confronted the rice merchant to ensure a cheap
supply of rice to the ill-organised, inarticulate, and semi-literate
labour force who would have otherwise easily succumbed to the monopolisti
power of the Chetty rice dealer.
The alternative was to break up the rice monopoly either by tne
planters themselves entering the rice import trade or by European
commercial firms doing so. But there were strong obstacles to this
alternative. The Chetty rice monopoly was closely interwoven with the
plantation labourers1 decided preference for those varieties of rice
42produced in India."1’ They had been used to Indian rice in their own 
country. More important, the par-boiled Indian rice was found easy to 
cook and also it was possible to keep the cooked rice overnight for
43 , •consumption next morning without going stale. This was important in 
the context where the labourers’ working day started at six in the 
morning and where the labourers were accustomed to have in the morning a 
heavy meal of rice prepared the night before.^ They disliked the variety 
of rice produced in Ceylon. In any case, the total quantity of rice 
produced in the Island was not sufficient to meet even the demand of the 
indigenous population let alone the immigrant estate population. Burma
41. ’Cooly Advances end Labour Supply’, by Old Planter, COO, 7 June 1895* 
Editorial, COE, 25 April 1907*
’The Labour Question and the Price of Rice’, speech by the Governor, 
ibid., 26 February 1903*
42. SCO, Minutes of Evidence, Cey. SP VI of 1894* PP* b6, cl2.
Editorials of COE, 6 February 1900 and 14 March 1908.
43. ’The High Price of Rice', ibid., 2p April 1907*
44* See below, pp. 2 6 7 - 2 6 8 .
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presented an alternative source of rice. But Burma rice was not par-boiled.
It entered the market as raw rice and was therefore not acceptable to
45the plantation labourers* There were, in fact, several attempts during 
our period to obt?in rice for Ceylon from Burma. But these attempts did
it
not meet with great success. r‘ One important reason for this outcome 
was that Burma rice could not successfully compete in Ceylon with Indian 
rice at the normal range of prices of Indian rice. Additional cost of 
par-boiling on top of higher transport costs from Burma to Ceylon 
inevitably augmented the price of Burma rice. It was only when the price 
of Indian rice reached an abnormally high level that Burma rice found
i rj
it possible to enter the Ceylon market. In our period, it was not common
for Indian rice to reach such abnormally high price so as to render the
purchase of Burma rice feasible. Even when attempts were made by the
planters to experiment with the issue of Burma, rice to their labour force
in years when the price of Indian rice was abnormally high, the Chetties
succeeded in thwarting such isolated efforts. The local Chetty merchants
took advantage of the labourers’ innate dislike to Burma rice and
/R
encouraged them to press their complaints. The Chetty trader had to be 
listened to, for as we will show later on, the kanganies and the labourers 
were in debt to the local Chetty merchant for loans raised by the 
kanganies and also for provision obtained by the labourers. Besides, 
when rivals appeared on the scene, the Chetties combined themselves to 
undersell the rivals and thereby eliminate them. The Chetties had virtually 
entrenched themselves at the point of supply of rice in India as well 
as the point of demand among the consumers in the estates in the Island.
In 1908, when the price of rice in Ceylon became abnormally high, Governor
45* Editorial, COB, 14 karch 1903.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
4 8. Editorial, COB, 6 February 1900.
Sir Henry Blake described the Chetty rice monopoly as one
... in the hands of a ring existing between the blade of paddy and
the consumer of rice. It comes from the field in Bengal and extends
through the Chetty who has given advances in the field to the Chetty 
who brings it to Colombo, rigs the market, and sells it at his 
own price...49
In order to find out the working of the system of part-payment of 
the wages in rice in the estates it is necessary for us to know two sets of 
prices, viz., the price at which the estates purchased rice amd the price 
at which rice was issued to the labourers. But available information on 
these tx-70 sets of prices are scattered. The only available series of rice 
prices are those pertaining to the rice market in Colombo. With the help of 
this series and the scattered information on the planters' cost price of rice
an attempt will be made at the outset to prepare an annual Table on the
approximate rates which the estates paid in purcha.sing rice. It is hoped to 
do this by taking the Colombo market price as the base and compute the 
planters' cost price of rice by adding to the Colombo price a sum to cover, 
first, the cost of transport from Colombo to the planting districts and 
also, secondly, a margin of profit to the trader who supplied rice to 
the estates.
This method of calculating the probable estate cost price of
rice is acceptable on two grounds. First, this was the method adopted by
the District Planters* Associations whenever these Associations fixed the
50
maximum price payable by the planters of the respective districts.
Secondly, the Colombo market price series was prepared by the Ceylon
Chamber of Commerce and published in The Weekly Ceylon Observer as a weekly
51guide to the planters in their purchase of rice. Evidence reveals
49. 'The Laboiir Question and the Price of Rice', speech by the Governor, 
ibid., 26 February 1908.
50. A genera-1 meeting of Dimbulla DPA, 8 September 1882, VICO, 14 September 
1832.
AnR of Rakwana DPA for 1898, COO, 28 January I899.
AnR of Rakwana DPA for 1901, COU, 30 January 1902.
that individual planters did make use of The Weekly Ceylon Observor price
list of rice in purchasing their supplies. While some planters obtained
their supplies of rice direct from Colombo, the majority of planters
hiappear to have purchased rice from the local Chetty merchant. When the 
local Chetties demanded exorbitant prices, the planters turned to the
S  4  mColombo rice market.' Ihis reaction of the planters reveals that even
when purchasing rice from the local Chetty, the planters were guided by
the Colombo price. Of the several varieties of Indian rice imported to
the Island, the varieties most widely consumed by the estate population
55were Soolye and Callunda. We will, therefore, confine our calculations 
of the market price to Soolve and Callunda rice alone. The annual average 
price of these two varieties of rice in the Colombo market is set out in 
column 1 of Table 4*7*
On the basis of the Colombo prices, we now hope to find out the 
approximate average prices paid by the planters of the different planting 
districts to purchase their supplies of rice. The regional differences 
in the price depended partly on the distance of the estates from Colombo 
and the available transport facilities. Rice was transported to the 
interior of the Island mainly by rail and cart. In some low country 
districts where there were rivers, rice was transported by ferries. In 
areas where these facilities were not available rice had to be carried to
52. ’Monthly Average Frice of Rice1, by A. A. B, COO, 3 February 1S94* 
'Planters and the Topic of the Day1, by PRO BONO PUBLICO, COW,
13 February 1900.
53* District Court, Kandy, A. Forsythe Vs G & W. Leechman, The Ceylon 
Overland Observer, 10 June 1879*
A general meeting of the Dimbulla DPA, 8 September 1882, WCO,
14 September 1882.
54. A general meeting of the Maskeliya DPA, 23 August 3.882, ibid.,
28 August 1882.
AnR of Piakwana DPA for 1893, COO, 28 January 1899*
55. 'Tenders for Victualling Immigrant Coolies', by G. A .  W.P., CGG, 
October-December 1505? pt. I, p. IO5 6.
Editorial, COW, 25 April 1907*
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TABLE 4.7 Showing the Colombo market price of rice together with the average cost price 
prioe to the planters and the average price charged to the labourers in the estates 
situated at low, medium, and high elevation, 1880-1910 (in rupees and cents per bushel)
Profit 
ott loss 
to the 
estates Year
(1)
Colombo
market
prioe
(2)
Low elevation Mid elevation High elevation
Cost price 
to estates
(3) -
Price to 
labourers 
(4)
Cost price 
to estates
(5)
Price to 
labourers 
(6)
Cost price 
to estates
(7)
Price to 
labourers 
(8)
,1880 2.85 3.10 3.60 3.35 4.00 3.75 4.50
1881 2.85 3.10 3.60 3.35 4.00 3.75 4.50
1882 2.55 2.80 3.60 3.05 4.00 3.45 4.50
1883 2.45 2.70 3.60 2.95: 4.00 3.35 4.50
I884 2.70 2.90 3.60 3.20 4.00 3.60 4.50
1
I885 3.15 3.40 3.60 3.65 4.00 4.05 4.50
Profit 1886 2.75 3.00 3.60 3.25 4.00 3.65 4.50
>
1887 2.80 3.05 3.60 3.30 4.00 3.70 4.50
1888 2.75 3.00 3.60 3.25 4.00 3.65 4.50
1889 3.15 3.40 3.60 3.65 4.00 4.05 4.50
1890 3.30 3.55 3.60 3.80 4.P0 4.20 4.50
J.891 3.15 3.40 3.60 3.65 4.00 4.05 4.50
1892 3.45 3.70 3.60 3.95 4.00 4.35 4.50
Loss «
^1893 3.95 4.20 3.60 4.45 4.00 4.85 4.50
1894 3.30 3.55 3.60 3.80 4.00 4.20 4.50
Profit 1895 3.15 3.40 3.60 3.65 4.00 4.05 4.50
1896 3.10 3.35 3.60 3.60 4.00 4.10 4.50
1897 3.95 4.20 4.20 4.45 4.45 4.85 4.85
1898 3.90 4.15 4.15 4.40 4.40 4.90 4.90
1899 3.60 3.85 4.00 4.10 4.10 4.50 4.50
1900 3.90 4.15 4.15 4.40 4.40 4.80 4.80
1901 3.90 4.15 4.15 4.40 4.40 4.80 4.80
1902 3.60 3.85 4.00 4.10 4.10 4.50 4.50
1903 3.40 3.65 4.00 3.90 4.00 4.30 4.50
Profit 1904 3.40 3.65 4.00 3.90 4.00 ’ 4.30 4.50
1905 3.40 3.65 4.00 3.90 4.00 4.30 4.50
ll906 3.70 3.95 4.00 4.20 ' 4.20 4.60 4.60
11907 4.40 4.65 4.55 4.90 4.80 5.30 5.10
Loss 1908 4.65 4.90 4.55 5.15 4.80 5.55 5.10
.1909 4.65 4.90 4.55 5.15 4.80 5.55 5.10
1910 4.10 4.35 4.35 4.60 4.80 5.00 5.00
Sourcess See pp. 191>_201-206.
Colombo market prices are from WCO, COO, and COW.
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the estates by the labourers. On the basis of the geographical location
and the available transport facilities, it is possible to divide the
planting districts in the Island into three main groups. First, there
were the districts situated at the higher elevation with relatively scanty
means of transport. To this group belong districts such as Badulla,
Passara, Rakwana, Pundaluoya,and Haputale. Secondly, there were the districts
such as Kandy, Hatale, Dimbulla, and Dikoya situated at medium elevation
and also had better means of transport. It was possible for the planters
in these districts to obtain rice at a price lower than the planters in
5 6the first group of districts. Thirdly, there were the low-country
districts of Kalutara, Kelani Valley, and parts of Kegalle situated nearer
to Colombo, and had the advantage of relatively greater accessibility
due to their low elevation.In these districts, the cost of rice to the
57planters was less than the two former groups of districts. The above 
division of the planting districts is not strictly accurate. An estate at 
medium elevation and situated near the network of rail communication 
could have obtained rice at a lower price than an estate in the low-country 
situated away from the main line of communication. However, on the whole 
our demarcation is admissible. This conclusion is confirmed by two sets 
of evidence. First, we have already seen in section 2 of the present 
chapter that, on the basis of the daily wage rates paid to the labourers, 
it is possible to divide the planting districts in to the same three 
groups of districts as we have done in this paragraph. At least as far as 
the up and.mid-country groups of districts were concerned, different 
daily wage rates were adopted in these two groups of districts because 
of the regional variation in the price of rice between these two groups
56. A general meeting of Uva DPA, 27 September 1897j COO, 20 October 
1897.
A general meeting of Udapussellawa DPA, 19 June i860, V.CO,
24 June 1880.
57. Sec. of PAC to Col. Sec., 3 December 1897 9 PPAC 1898, Correspondence, 
p. cczii.
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of districts. Secondly, scattered information available to us on the
cost price of rice to the estates in the various districts confirm our
division of the planting districts into the three divisions given above*
However, even in case of the three groups of districts indica.ted
in the above paragraphs, it is not possible to obtain accurate and
consistant data. The regional differences in the price of rice underwent
changes from time to time over the 30 years of our study depending largely
on the progress of the transport facilities in the planting districts
and the changes in the margin of profit retained by the traders who
supplied rice to the estates. In view of the scanty information available
to us, the most we could do is to draw up a rough scale of the difference
in the price of rice among the three groups of districts and test our
conclusions against the qualitative information available to us on the
regional state of the rice market.
Detailed evidence on the regional price of rice paid by the
59planters is available for the year 1908.' According to this information 
the planters in districts such as Badulla, Rakwana, Haputale, and 
Pundaluoya situated at higher elevation paid an average price of Rs*5*35” 
5*65 for a bushel of rice. In the same year the price in Colombo was Rs*4»65 
suggesting an average difference of 80 cents to Re*l per bushel between 
Colombo and the districts at higher elevations. The available evidence
c?
for the 1880" suggests that similar rates of difference existed in that 
period. Thus, in I883 when the Colombo average price stood at Rs.2*47> 
the planters in Badulla paid an average rate of Rs*3*p0 P-r bushel.^’
Details of annual prices maintained by a Bogawantalawa planter reveal 
that between 1880 and 1892 he paid an annual average of 86 cents more
58. See above, pp. 173-174.
59. Cev. Lab. Com. 1'03, Proceedings, Replies of tho planting witnesses 
to Question No. 13*
60. AR of AG/* Badulla District, CAR 1883, p. 2 7 A .
than the Colombo price.^ Thus, it appears? reasonable to adopt the
conclusion reached on the basis of the evidence for the year 1903 that
the planters in the higher elevations paid an average of 60 cents to Re.i
per bushel of rice more than the price in Colombo. The same set of
evidence reveals that the planters in the districts situated at medium
and low elevations paid approximately between 40-50 cents and 30-30 cents
respectively more than the Colombo price to purchase rice for their 
62
estates. L The different prices paid by the planters of high, medium, end 
low elevations for the purchase of rice in the period from i860 to 1910 
are computed on the basis of the above conclusions and set cut in columns 
3, 5> and 7 in Table 4*7*
Prom the information available to us, it is possible to set up a 
reasonably acceptable scale about the price at which rice was issued by 
the planters to their labour force. The general concensus of the planters' 
views throughout the period from 1880 to about 1896 was that where male 
and female labourers were paid daily wage rates of 33 and 25 cents 
respectively and given "full work" of 20-24 days per month, they could 
be charged at the rate of Rs.4 per bushel of rice issued to them, without 
jeopardizing the labour supply to the estates.^ This meant that the 
planters considered that a male worker earning between Rs.6.60 and Rs.7*20 
per month (33 cents x 20-24 days) could be reasonably charged Rs.4 for 
rice per month because he was entitled to one bushel of rice per month 
and that a female worker earning between Rs.5 &nd Rs.6 per month (25 cents 
x 20-24 days) could be charged Rs.3 per month because she was entitled 
to obtain three quarter of rice per month from the estate. The above
61.’SCO, Written Answers, Cey. SP VI of 1894? P* c22.
62c Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Proceedings, Replies of the planting witnesses 
to Question ho. 13.
’The he]ani Valley Railway', by A. C. Kingsford, COO, 14 February 1894. 
'The Kelani Valley Railway Scheme. Deputation to the Governor1, 
ibid., 15 February 1894.
^3• Cey. Lab. Com. 1906, Proceedings•
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scale was regarded try the planters of estates situated at mid-elevation 
as a fair one which would leave a margin of savings for the labourers*
In the districts situated at higher elevation and where the labourers 
were paid a relatively high daily 'wage rate, the planters considered 
Rs*4*50 Psr bushel of rice as the reasonable rate to be charged to the 
labourers.0  ^ In the districts situated at low elevation and where the 
labourers were paid a relatively low daily wage rate, Rs.3.60 was regarded
65
as a reasonable charge to the labourers. The planters* premise that
these rates were reasonable will be examined in Chapter V. Here, it is
sufficient to note the premise on which the planters acted in fixing the
price at which rice was issued to the labourers.
The columns 4, 6, and 8 in Table 4*7 show the approximate rates
discounted from the labourers* wages for rice issued to them by the estates.
For the years from i860 to 1896 we have adopted the rates given in the
preceding paragraph because there is evidence that these rates were
maintained by the planters during these years. A planter giving evidence 
the
before/Ceylon Silver Currency Commission in 3 892 testified that rice was
issued to the labourers at Rs.4 per bushel during the preceding 10 years
This is confirmed by other evidence* Some planters paid the newly arrived
labourers from South India an initial cash advance of Re.l per heatL to
6 y
obtain rice during the first week of work on the estates* The usual
weekly quota of rice being a quarter of a bushel, this rate of cevsh
advances suggests that a bushel of rice cost Rs«4 to the labourers.
Besides, the planters on several occasions pointed out that a labourer’s
wages of three days were sufficient to cover the cost of his weekly quota 
6 8of rice. This was confirmed by Lt. Governor, John Douglas— a man who
6 4. ’Kanganies’ Pay', by Reformee, WCO, 12 June i860.
6 5. Sec. of PAC to Col. Sec., 3 December I897> PPAC 1893, Correspondence, 
p. ccxiii.
66. Editorial, CjjOO, 10 June 1390.
SCC, Minutes of Evidence, Cey. SP VI of 1894» p. b4*
67* The Deputation of the PAC to the Gov., 15 August 1887, PPAC 1888, p.67.
_ _  _  _ . ^  . .  _  *• 1 •  r >  ^  r n  a /■» i  O O i  ~  a  a68. Proceedings 01 tne annual general meeting oj. m e , r m  m u i , p.
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‘became unpopular among the planters because of his sympathetic attitude
69
towards the estate labourers. ' At the standard wage rate of 33 cents
per day, this works out to approximately Re.l for the weekly quota of
a quarter bushel which meant that a bushel of rice cost the labourer Rs.4*
The information set out in Table 4*7 reveals that during the
period from i860 to 1896, except in 1852-93, the planters purchased rice
at a price less than the price at which they issued rice to the labourers.
Thus, the planters were left with a profit, This conclusion is confirmed
70by the available qualitative evidence. The planters were not quite
outspoken about the profit they made on rice during these years. However,
?. few planters complaining about the loss they incurred in 1893, referred
71to their past experience of years of profit. They justified such profits 
on the ground that they had incurred a loss on rice during the late
c i
I87O0 when the price of rice was high and rice was issued to the workers
72
at rates below the cost price to the estates. When the price of rice 
increased in 1892-3 and the cost price to the estates exceeded Rs.4 per 
bushel, the planters incurred a loss in the transaction. The planters 
concern over the loss in rice in these two years is well documented. 
However, the high price of rice in 1892-3 was short-lived. The market 
price of rice fell below Rs.4 per bushel in 1894-6. Consequently, the 
planters again found it possible to obtain a profit on rice.
The years I896-I9IO present a basic change in the price scale 
on which the planters hitherto issued rice to the labourers. A new 
price scale seems to have come into being after 1896, The policy of
6 9. Lt. Gov. to 3 of S., IJo. 144 of 12 October 1683, C.O. 384/145*
70. ’Profit on Rice1, by M. P, UCG, 14 December I08O.
’The New Cooly Legislation’, by J. B, ibid., 12 January 1084. 
Editorial, COO, 10 June I890.
’Equitable Taxation’, by P. B, ibid., 29 February 1896.
71. SCC, Minutes of Evidence, Cey. SP VI of 1694, P* b4.
DhkC, Proceedings, Cey. 3P II of 1693, p. 20.
72. 'The Cooly Rages Legislation', by Cobaenito, WC0_, 9 January 1834.
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charging the labourers with a fixed rate for rice issued to them was
dropped and a new principle of having a minimum and a maximum limit on
the price of rice issued to the labourers was adopted by the planters.
During these years, the planters appear to hrve acted in the belief that
respective male and female labourers on the daily wage rates of 33 and
25 cents and working an average of 20-24 days per month could be charged
a minimum rate of Rs.4 and a maximum rate of Rs.4 • 80 per bushel of rice 
73issued to them. The minimum rate of Rs.4 was regarded as a reasonable 
and a fair price which would ensure an adequate supply of labour while 
the above wage scale with rice at the maximum rate of Rs.4 .80 was regarded 
as a minimum living wage for the labourers— a scale which should be avoided 
if possible except when the cost of rice was exceptionally high. It was 
thought that the latter scale would leave the labourers barely any 
savings and would discourage the labourers from coming to work on the 
estates. In the low-country districts where the price of rice was usually 
below that of the districts at medium elevation, the charge for rice 
issued to the labourers varied between Rs.4 and Rs.4*58 per bushel. In 
the districts at higher elevation where the planters had to pay a relatively 
high price to purchase rice, the labourers were charged between Rs«4»50 
and Es.5 per bushel. The upper limits charged to the labourers stated 
in this paragraph were obtained from the evidence in The Labour Commission 
Report of 1908. 1908 is the most reliable year for this information 
because in our period the market price of rice was at its highest in 1908. 
Therefore, the price charged in this year could be reckoned as the maximum 
rate which the planters sought to obtain from the labourers for rice 
issued to them.
The main reason for the evolution of the new scale after 1896 was 
the rise in the price of rice since that year. Unlike the increase in
73. For the views of the planters, see the evidence■ given by the planting
witnesses in reply tc question Ho. 13 of the Labour Commission.
Cey- Lab * Com. 1908. Proceedings.
O
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the price of rice in 1892-3 which was short-lived, after 1896, the high 
price of rice came to stay. The average cost price of rice to the estates 
exceeded Rs.4 per bushel except in 1903-5 when there was a temporary 
decrease in the price. The planters* policy in the period 1897-1910 was 
to charge to the labourers a minimum stipulated rate when the estate 
purchase price of rice was below that rate. In such years, the planters 
were obviously left with a profit. VJhen the estate purchase price of rice 
exceeded the maximum stipulated rate chargeable to the labourers, the 
planters charged to the labourers only that rate and thereby the planters 
incurred a loss. When the estate cost price of rice fell within the 
minimum and the ma.ximum rates chargeable to the labourers, rice was issued 
to the la-bourers at the estate cost price.
It is possible to get some idea as to bow the above stated scale 
operated, chronologically, in the years 1897-1910. In the years 
1897-1902, the planters’ average cost price fluctuated between the 
minimum and the maximum limits on the above scale. Therefore, during 
these years, the labourers were charged with the planters' cost price 
of rice. In the years 1903-5? the estate cost price of rice fell below 
the minimum price chargeable to the labourers and therefore the planters 
made a profit- In 1906 and again in 1910, the estate cost price of rice 
fell within the minimum-maximum scale chargeable to the labourers, and 
therefore the labourers were charged with the estate cost price. In 
the years 1907-9 ? there was a heavy'' increase in the market price of 
rice. Consequently, the estate cost price of rice exceeded the maximum 
rate on the scale and the planters ha-d to incur a loss on rice supplied
74to the labourers in these two years.
The foregoing analysis of the available statistical data reveals 
that the planters in fact subsidised the rice issued to the
74. Cey. La b. Com. 1908, Report, p. viii.
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workers only in the years 1392-3 and 1 9 0 7 - 9 * This conclusion is well
7 6
supported by the available qualitative information. ’ First, the planters
appear to have been vociferious whenever the market price of rice was
too high for the planters to avoid making a loss on their part. A scrutiny
of the proceedings of the meetings of the Ceylon Planters’ Association,
the District Planters’ Associations, and also the information available
in the pro-planter Press reveal that the outcry of the planters against
high price of rice was virtually confined to the years 1892-3
and 1907-9. Secondly, the planters'reaction to the CustomsDuty on imported
rice and the rail freight on rice imposed by the Ceylon Government
supports our conclusion that the loss on rice was confined to these
years. Pice imported to the Island carried an import levy of 10 per cent
of the import price of rice. On the Ceylon Government Railway, rice was
classified as a second class commodity of transport and therefore had
to pay a fairly high rail freight, particularly compared with commodities
such as coffee and tea which were classified as sixth class commodities
of rail transport. On the whole, the planters were against both the levy and
the high rail freight because these inevitably increased the market price
of rice. At times they launched vigorous and active agitation with the
aim of getting the levy abolished and the rail freight reduced. It is
interesting to note that such sustained agitation during the whole of
the 30 years of our period were mainly confined to the years 1892-3 
77and I9O7-9 . Apparently, among other factors, the loss which the
75. There were, of course, exceptions to this general conclusion due
to regional and monthly variations in the market price of rice. For
instance, the high price of rice which lasted throughout 1907-9  
really started in late 1906.
7 6.
The Upper Yaskeliya Estate Co. Ltd., Report for lS97> COO, 19 
19 February I89S.
.Yatiyantota Tea Co. Ltd., Report for I898, ibid., 17 April 1899*
77* Editorials of ibi_d., 16 January 1893, 3 February 1899, and 18 March 1893* 
'Rice Freight on Railway', by Oudeis, ibid., 6 September 1894*
'The Labour Question1, by G. II. Thomson, COV., 12 April 1907.
'The Labour Question', by J. Gordon? ibid., 15 April 1907.
planters incurred on rice during ther.e years prompted them to a relentless
attack on the import duty and the rail freight. The absence of such
agitation d u r i n g  the rest of the years suggests that the problem of
the loss on rice was not felt by the planters throughout our period. The
fact that the planters1 loss on rice was confined to the years 
1892-3 and 1907-9 reveals that during the rost of the years of our period 
the Customs Duty and the rail freight on rice fell primarily onthe consume 
It is clear from the above discussion .and the information in 
Table 4*7 that the policy which the planters enunciated, shovm by ' 
us in page 193 above did not work as avowed by the planters. A fixed price 
was charged to the labourers only either so long as it was profitable to 
the planters to do so or if it did not involve a continuous loss to 
themselves. When the price of rice came to stay at a high rate after 1896, 
the planters altered the policy of a fixed price charged to the labourers 
and adopted the policy of charging to the labourers the price at which the 
planters bought rice. When the planters did make a loss on rice, it was 
relatively infrequent. It was confined to the years during which the 
market price of rice was exceptionally high so as to make the whole of 
the monthly wages of an average labourer barely sufficient to cover the 
cost of his supply of rice (let alone his other necessities of life) if 
the market price was charged to the labourers.
During times of exceptionally high price of rice the planters had 
the alternative of raising the wage rates than making themselves a loss
73on rice. But the planters preferred the latter course. The reason is
clear from the information in Table 4*7* As several planters themselves
pointed out, occasions when, the price of rice was exceptionally high 
79we re rare. Thus, a loss on rice to the planters was a temporary and a
78c Editorial, ibid., 25 April 1907. 
Cey . Laly Com. 1908? Proceedings.
79* Ibid., p. 220.
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rare phenomenon. When the price of rice settled down to the normal 
market rates, the planters never made a loss. A planter giving evidence 
before the Labour Commission of 1908 was clear on this point when he
80stated that the high prices in I9O0 were abnormal and would soon gc down.
The planters, on the other hand, believed that if the wage rates v.Tere
raised when the price of rice increased, it would be difficult to lower
the wage rate when the price of rice recedes;that an increase in wage
rates once conceded would be a ln.sting phenomenon. The labourers were
used to the idea of a fixed wage rate so much that it commanded a sort
of a customary sanction among them. They were imported to the Island on
the understanding of paying a fixed wage rate. Besides, administratively,
the planters found a fixed rate of wages with a fluctuating rate of rice
a relatively convenient arrangement than a wage scale which fluctuated
with every fluctuation in the market price of rice in a situation where
the market price fluctuated frequently. There was also the belief among
the planters that any increase in the earnings of the labourers would
31
be swallowed by the Chetties and the mony-lenders.
8°. Ibid., p. 83.
81♦ 'Raising of Coolies' wages: An Opposing view to Mr. Rutherford', 
by A Planter, C0V.T., 6 April 1907.
CHAPTER V
THE METHODS OF WAGS PAYMENT AND THE REAL INCOME
An endeavour is made in the present chapter to find out the 
actual economic conditions of the immigrant plantation workers in Ceylon 
in the period 1880-1910. On analysis it appears that while the basic 
economic necessities of the workers were realised, the methods by which 
such needs were fulfilled tied the workers to an economic life of 
debt-bondage. In sections 1-3 our attention will be devoted to these 
methods. Section 1 will concentrate on the method of payment of the 
labourers' wages in kind. Available evidence leads us to the conclusion 
that, on the whole, this method worked in the interest of the workers. In 
sections 2 and 3 where the methods of payment in money, vis., the payment 
of cash advances and the balance of wages, are examined it appears that 
these two methods contributed in varying degree to bind the labourer to a 
life of indebtedness to the kangany, the shop-keeper, and eventually to 
the estate. Of the two methods, however, the predominant factor causing 
labour indebtedness was the operation of the system of advances. In section 
4 ifhere an attempt is made to compare the rate of wages paid and the cost 
of living of the labourers we find that the wage of an average labourer 
was inadequate to meet the cost of his basic requirements, particularly 
in the years after I89O. The labourers subsisted on advances but the 
inadequate wages made a total wipe-off of their advances account infeasible 
Consequently, their life was one of constant indebtedness being perpet­
ually repaid with manual labour. The labourers acquiesced to this 
arrangement because it was nothing alien to their economic life in the 
villages of South India. Borrowing money in times of need and paying 
these loans off with one's manual labour was an economic fact in the 
life of the agricultural population of South India. The planters 
pursued the system because in the absence of any form of indenture
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labour agreements in Ceylon, unlike most other countries where Indian 
immigrant labour was employed, labour indebtedness gave the planters the 
only practical held over the labour force. The system, in fact, meant 
the grafting of some aspects of the economic life of the agricultural 
labourers in South India on to the plantation labour system in order to 
keep the labourers tied to the plantation. The entire system appear!to 
have evolved customarily independent of statutory legislation.^
1. Payment in kind
The part-payment of the labourers' wages in kind took the form 
of a weekly supply of rice. The planters organised the supply of rice to 
the labourers with the object of making it an effective internal arrange­
ment to maximize the daily turn-out of labourers for work. The labourers 
were required to turn up for a specified number of work-days per week 
before they were eligible for their weekly quota. When the labourers failed 
to work the specified number of days the weekly quota of rice was curtailed. 
This in fact meant the adoption of a technique of payment involving the 
indirect use of compulsion. Apparently, the labourers recruited from a 
peasant agricultural sector to a commercialized plantation sector, akin 
more to a modern industrial organisation, involving regular and consistent 
work, were found to lack adequate commitment to such work. It appeals 
that among these labourers, who obviously lacked the necessary orientation 
and discipline required of a modem labour force, problems such as high 
labour turnover and excessive absenteeism were widespread and therefore 
some method of compulsion had to be used to get them commited to regular 
work. Besides, a substantial section of the Indian labour force in Ceylon 
was heavily indebted, particularly in the years after I89O without any 
satisfactory means of paying back their debts. This plight made them
1. Editorial, COO, ?9 Kay I89O. 
Editorial, ibid., 7 June I89O.
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indifferent towards regular work. The Labour Commission of 1908 found 
reason to conclude that the average labourer working 5 days in every 7 
would not have worked as much as he did if it was not for the issue of
p
rice being dependent upon the number of days the labourer actually worked.
On the whole, the system of part-payment of wages in rice appears
to have operated in the interest of the labourers for rice supplied by
the estate was normally below the retail market price at which rice was
available to the consumers in the localities where the plantations were 
3situated. This is clear from Table 9»1 below, which compares the price 
at which rice was issued to the labourers and the regional retail market 
price of rice as given in the annual Blue -Cooks of the Ceylon Government.
As we have seen earlier, it was essential for the labourers to be supplied 
with rice below a certain price if the planters were to maintain the level 
of daily wages paid to their labourersSecondly, it is apparent that 
the monthly quota of one bushel of rice per male, three quarter per 
female, and half per working child was more than the normal requirement
(T
of the average labourers of these categories.' This was particularly so 
where the labourers lived in family units as most of the plantation 
labourers in Ceylon did. There is overwhelming evidence that the quantities 
of rice which remained after meeting their normal requirements were 
bartered by the labourers with the local tradesmen to obtain at least a 
portion of the curry-stuff which the labourers needed.^ Thirdly, when the 
market price of rice was exceptionally high, as in the years 1892-3 
and 1907-9 > "the planters sustained a loss on rice supplied to their
Cey. Bab. Com. 1908, Report, p. xi.
3. See also above, pp. 193ff.
4* Ibid.
5* Cey. Lab. Com. I908, Appendix C, p. 610.
Ibid., Appendix D, p. 612.
6* Ibid., Report, p. viii.
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TABLE 5»1 The average retail price at which rice was available to the 
consumer in the planting districts situated at low, medium, and high 
elevations and the price charged to the labourers by the estates in the 
respective districts, 1880-1910 (in rupees and cents per bushel)
Year Low elevation Medium elevation High elevation
Retail
market
price
Price 
to la­
bourer
Retail
market
price
Price 
to la­
bourer
Retail
market
price
Price 
to la­
bourer
1880 3.50 3.60 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.50
1881 3.50 3.60 3.75 4.00 4.50 4.50
1882 3.50 3.60 3.75 4.00 4.50 4.50
1883 2.75 3.60 3.50 4.00 4.50 4.50
I884 3.00 3.60 3.84 4.00 4.50 4.50
I885 4.00 3.60 3.60 4.00 4.50 4.50
1886 3.00 3.60 3.50 4.00 4.80 4.50
I887 3.25 3.60 3.50 4.00 4.30 4.50
1888 3.25 3.60 4.00 4.00 4.80 4.50
I889 4.00 3.60 4.12 4.00 4.50 4.50
I890 3.83 3.60 4.25 4.00 4 .88 4.50
1891 3.72 3.60 4.13 4.00 5.00 4.50
I892 4.21 3.60 4.75 4.00 5.25* 4.50
1893 4.50 3.60 4.95 4.00 5.38 4.50
1894 4.30 3.60 4.19 4.00 5.00 4.50
1895 4.33 3.60 4.06 4.00 5.00 4.50
1896 3.83 3.60 4.88 4.00 5.00 4.50
1897 5.04 4.15 5.15 4.45 6.00 4.85
1898 4 .88 4.15 4.75 4.40 5 .25 4.90
1899 4.54 4.00 4.50 4.10 5.75 4.50
1900 4.90 4.15 5.00 4.40 6.00 4.80
1901 4.80 4.15 5.00 4.40 6.00 4.80
1902 4.75 4.00 4.50 4.10 6.00 4.50
1903 4.60 4.00 4.50 4.00 6.00 4.50
1904 4 .6 0 4.00 5.13 4.00 5.50 4.50
1905 5.10 4.00 5.13 4.00 9.00 4.50
1906 5.60
00•Tl- 5.50 4.20 6.73 4.60
1907 6.00 4.50 5.75 4.75 6 .58 5.10
1908 6 .25 4.55 5.83 4.80 6 .25 5.10
1909 6.20 4.55 5.75 4.80 6.11 5.10
1910 5-87 4.35 5 .50 4.80 6.00 5.00
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labourers thereby lessening the burdensome impact on the labourers of 
the high market price of rice during the years of scarcity. 1 Fourthly, 
the system ensured the labourers a regular supply of their staple food.
The purchase and the distribution of rice was sponsored by the estate.
The consumption of rice among the large estate labour population was 
naturally large. To leave the labourers to purchase their own rice from 
the local tradesmen would have placed the labourers at the mercy of the 
trading classes. The advantage to the labourers of the regularity of the 
supply of rice was clearly seen during the depression of the early 1880s. 
These were years when the planters succumbed to grave financial difficulties
Q
and failed to pay a large number of the labourers their balance of wages.
But the supply cf rice to the labourers proceeded unabatted because the 
labourers had to be provided with at least their basic food if they were 
to be retained on the estates.
However, the system of part-payment of wages in rice was not 
free from drawbacks from the point of view of the labourers. The actual
9
distribution of rice was done by the kangany, the kanalcapulle, or a Chetty.
10
There were complaints that short-measure was often in use. Another 
grievance was that the quality of rice supplied to the labourers was 
inferior.^ However, with the information at our disposal it is not 
possible for us to know the nature and the extent of the loss to the
7. See above, pp. 193ff*
8 . See below, pp. 22-7-228.
9. Appeal Court, J. H. Meedeniya Vs Ismail Saibu, COQ, 23 August 1980, 
Cey.Sab. Lab. Con. 1-1n, para, 30.
10. Talawakele Votes, COO, 22 April 1893*
'Heport on the alleged ill-treatment of Indian Coolies in Ceylon’,
by G.A. Sabaragamuwa Province, IIP?, Vol. 8254? Pro. Vo. 626 of
21 August 1909.
11, Planting 'Totes from Haskeliya, The Overland Ceylon Observer,
21 Jvne~lo79.
A general meeting of Dimbulla DPA, 8 September 1882, VCO,
14 September 1382.
Editorial, COO, 10 June I89O.
Planting Votes from Central Dimbulla, ibid., 2 February 1892.
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labourers on this count. Evidence also reveals that the "bargains made by
the labourers with the local shop-keepers in bartering excess rice were
12rarely of an advantageous nature to the labourers# The shop-keepers 
usually purchased rice from the labourers below its actual value and in 
return gave provisions to the labourers at high prices# In spite of this 
disadvantage, the labourers continued to barter with the shop-keepers 
because it enabled them to obtain some of their other requirments from 
the latter on credit . Though the system of part-payment of wages in 
rice had the short-comings stated above, the regularity and the certainty 
of a relatively cheap supply of rice on the estates made the system a 
useful oneto the labourers.
2# The payment of cash advances
The aim of this section is to analyse the implications of the 
working of the system of cash advances on the conditions of the immigrant 
plantation workers# On examining the available evidence we come to several 
important conclusions. First, that all cash advances given out by the 
planters did not ultimately reach the labourers though the latter were 
expected to work off the entire amount. Secondly, cash advances were given 
out by the estates without any regard to the ability of the labourers to 
repay these advances and this factor in a large measure contributed to 
subject the labourers to a state of debt-bondage to the kungany, the 
shop-keeper, and eventually to the estate. Finally, we will attempt to 
explain why the labourers did acquiesce to the system of cash advances.
It is difficult to know precisely how much of the cash advances 
eventually reached the labourers. Available information in this respect 
is meagre and scattered. But from it one can gather that the labourers 
were given approximately Rs.5 ^o Rs.10 per head as advances to induce
12. Cey. JLab._ Com. 1903, Report, p. viii
'Cooly Advances and Labour Supply’, by Old Planter, COO, 7 June 1895*
13. Cey. Lab. Com. 1903, Report, p. viii.
217
to migrate to Ceylon.^ These cash advances given to the prospective
immigrants were either utilized by them to settle their
debts in their villages or were left behind by them for the benefit of
their relatives. This amount varied depending on the general economic
ISconditions in the villages in South India, In times of favourable
agricultural seasons in South India the amount which had to be offered
as advances to encourage the agricultural labourers to emigrate would
have been high while in times of unfavourable agricultural seasons this
amount would have been relatively low. It is comparatively easy to obtain
information on the amount spent by the kanganies to cover the cost of
transportation of the labourers to the estates and the cost of subsistence
en route. The cost of transport obviously varied with the distance
between the village in South India and the estate and the available
transport facilities. In the I89O”, the cost per labourer en route varied
between approximately Rs.4 by the llorth Road and Rs.8 by the
16Tuticorin-Colombo route. With the restriction of immigration to the 
latter route in 1899 immigrants had to be imported at a transport cost 
of approximately Rs.8 per head. Thus, the only admissible conclusion one 
could arrive at on the amount spent on the labourers for their recruitment 
and conveyance to the estates is to present a vague figure averaging 
between Rs.9 and Rs.lS. It is important to note that in the 18901" the 
planters considered Rs.10-Rs.20 as the desirable limit to be given out 
as advances to import labour from South India. After about 1904? this rate 
increased to Rs.30. In actual practice; the rates advanced exceeded this 
limit, particularly during times of scarcity of labour. The kanganies 
exercised greet care to spend as little as possible on the labourers both 
at the time of recruitment and in the transportation of labourers so as
14- AnR of CLC for 1?06, YFAC 1906, p. 19.
'The Labour Question1, by G. K. Thomson, CO^ T, 12 April 1907*
19. Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 February 1905» YPAC 1934-1905? P* 55“5^>
16. 'The Labour Question', by G. N. Thomson, COT,7, 12 April 1907.
218
'to augment their own share of profit* The vested interest of the kanganies
in the system of coast advances was clearly seen when they opposed the
Tin Ticket System inaugurated in 1902 by the Ceylon Government to
facilitate the transport of labourers from South India to the planting
17districts in Ceylon. As we have seen earlier on, under this scheme the 
Ceylon Government undertook to bear the initial cost of transportation of 
labourers. The cost was to be subsequently reimbursed by the estates and 
was to be eventually added to the labourers* estate advances account. 
However, even after 1982, coast advances had to be given to the kanganies 
at least for the purpose of recruitment of labour even if the labourers 
were to be transported 021 the Tin Ticket System. Thus,throughout our 
period, the system of recruitment gave the kanganies the opportunity to 
retain for themselves a portion of the coa-st advances given out by 
the planters.^
It is extremely difficult to gather any information on the precise
amount which reached the labourers out of the "local advances". However,
there is sufficient evidence to show that the whole of the local advances
19
did not ultimately reach the labourers. The shop-keepers gained from
the local advances by charging e:ctortionate rates of interest on the
labourers* credit at the bazaar. There was a general collusion among
kanganies, shop-keepers, and money-lenders to wrest high advances from
the estates to their own advantage. The planters were quite outspoken
about the unscrupulous activities on the part of some kanganies and
• 20"outside creditors". Besides, the kanganies appear to have been anxious 
to keep their gangs as well as superintendents in the dark regarding the 
true starte of the labourers* accounts with them. All accounts between
17» See above, pp. 86-88.
13. Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 February 1905? YPAC 1904-1°05?
pp. 54-“,55*
19. 'The Cooly Labour Question and Crimping*, by X,. COO, 20 March 1891*
20. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Appendix RE, p. 653*
A general meeting of PAC, 2 Hay 190.3 , YPAC 1903-1904? P» 47*
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the labourers and their creditors were maintained by the kanganies. The 
average labourer did not know the exact nature of his initial debt to the 
kangany on his arrival in the Island nor his subsequent financial commit­
ments. Where some labourers were aware of their initial debt to the
kanganies, these labourers subsequently found their debt accounts interfered
21with by the kanganies to their disadvantage, ' Regarding the kanganies’ 
accounts with their labourers, the Labour Commission of 1903 found evidence 
"... to think that in many instances the labourer is made the victim of
i 22more or less deliberate fraud". The Commission continued,
We wish, however, very forcibly to bring to the attention of those 
who are responsible for estate management in Ceylon the great 
desirability of causing the accounts between the kanganies and their 
labourers to be subjected to a far closer scrutiny than is at present 
customary, and of doing all that in them lies to afford adequate 
protection from the rapacity of unscrupulous kanganies to the 
labourers in their employ. 23
Where several individual planters did exercise supervision over the
kanganies’ accounts with their labourers, the average debt of the labourers
24
was reported to be relatively low. But such interest on the part of the 
superintendents were rare. The great majority of the planters preferred 
to leave the maintenance of the individual accounts of the labourers 
totally in the hands of the kanganies without any supervision on their 
part. The planters, on the whole, confined their accounts to the financial 
transactions between the kanganies and themselves. This was largely the 
result of the system of labour management on the estates where the kangany 
played the role cf labour contractor, holding himself responsible to the 
estate for money given by the estate for the recruitment and the management 
of the labour gang. Besides, the system whereby the kanganies maintained 
the individual accounts cf the labourers saved the planters of a great deal 
of trouble of having to take care of the detailed accounts of the labourers.
21. Sub editorial, CCO, 27 April 1395*
22. Cey. Lab. Com. 1?08, Report, p. viii.
23.Jbid.
24. Ibid., Proceedings, p. 442.
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The advantages derived by the kanganies and the "outside creditors” from 
the system of indiscriminate estate advances tended to foster the growth 
of an economic elite among the Indian population in the planting districts.
Though the advances given out by the estates were not wholly 
utilized for the benefit of the labourers, the latter were expected to 
work off the entire amount of the advances. The gangs of labourers were 
regarded as security for the entire amount of advances given out by the 
estates. However, the rates of advances given out, particularly during 
the seasons of heavy demand for labour in the years from 1390 to 1910, 
were in most cases out of proportion to the labourers1 ability to pay 
back. While advances as high as Rs.100 per head were offered in some 
districts, the average advances in the seasons of peak work load during
c«
the I89O’ stood between Rs.30 and Rs.4-0. Thereafter it averaged between
Rs.4O-Rs.5O. The usual method followed by the estates to recover the
advances was to take in one months balance of wages of the labourers every
two months. When outstanding advances were reasonably low during the
coffee period it was found possible to defray the advances account of the
labourers with the balance of wages. In the years of prosperity under
tea, when the total monthly w a g e of the labourers were relatively high,
the monthly balance of w a g e of an adult male labourer stood between Rs.2 
25
to Rs.3, This meant that the maximum an average labourer could hope to 
defray from the estate advances account by working a whole year could not 
have possibly exceeded Rs.lS. The estates had to give out fresh advances 
at least annually, especially during seasons of the heavy yield of tea. 
Thus, fresh advances were obtained from the estates without totally 
working off the old advances. The inevitable result was the accumulation 
of the labourers’ total indebtedness which tended to increase annually 
without any hope of a total wipe out except by the transfer of the gang 
to another estate 011 a tundu.
25. Bee below, Table 5*4 (p« 251).
The system of estate advances also contributed to increase the
"outside debt" of the labourers. The money-lenders and the shop-keepers
were ready to offer credit to the labourers because of the labourers’
ability to obtain cash advances from the estates in times of labour
shortage.2  ^In giving out credit to the labourers the "outside creditors"
looked to the prospective advances to the labourers’ from the estate as
security. They sought to recover the labourers' debt by pressing the
2 7kanganies to pressurize the planters to give out higher advances.
Legally the creditor hod the power to imprison the debtor for non-payment 
of the debt. The "outside creditors" often used this power as a threat
to get the kanganies move from estate to estate in search of higher
advances. Thus, the "outside debts" gave the "outside'creditors" a firm
28hold over the kanganies and their gangs of labourers. The labour gangs 
were used as pawns by the "outside creditors" to wrest heavy advances 
from the estates.
As far as the kanganies were concerned, besides enhancing their 
income, the advances system provided them with an instrument to exert 
control over their gangs. In the coffee period gangs were mostly relatives 
and the kangany was regarded as a paternal head. Therefore a link of 
kinship provided the kangany with a hold over his gang which was supplemented 
by the labourer’s debt because the kangany was the sole financier of the 
labourers. He have seen in chapter II that with the development of the 
head kangany system the tie of kinship declined during the tea period and 
especially the head kangany*s hold over his gang as a community leader 
weakened. His hold over the labour force became increasingly one of debt.
As a planter pointed out, "No doubt his (kangany1s) power is due to the 
chain of debt... his chief security is in the heaviness of those
26. 'Mr. Charles Young’s Opinion’, COO, 14’May 1895*
27. ’ The Labour Cuestion', by Aberdonesis, ibid., 17 May 1895*
‘Our Labour Supply gad the Tundu System', by Agricola, ibid., 22 May 1293
28. 'How Money paid for Advances goes' 1 ibid., 27 May xu95*
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29silver chains.1’ It was this hold that made it possible for the kanganies 
to move gangs in search of higher advances. There is evidence that at 
times the labourers were not inclined to move frequently from one estate 
to another but that they were compelled to do so by their kanganies.
It is left for us to consider as to why the labourers acquiesced 
into the system of cash advances and consequent heavy indebtedness. This 
question is particularly significant in the light of the legal position 
of the labourers regarding credit obtained by them. For all credit 
obtained from the estates, the money-lenders, and the shop-keepers, it 
was the kangany who was responsible. All cash advances were obtained by 
the kangany on iegaily valid Promissory Notes. Legally the labourer could 
not be held responsible for the debts and he had the right to leave the 
employer, irrespective of his debts, either at one month’s notice or if 
his wages were not paid to him for more than sixty days. The labourers, 
however, were quite alive to their obligation of debt.^
The explanation for the labourers’ acquiscence into a life of 
indebtedness is found in the customs and traditions which had conditioned 
their economic behaviour in South India. It was a common practice among 
the agricultural labourers in South India to raise advances in their 
villages, particularly in times of financial needs for such purposes as 
festivals, marriages, and funerals.^ These debts were usually settled 
by performing manual labour. This creditor-debtor relationship was hardly 
affected by legal norms. It was primarily based on custom. The immigrants 
carried with them their traditional values and attituds to the country 
to which they migrated. The customary debt relationship to which the 
labourers were used in South India- governed their behaviour in the
29. ’The Kangany System and the Coast Advances’, by '1873', ibid., 
7 June 1890.
Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Report, p. ix.
31. Resettlement Report of Salem District, M3KP, Vol. 7176, Pro. 
No. 212 of 15 July 1905, p. 29.
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planting districts in the Island as well. Cash advances were obtained by
the labourers from the kanganies and they acquiesced into debt-servitude
until that debt was settled. Social custom forbade eva-sion of debt.
Customary obligation regarding debt was so strong among the immigrant
labour population that it was quite common for gangs of labourers to take
over the debt of their deceased relatives even though there was no legal
32obligation to do so. It is the customary acquiscence to the obligation 
for debt which made the planters repeatedly refer to the Indian immigrant 
labourers in Ceylon as very honest men.~’^ The Labour Commission of 1908 
found that the labourer's willingness to discharge his liabilities was 
"... dependent upon his sense honour and the loyalty which he feels himself 
to owe to his fellow-labourers and to his kangany." This was the result 
of the customary social values to which he was accustomed in South India.
On the estates in Ceylon the immigrant found his staple food advanced to 
him by the estate, his other requisites such as subsidiary food-stuffs 
and clothing advanced by the shop-keeper, and his occasional demand for 
cash advances mex by the kangany. The amount of debt did not bother him 
so long as he could obtain fresh advances. He migrated from his village 
on cash advances and continued to work on the estates on advances and 
in indebtedness— a way of life so familier to him in South India. His 
conservatism, poverty, ignorance, and illiteracy kept him to his customary 
way of life in spite of his legal rights to the contrary.
The view expressed in the above paragraph is confirmed by the 
available evidence Which strongly suggests that discontent among the 
labourers increased mainly when fresh advances were not forthcoming. The 
expression of labour discontent took the form of either bolting or giving
32. 'Coolies-Advances-Lebts-l.ortality on Feverish Estates - A Black 
Picture', by an Old Planter, COO, 24 hay 1894*
'The Labour Question in Ceylon1, ibid., 21 October 1895*
33* Labour Question. P.eport of the special committee of PAC, kemoranda 
Ee. Labour Question, YP1C lp02-1903, p. 8 .
34* Cey. Lab. Com. 1QQ8 + Beoort, p. ix.
TABLE 5*2 Seme available information on the state of indebtedness of 
the estate labourers, 1907-3 (amount in rupees)
Planting
district Planter
Total avera­
ge debt per 
labourer
Average debt 
per labourer 
to estate
Average debt 
per labourer 
to kangany
Kalutara F*R,Dakeyne N 25-35 30-40
F.J.Wright N 104 N
W.N.Tisdell 47 17 30
K.A,Tipple 50 25 25
Madulkele J.P.Hortin 70 55 15
S.G.Jackson 42 N N
Dikoya T.Gidden 43 15 28
Kotmale A.G,Forbes 47 22 25
J.Duncan 40 N N
Badulla John Rettie 22 14 8
Haputale T,Davidson 60-70 20 40-50
Dimbulla W.L.Strachan 41-44 N N
A,H,Thomas N 7 N
Knuckles A,D,Donald 76 N N
Mat ara EoA.Clive 60 30 30
Gampola G.C .'Bliss N 22 N
Ran gal a W.Sinclair 60 30 30
Matale R.W.Bolling 40 N N
J.Taylor 54 N N
L.R.Rudd N 25 N
Nav/alapitiya M.S.IIilne 43 24 19
D.S.Gameron 16-17 10 6-7
L,S,G,Carey N N 50-60
Source : Cey. Lab. Com, 1903, Proceedi■nffs.
Note: It is not possible to find out any information on the
state of the labourers1 debt to the shop-keeper. However, 
it is likely that the labourers' debt to the shop-keeper 
would have eventually found its way to the labourers' 
debt account with the kangany,
N: No information available
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a month's notice to quit the estate. In our period, the incidence of 
bolting and”notice giving” was heaviest in the years from 1902 to 1904.
The extent cf the problem so alarmed the planters that the Ceylon Planters' 
Association appointed a special Committee in 1902 to investigate the 
questions of bolting and "notice giving”,'^ It is significant that 1902-4 
were also the years when the rates of advances were generally low 
following the slump in the tea industry. During these years planters didA
not readily succumb to the demand for advances. Where heavily indebted
labourers did bolt or quit- an estate, such behaviour on the part cf the
labourers was not directly due to the burden of debt but the result of
their inability to obtain further cash advances from the estate in addition
26to their existing heavy debts.^
3. The payment of the balance of wages
The main argument in this section is.that the methods of payment 
of the balance of wages practised by the planters up to 1903 in some ways 
did operate to increase the labourer's total debt and tighten his 
debt-servitude, but that particularly after I89O the predominant factor 
contributing to the labourer's indebtedness was the working of the advances 
system. At the outset we will look into the method of deferred payment 
of wages of the coffee period which formed the basis of the labourer's 
"outside debt”. This customary method of payment was badly disturbed in 
the early i860 due to the economic catastrophe in the plantation sector. 
The Colonial Government stepped into safeguard the wages of the labourers. 
We will examine how it attempted to do so, first, by trying to intervene 
into planter~labour industrial relations, and subsequently by attempting
35. Labour Question. Report of the special committee of PAC, Memoranda
He. Labour Question, YPAC 1902-1903? pp« 1-17*
'Proctors and Police Coolies', by P. H. Papillon, COG, 5 May 1902.
36. 'Coolies and their Advances', by A. E. Wright, COO, 17 April 1895*
'Labour and C-ooly indebtedness up-country*, COW’ May 1902.
Editorial, ibid., 18 September 1902.
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to encourage the planters to move towards more frequent payment of wages.
 ^ 3
The planters of l880‘’ resisted both these attempts. However, after I89O 
the planters began to gradually break aviay from the pre-1890 method of 
wage payment. V/e v/ill analyse the motivation behind this change of attitude, 
and attribute it mainly to the planters’ desire to destroy the labourers’ 
"outside credit". Finally, we will attribute the non-fulfillment of the 
desire of the tea planters to the growth of a new basis of "outside credit" 
for the labourers in the offer of indiscriminate cash advances to the 
labourers by the estates. Thus, we will conclude that the actual basis of 
the labourers’ indebtedness in the years after I89O was the advances 
system rather than the method of payment, the latter being the view held 
by the majority of the planters towards the end of our period.
The wage lav; as embodied in the Haster-Servant Ordinance No. 11
of I865 stipulated that if a month’s wages clear of debt remained unpaid
at the end of the succeeding month, two months' notice was sufficient for
37the labourer to leave the employer or to refuse to work. However, the 
widely accepted practice in the period was for the planters to pay their 
labourers four times in the year in quarterly payments, but always 
retaining in arrear with the employer the balance of wages of the labourers 
for a period of three months. This meant that the wages due to the 
labourers for the months from January to March were paid at the end of 
June. Besides, the balance of wages were not paid direct into the hands 
of the labourers but to the kangany. The kangany in turn deducted what 
the labourers owed him and the shop-keeper and handed over the balance to 
the labourers. The above method continued up to 1890. It was thought that 
the method of deferred payment gave the employer a hold over his labourers. 
The planters jealously guarded this hold over their labour force in order 
to recover the outlay of "coast advances" already spent by them in
37. Clause 21 of the Ordinance. See PPAC 1883, Correspondence, 
p. xxxv.
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getting the labourers from South India and also to keep their labourers 
tied to the estates during the coffee' picking season without the risk of 
the labourers deserting the estates. It has been shown that the underlying 
factor for the planters* preference for infrequent payment was the 
shortage of working capital under which the coffee planters of Ceylon 
had to work, host of the coffee estates in Ceylon were managed by propri­
etor planters. There were no large companies with adequate working 
38
capital. " Besides, coffee was a highly seasonal crop and the coffee
planters received their earnings seasonally and had therefore to defer
some of their financial commitments until their earning actually reached
them. Thus, the nature of the coffee economy contributed to the practice
39of infrequent payment of the balance of wages.
The intensity of the planters' conviction in the need to preserve 
the system cf deferred wage payment was clearly se;n in the first decade 
of our period when the planters fought hard to retain the existing system 
in the face of attempts by the Colonial Government to introduce a system 
of frequent payment of the balance of wages of the labourers. The main 
reason which prompted the Government to intervene in the 1880“ into 
planter-labour wage relations was the widespread default on the part of 
the planters to maintain the existing arrangement of quarterly payment with 
three months in arrears. The planters in the throes of their worst 
financial crisis failed to completely honour their wage commitments 
towards their labour force and the balance of wages of the labourers got 
accumulated in long arrears.^ The labourers of those coffee estates 
which went bankrupt lost their long accumulated back-pay. Where estates 
changed hands during the depression, the new owners refused to honour
38. IT. Ramachandran, 1963, P* 2.
39• L. R. Jayavardena, unpublished dissertation fo?? research 
fellowship, Cambridge, I960, pp. 27-32,
40. Gov. to S of s., No. I44 of 1? October I883, C„0. 384/145.
CK 1883-188/-, 19 December 1883, p. 13.
Cases instituted by labourers on coffee estates to recover wages,
CGC-, (weekly series, 1834—1886).
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large outstanding arrears of wages.
The system of deferred payment of the balance of wages had worked
so far on the mutual trust and confidence among the planters, the
kanganies, and the labourers. Those labourers who stayed on in the estates 
during the bad years of the coffee depression subsisted mainly on the 
quota of rice supplied by the estates as part-payment of the wages. Like 
their employers they stayed on hoping for better days. But the protracted 
depression appeared to rule out the possibility of a satisfactory 
settlement of the problem of the arrears of back-pay. There was, of course, 
the legal safeguard for the labourers. But this safeguard embodied in 
the Master-Servant Ordinance No. 11 of IO65 made only up to three months’ 
arrears of wages a first charge on the estate. Besides, the widespread 
poverty, ignorance, and illiteracy of the labourers were serious practical
/I
obstacles for them to recover even the wages gurantecd by the law. ' The
inadequacy of the existing wage law was seen in 1883 when several kanganies
instituted leg,nl action against their employers in order to recover the
balance of wages of their labour gangs. These few attempts were quashed
/ o
d_ue to a technical loophole in the law. ^  The magistrate found that under
the existing law the labourers could not jointly sue their employer and
that they couid do so only individually and severally. In practice, 
this amounted to a denial of the labourers’ right to sue their employers 
because the labourers could not afford to file individual action against 
their employers.^ Vftien the inadequacy of the law became clear the 
Colonial Government quickly moved into rectify the situation, especially 
since non-payment of wages was on the increase with the continuance of 
the depression.
41. Gov. to S of S., No. 1 of 3 January 1884, C.O. 384/151*
Gov. to S of S., No. 144 of 12 October 1883, 384/145*
4?* The Times of Ceylon, 27 October IO8 3.
‘Coolies’ wages', P?AC 1664, Correspondence, pp. 162-166.
43* Cn 1883--1884, 1 December I083, p. 13*
A special committee meeting of PAC, 21 September 1883, PPAC 1884, p. 80.
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After preliminary investigations into the wage situation in the
estates, the Lt. Governor John Douglas discovered much to his surprise
that withholding of balance of wages in long arrears had become quite 
44common. He realised that a mere closing of the loophole in the existing
law was insufficient to adequately safeguard the wages of the labourers,
particularly in view of the large overdue, back-pay; and that it
should be accompanied by a certain measure of Government intervention into
planter-labour relations. His draft Ordinance provided for joint suit by
the labourers and also sought to extend the period for which the wages
were a first charge on the estate recoverable by writ against property to
45a period of 6 months. Besides, the draft also provided for the employer 
to forward quarterly returns to the Government Agent of the Province 
specifying the number of labourers employed, the amount of wages agreed 
upon to be paid, the advances given, and the wages due if any at the end 
of each quarter of the year. In the event of failure to submit such returns 
or the submission of incomplete returns, the Government Agent was empowered 
to go to the estate and ascertain for himself what the returns had failed 
to disclose. In snort, the Government Agent was to be given the power to 
directly interrogate the labourers on questions pertaining to wages. The 
draft also provided the mode of recovery of the arrears cf wages and 
prescribed the imposition of a penalty upon anybody obstructing the 
Government Agent in the exercise of his duties specified in the Ordinance.
The draft Ordinance infuriated the planters. They vehemently 
opposed any. form of Government intervention into planter-labour relations 
and wanted to maintain the status quo in which they had a free hand in
46
their dealings with the labourers. They also protested against the 
44- Col. See. to Sec. of PAG, 31 October 1883, PPAC 1884, Correspondence,
p. 161.
45• F0** the draft Ordinance, see Col. Sec. to Sec. of PAG, 18 December 
1883, enclosure, ibid., pp. 171-177*
See also, CH 1883-1884, 19 December 1883, p. 12..
Ibid., 4 February 1884, p. 39*
4 8. oriairman 0.1 m C  10 memoers, 3 January 1884, PPAC I884, Correspondence,
-p I 7 0I' • 1 17*
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provision extending the period for which the wages were to he a first 
charge on the estates because it meant that a greater amount of cauital
47
would be liable to be used to pay up arrears of wages. On the whole,
the planters' contention was that the existing lav; was adequate to safeguard
the wages of the labourers if only the technical loophole in the lav; was
closed up and the labourers were given the right of joint suit against
+ V  • 1 4 8their employers.
While the controversy on the draft Ordinance was raging, Sir
Arthur Gordon arrived as Governor. The planters hoped that the 2iew Governor
would totally withdraw the draft Ordinance at least for the time being
in order to begin his period of governorship in a peaceful atmosphere.
But the time and the circumstances had outrun such a possibility. By
mid~l884 the facts on arrears of wage payment had already come to the
knowledge of the Government and had already been made public, and even
the planting community and the Legislative Council had admitted the
49necessity for further protection of the labourers* v;ages. In any case, 
Gordon himself was of the view that the labourers’ wages should be secured 
for them.^
However, the planters' agitation against Government interference
mounted in intensity. They argued that the high incidence of large-scale
accumulation of arrears of wages was something unusual, the result not
of the planters' fault but of their plight and that this situation was
being gradually ameliorated with the recovery of the plantation sector
51following + he growth of the tea industry.
47* CH 1883-1S64, 4 February 1834, p. 44*
48. A special general meeting of PAG, 8 January 1834, PPAC 1384, pp. 101,
106.
49. Sec. of PAC to Col. Sec., 24 November 1833, ibid., Correspondence, 
p. 167.
Sec. of PAC to Col. Sec., 15 December 1883, ibid., p. 170.
50. Reply to the address presented to the Gov. by PAC, ibid., p. 93.
8 January
51. A. special,committee meeting of PAC, /ibid., pp. 98, 101.
In view of the "most determined, general and violent opposition"
offered by the planters Gordon was ready to make certain amendments in
the draft to make it palatable to the planters and in this decision he
was influenced by three factors. First, he correctly saw that the
successful working of the Ordinance depended on winning over the confidence
52
and the support of the planters. Secondly, Gordon came to Ceylon 
immediately after a governorship in Mauritius (187O-4 ) where his relations 
with the planting community in that colony had not been cordial, partic­
ularly due to his reforms pertaining to the immigrant labour system in
53that colony. This record of his administration in Mauritius was 
obviously known to the planters in Ceylon. Gordon was anxious to prevent 
the Ceylon planter— the most powerful community in the Island whose 
good-will was considered essential for the smooth administration of the 
colony— getting obsessed with the idea that he was an anti-planter man.
He informed the Colonial Office that if a bill so distasteful to the 
planters was enacted, "No amount of argument, no protestations on my part, 
no subsequent friendliness of act or speech would have been sufficient 
to heal the wounds thus created'.^
At the same time both Gordon and Douglas felt that the Government 
must possess some sort of a reserve power to step in whenever the arrears
52. Gov. to S of S., No. 195 of 21 May 1884, C.O. 54/151.
Gov. to S of S., No. 118 of 27 March 1884> ibid.
CH 1883-1884-, 19 December 1883> p. 15•
53. Prior to his appointment as Governor of Ceylon (l883~9C) Gordon held 
five governorships— in New Brunswick, Trinidad, Mauritius, Fiji, and 
New Zealand. In Trinidad, Mauritius, and Fiji where he had to deal 
with the Indian immigrant labour problem Gordon did much to improve 
their conditions, and even earned the enmity, of the planters,
particularly in Mauritius for his humanitarian and liberal attitude 
towards the immigrant labour in that colony.
On Gordon's career as a British colonial administrator, see 
J. K. Chapman, 19&4*
Strangely, Chapman has not a word to say about Gordon's work relating 
to Indian labour problem in Ceylon which occupied a prominent place 
in his administration and which veered the planters most violently 
against him in spite of his other work to help the plantation sector.
54. Gov. to S of S., No. 1 of 3 January 1884, C.O. 384/151.
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55of wages were in jeopardy approaching a near scandle„ They felt that 
such power of intervention were essential to ensure a substantial degree 
of justice to the labourers and to see that the labourers were not subject 
to loss and fraud. With these views, Gordon found full support from the 
Colonial Office and the senior Government officials in the Island.
Gordon's amended draft stripped the powers given in the original 
Ordinance to the Government Agent to intervene into planter-labour 
relations. It also abandoned the provision to extend the period of lien 
to 6 months and retained the existing limit of 3 months. The only novel 
provision in the amended draft was that the Government retained, the right 
of information on the wage situation in the estates and a reserve power
56
of interference in cases where the labourers wages were unjustly withheld.
Every superintendent was required by law to submit quarterly returns
stating the date on which the labourers have been paid in full, under
penalty of fine or imprisonment. The Government was to have special powers
of interference in cases in which the wages of labourers were in jeopardy
of being lost. In such cases the Colonial Secretary after full inquiry
was to inform the Attorney-General to take action. The Government, however,
pointed out that its right of interference wi11 be used only in exceptional
circumstances when interference became absolutely necessary. Amidst
mounting criticism from the planters agnhnst any form of Government
interference, Gordon enacted the Ordinance No. 16 of 1884 embodying the
57provisions indicated above.
The history of the Ordinance during its short life of four years 
was one of failure. The planters continued to condemn the Ordinance as
55. CH 1883-1S8A, 4 February l884> P* 47«
Gov. to 3 of S., No. 144 of 12 October 1883, C.O, 384/145*
56. Gov. to S of S., No. 1 of 3 January I884, C.O. 334/151*
CH l8S3-l88a, 19 December 1883, P* 15*
57* A special general meeting of PAC, 8 January 1884, PPAC l88h, pp. 100-105 
Sec. of PAC to Col. Sec., 16 January I884, ibid., Correspondence, 
p. l80.
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paving the way for inquisitorial interference , and time and again they 
agitated for its repeal* Gordon saw that some of the provisions of the 
Ordinance had been ”... practically defied with substantial impunity” by 
the planters* Only a few quarterly returns were submitted to the 
Government and even these were incomplete.
The main weakness as regards the attempt at Government interference
into wage relations was that it was piecemeal. For these piecemeal
measures of interference to be successful, they had to have the co-operation
and the support of the planters. But where the planters bitterly opposed
such interference, Government supervision end control had to be done on
a comprehensive scale backed by an adequate administrative machinery if
such measures were to be effective. In the Colonial Office, the Indian
Government, and the Colonial Government, there was the basic question
whether such a comprehensive scheme of Government intervention was
necessary at all in case of Indian labour migration to Ceylon. The overall
attitude of the day was that such comprehensive state control and
supervision was necessary only in case of Indian emigrants who went to
59 r>distant colonies under long-term indenture contracts. In Geylon, where 
the labourers were on monthly contracts and where the distance between 
their villages and the plantations was relatively short it was felt that 
comprehensive state control and supervision of planter-labour relations 
was not quite necessary. Gordon himself came round to this view. This 
was in fact one reason why he scrapped the administrative machinery 
which Douglas provided in his draft Ordinance for the Government to 
intervene into planter-labour industrial relations. In the years after 
1884, this view hardened in Gordon. Besides, he saw that the non-payment
c«
of balance of wages in the early 1880 was an unusual event. With the
5 8. Gov. to S of S., No. 125 of 14 May 1888, C.O. 384/168.
59. See above, pp. 37-52.
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recovery of the plantation sector the incidence of such default was on
the decline. The main drawback in the plantation labour life in Ceylon
was that the labourers recruited on monthly contracts were being kept for
60
longer periods by deferred payment of wages. Gordon gradually began to 
view that what was really necessary in Ceylon was not Government 
interference but to make the labourers truely monthly servants by making 
legal provision for the employers to pay the wages of their labourers 
monthly.
The opportunity for Gordon to revise the wage lav; on the lines
indicated above arose in 1888. In that year, in a case which appeared
before the judiciary, the magistrate delivered a verdict which virtua n y
invalidated all existing planter-labour monthly contracts. The court
held that there was no legal base for the existing practice by which
monthly contracts were entered into by the planters with their labourers.^
The customary practice was for the planter to offer the newly recruited
labourer with an advance in rice or money and enter the labourer's name
in the estate Check-roll. Hitherto, this encounter was regarded as a
verbal contract between the employer and the labourer. The judgement
challenged this notion, pointing out that the prevailing practice amounted
only to an implied contract and that such implied contracts had no legal
sanction under the existing lav;. The planters, in constant fear of
sudden desertion of the labourers, quickly got up an agitation calling
for the revision of the labour law so as to place the customary practice
6 2on a firm legal footing.
60. Gov. to S of S., No. 453 of 6 November 1888, C.O. 384/168.
Gov. to S of S., No. 481a of 25 November 1889, C.O. 384/172.
61. Case No. 2,032 of Police Court, Badulla,
Gov. to S of S., No. 125 of 14 iuay 1888, enclosure I, Supreme
Court Circular, C.O. 384/168.
This case' followed by two other cases which tended to undermine 
the existing relations between the planters and the labourers.
These were the case No. 3,278 of Police Court, Hatton and case 
No. 866 of Court of Requests, Hatton. See, ibid.
62. Thirty-fourth AnR of PAC, PPAC 1888, p. xxii.
Report of the deputation to the Gov., 15 August 1887, ibid., pp. 63-/2.
Gordon drafted a new Ordinance embodying the planters* request.
At the same time Gordon introduced in the draft Ordinance the idea of
monthly payment of balance of wages of the labourers. Gordon's aim,
however, was not to enforce monthly payment but to encourage the planters 
6 3to adopt it. The draft embodied that if a labourer was not paid his
balance of wages at the end of the next succeeding month, the labourer
should be rightfully eligible to quit without giving any form of notice.
Thus, monthly payrment. was to be looked upon as a condition of the -renewal
by implication of the contract of service, and the punitive checks on
the labourer for insubordination, neglect of work, and desertion were to
be disregarded when the payment of wages was delayed.^ Gordon
explained to the Colonial Office in 1888 that
... if the wages of a cooly are more than one month in arrears, he 
shall be released from all the liabilities to which he is subject 
as to notice, and may leave his employer's service when he will.
The desire not to arrive at this state of tilings will, I think, 
be a sufficient incentive to ensure regularity of payment. 65
Gordon meant this new gurantee of the regularity of payment to substitute
the earlier gurantee of Government interference embodied in the Ordinance
of 1884. ^  The draft Ordinance therefore made provision to abolish the
Ordinance of 1884.
As with Government interference so also with monthly payments,
£ 7
the planters were infuriated. The arguments with which they backed up 
their protest against the draft Ordinance reveal some of their basic 
ideas about the labour system. As we have seen earlier on, the system of 
deferred payment of wages gave the planters a hold over their labour force
63* Gov. to S of S., No 451 6 November 1888, 384/168.
64. Gordon's view was that any provision in the law calling for the
labourers to give notice 01 xueir intention 00 quit woulo. in ils self
place practical difficulty on the labourers in using this right to quit
in case of non-payment of wages.
Gov. to S of S.", Confidential, 22 April 189O, C.O. 334/1"'-.
6 5. Gov. to S of S., No. 12p of 14 March 1888, C.O. 384/160.
6 6. Gov. to S of S., No. 451 of 6 November 1888, ibid.
6 7. A general meeting of PAC, 7 December I889, PPAC l889v pp. 65-75.
both as a set-off against the advances given to the labourers as well as
a means of keeping the labourers tied to the estates during the coffee
pea.k season. They made this clear thus, "... we require a fair and
reasonable power to retain in our hands a certain amount of the value of
6 8the coolies’ labour as a set-off against the moneys advanced'.' Besides,
any provision permitting the labourers to desert without giving notice
was regarded by the planters, with some truth as regards unscrupulous
kanganies, as an encouragement for "crimping” by letting open loopholes
in the lav;. They insisted on the labourers giving 45 hours notice for
the payment of the balance of wages irrespective of the period for which
the wages were due. Only the non-payment within 45 hours, they argued,
should entitle the labourers to quit without giving one month’s notice.
The planters unanimously resolved to oppose the enactment of the idea of
69
monthly payment and the self-acting clause. * They protested that the
draft Ordinance would lead them "... in chaos and would find themselves
in a worse position than before", and demanded that the draft should be
amended so as to recognise quarterly payment and to make the self-acting
clause effective only when the wages were not paid for a quarter cf a
70
year before the end of the next succeeding quarter.
Gordon, on the other hand, firmly believed that the system of
deferred payment was detrimental to the interest of the labourers and
should be done away with. In a series of despatches to the Colonial Office',
Gordon built up a convincing case for monthly payment and the self-acting 
7]principle.’ ' The system of deferred payment drove the labourer into 
debt-bondage in two ways• First, the labourers had to obtain their
65. Ibid., speech by R. K. Rutherford, p. 63«
6 9. Ibid., pp. 66-77*
Thirty-fifth AnR of PAC, PPAC 1889, P* xxvii.
70. Proceedings of a general meeting of PAC, 7 December 1889, ibid., p. 69.
Gov. to S of 3., No. 451 of 6 November 1888, enclosure 1, 384/168,
71. Gov. to S of S., No. 125 of 14 March 1S88, ibid.
requirements from the shop-keeper on credit till such time as their
balance of wages were pa,id to them by the estate, and the shop-keeper
usually charged heavy rates of interest. As Gordon observed
... if his wages for any one month can be withheld from him for 
nearly, six months at the end of that time he is deeply in debt; 
to the Kangani and the Basaar. His only chance of discharging these 
debts is by waiting on in the service of the Estate for his pay, 
he takes further advances which bind him to the Estate yet more 
closely and he can hardly be deemed a free monthly servant. 72
Besides, infrequent pay enabled the labourers to obtain '’outside” credit
because the shop-keeper and the money-lender regarded the arrears of
the labourers’ pay which remained with the employer as a security for
credit given out to trie labourers. This was secured by handing out the
balance of wages direct to the kangany. The kangany settled whatever debt
the labourers owed to the shop-keeper and handed over the balance, if any,
to the labourer. Therefore, the basis of the debt-bondage of the labourers
appeared to be the method of payment of the balance of wages. Gordon's
aim was to radically change the entire basis of the immigrant labour
system in the Island, which kept the labourers tied to the estates by
debt-bondage, so as to make Ceylon attractive to the Indian immigrant
labourers by holding out the prospects of prompt payment of wages end
freedom from debt. Gordon's views were too advanced of the times. The
planters of the i860 recovering with a new crop on the heels of the
depression of their old staple were neither in an economically stable
position nor in an enlightened state of mind to risk experiments about
the approach to the problem of labour supply. Only a few planters were
disposed to agree with Gordon that monthly payment was ultimately in
that
their own interest. Gordon also pointed out/the system of deferred payment
was inconsistent with the idea of any truely monthly contract. He wrote
If a labourer be indeed a monthly servant he should be paid his wages 
monthly. If he is to be indentured for a longer period, the lav; should 
not adopt the fiction that he is a voluntary monthly servant 
voluntarily reengaging from month to month.73
72. Ibid.
73. Gov. to S of No. 48la of 23 November 1889, C.O. 38d/l72.
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Gordon was incredulous about the planters' contention that the labourers 
preferred delayed payment of a lump sum as against the frequent payment 
of small sums. Recalling his experience as Governor in British Guiana 
and Mauritius, Gordon pointed out that the same argument was put forward 
by the planters of those colonies as an excuse to delay payments but 
that it was abundantly shown there that the labourers fully appreciated 
regular payment when they can get it. Besides, he made it clear that 
there was nothing in the Ordinance which rendered the offer or the 
acceptance cf monthly payment compulsory, and that the self-acting clause 
would have any practical meaning only if the labourers themselves desired 
to have their balance of wages paid monthly. Gordon questioned the propri­
ety of retaining the wages of the labourers as a security for the 
advances made to the kanganies to recruit labour. He condemned the practice 
as "inequitable " and something which could be grieviously abused. Finally, 
while admitting that the introduction of the system of monthly payment 
and the self-acting clause would cause feelings of irritation among the 
planters, Gordon argued that it would be so only at the inception cf 
the new system and that the question should be viewed from a long term 
perspective as a permanent solution to the problems of the labourers and 
the planters. He wrote
In a few years that irritation would be forgotten and the benefits 
of a system of prompt payment to both employer and employed, fully 
recognised; while, though acquiescence in the wishes of the planters 
might produce temporary satisfaction, the checks which it would be 
them necessary to maintain, and re-institute, would keep up a 
perpetual friction and soreness far more injurious, in the long 
run, than any temporary discontent.74
In his views Gordon was strongly supported by the Colonial Office
75and the local Executive Council. When it was clear that the draft had 
received the consent of the Colonial Office and the support of the senior 
officials in the colony, the planting representative in the Legislative 
Council made a last bid to obtain some concessions. He offered to support
74* Gov. to S of S., No. 451 °f 6 November 1888, C.O, 384/168.
75* 8 of S. to Gov., Coolie Emigration, 3 August 1888, ibid.
S cf S. to Gcv., Coolie Emigration, 29 January I89C, C.O. 384/172*
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the bill, if Gordon was ready to amend the draft so as to extend the
period at which the self-acting principle would become effective from
30 to 60 days-1 ' Though reluctantly, Gordon conceded in the hope that it
would create a better atmosphere for the new Ordinance to be implemented.
Cnee the planters obtained the above concession and the bill reached London ,
the planters revived their agitation in London to get the self-acting
77clause revoked before the bill received royal assent. These attempts,
however, ended in failure and the bill as passed by the Legislative Counci
*7 ft
was approved in London as Ordinance No. 7 of 1890.
However, the eztenticn of the ’’grace period” to 60 days in effect
amounted to quarterly payment, for a labourer could quit without giving
notice only if one month’s wages were not paid within the succeeding
60 days, that is, for instance if the wages for January were not paid by
the end of March. What of the actual practice among the planters in the
years after I89O?. Gordon conceded to the planters’ request in the belief
that it would eventually lead to monthly payment. He thought that the
employers would pay the first month’s wages of the labourer at the end
of the labourer’s third month in service and would thereafter pay monthly
1 7 9
always retaining two months wages. But most planters did not follow 
this method. Instead they paid once in three months for the entire three 
months. Thus, it boiled down to quarterly payment. It was, however, an 
improvement on the pre-1890 practice among the planters of paying four 
times a year retaining three months’ balance of wages.
76. Gov. to S of S., Lo. 142 of 6 May 18$0, C.O. 384/176.
77* G. Kelly and T. N. Christie to Sec. of Ceylon Association in London,
22 May 1890, FPAC lS"T, Correspondence, pp. xxv-xxvii.
Sec. of Ceylon Association in London to S of S., 7 July I89O, ibid., 
pp. xxiii-zxiv.
7 8. S of S. to Gov., Coolie Emigration;, 4 July 1890, C.O. 3O4/I76.
S of S. to Gov., Coolie Emigration, 27 June 1390, ibid.
For the Ordinance, see ?^AC 18°1, pp. xrcvii-xxviii.
79. CH 1889-1890, 1 May 1890, p. 163.
Gov. to 5 of S., Mo. 142 of o May 1390, C.O. 384/176.
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As the tea period progressed, the attitude of the planters to 
the method of infrequent payment of the 'balance of wages seems to have 
undergone a significant change. They moved towards more frequent payment 
of balance of wages.^ But this move was slew and gradual, and did not 
show a direct switch over to either bi-monthly or monthly payment.
c»
Throughout the 1390 , the majority of the planters still appeared to have
paid quarterly though the method of bi-monthly payment was on the increase.
However, where such bi-monthly payments were made, it was done with one
or two months’ wages in arrears.^ On the other hand, evidence reveals
that by 1908 this practice was widespread. During the first decade of
the present century, several planters were even advocating monthly payment.
The evidence of the planting witnesses who appeared before the Labour
Commission of 1908 reveals that the great majority of them were in favour
82of monthly or bi-monthly payment of balance of wages without arrears. '
The period from I89O to 1908 also saw the transition from indirect payment
of the balance of wages of the labourers through the kanganies to direct
O “3
payment into the hands of the labourers.
The gradual nature of the change of attitude is a reflection of 
the desire of the planters to maintain a hold over the labour force and 
thwart the risk of losing labour at heavy crop times and also the desire 
to have some security for out-going coast advances. Like in case of the 
coffee planters of earlier times, these factors influenced the tea 
planters of the I89O" as well.^ 4 But the persuasiveness of these factors 
on the plonkers in their method of payment gradually waned during the 
tea period.
80. A general meeting of Maskeliya DBA, 2k January 1902, COW, 31 January 1902.
A general meeting of Arabagamuwa DBA, 16 Kay 1902, ibid., 20 Kay 1902.
81 • AnE of Dikoya DBA, ibid, 3 January 1896..
See also, AnEs of other DBAs in ibid., in January and February I896.
82. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Broceedings.
8 3. Annual general meeting of BAC, 17 February 1904, Eesolution, YBAC, 
1903-1904, p. 67. ~
8 4. Editorial, COO, 7 June I89O.
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Several explanations can be given for the drift of the planters 
towards more frequent payment of balance of wages in the tea period. The
c»
lS90k saw the formation of large-scale tea companies backed by substantial
85
working capital from British banking houses. " Besides, unlike in the
case of the coffee plantations, the tea estates turned out yield throughout
the year and brought in continuous earnings to the tea planters. This
enabled the tea planters to pair their labourers more frequently than the
86coffee planters did in the years prior to I89O. While the underlying 
factor for frequent payment was the transition from coffee to tea and 
the greater access the tea planter had for working capital, it is important 
to realise that the immediate factor which encouraged the planters to 
move in favour of frequent and direct payment was the effect of infrequent 
payment in increasing the "outside debt" of the labourers and the
O rj
disturbing influence it had on the labour force. 1
In the period from I89O to 1910, the "outside debt" became a 
serious problem to the planters. Once in debt to the "outside" creditor, 
the latter pressed the kangany to obtain fresh advances from the planter 
in order to recover his debt or manoeuvred to move the gang in search 
of higher advances. Thus, the planters saw in the method of infrequent 
and indirect payment an important reason for the heavy "outside" 
indebtedness of the labourers and the high turnover of the labour 
force— factors which contributed to increase the rates of cash advances 
paid out by the estates. Therefore, the planters found it in their 
interest to undermine the credit of the labourers at the bazaar and 
weakened the shop-keeper’s hold over the labourers. The planters believed 
that this could be accomplished by making the balance of wages available
8 5. N. Bamachandran, 1963? pp« 4ff»
Elaine Gunewaraena, 1965? p. 25•
8 6. L. R. Jayawardena, unpublished dissertation for research fellowship, 
Cambridge, i960, pp. 27-32.
8 7. Fifty-fourth AnR of PAC, PPAC 1907, p. 99.
o a o£-<4-c.
to the labourers more frequently so as to avoid the accumulation of the 
labourers' debt with the shop-keeper on provisions purchased by the 
labourers. One could discern that the planters' desire to pay more frequently 
increased in inverse correlation to the rise of the indebtedness cf the 
labourers and the rise in the rates of advances paid by the planters. In 
1907 when labour was scarce and the rates of advances and the "outside
debts" of the labourers were very high, the planters' opinion moved fast
towards the adoption of the system of monthly payment. In recommending 
monthly payment, t.ae Labour Commission of 190S was, in fact, recommending 
the general consensus of views of the planting community; and the
Ordinance No. 9 01 1909 embodying monthly payment was passed with the
4. * , + 88support of the planters.
However, the planters' object was not realised. The labourers'
indebtedness to the shop-keeper increased ‘in spite of the adoption cf the
system of monthly payment of the balance of wages into the hands of the
labourers. Nor did the frequency of payment help to reduce the rates of
advances paid by the planters. In fact labour indebtedness and the high
rates of estate advances continued to remain as the major problem in
8 9the plantation labour system in the Island in the post-1903 period.
The main reason for this was the persistence of the system of estate 
advances. We saw that under the system of infrequent payment of wages, 
the back-pay which remained with the employer was regarded as a security 
by the shop-keepers and the money-lenders in giving credit to the 
labourers. This was particularly so during the period up to I89O. During 
this early period the shop-keepers took care to limit their credit to 
the labourers to the amount of back-pay which accumulated with the 
employer. In the years after I89O while frequent payment cf the balance
88. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Proceedings.
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of wages removed the dependence on the back-pay as a source of security, 
the widespread offer of local cash advances by the estates turned out 
to be the new source of security for the labourers’ outside credit ors. As 
a result the bazaar credit to the labourers continued in spite of the 
adoption of the system of monthly payment by the planters in 1903 and 
it contributed to swell the labourers’ total indebtedness.
4* The balance of wages and the cost of living
The object of this section is to find out how the wages paid to
the immigrant plantation labourers in Ceyloii compared with their cost of
living. In doing so we have deviated from the practice common among the
economists of comparing the total earnings with the consumer price index.
Instead the method followed below is to find out, at the outset, the net
balance of wages actually handed over to the labourers after making the
necessary deductions for the goods and services supplied to them by the
estate. Thereafter, an attempt will be made to compare the balance of
wages with the cost of the requirements of the labourers other than what
the estate supplied them. This course was adopted because without the
knowledge of the balance of wages of the labourers it was found extremely
difficult to know the amount of one of the major items of deductions
made by the estate from the wages of the labourers— namely, deduction
against the labourers’ advances account. The only reliable information
in this respect is that usua.lly one month’s balance of wages was debited
90
against the. advances account in every tv.To montns. On this basis we have 
worked on the principle that the annual average deductions against the 
labourers’ advances account would have approximated half the total average 
annual balance of wages of the labourers and that the annual cash receipts 
of the labourers would have therefore been the balance of wages of 
six months in the year.
90. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908» Report, p. viii.
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Our attention will be now focussed on the adequacy of the balance
of wages to meet the cost of the requirements of the labourers other
than rice and the services of the "dhoby and barber” which were provided 
91
by the estate. In this respect it is necessary for us to look into the 
requirements of an average labourer and the cost of his requirements in 
the years 1800-1910. The immigrant labourers generally lived in 
joint-family units. It is difficult to obtain reliable and typical data 
on the family budget of the average plantation labour family. The 
variation in the size of the family, the number and the age of wage-earners, 
the number and age of dependents create further complexities. Therefore, we 
shall take the adult male and female labourer as the units of our study.
This method of study seems acceptable in the light of the fact that 
approximately 80 per cent of the immigrant plantation labour population 
consisted of adults. Even in case of adults it is difficult to knov.r the 
goods and services actually consumed by them. However, we are in a 
position to find out what items were considered desirable for an average 
estate labourer. These may or may not be identical with what the labourers 
actually consumed. It is our intention to use the information in our 
possession regarding the desirable requirements of an average labourer 
as the basis in our effort to find out the standard of living of the 
labourers.
Detailed information on the monthly requirements of the average
male and female adults are found in accounts given by several planters
92
towards the latter years of cur period of study. However, the first 
systematic and dependable survey of the basic requirements of the estate
91. The washing of labourers’ clothes and cutting their hair was organised
by the estates and the estates deducted the cost of these services
from the wages of the labourers.
92. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Appendix C, pp. 610-611.
Ibid., Appendix D, p. 612.
Ibid., Appendix E, p. 613*
labourers was carried out at a much later time, in 1923* These investiga­
tions were sponsored by the Government of Ceylon and carried out by the 
Assistant Director of Ceylon Census and Statistics, R. Jones-Sateman* 
However, the actual initiative for these investigations came from tho 
Government of India which for several years repeatedly emphasised the
need to investigate into the minimum rates of wages required by the
93immigrant plantation workers in Ceylon, Bateman’s investigation were
fairly comprehensive. His findings were published in the form of a Ceylon
Government Sessional Paper entitled "The Report on an enquiry into the
relation between the wages and the cost of living of estate labourers,
94April-May 1923." The Government of India while accepting Bateman’s
findings on the requirements of an average labourer as far as his findings
95went criticised Bateman as having erred on the side of omission. Based 
on Bateman’s conclusions and the criticism of the Indian Government we 
have compiled column 1 of Table5*3 on the approximate basic requirements of 
an average labourer in 1923* Our next problem is to know how far the
cj
consumption pattern of an average estate worker of the early 1920 
differed from that of an estate worker in the period 1830-1910. 
Fortunately, in this respect some useful information pertaining to 
our period is available in the accounts of several contemporary planters. 
The information given by these planters on the basic requirements of 
the labourers during our period of study compares very favourably with 
the list given in Table 5*3*
93. Under Secretary of State for India to Under S of S., C.O.,
19 June 1919, C.O. 54/824.
Sec. to Government of India to Col. Sec., Ceylon, 1 July 1922,
enclosure, C.O. 54/858.
94. Cey. SP. XXXI of 1923.
95. Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India to
Col. Sec., Ceyloh, No. 511 of 9 July 1924*
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TABLE 5.3 The monthly cost of living (other than cost of rice, "dhoby and barber", and deductions 
against the advances acoount) of an average male estate woker in the up-country planting districts
Requirements of an average
male worker per month Cost of requirements
(1) U )
1886 11897 1888 1891 1892 1893 1907
Part I..Subsidiary food-stuffs
Salt x4 measure .13 .13 .15 .15 .15 .17 .15
Dal ' 1 measure .10* .10* .12 .12 .13 .13* ) .34
Green peas 1 measure .11* .10* .10* .10* .14 .15 )
Coriander i4 measure .02* .02* .02* .03 .03 .03 .03*
Maldive fish 1 lb. .18 .17* .18 .21 .30 .28 .42
Dry fish 1 lb. .10* .10 .10* .12 .13* .13 .18
Dry chillies 3■4 lb. .09 .08 .09 .09 .11* .22 .13*
Tamarind li lb. .05* .05* .05* .06 .06 .07 .09
Red onions 1 lb. .03 .04 .04 .06 .07* .09 12*
Mustard and pepper etc. .03 .03 .03 .03 .04 .05 .06
Total dost of subsidiary food-stuffs .86* .84-* .90 .97* 1.17* 1.32* 1.53*
Part II. Other items 
Betel .12 .12 .12 .14 .15 .1 9 k .25
Clothing .35 .35 .35 .40 .41 .55 .65
Household goods .23 .23 .23 .26 • 31* .35 .40
Total cost of other items .70 .70 .70 .80 .87* 1.09* 1.30
Part III
Average monthly expenditure 1.56* 1.54* 1.60 1.77* 2.05 2.42 2.83*
Minus income from bartering rice .57 .57 .57 .65 . —3 00 .88 1.00
Monthly expenditure to pay in cash 1.00 .98 1.03 1.12 1.27 1.54 1.83
Annual expenditure to pay in Cash 12.00 12.00 12.25 13.50 15.25 18.50 22.00
2 A 7
Our next task is to find out the retail market price in the
period 1880-1910 of those articles which were generally consumed by the
plantation workers. Information on the movement of prices of consumer
goods in the planting districts is not available for the entire period.
Some information is available for the years 1886-3 and 1891-3 in the
evidence placed before the Ceylon Silver Currency Commission of 1893 by
n6
several up-country shop-keepers regarding the prices in their shops."7'’
These shops catered exclusively to the estate population. Information on
the retail price of consumer goods of the estate worker is also available
97for the years 1907. On the basis of this series of information, part 1
of Table 5*3 below sets out the expenses incurred by an average estate
labourer on his subsidiary food-stuff in the years 1886-8, 1891-3$and
1907* For the years 1906 and 1908 the average total expenditure on
subsidiary food-stuffs of an adult labourer has been estimated by several
planters. It is important that these totals- given by them tally with our
total for 1907? the year for which detailed breakdown of prices of
98consumer goods is available. Information is very thin on the cost of
the other items of consumption set out in part 11 of the Table, viz.,
betel, clothes,and household goods in the labourers budget. On these
99articles details are available only for the year 190?. With this 
information as the base we have attempted to improvise for the rest of 
the years making due allowance for the change in the cost of living. For 
this purpose we have taken the movement in the prices of subsidiary 
food-stuffs set out in part 1 of the Table as the criterion.
9 6. SCC, Resort, Cev. SP VI of 1-894? PP* D23-D24® The shop-keepers were 
Indian Chetties whose shops were in the heart of the plantation area- 
in Dimbulla, Devon, Craig Lee, Tilli Coultry, and Talawakelle.
97* Cev Lab. Com. 1908, Appendix C, pp. 610-611.
98. Our Table compares favourably with that of K. Thiargaraja, an Indian 
observer who visited the plantations in Ceylon in 1917 end compiled 
a Table on the cost of living of the labourers.
K. Thiargaraja, 1917? PP* 182-183.
99* Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Appendix C, p. 611.
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From the total expenses of a labourer on the items in Table 5.3 
we have deducted a certain amount as a set-off against the labourers 
"excess rice" which he bartered with the shop-keeper in return for sub­
sidiary food-stuffs. Here again, it is not possible for us to arrive at 
anything more than a rough approximation of the value the labourers 
obtained in return. We could, however, work on several premises. It was 
widely held that an adult estate labourer normally consumed approximately 
three quarter bushel of rice per month which left him with a quarter 
bushel every month for the purpose of barter. The rice purchased by 
the shop-keeper found its way back to the estate. Thus the shop-keeper’s 
price for rice bartered by the labourers should have fallen short of the 
cost price of rice to the estates. Besides, we have already seen that
the practice of bartering rice with the shop-keeper was often to the
101disadvantage of the labourer. It was generally held that in the
bartering of goods with the labourers the shop-keeper rated heavy interests
102
usually varying anything between 20-25 per cent. When we apply these 
premises to the year 1907 it is possible to conclude that the maximum 
value the labourers could have obtained by bartering a quarter bushel of 
rice could not have exceeded Re.l.^^ With Re.l as the base, we have 
improvised for the rest of the years on the basis of the movement of 
prices cf subsidiary food-stuffs in the up-country planting districts.
Table 5*3 presents the annual cost of articles of consumption, 
other than rice, of an average adult male in the up-country planting 
districts. It is now hoped to get some idea of the annual cost of these
100. Notes and Comments, COO, 2 October 1894*
Sub-editorial, COW, 12 April 1907*
101. See above, p. 216.
102. fThe Labour Question’, by N. Thomson, COW, 12 April 1907*
103. This conclusion is at least partly confirmed by the experience cf 
a planter who found that the labourers appreciated his method of
giving Re.l instead of the weekly issue of rice, either once or
twice CL month.
Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Appendix H, p. 614.
articles for average adult male and female workers in the three main 
planting regions of low, mid, and up-country districts. Here, we are 
beset with two problems. First, the lack of any detailed information on 
the extent of consumption of the items in Table 5.3 by female estate 
workers. To overcome this problem we* have taken as the basis of our 
calculations, the generally accepted view at the time on the desirable 
difference between male and female workers with regard to the quantity 
of rice issued by the estate and also in respect of the rates of wages 
paid to these two groups of workers. The rate cf pay as well as the 
quantity of rice issued to a female estate worker fell by a quarter of 
what was given to a male worker (pay 33 cents for male and 25 cents for 
female worker per day; rice at one bushel for male and three quarter 
bushel for female worker per month respectively). Apparently, the 
proportionate requisites of a female worker was generally accepted as 
being three quarter of that of a male worker.
Our second problem is that our findings set out in Table 5*3 on
the cost of living of the esta.te workers relate only to up-country
planting districts. We are confronted with the question of finding the
regional differences in the cost of the labourers' requirements given in
Table 5*3* Here, we have relied mainly on the basis adopted in 1927 by
the Ceylon Government in agreement with the Indian Government in enacting
the pioneer piece of legislation in Ceylon regarding the minimum rates
of wages to be paid to the immigrant estate workers in the Island. This
legislation embodied in Ordinance No. 27 of that year enacted that rice
should be supplied by the estates to the workers irrespective of the
location of the estate at a fixed price of Rs„6 .4 0 cents per bushel and
that workers should be paid daily wage rates of 50? 52, and 54 cents in
1 0 / 1
tho estates situated in low, mid, and up-country respectively. T Since 
rice was supplied at a uniform price, the difference in the regional rates
104, CGG, No. 7676 of 30 November 1928.
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of daily wages were actually meant to cover the regional difference in
the cost of living of the labourers other than the cost of rice. On the
basis of these wage differentials the regional differences in the cost
of living other than the cost of rice works out to a ratio of 11: 10: 9
105among up, raid, and low-country planting districts respectively.
Table 5*4 attempts to compare the annual cost of living other 
than rice of the labourers in the low, raid, and up-country planting 
districts with the annual balance of wages-handed over to them by the 
estates. It is clear from Table 5*4 that in the years after early
I89O0, the balance of wages of the labourers were hardly sufficient to 
meet the cost of their basic consumer items which were not supplied to 
them by the estate,
Yfe have so far seen that wages turned out to be inadequate with 
the progress of the tea period. Y/hereas our conclusions on the earnings 
of the labourers are based on fairly acceptable data, our analysis of the 
cost of living of the labourers is based on imperfect material. But these 
are the only data available to us directly pertaining to the cost of 
living of the labourers. In viev; of the fragmentary nature of these data 
on which we have based our conclusions we now hope to substartiatc these 
conclusions with three general arguments.
First, the Colombo wholesale market price of those food-stuffs 
generally consumed by the estate labourers are available to us. The 
movement of these prices show an upward trend particularly during the last 
decade of our period.Secondly,  the district hospitals in the planting 
districts, which almost exclusively treated the sick estate labourers, 
maintained records on expenses these hospitals incurred on feeding the
105, This ratio is calculated on the basis that an average labourer 
worked 20 days in the month. This is the most acceptable average.
106.- See Appendix D.
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inmates of the hospitals * the number of labourers treated annually and 
the annual number of days the labourers stayed in the hospitals. The 
statistics on the number of days on which the labourers were treated in
the hospitals can be reckoned as fairly correct because the hospital
treatment of the labourers was a source of revenue to the medical scheme. 
The estates were charged with a daily fee for each labourer hospitalized. 
In the period, particularly from I89O to 1910> "the hospital menu underwent 
little change. It is not possible to know how far the data on hospital 
expenses on the food items of the inmates are accurate. But the irregular­
ities could have been common to the entire period. The average annual 
cost incurred by the hospitals in the different districts on feeding per
sick labourer per day can be taken as a general guide of the movement of
prices of food items in the various districts. Such average cost show a
107
consistent upward trend, particularly after about 1895* Finally, it is
significant that towards the end of our period the planters themselves
began to debate the question whether an increase in the wage rates paid
to the estate labourers was necessary. At least a minority of planters
in the tea period began to point out that the wages of the labourers were
108inadequate and that these should be raised. This minority opinion 
seems to have slowly gained ground, especially in the years 1904-10. The 
Labour Commission of 1908 examined the question and finally emerged with 
the majority version of the planters that the wage rates were adequate 
provided rice was supplied at a reasonable price. The dissent of one of 
the members of the Commission, himself a planter, on the majority verdict 
is symbolic of the minority thinking among the planters on the subject of 
the adequacy of the wages. It is important that such opinion should have 
gained ground at all at a time when the planters as a body were striving 
to maintain the static wage rates.
107. AR of PCMO, (annual series, 1884-1910)* CAR.
108. 'Coolies: Their Earnings, Savings and Remittances1, by G.D.,
COO, 17 June I89O.
Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Rider by C . C. Mee, p. xxii.
It should be noted that in computing the cost of living of the
labourers as given in Table we have omitted several important
financial encumbrances of the labourers. There were the dependents of
the labourers to be cared for, particularly children under 10 years of
109
age and the old and the infirm. Among the immigrant plantation workers 
the proportion of the dependents to the total working population was 
relatively low. This was largely due to the migratory nature of the 
labour force. At the census of 1901 it was estimated that the number of 
dependents consisted only about 14 per cent of the total estate population 
Besides, the needs of the dependents would have been minimal. Nevertheless 
it is inevixefbie that the dependents should have brought about some 
increase in the family budget. Evidence reveals that the labourers did 
engage in petty luxuries such as gambling and consumption of alcohol. The 
Labour Commission of 1908 found that these practices were frequently 
indulged in by the immigrant labourers, more especially after their pay 
day.11^ In particular, the consumption of alcohol was found to be 
excessive among xhe labourers, so as to seriously affect the efficiency 
of the labour force at least in certain planting districts. The spread 
of drunkedness among the labourers was a common complaint of the District 
Planters’ Associations. The workers also did manage to remit some of their 
earnings to South India. With the limited information at our disposal it 
is impossible for us to obtain any idea of the volume of remittance made 
by the estate labourers. The annual Administration Reports of the Post 
Master General of Ceylon furnish information on the total amount of money 
remitted to India from the various Post Offices situated in the planting 
districts of the Island. These totals include money remitted by the 
planters as "coast advances" and money sent by the kanganies and also
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by the Chetties trading in the planting districts. 111 Therefore, it is
impossible to identify the remittances of the estate workers. However,
there is sufficient evidence to believe that the estate workers did utilize
the Money Order System to remit money to their villages. Besides,
information reveals that the labourers returning to South India carried
112money and jewellery in their person. Other financial commitments of
the labourers included payment of interest to the shop-keepers, and
expenses on religous and social festivals, particularly "Deepavali”
celebrated through out the planting districts by the immigrant plantation 
113workers.
How did the labourers live under conditions of barely adequate 
balance of wages and yet met their other financial commitments?. One 
explanation is the existence of the joint-family system among the immigrant 
estate population in Ceylon, A joint-family unit consisted of not only 
the parents and their children but also the close relatives. Most of the 
members were wage earners. Children above 10 years of age found employment 
on the estate, particularly as weeders. The desire of the relatives to 
live together is clear from the available evidence. The planters found in 
the grouping of relatives a factor contributing to maintain the stability 
of the labour force. At times tundus were demanded by the labourers 
to move out to other estates with the aim of joining their relatives. 
Incidence of polygamy as a means to increase the wage earning capacity 
of the family are on record. The Labour Commission of 1908 found evidence 
to point out that "the earnings of the members of a family group are
111. ’Coolies: Their Earnings, Savings and Remittances’ by G, D, COO,
17 June 1890.
112. Editorial, ibid., 10 June I89O.
113. Coast Advances, Debts, Mortality of Feverish Estates. A Black Picture’ 
by an Old Planter, 0C0, 24 May 1894*
The Labour Question, by G. A. Talbot, ibid., 4 January 1896.
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held, in some sort, in common," While the joint-family tended to increase
the earnings of the family, on the other hand, it also helped to curtail
their expenses particularly in regards to household goods and subsidiary 
food-stuff s.
However, the main reason for the immigrant's endurance of
inadequate wages can he attributed to the working of the advances system.
While some of the financial contigencies of the labourers were partly met
by the balance of wages, it was the cash advances which sustained the
labourers where the balance of wages were inadequate. Though some portion
of the balance of wages was taken in by the kangany to settle the "outside
debts" of the gang, a total wipe out of these debts were possible only
by obtaining cash advances from the employer or by transfering the gang
to another employer on a tundu . Where the labourers required money for
eventualities such as festivals or for remittance to South India they
made demands on the kanganies. The kanganies in turn obtained advances
from the employers or the money-lenders. If due to a continuous long spell
of surplus labour the advances would not be forthcoming to meet the
labourers1 financial commitments, discontent among the labourers would
become widespread. A portion of the outstanding advances would be worked
off by the labourers. But eventually the "outside debt" had to be taken
over by planters in order to retain the labour gangs or to procure fresh
gangs. As a leading planter pointed out
... what they now owe us, represents chiefly debt contracted with
the cadday-keeper and money-lender originally and which we have
had to takeover... our so-called coa,st advances represent money n 
given out by us to settle debts originally contracted in the bazaar.
114. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908» Report, p. xi.
115. Ibid., Proceedings, p. 83.
11^. Annual general meeting of PAG, 17 February 1904 > PPAC 1903-19"‘A, 
PP. 75-76.
2 %
If, ap we have seon, the hulk of the advances given out to the
immigrant labourers by the estates were irrecoverable, the question follows
as to why the planters did continue the practice of giving out heavy
advances. The following extract from the dissenting note submitted by C. C.
Mee, a member of the Labour Commission of 1908 and one of the few planters
of the day with a critical approach to the labour problems, provides the
answer* Mee wrote "... it is a safeguard in many cases to have highly
indebted coolies, because they cannot then leave an estate so easily (unless
117
they give notice), or play up for higher advances at critical times...."
In the coffee period, infrequent payment of the balance of wages provided 
the planter with a hold over his labour force. Then*the desire of the 
planters was to bind the labourers to the estate during the few months to 
which the coffee crop was confined. In the tea period when the crop was 
almost perennial, the planter was anxious to keep the labourer tied down 
to the estate throughout the year. The period also witnessed a move towards 
frequent payment of wages. Consequently, the planters found in the offer 
of advances and the consequent indebtedness of the labourers the only 
practical method of maintaining a hold over the labourers. Though the entire 
amount of the outstanding advances were irrecoverable, such advances gave 
the planter some sort of a negotiable security. He could either have the 
gang of labourers or if the gong moved out, he could recover the total debt 
of the gang, which he could utilize to engage another gang.
Thus, while the system of cash advances met a part of the cost of 
living of the labourers, simultaneously it tied down the labourers in 
debt-bondagc to the estate. The labourer, as we have pointed out earlier 
on, having lived on advances and indebtedness in his own village in South 
India, acquiesced to the debt-servitude on the estate.
117. Cey. Lab. Com. 1708, Rider by C. C. Hoe, p. xxii.
See also, Editorial, CCO, 29 Hay 1890.
The Labour Question. Report of the special Committee of PAC,
Memoranda Re. Labour Question, PPAC 1902-1903, P* 7*
CHAPTER VI 
HEALTH AND LEVEL OF LIVING 0? THE 
IMMIGRANT PLANTATION- LABOURERS
Vie have seen in the preceding chapter that poverty and 
indebtedness were common denominators among the plantation labour 
population. These together with widespread ill-health and illiteracy 
contributed to perpetuate a low standard of living among them. In section 
1 of the present chapter we will look into the available data on the 
general state of health of the plantation labour community. It can be 
said generally that the health of the community was appalling and that 
over the period of our study there was no striking progress in the over­
all standard of health. In section 2 we will examine the basic causes 
of the general state of ill-health. These basic factors were again 
related to the method of labour recruitment, hours of work, and insani­
tary living conditions, as much to the prejudices, ignorance, and 
illiteracy of the labourers themselves— the latter being the factors on 
which the planters laid most stress in explaining the general state of 
ill-health. While the widespread state of ill-health and the low level 
of living obviously had distressing effect on the labour life on the 
estates it also contributed to bring about a certain degree of ineffi­
ciency in the plantation work force.
1. Indices on the aeneral state of health of the immigrant plantation 
labourers
The present section contains several indices which will help us 
to grasp the general state of health of the immigrant labourers. Table 
6.1 shows the death rates of the immigrant estate labourers and the 
other communities (given in the Hospital Returns as "mixed races”) in 
the hospitals situated in the plantation districts. The Table reveals
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that the hospital mortality rates of the immigrant labourers were heavy. 
Hospital death rates are certainly not correct criteria to compare the 
incidence of mortality among the immigrant labourers and. the rest of the 
population, 'thereas a large number of death among the labourers took 
place in the hospitals, in case of other races a fevjer absolute number 
of deaths occurred in the hospitals. However, a Table on the hospital 
death rates is included in the present section for two reasons. First, 
these are the most accurate available statistics on the death rates in 
the Island in our period. It is not possible to obtain annual series of 
statistics on the crude death rate among the immigrant labourers with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy. Annual series of statistics on the sise 
of the estate labour population during our period are not available. It 
is also not possible to procure correct statistics on the number of 
deaths which occurred outside the hospitals. In the case of Hospital 
Returns, fairly correct statistics were maintained, partly because the 
admission of sick labourers to the hospitals was a source of revenue to 
the hospital scheme. Secondly, what is more important to our study is 
that the Table unmistakably shows that there was no significant 
improvement in the hospital death rate of the immigrant labourers 
throughout our period.
Table 6»2 shows that the majority of deaths among the estate 
labourers were due to diarrhoea, dysentery, and debility. Death due to 
anchylostomiases shows an upward treni towards the end of our period*
This was largely due to defective compilation of statistics during the 
earlier years when medical men failed to diagonise anchylostomiases from 
malarial cachexia and therefore attributed a large number of death by 
the former disease to the latter. The causes of death seen in Table 6.2 
is a useful criterion of the health of the labour population. It distinctly 
illustrates that the principal causes of death among the labourers were 
preventible diseases— '"diseases of poverty’1
1. Vera Anstey, 1939j P* 63.
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TABLE 6 .1 Hospital mortality rates of the estate labourers and "mixed race;
in the planting di.stricts, 1883-1910 (per' 100 of admissions of each category
Estate Hi zed Est at e Mixed
Year labourers1 races Year labourers races
1883 12.08 6.63 1897 20.83 6.04
1884 21.05 7.30 1898 23.34 6 .0 8
I885 22.27 9.93 1899 22.98 6.54
1886 19«70 8.16 1900 23.29 6.39
1887 18.70 8 .28 1901 29.33 6 .0 7
18 88 21.97 8.49 1902 22.28 5.50
1889 22.18 8.53 1903 19.86 5.91
I89O 22.15 6.79 1904 17.79 5.75
I891 23.35 7.10 1905 19.52 5.97
1892 30.30 7.49 1906 24.88 7.23
1893 27.67 8 .9 8 1907 24.49 7.17
1894 21.49 6 .06 1903 21.88 7.38
1895 22.46 7.25 1909 21.05 7.99
I896 19.64 7.76 1910 20.66 8 .00
Sources: ARs of PC'IO, (annual series, 1883-1393)» CAR. 
Hospital Returns,(annual series, 1894-1910), Cey. 33.
Tables 6 .2 and 6 .3 are compiled from the information available
in the annual Administration. Reports of t ^ s Registrar-General, on Vital
Statictics. These statistics are not as accurate as the stati sties in
the Hocoital Returns vfhich form the hasis of Table 6.1. This was largely
because the collection of data from the est at es on the number of deaths
and their causes was defective. But the Vita1 Statistics throw valuable
light on the gene ral trends of the causes of death among the estate
labour population and the rates of infant mortality on the estates. The
errors in the Vitrl Strtistics may have occurred mainly by way of
omissions.
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TABL3 6.2 Principal causes of death among the immigrant plantation
workers , 1894-1910 (per 100 of deaths)
General
Diarrhoea dropsy Bronchitis
and and Anchi03- and
Year dysentery debility Fevers tomiases pneumonia
1894 38 17 7 3 8
1895 36 16 7 3 10
1896 38 17 5 2 9
1897 36 20 6 2 6
1898 40 20 6 1 6
1899 42 20 6 1 6
1900 38 19 7 1 8
1901 47 19 6 1 6
1902 38 22 6 1 7
1903 33 34 5 1 8
1904 25 26 4 2 9
1905 34 29 5 3 10
1906 39 20 6 3 8
1907 40 21 4 4 7
1908 35 19 4 5 9
1909 35 15 3 7 11
1910 32 16 3 7 10
Source: AR of Registrar-General, on Vital Statistics , (annual
series, 1894-1910), CAR.
The heavy rat es of mortality by the above indicated diseases are
not accurate criteria of the general ste/te of health among the estate popu-
lation. But accurate data on the incidence rates of disease s are not
available and therefore we have to depend mainly on the statistics pertain­
ing to mortality rates to appraise the state of health. Diseases such as 
diarrhoea, dysentery, and anchylostomiases are not by themselves fatal 
diseases unless these diseases become acute. The high death rates from such 
diseases reveal a very high incidence of these diseases among the 
plantation labourers.
TABLE 6. 3 Infant mortality rate s among the estate labourers and the
Sinhales e in the planting distri cts ? 1887-1910 (deaths per 1000 births)
Estate Sinha­ Estate Sinha­
Year labourers lese Year labourers lese
1887 248 176 1899 221 189
1888 188 164 1900 211 171
1889 212 163 1901 212 173
1890 209 155 1902 200 172
1891 194 167 1903 195 159
1892 229 I65 1904 202 172
1893 229 171 1905 190 163
1894 186 162 1906 210 188
1895 218 172 1907 204 161
1896 213 146 1908 214 181
1897 201 132 1909 235 219
1898 240 169 1910 224 170
Source: AR of Registrar-General, on Vital Statistics,
(annual series, 1887-1910), CAR.
What is 'basically relevant to us is that none of these indices 
reveal any striking progress in the overall state of health throughout 
our period. This "was despite the medical -welfare programme organised by 
the Government and the planters, the establishment of the Ragama 
Immigration Camp, and the closing of the North Road to immigrant traffic. 
The absence of a significant progress was fundamentally interwoven with 
the low socio-economic conditions and the poor living and working 
conditions which did not show any noticeable improvement in our period-
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2. Genesis cf 511-hcalth amonr the immigrant workers
In the present section we will attempt to make an objective 
analysis of the factors which brought about a general state of ill-hea.lth 
among the plantation labour community. On the whole, the planters 
attributed this to factors such as labourers1 insanitary habits, supers­
titious inhibitions, and privation. That these characteristics pervaded 
the life of the immigrant labour in Ceylon is indisputable as we will 
see below. These were the outcome of the ingrained social habits and 
customs, abject poverty, and the illiteracy of that stratum of the 
community in South India from which the immigrants were drawn. But this 
line of reasoning on the part of the planters leaves much to be desired, 
as a satisfactory explanation of the ill-health of the plantation labour 
population. On closer analysis it appears that some aspects of the 
plantation labour system, particularly factors such as long hours of 
work, the wage structure, bad housing, insanitary condition, and the 
lack of adequate welfare facilities on the plantations contributed 
towards the general ill-health of the labourers in a large measure.
The quest ion, however, cannot be disassociated from the general 
state of health of the new arrivals who annually replenished the 
plantation labour community in the Island. Cholera and smallpox 
frequently broke out in South India in epidemic form. Besides, evidence 
suggests that the poorer classes of people in South India, had a partic­
ularly low standard of health and that the incidence of diseases such
as diarrhoea, dysentery, and anchylostomiases were high among 
2
them. The available evidence is conflicting on the extent to which the 
new arrivals contributed to swell the death rate on plantations, but 
there is general agreement that on the whole the new arrivals were
2. K. Gan guise, 1933, chap. IV.
Ira Klein, 1973, pp. 639? 643.
’Coolie emigration from, the Iladras Presidency to Ceylon1, IP P., 
Vol. 692, Pro. No. 24 of January 1873? p. 124.
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physically in poor state of health, suffering from malnutrition.^ In 
1910,the Principal Civil Medical Officer, after an examination of the 
faeces cf three shiploads of plantation labour immigrants in Colombo, 
reported that "...the results obtained from this inquiry proves that the
immigrant cooly is seriousIjr infected with intestinal parisites (partic-
\ "4ularly anchylostomiases; on his arrival in Ceylon. The gradual improve­
ment in the Ceylon Government quarantine arrangements helped to curtail
the danger of frequent and large-scale introduction of plague, cholera,
5
and smallpox. But the quarantine measures failed to make the Island 
completely immune to these diseases. Besides, such measures could do 
little to avoid the introduction of other communicable diseases.
The diseases such as anchylostomiases were so widespread in South 
Indie, that it was impossible to avoid the introduction of fresh batches
of immigrants stricken with such diseases so long as South Indian labour
was required on the plantations. Nevertheless, the system of recruitment 
of labour in some ways contributed towards the general state of 
ill-health of the labour force. The recruiting efforts of the kanganies 
were concentrated on the numerical strength of their gangs rather than 
the physical capacity and the ability of the recruits to perform manual 
labour. Migration itself was unrestricted* There was no selection of 
labourers in India. Particularly during the times of famines and epidemics 
in South India the immigrant labour population in the Island was swelled 
with refugees trying to escape from the hardships in their homeland.
The medical, examination of immigrants at Paumben and Tuticorin conducted 
by the Ceylon Government medical officers was of a desultory nature 
where estate labour immigrants were concerned. ’Where labourers arrived 
in Paumben or Tuticorin attached to a kanganyfs gang the usual practice
3. DHMC, Proceedings, ley. SP II of 18-3, pp. 2-3, 9, 15*
4. PHPAG, Cey. SP XV of 1910, p. 27.
5. See above, pp. 66-76.
wa.s to send them across without too much checking. The ordinary passenger 
travelling from Tuticorin to Colombo had to submit documentary evidence 
of good health and proof of having been away from an infected district 
during the previous fifteen days, in order to board the streamer. After 
an enquiry into the medical arrangement for the immigrants at Tuticorin 
a medical officer reported that
... no such precautions exist in the case of estate labourers. These 
can obtain tickets without any reference to the Port Medical Officer 
... to Colombo, on the bare statement of a kangany that they are 
estate coolies.... The passengers and the crew of a ship are 
examined by the Medical Officer before leaving Tuticorin. This 
examination is a hurried one, ?,s over one hundred and fifty deck 
passengers have to be examined in about an hour. This is the only 
examination that the so-called cooly emigrant has to undergo.6
Further, the important system of family recruitment made it
impossible to prevent the dependents of the recruits entering the Island
irrespective of their general physical condition. It was a common practice
for the immigrant labourers to bring with them their aged and infirm
relatives, whose presence they desired and whom it was their custom to 
7
support. The planters were of the view that any action which might restnc 
or put a stop to this practice would keep a number of the prospective 
immigrants from coming to work on the estates and that it would also 
disturb the system of recruitment of families. Until the closing of the 
North Road in 1899? the long march on the route also contributed to 
aggravate the physical debility of the immigrants.
From the point of view of the general standard of health, the 
labour immigrants to Ceylon appear to have been less fortunate than the 
countries which recruited labourers under the indenture system. In the 
latter countries immigration was restricted, recruitment was confined to 
adult labourers, and the recruits were subjected to a fairly effective
6. Gov. to S of 3., No. 137 of 27 April 1897? enclosure, ’Report on the 
epidemic of plague in Bombay1, by Dr. H. M. Fernando, C.O. 94/636.
7. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Report, p. xix.
medical examination prior to their embarkation from India, This procedure, 
at times, resulted in the rejection of those recruits who were found unfit 
for manual labour. Even Malaya, which like Ceylon, was allowed to import 
unindentured labourers after 1397 > generally restricted its recruiting 
activities to adults and subjected the emigrants to a more effective 
medical examination at Negapatam than what the Ceylon medical officers 
performed at Paumben and Tuticorin, It is on record that the professional 
recruiters who were working in South India for the Malayan planters 
resorted to the practice of handing over to the Ceylon kanganies those 
of their recruits who were rejected at Negapatam on grounds of physical 
debility. The employers of Indian labourers in countries such as the West 
Indies, Mauritius, Piji, and Malaya spent more money than the Ceylon planter 
did in order to import labour and therefore took greater interest about 
the type of labour they obtained.
The high percentage of death among the labourers working in the 
estates in Ceylon from bowel complaints as seen in Table 6,2 portly reflect 
their poor and unhealthy dietary habits. As Dr. Griffin pointed out,’’The 
majority of diseases are those of the digestive organs pointing to
Q
defective feeding in some way.” It was generally accepted in our period
that the diet of an average adult labourer should consist of rice, pulses,
9 .chillies, dry fish, and curry-stuff. Such a diet lacked certain essential
constituents of a satisfactory human diet, especially food containing
sufficient quantity of animal proteins such as meat, fish, and milk.
Moreover, the actual food consumed by an average labourer fell even below
this generally desired diet of the labourers. They subsisted mainly on a
10
rice diet supplemented with salt and some pulses such as peas and deal.
Even if barely sufficient in quantity, the average diet of the labourer
8* DEMC, Proceedings, Cey. SP II of 1893, p. 45*
9. See above, pp. 245-246.
10, Gov. to S of S., No. 396 of 15 September 1882, enclosure, Report on 
high hospital mortality of Malabar coolies, by PCMO, G.O. 54/541*
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was markedly deficient in quality. The most striking feature of the
labourers* food habits was the excessive consumption of carbohydrates. The
Principal Civil Medical Officer wrote that
The majority of malabars admitted in 1881 as in previous years were 
suffering more from the effect of privation or incomplete nourishment 
from want of food or the consumption of food containing a deficient 
quality of albumen and fats, ... their bodies in consequence became 
poorer in these necessary constituents and richer in water, a state 
of anaemia being produced which predisposed to disease by diminishing 
the resistence power of the body.11
The poor diet could be partly attributed to privation. Besides,
their food habits were a continuation of their past experience in India.
It has been pointed out that the religious scruples and the social
prejudices among the labourers of some castes prevented them from consuming
beef. However, several of the lowest castes, who in fact formed the bulk
of the labour force, had no inhibitions as regards any kind of flesh and
if they did not consume meat it was mainly because they could not procure
it with the means at their disposal. Basically, deficient diet was the
natural outcome of two important factors. On the one hand, the inadequate
wages obviously compelled the labourers to subsist at a bare minimum
standard. On the other hand, poor diet was also the result of the mode of
wage payment on the estate which tied the labourers in debt bondage to
the kangany and the shopkeeper, for the labourers had to obtain their
food-stuffs other than rice on credit. Inevitably the shopkeeper had an
important say in the labourer’s diet. The labourers, indebted to the Chetty
12tradesman, had invariably to obtain their requirements only from him. In 
fact, one important obligation of a kangany for any debt contracted from the 
Chetty was to see that his gang of labourers purchased their provisions .from 
the Chetty and no one else. The kangany had necessarily to contract debt from 
the Chetty because of the irregular system of wage payment of the estate. 
Besides, especially in case of estates situated in isolation from the
11. Ibid.
DEI'C, Proceedings, Cey. SP II of 1893, pp. 1, 9«
12. See above, pp. 221-222.
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main towns, as most of the estates were, practically the only shop
available in the vicinity of the estate was that of the Chetty. The
monopolistic role of the Chetty in the supply of food-stuffs to the
labourers enabled him to decide on the quality and the quantity of what
he supplied to the labourers; and the Chetty on the whole charged exorbitant
prices and was guilty of supplying poor quality and short measure goods.
He had little or no regard to the well-being of the labourers and, in fact,
sought to use the indebted labourers as pawns to wrest money from the
estates in short supply of labour. A few planters experimented with
estate shops in order to eliminate the unhealthy monopoly of the Chetty
13over the supply cf food-stuffs to the labourers. But these isolated 
efforts were not of much use in a general set-up where the Chetty could 
exercise his coercive power to put pressure on the kangany to get the 
letter's gang to patronise his shop.^ However, on the whole, the planters 
were content with making arrangements only for the supply of rice to the 
labourers. Their mode of wage payment, in fact, reflect their general 
indifference to the dietary requirements of the labourers, other than rice* 
One of the worst features of the dietary practices of the 
labourers was closely related to the hours of work on the plantations.
The long working day which lasted normally from 6 a.m. to 4 p.m. without 
a meal break naturally had adverse effects on the physical condition of 
the workers. As Dr. Griffin, a medical practitioner of 18 years of 
experience among the labourers, pointed out
13. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Deport, p. xvi.
3-4. Ibid.
The merchants' monopolistic hold over the food supply of the labourers 
find parellel in India at that time. Thus, Burnett-Hurst wrote, "The 
grain merchant encourages the mill-hands to make his purchase from 
him on credit and even lends him money. Once he has secured his hold 
on his customer he proceeds to supply him with inferior and mixed 
grain and give him light measure. In fact every one takes advantage 
of the poverty and the lack of bargaining power of the worker."
A. R. Burnett-Humst, 1925, p. 6 4.
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Nine coolies out of ten on estates go nine hours without anything 
to eat..., I think that the long hours of work without food prevents 
a great many arrivals from India from developing into strong 
labourers. I do not think long hours— perhaps 10 or 31 hours— without 
food is likely to be anything but prejudicial to a cooly who 
arrives physically not in a strong state. . . 15
Besides, because of the early morning muster and the absence of 
a mid-day meal break, the labourers normally ate in the morning a fairly 
heavy meal of cold rice prepared the night before— a meal not too suitable 
in a cold climate. A medical practitioner of fifteen years* experience 
among the plantation labourers pointed out that
I consider that the eating of cold rice in the morning is most 
certainly objectionable, especially in this climate. Stale rice in 
the mornings is certainly very injurious to bowel complaints, or 
anything of that kind. The cooly in such a climate requires 
something stimulating in the mornings, in the shape of coffee or 
tea, as well a.s warm rice if he had the time to cook it. 16
The planters and the kanganies were hesitant to give their
labourers a mid-day meal break for fear that if the labour force was
knocked off at mid-day there would be some difficulty in getting the
17labourers to return to work. The fact that most kanganies and a few 
labourers did have their mid-day meal in the field suggests that the main 
reason for the great majority of the labourers to skip a mid-day meal 
was that they could not afford it.^w This together with the fact that a 
meal break was not recognised in the system in that there was no cessation 
of work to enable the labourers to have a meal, inevitably, resulted in a 
"long fast.” On the Assam tea plantation the problem of the labourers 
diet was tackled b;r setting up the "Hotel system" to provide a hot mid-day 
meal to the labourers. Though the system was suggested for Ceylon, it 
failed to find any support from the planters.
15, DHi:C, Proceedings, Cey. SP II of 1893, p. 45.
16. Ibid,. p. 19.
I?* 3btd., p. 45*
IC. Thiargaraja, 1917? P* 1^3.
18 • fHHC, Proceedings, Cey. SP II 1893, pp. 19, 45'
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What of working conditions in the. field?. The work of tea
plucking was light and involved a relatively healthier outdoor life than
in case of factory labourers in India in those days when most factories
were ill-ventilated, badly lit,and congested with industrial dust and
fumes. But outdoor life, particularly on plantations, meant that the
impact of the climate on the health of the labourer, who spent practically
his whole day in the field, had to be taken care of. The climate,
particularly in the highlands where tea flourished, was cold and damp,
and the region was subject to heavy monsoon rains in some months of the
year even to the extent of precluding any field work. The annual
temperature in most plantation districts fluctuated between $ 0 to 60 P.
Field work in cold, damp, and windy weather naturally required adequate
protection from exposure to such a weather. The climatic factor was
particularly important in case of new arrivals who came from the hot and
arid plains of South India and therefore had to face a considerable
19change in the climate. Whatever available protection the labourer had
from the weather was confined to a coarse cloth, known as a cumbly, used
to cover the head and the body of the field worker. Most labourers could
not afford more than a single cumbly which inevitably meant that in wet
weather, the damp cumbly had to be worn every day of the working week
20
without little or no drying. This together with unprotected feet
21exposed the labourers to the vagaries of the weather. While this factor
contributed to aggravate the general state of ill-health among the
labourers, it was particularly responsible for the considerable incidence 
of mortality from respiratory diseases such as pneumonia and bronchitis 
among the plantation labour community.
The condition of the housing provided by the employers was far 
from satisfactory for healthy human habitation. To migrant labourers
19« Ibid., p. 1.
20. Ibid., p. 10.
21* Gov. to S of S., Me. 264 of 19 June 1885, enclosure 3, FGI-IO to Col.
Sec., ilo. 521 of 9 June I885, C.O. 54/559*
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recruited from a long distance dwellings had to he provided by the
employer* These duellings, which vrere usually known as "coolie lines",
v/ere provided to the labourers rent free. The usual plantation labour
dwelling was a row of rooms each approximately 12 by 10 by 9 ft., opening
into a long common verandah. Clusters of such "coolie lines" we re situated
at several spots in the plantations depending on the size of the
plantations. In "line" construction little attention was paid to factors
such as drainage, ventilation, and privacy. The lack of proper drainage
contributed to create a filthy environment around the "coolie lines1*•
The floor of the "lines", which the labourers used to sleep, was hardened
with a mixture of mud and cov;dung. This type of floor easily got damp
in the wet climate of the tea plantation districts. This together with
thatched roof3, and rooms without windows and doors (except a mere opening
to enter the room) contributed to make the "coolie lines" a gloomy,
dismal, and an unhealthy place as a human dwelling. The labourers often
made the conditions of the "lines" still worse by enclosing the verandah
in an attempt to create privacy for themselves.
Descriptive accounts of the conditions of the "coolie lines”
are available for the years from 1883 to 1886 when a system of sanitary
inspection of estates by the Superintending Medical Officers appointed
22by the Government was in existence. They reported that in a great
majority of "lines", scavenging, drainage, and roofs v/ere neglected;
that the sanitary conditions v/ere bad, and that cattle were kept in the
verandah. In a few cases it was found that the labourers actually lived
in sheds meant for cattle. The improvements which the Superintending
Medical Officers recommended v/ere left in cold storage mainly because
the depression in the plantation sector precluded the employers from
23
undertaking additional financial commitments. In the years after I89O,
22. Gov. to S of S., No. 320 of 30 June 1883, enclosure, PCMO to Col.
Sec., 20 June 1883, C.O. 54/547.
23. AR of PCMO, CAR I88h, p. 140D.
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the rapid increase in the number of resident labour population and the
revived prosperity in the plantation sector resulted in the extention
of labour dwellings in the plantations. But there was little improvement
in the quality of the dwellings. Particularly, those of the low-country
planting districts were described as "a disgrace”. It was only towards
the very end of our period that a handful of planters began to experiment
24with tiled roofs and cemented floors.
Defective sanitation was yet another bad feature of labour life
on the plantations. There was no satisfactory system of sewage disposal
on the estates. The labourers habitually defeacated on the surface of the
soil; and the only facility provided by plantations, with very few
exceptions, was to set apart a block of land in the vicinity of the
"coolie lines" for the labourers to deposit their excreta. The estates
employed scavangers to collect the human excrement from these allotments
either daily or several times a week. In 1907? the Committee on the
Sanitation of Estates, on inquiry, found that special arrangement for
25
the collection and disposal of sewage was made only m  one estate.
The favourite explanation of the planters for not providing any
form of sanitary latrines on the estates was the disinclination of the
2 6labourers to use them.- A few planters who experimented with latrines 
pointed out that the system had to be eventually dropped having proved 
unsuccessful with the labourers. The labourers were unacouinted with 
even the most elementary ideas of hygiene and sanitation, and therefore 
it was found difficult to wean them from the insanitary habits they 
v/ere steeped in. Even when a block of land was demarcated, it was 
difficult to prevent the labourers defeacating all over the estate. This 
perhaps was partly unavoidable in a situation where the labourer,
24. FPRPAC, Cey. SP XXXI of lplO, p. 11.
25. PRFAC, Cey. 3? XV of 1910, p. 3.
26. PPRPAC, Anjehylostomiases CommitteeL Proceedings, Cey. SP XXXI of 1910* 
Almost all the planting witnesses who appeared before the Committee held
2?2
accustomed to insanitary habits, v:ere busy for long hours of the day in
field v;ork usually at a considerable distance from their dwellings. On
the whole, while the prejudices and habits of the labourers were serious
impediments against improvement of the general state of sanitation on the
plantations, it cannot be overlooked that the management made no genuine
effort at a comprehensive system of latrine construction, which as the
medical officers in the plantation districts unanimously pointed out, was
obviously a necessary preliminary step to wean the labourers from their
habits. Even where blocks of land were allocated, there is evidence that
27sewage was not satisfactorily disposed. The neighbourhood of the "coolie 
lines" was the area subjected to heaviest soil pollution. In spite of 
the fairly satisfactory progress of the low cost system of "trench latrines" 
with the labourers on estates where it was tried out, no widespread
28effort was made by the planters to provide even this primitive facility.
The cost of latrine construction no doubt dissuaded the planters.
The inevitable result of heavy and widespread soil pollution on 
a population living in a damp climate and engaged in field work with 
unprotected feet was to create a general state of ill-health. Soil 
pollution naturally contaminated the water supplies of the labourers 
which were drawn from unprotected streams and wells into which infected 
soil was carried by rain water. Besides, it was not uncommon for the 
labourers to use streams for the disposal of their excreta. A planter 
giving evidence before the Anchylostomiases Committee of 1910 pointed 
out that on his estate the water supplies for the use of the labourers 
were drawn from the same stream in which the labourers deposited their 
excreta.^
27* M I C , Proceedings, Cey. SP II of 1893, pp. 18-19.
28. Faeces voided in a trench in the ground and covered with earth to 
prevent the migration of anchylostomiases larvae and the breeding of 
flies. At best, this type of ’latrines1 are suited for labour gangs in 
temporary occupation of an area.
29. PPRPAC, Cey. SP XXXI of 1910? P« 6.
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The most distressing consequence of insanitation was the rapid
and incessant spread of anchylostomiases while it also contributed to
the spread of a host of other water-borne diseases, especially diarrhoea,
dysentery, and enteric fever. Latrines, as the Medical Advisor to the
Colonial Office, Sir Patrick Mason, pointed out, was the "crux of the
30
anchylostomiases problem." Anchylostomiases was the most widespread
disease among the plantation labourers. Towards the end of our period
it was discovered that practically every labourer on the estates suffered
from it.^ While anchylostomiases by its direct effect caused a certain
percentage of deaths among the labourers it had the equally baneful
consequence of gradually sapping the vitality of the infected, retarding
the physical power of resistence, making his constitution easily
susceptible to other bowel diseases such a.s diarrhoea and dysentery.
Thus, as the Labour Commission of 1908 pointed out the ultimate result
of widespread insanitation in the estates was to bring about "...a great
32
deal of preventible disease and a certain amount of lose of life...."
It is clear from the discussion in the present section that 
factors such as insanitation, ill-health, inadequate medical care, 
undernourishment, bad dwelling conditions, and exposure to wet and cold 
weather were the common denominators in the plantation labour life. This 
situation was made worse by the poverty, indebtedness, ignorance of the 
labour population, and the constant movement of gangs between estates. 
Thus, the overall picture was a distressing one. Nowhere was the ultimate 
adverse effect of the interaction of the aforesaid factors more 
succinctly illustrated than in the rate of infant mortality. The rate
PMPAG, 1Discussion on sanitation in reference to anchylostomiasos 
in the Tropics’, Cey, SP XV of 1?1Q, p. 7*
31c FPRAC, Cey. SP XXXI of 1910. p. ii.
32. Cey ._ Lab. Com. 1903, p. xviii.
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of infant mortality is perhaps the most sensitive index of the health
and conditions of life in any community; for the infants are the most
susceptible section of the community to i31-health and bad living
conditions and the first to succumb. Among the immigrant plantation
labourers, the rate of infant mortality swelled throughout our period.^
As we will see later on, maternity welfare facilities in the
plantations were minimal. 4 The expectant mothers in the estates were
mostly attended at child birth by women from among the labour community.
These “'line Dhais", as they were known, had no proper mid-wife training
and relied on customary knowledge. The earliest available account about
the treatment given by the "line Dhais" is found in the Administrative
Report of the Id rector of Sanitation for the year 1926. He rjointed out
that many infants died from debility caused often by the starvation
of the infants during the first fev? weeks of life due to lack of milk in
the mother as a result of the treatment received from the "line hhais".
He observed that on the birth of an infant, a decoction sufficient for
ten days was prepared, and that for three days after the birth of the
child the mother was given no nourishment beyond four cups of the
decoction and an occasional cup of coffee or rice coniee. The decoction
was continued up to the tenth day with increasing quantities of food.
The infant was usually kept away from the breast for three days. The
Director concluded that this treatment of the mother and the child had
a debilitating effect resulting in a large number of infant and maternal 
35deaths. When breast milk failed it was not possible to obtain any 
suitable substitute. Consequently, "... unsuitable food is given, such 
as rice etc. which brings on diarrhoea, often ending in d e a t h . F u r t h e r
33<- See above, Table 6.3*
34* See below, pp. 324-325*
35. AR of the Director of Sanitation, CAR 1926, p.
36• AR of the PC::0 for 1885, CAR I885, p. 139D.
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■the general state of ill-health 0f the comm unity, particularly the widespread
prevalence of anchylostomiases among the females contributed its share
to debilitate the conditions of the infants. One of the worst features
of plantation life which adversely reacted on the health of the infants
was the insanitary and unhygienic conditions of labour dwellings. Mothers
returning to work after child birth at times took the infants to the
work site due to the lack of proper attendance which precluded leaving
infants behind in the "lineal This practice inevitably aggravated the
37ill-health of the inf out s.
It is not correct to surmise that the general state of the health 
of the labourers as discussed above prevailed throughout the planting 
regions with the same degree of impact. There were obvious regional 
variations. Districts favourably situated as regards the climatic 
influences fared better. Particularly, the newly opened up low-country 
districts were more prone to spread of illness. Besides, the purity of 
the supplies of stream water depended largely on the location of the 
estates. Here again, the low-country districts with less flowing streams 
stood at a disadvantage. The old established estates had a certain 
percentage of resident labour who had got acclimatised and therefore 
were less susceptible to disease. The labour gangs on the estates of 
those humane planters who paid a greater attention to the question of 
public health were undoubtedly healthier than those on other estates.
But these district— and estates— wise differences remained a matter of 
a degree. The basic problems were common throughout the planting districts.
There is another aspect which exerted an important influence on 
the level of living of the labourers, namely, their standard of literacy. 
There is no quantitative data on the level of literacy among the 
immigrant plantation labourers in our period. The earliest available data 
found in the Ceylon Census Reports of 1911 place the rate of literacy
37. Lt. Gov. to S of S •, No. 98 of 4 September 1835, C.O. 54/560- 
Report of the PCMO for 1864, enclosure in ibid.
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among the estate labour population at 9 per cent.''" The qualitative data 
available for our period leave us without any doubt that the v?of 
majority of the labour population was illiterate and that literacy was
■)Q
by and large confined to the kanganies and sub-kanganies. Widespread 
illiteracy and ignorance was a factor which contribute to perpetuate the 
servile bondage of the labourers to the kangany and the estate. The 
labourers even without the rudimentary understanding of reading and 
writing were left at a gross disadvantage in their dealings with the 
kangany and the shop-keeper and were often at their mercy. Extortion 
en route between South India and the plantations was largely the outcome 
of illiteracy. A proprietor-planter was quoted as saying that, "The 
head kangany is utterly devoid of the slightest sympathy towards his 
sub-kanganies and coolies, who are simply held in slavery. Ignorance, 
crass ignorance, is at the bottom of his chicanery..." ^
The labourers themselves came from a community where illitcrccy 
was widespread. Table 6.4 below, compiled from the data available in the 
Madras Census Report of 1901, reveals the state of literacy among the 
principal castes and the districts from which the immigrants plantation 
labour force was drawn* The district figures are for the entire population 
in the district* The rate of literacy of the lower castes were very much 
below the district rates. We will see later on that the facilities
available in the estates for schooling were minimal and that there was
little improvement in the level of literacy of the immigrant estate 
population throughout our period.
3®* Ceylon Census Report, 1 9 H » Vol. on Population by Age etc., pp. 123 ff. 
In the previous census reports the statistics pertaining to estate 
Tamils were grouped together with Ceylon Tamils and therefore it is 
not possible to obtain seperate statistics for estate labourers*
39. Ibid., 1891, Vol. I, p. 31.
I O .10- e j / 0.1. * 1, p * 1 C 9 *
40. A. G. E. Wise to Under S of S., 24 August 1904, PEITCC, Gey. SP IV
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TABLE 6 .4  Caste- and district-wise rate of literacy in South India, 
1901 (literate per 1000 of population)
By caste By district
Kalian 53
Vellala 35
Palli 33
Ambalakaran 27
Pallen 12
Puraiyan 5
Chakkiliyan 1
Tanjore 101
Tinnevelly 99
Madura 77
Trichinopoly 66
Source: Census of India, 1901? Vol. XV-A, Madras, pt. II,
pp. IO6-IO7.
Ibid., Vol. XV'-B, Madras, pt. Ill, pp. 67-74*
Closely interrelated with the problem of schooling of estate 
labour children, there was the problem of child-labour' on the estates.
There was absolutely no age limit for child-labour on the tea estates.
Nor were there regulated hours work for children on the estates. Child-labour 
helped the estates to meet the demand for extra hands in tea plucking 
during the peak season of work-load. For the labourers the employment of 
their children helped to augment the family earnings. Ignorance end 
poverty-stricken as they were, the bulk of the labourers preferred to 
send their children to the field than to the schools even where the 
schools were available. Indiscriminate child-labour without any legal 
precautions not only contributed to the evasion of schooling but it also 
worsened the general state of the childrens* health. Any individual efforts 
by the planters either to limit the hours of work or to impose an age- 
limit for child-labour would have exerted a disturbing influence on the 
labour force because such restrictions v/ere bound to curtail the family 
income of the labourers. Imposition of restrictions by individual 
estates would have even resulted in the discontented labour gangs 
giving notice to move on to estates which did not impose such
2?8
restrictions. Only collective action would have brought about some 
satisfactory results. But the planting opinion was not sufficiently 
enlightented to forge ahead in this direction. More important, such 
restrictions would have affected the field work in the estates.
Conclusion
Ill-health and the low level of living inevitably retarded the
efficiency of the labour force. Time and again, the planters complained
of heavy incidence of absenteeism and the general state of inefficiency
of the labourers. The Labour Commission of 1903 succinctly pointed out
about the prevalence of a "...large wasteage of energy indicated by the
poor average out-turn." It found that "...at least one quarter of the
entire labour force available in the Colony fails daily to turn out to
work."^ This was with the weekly rice issue made dependent on the number
of days a labourer turned out for work. Throughout our period it was
strongly felt that the seasonal shortage of labour which occurred in
some years could be overcome if the labourers turned out for work more
regularly. The planters attributed the poor turn-out mainly to laziness
and the^ f characterised the labourers as a community who worked basically
to obtain their measure of rice. But the factors which brought about a
high incidence of absenteeism were more latent. Coming from a peasant
sector the labourers lacked the discipline necessary for regular work
required of a modern labour force. This is seen in the available evidence
42
on malingering among the labourers. We have also seen in chapter V 
that constant movement of labour gangs between estates and also the 
perpetual indebtedness of the labourers contributed to increase the 
incidence of absenteeism in some ways. * Besides these factors, the poor
41. Cey. Lab. Ccm. 1908, Report, p. xi.
42. Ibid., Proceedings.
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health and living conditions no doubt seriously hampered any striking 
progress in the efficiency of the labour force. This at any rate is the 
only conclusion one could, reach on the basis of the evidence set out in 
the Table below which shows a direct link between the high rate of 
absenteeism and the relatively unhealthy low-country planting districts 
which also were the districts which offered relatively poorer conditions 
of living.
TABLE 6.5 Some available evidence on the turn-out of the immigrant 
plantation labourers
Planting
district
Average daily turn-out 
(percentage of the labour force)
Kalutara 65-75
Kelani Valley 65-75
Kegalle 60-70
Badulla 80-87
Dikoya 85-90
Tundaluoya 83
Source: Cey. Lab. Com. 190S» Froceodings.
CHAPTER VII
LABOUR WELFARE SCHEMES
In the present chapter we will look into the steps taken by the pla­
nters and the Colonial Government to improve the conditions of health of 
the estate labourers in our period, which witnessed two medical welfare 
schemes— the first inaugurated in the years 1880-2 and a supplementary 
scheme brought in, in 1893- Medical welfare was a major field relating to 
immigrant labour which provoked animated discussion and bitter controversies 
between the Colonial Government and the planters— controversies which 
reveal the contemporary thinking and the role of the planters and the 
Government towards improving the health of the labourers. The schemes 
mark a major departure from the somewhat laissez faire attitude of the 
Colonial Government during the previous fifty years towards the question 
of medical welfare of estate labourers. Government involvements in the 
plantation labour medical welfare measures in Ceylon show some similarity 
in this sphere with the set-up in those countries which imported Indian 
labour under the indenture system. The similarity is a rare one; for, on 
the whole, the labour system in Ceylon was left free of Government 
interference, unlike the indenture system which was subjected to Government 
control and supervision. Even in the sphere of medical welfare, Government 
interference into planter-labour relations in Ceylon fell far short of 
the degree of interference which prevailed in other countries. The medical 
schemes also reveal a greater financial but a lesser personal commitment 
by the planter in the medical care of the labourers in our period. Besides, 
the working of the. schemes show the improvements which took place in the 
conditions of labour life on the plantations and helps us to grasp the 
fundamental causes of the general state of ill-health that pervaded their 
life throughout the period despite the medical welfare measures. At the 
outset we will discuss the background and the origins of the 1880-2 scheme,
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outline its major provisions, and discuss its fortunes during the first 
decade of its implementation. The scheme will he dealt with comprehensively 
because it remained as the basis of labour medical welfare for several 
decades. He will thereafter look into the origins of the 1893 scheme and 
the working of the combined schemes during the next two decades. Finally, 
we will examine the progress made in our period in the other fields of 
labour welfare, particularly public health, maternal and child care, and 
the education of estate children..
1. Pre-1680 set-up
The 1880-2 scheme which remained as the basis of the medical 
welfare measures in our period can be viewed as a major new development 
as well as a firm break from the general tenor of the pre-1880 medical 
welfare measures. The main feature of Government policy up to 1880 was to 
leave as much of the medical welfare of the labourers as possible in the
S Shands of the employers. During the 1830" and 1840", the Government paid
little or no special attention to the problem. The planters kept a stock
of medicine and themselves attended to the simple ailments of the labourers.
2
The more serious cases were despatched to the Government hospitals. But
1. The history of the plantation labour medical measures in the coffee 
period has been dealt in the following research studies. I. H. Vanden 
Driesen, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, I954> 3. Bastiampillai, 1968$ 
M. W. Roberts, 1966b. S. A. Meegama (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 
1968) has dealt briefly v/ith the medical schemes in our period. He
has, however, concentrated his attention more on the second quarter of 
the twentieth century. L. R. Jayawardena (unpublished dissertation for 
research.fellowship, Cambridge, i960) who has devoted his u/brA: to 
our period ha.s restricted his study to the behaviour of the entrepreneur 
towards the working of the schemes. For the period prior to i860, we 
have indicated only the broad themes based on the above works in order 
to plane our study in its historical perspective.
2. Memorial of PAC to S of S, PPAC 1882, Correspondence, p. 186.
Government hospitals were few in number and were situated in the main
towns, usually a long way from the plantations. Besides, the planters
were charged for maintaining sick labourers in the hospitals, which was
obviously a factor dissuading the planters from sending their labourers
for treatment. By the 1850s some plantations h?.d begun to form groups to
engage the services of a medical man— either a doctor or a dispenser. The
Government then viewed the medical welfare of the labourers as the stiLe
responsibility of the planters and gave statutory recognition to this
attitude in the Master-Servant Law of 1865* It enacted that
Any servant who shall be incapacitated by sickness from labour whilst 
in the service of any employer shall be entitled to lodging, food, 
as well as medical care, at the expense of such employer during 
such incapacity; provided that the employer shall not be bound to 
pay to the servant during such a period his w a g e s in addition.3
In the subsequent decades the above clause became a point of controversy
between the Government and the planters, each trying to "pass the buck"— the
responsibility for the medical welfare of the labourers.on the other.
The first practical intervention by the Government came about in 
1872 with the Ordinance Bo. 14 of that year. The glaring inadequacy of 
the existing medical arrangements, the high hospital mortality rate among 
the immigrant labourers, the belief of imperfect fulfillment of the 
obligation by the employers, and the Colonial Office criticisms of the 
medical arrangements convinced Governor Filliam Gregory of the need for 
a closely State-controlled and a State-supervised medical scheme for the 
plantation labourers. But the planters objected to the idea of State 
intervention into planter-labour relations. Besides, a comprehensive 
medical scheme was bound to involve additional cost to the planters. Gregory 
viewed the goodwill of the planters as a necessary condition for the.success 
of the estate medical scheme. The result was an attempt at a compromise 
which eventually turned out to be a very uneasy one. The new scheme was 
virtually a planter— run medical scheme with very limited and remote control
3. Clause 27, Ordinance No. II of 1865, Ceylon. Legislative Enactments,
Vol. I, (Revised, 1923), p. 570.
and supervision by the Government. The planting area was divided into 
districts; each district was to have a hospital with an European medical 
officer. The working of the scheme in each district was in charge of a 
District Medical Committee of planters. The scheme was to be financed by 
an acreage tax on the estates— the feature of the scheme most resented 
by the planters. The Government reserved the power to take over the 
functions of inefficient District Committees and also appointed an Inspector 
to advise and supervise the work of the committees, to supervise the 
medical arrangement in the hospitals, to visit estates, and to furnish 
annual reports to the Government on the working of the scheme.
The scheme, however, failed to bring about an appreciable improve­
ment in the conditions of the labourers’ health. The planters, the 
Government officials, Gregory, and eventually the Commission appointed 
in 1879 to review the working of the scheme, were unanimous that the scheme 
was unsatisfactory. The scheme depended for its success on the active 
co-operation of the planters. Their l°ck of enthusiasm and general indiff­
erence war an important factor in the ultimate failure of the scheme. As 
we will see later on, the scheme itself was defective and inadequate. - 
Besides there were frequent disagreements between the planters, medical 
men, and the Government officials in the implementation of the scheme.
The unprecedented influx of the immigrants into the planting areas con­
sequent on the South Indian famine of 1876-8 finally sealed the fate of 
the scheme.
2. The 1880-2 estate medical welfare scheme
During the late 1870  ^and the early 1880^’ the problem of the 
medical welfare of the immigrant plantation workers came to the limelight 
again and the planters and the Colonial Government began to search for a 
better alternative. On the one hand, there was the growing dissatisfaction 
against the working of the I872 arrangement. It was inadequate and 
unsatisfactory to cope with the health problems of the plantation workers 
even during normal years of labour immigration. On the other hand, the 
heavy influx of the famine-stricken immigrants from South India in l877“8 
strained the existing scheme to the point of collapse. The hospital death 
rate among the immigrant labour population increased swiftly and the 
Colonial Office and the Colonial Government became increasingly alive to 
the problem. Governor Gregory himself realised the need for a new approach 
but bequeathed the task to his successor, J. B. Longden. The period from 
the latter's assumption of the governorship in 1879 up to the time of the 
settlement of the new scheme in 1882 witnessed the bitterest of the clashe 
between the planters and the Colonial Government in the entire history of 
the estate medical welfare schemes. Not the least of the causes for the 
intensity of the clash lay in the deepening economic crisis in the plan­
tation agriculture in the Island in these years. The controversies cenxred 
mainly around the method of financing the new scheme and, to a lesser 
extent, on the nature of the scheme.
As regards the nature of the scheme, the planters on the whole 
favoured a return to the pre-1872 "paternal arrangement" where there was 
little interference from the Government.^ But the Colonial Government and
R
the Colonial Office would have none of it. The policy of leaving the
4* The Deputation of the PAC to the Gov., 9 February 1882, PPAC 1882, 1 5 8
5 . Gov. to S of S., Bo. 78 of 20 February 1882., Minute by C . P. Lucas,
C.O. 54/547-
medical care of the labourers solely in the hands of the employers had 
not brought about'any striking improvement in the health of the labourer 
The need for a comprehensive scheme of medical aid either managed by the 
Government or run by the planters under close Government supervision was 
apparent, particularly in view of the immensity of the problem of high 
hospital death rate of the immigrants. The planters' opinion, which in 
the early I87O" was opposed almost to a man to Government interference, 
gradually drifted towards the end of the decade in favour of a 
Government-run medical scheme. The working of the 1872 scheme had 
been a nuisance to many planters involving a sacrifice of time, partic­
ularly in attending Medical Committee meetings. Besides, the ultimate 
objective of the planters was to get the Government to take over both 
the management and the financing of the medical welfare of the labourers
Governor Longden, personally, had no sympathy with a Government medical
7
scheme because of the greater cost such a scheme would entail, 
nevertheless, he expressed his willingness to undertake such a scheme 
if the planters were prepared to entrust the management of the scheme to 
the Government. The result was the final acceptance of the idea of a 
Government medical scheme in place of the planter-run scheme of the 
pre-1880 era. The responsibility of the Government for the management 
of the new scheme was distinctly embodied in the Medical Wants Ordinance 
No. 17 of 1880.8
Violent friction, however, occurred between the Government and 
the planters on the question of raising money to run the new scheme. The
planters vehemently objected to bear the cost of the medical scheme and
argued that it should be defrayed out of the general revenue of the
6.~H)LC, Governors' Addresses, Vol. II, 7 May .18775 P« 4^5*
7. Ibid.
The Deputation of PAC to the Gov., 9 February 1882, PPAC 168?, p. 156
8. Clause 3 of the Ordinance, PPAC 188?, Correspondence, p. 19?•
9
Government. They contended that the obligations imposed on them by the 
Master-Servant Ordinance of 1865 was limited and pointed out their 
willingness to pay the cost of hospital treatment of sick labourers for 
a reasonable time, to keep medicine on the estates, to personally attend 
to the ordinary ailments, and to provide mothers with sufficient food and 
lodging free of charge during the first month of their post-natal period. 
Beyond these, the planters were not prepared to bear the cost of a 
comprehensive medical scheme involving the construction and maintenance 
of hospitals and the payment of salaries to medical officers. This stand­
point of the planters was substantially a repetition of what they advocated 
in 1872 but repeated with greater vehemence due to the deepening financial 
crisis which the planters were facing in the years 1879-8 2.
The main arguments of the planters were three-fold. First, that 
the planting industry was responsible for the increase in Government revenue 
in the nineteenth century and that the planting interests therefore has a 
strong claim on the general revenue of the Government. Secondly, that the 
labourers and the planters paid their due share to the general taxation 
of the Government and were therefore entitled to share the benefits of 
Government medical facilities which were made available free of special 
charges to the other sections of the population. Thirdly, the coffee 
industry on which the prosperity of the colony depended was passing through 
an unprecedented depression and therefore required relief.^ The planters 
tried every conceivable method to bring pressure on the Government by way 
of special meetings, submission of petitions, going in deputation to the 
Governor, and eventually by memorialising the Colonial Office and the
9. Twenty-sixth AnE of PAC, PPAC 1.880, p. xxiv.
Twenty-seventh AnP of PAC, ibid loSl, p. xx.
10. Gov. to S of S., No. 51 of 2 February 1882, enclosure, Protest by 
J. L. Shand and W. >7. Mitchell, C.O. 54/537*
11. A. general meeting of PAC, 8 October 1880, PPAC 1881, pp. 43-44*
A general meeting of PAC, 28 December 1880, ibid., pp. 59-65.
CH I8 01, 24 November 1880, p.
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Queen. If the general revenue of the Government was unable to bear the
cost, and if special taxation was found necessary, the planters argued
that the labourers should be made to foot the medical aid bill. To wit
they advocated an increase in the existing import duty on rice.
However, the Colonial Office and the Colonial Government considered
that it was obligatory for the planters to bear the total cost of the
13estate medical scheme. It was pointed out to the planters that they
paid little or nothing to import labourers . 'unlike - their counterpart
in other British colonies who had to incur heavy costs to import
indentured labourers. The Government held that it was unfair to saddle
the general public with the cost of the medical care of the immigrant
labourers, particularly because the bulk of the native population were
not directly connected with the plantation industry. It was also shown
that the magnitude of the public health problems of the immigrant labourers
called for special arrangements for their medical care, that the cost of
such special arrangement was part and parcel of the cost of production
of plantation produce and should therefore be borne by the planters.^
The planters’ suggestion to increa.se the customs duty on imported rice
was met with vigorous criticisms from the Governor as inexpedient "not
merely unprecedented and objectionable... also radically unjust", besides
the revenue from such a measure being insufficient to meet the estate 
18medical bill. The planters were told that the growth of Government 
revenue did not entitle them to expect the care of the labourers to be 
made a charge on the public revenue because the rise in revenue had been
12. The petition of PAC to the Queen, PPAC 1882, Correspondence, pp. 164-167* 
Sec. of PAC to Col. Sec., 25 February lS8l, enclosure, memorial of 
PAC to the 3 of S., ibid., pp. I85-I87.
13* Gov. to S of S., No. 287 of 30 December 1830, C.O. 54/529*
^CLC, Governors' Addresses, Vol. Ill, 15 December 1880, p. 94*
14. Lt. Gov. to S of S., No. 12 of 5 March 1881, C.O. 54/532.
S of S. to Gov., No. 264 of 12 August 1881, C.O. 54/533.
15. Gov. to S of S., No. 287 of 30 December 1880, C.O. 54/529*
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accompanied by augmented expenditure, a large proportion of which had 
directly or indirectly devoted to the coffee districts.
Having taken the above stand firmly, the Colonial Government
searched for a mode of collecting the money in a manner least onerous
and irksome to the planters.^° Longden was prepared to modify points of
detail in an attempt to win the goodwill of the planters as far as possible
without sacrificing the basic principle of the planters’ liability to bear
the cost. Thus, in addressing the Legislative Council he declared
... it is comparatively immaterial by what machinery the fund is 
raised, so long as the principle is maintained that the cost of 
the medical care of the immigrant coolies shall be borne by those 
for whose benefit those immigrants have been and are annually 
introduced and are employed. 17
Three modes of collection were proposed. There was the o.creage
tax adopted in 1872. But this had been tried and disliked both by the
18
planters and the Government. It was found difficult and expensive to 
collect. Besides, it was objected to as being unfair, for under the acreage 
tax all estates were taxed at the same rate irrespective of their varying 
yield. The alternatives, were either an export duty on plantation produce 
which was strongly recommended by the Colonial Government or a capitation 
tax according to the number of labourers employed on the estates— a recom­
mendation insisted by the Colonial Office. The years 1879-81 witnessed a 
continuous debate on the merits and demerits of these two modes of 
collection— the Colonial Government and the Colonial Office taking their 
stand firmly on their respective suggestions and the planters attacking 
bot^i in an attempt to evade payment towards the medical aid scheme. Of 
the two modes, however, the general tone of the planters attack reveals
16. Gov. to S of S.9 Ho. 70 of 4 March 1880, C.O. 54/525- * *
1 7. CLC, Governors' Addresses, Vol. Ill, ip December 1880, p. 94-
18. Gov. to S of 5., Ho. 506 of 20 December 1.879j C.O. 54/
Gov. to S of S., Ho. 14 of 13 January 1881, C.O. 54/531 •
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that their hostility to the capitation tax was stronger than against 
19the export duty.
The Colonial Government saw several advantages in the export duty 
over the capitation tax. It had nearly the same advantage as the capitation 
tax for it was roughly equitable in incidence. Moreover, it was less 
expensive in collection because the customs duty did not require an extra 
elaborate machinery for its collection. It was less dilatory and less 
troublesome to estate superintendents and also less irritating to them 
because the collection was not constantly before their eyes, being an 
indirect tax. In these respects, the duty had distinct advantages over 
both the acreage and capitation taxes. Consequently, the Colonial 
Government embodied the idea of the export duty in Ordinance No. 17 of 
1880 despite Colonial Office recommendations to the contrary and planters’ 
hostility.^
However, when the bill reached London for ratification the Colonial
21Office steadfastly pressed for the capitation tax in place of the duty.
In an age when Britain was rapidly going over to the concept of free trade,
'I \\
to the Colonial Office the words export duties sounded as an anathema.
In actual fact, the export duty in the Ordinance of 1880 had little to
do with the laissez faire objections to export-import duties. The
Pi antation products in Ceylon were mainly for export and only a very small
quantity was consumed in the Island. Among the officials in the Colonial
Office only Under-Secretary, C. P. Lucas, saw the distinct practical
advantage of the duty over the capitation tax in the context of the issue 
22
in Ceylon. " ' He presented the majority view in the Colonial Office in
19* A special general meeting of PAC, 6 January 1882, PPAC 1882, pp. 114-115<
20. S of S. to Gov., No. 56 of 18 December 1880, C.O. 54/
21. S of S. to Gov., No. 89 of 18 March 1881, C.O. 54/529.
S of 3. to Gov., No. 234 of 12 August 1881, C.O. 54/533.
22. Gov. to 3 of S., No. 287 of30December 1880, Minute by C. P. Lucas,
c.o. 54/529.
Gov. to S of S .; No. 78 of 20 February 1882, Minute by C. P. Lucas,
C.O. 54/537.
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a nutshell thus
The objection to it are, that it might be very hard on some estates, 
that the most productive may pay too much, the least productive 
too little— that further it might be difficult in collecting the ta.xbet­
ween the planters of coffee and that grown by the native Sinhalese; 
and lastly that the House of Commons would object (wrongly) to the 
name export duty, while the planters would always be able to get 
up an agitation against it on account of its sound.23
The Colonial Office pressure led reluctant Longden and the Colonial 
Government, amidst violent opposition from the planters, to pass the 
amending Ordinance ITo. 11 of 1881 substituting the capitation tax in place 
of the duty in the Ordinance of 1880. This then was the arrangement in 1881.
But the financial arrangement in the 1880-1 scheme failed to get
off the ground. The crucial factor was the precipitous financial crisis
in the plantation sector due to continuous ravages of the coffee leaf
disease on top of declining coffee prices. The deepening economic plight
had two effects. First, the intensity of the depression in the years 1881—2
caused a change of heart on the part of Longden and the Colonial Government
towards the planters. They saw the need to relieve them from the severity
of the repeated crises which afflicted the plantation agriculture in the
Island.^ Longden recommended that the general revenue of the Government
should bear a part of the cost of the medical care of the labourers.
However, Longden was not ready to shift grounds from the basic principle
of the fundsgmental liability of the planters and still maintained that
it was only the special circumstances which caused him to relieve the
planters. The Colonial Office, however, was not ready to grant even this
partial concession "... at the expense of the general community of che
25medical care of the labourers whom they employ." But the deeping economic
23. Ibid.
24. Gov. to S of S., Ho. 78 of 20 February 1882, C.O. 54/537*
The Deputation of PAC tc the Governor, PPAC 1882, p. 163*
2 5. Ibid.
S of S, to Gov., No. 137 of 20 April 1882, C.O. 54/537*
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depression and the pressure from the planters and the Colonial Government
2 6pushed the Colonial Office to finally consent. In agreeing to let the
general revenue bear half the cost of medical -welfare for the year 1882
the Secretary of State, Earl of Kimberley, wrote that the concession should
be regarded as a purely temporary measure of relief in view of the depression
2 7and not necessarily to be renewed in future years.'
Thus, the basic principle of the planters’ liability remained. With
it, the issue had yet to be resolved for the capitation tax to which the
Colonial Government and the planters vehemently objected still remained
on the statute book. The depression had the effect of escalating a severe
attack by the planters and the Colonial Government on the capitation tax.
The central point of criticism was the impracticability of making anything
28like a correct assessment of the number of labourers on each estate.
This was the weakest point of the capitation tax compared with both the 
acreage tax and the export duty, for out of the three aspects of plantation 
land (for the acreage tax), labour (for the capitation tax) and produce 
(for the export duty), labour was the field on which it was most difficult 
to obtain correct statistical returns. In this respect the situation in 
Ceylon was different from that of the other British colonies which imported 
indentured labour under Government supervision and which therefore had 
fairly reliable statistics on the strength of the labour force on each 
plantation. The highly migrant character of the labour force between South 
India and Ceylon and also between estates made it difficult to obtain 
correct figures on the number of labourers in each plantation. Besides, 
the planters viewed the compiling and forwarding of returns as an unnecessary
26. Gov. to S of S., telegram, No. 575 of 16 May 1882, C.O. 54/539•
27. S of S. to Gov., No. 174 of 22 May 1882, ibid.
The Government decided to relieve the planters at a time when Its 
treasury was seriously depleted, its policy of collecting peasant taxes 
was rigorously implemented, and its expenditure severely retrenched.
28. Lt. Gov. to S of S., No. 174 of 8 July 1881, C.O. 54/533.
Gov. to S of S., No. 244 of 3 June 1882, enclosure, reports of several 
Government officials and planters, C.O. 54/539*
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and time-consuming duty and a step in the direction of Government inter­
ference in to planter-labour industrial relation— something which they 
despised. The Government had reservations on the question whether the 
planters would submit correct statistics on the size of the labour- force 
on the estates in a situation where such statistics were collected mainly 
to be used to impose additional taxes on the planters themselves. The only 
way to check the forwarding of false statistics was to impose a heavy 
penalty on the employers found guilty. But such a step was bound to cause 
friction between the planters and the Government officials. All this could 
be avoided and the collection be done economically and simply by an export 
duty. The strong opposition of the planters and the Colonial Government 
drove the Colonial Office to reverse its stand, drop its insistence on 
the capitation tax, and allow the re-enactment of the export duty. Earl 
of Kimberly minuted to his juniors that,
When ... there is a determined opposition on the part of both the 
Government and the planters to a scheme of taxation, it is hopeless 
to make it work. Those who work it, will not give it a fair chance.
I should therefore resign the contest. The question is how we can 
most gracefully surrender, and when. 29
As with the question of temporary concessions to the planters facing an
unprecedented financial crisis, so with the capitation tax, the earlier,
somewhat unrealistic attitude of the remote Colonial Office gave way in
the end to the more realistic stand taken by the local authorities on
the spot.
The Ordinance ITo. 9 of 1882 re-imposed the export duty but with 
a difference. Under 'the amended lav; the duty was reduced by 58 per cent 
of what was originally imposed in 1080. Besides, the Government also 
decided to throw open, for the benefit of the estate labourers, the 
Government civil hospitals situated in or near the planting districts, in 
addition to the district hospitals meant for the labourers under the new 
estate medical scheme. These civil hospitals were hitherto restricted to
29. Gov. to S of 3., Ho. 244 of 3 June 1882, Minute by S of S., ibid.
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the indigenous population in the Island. Despite the concessions the 
planters continued their protest against the b^sic principle of the Or­
dinance and reiterated their view that the entire cost of the hospital
30scheme should be defrayed from the general revenue of the Government.
The new Medical Aid Fund which derived its source of finance from
the export duty and the charges on the estates for the medical visits and
hospital treatment of the labourers came into operation in 1883. In the
next decade, several developments relative to the financial basis of the
Fund took place. For the year 1883, the Government had to bridge a heavy
deficit in the working of the medical scheme. The Governor and the Colonial
Office were not willing to let this ’’monstrous state of things” to continue
Thus, in 1884 the Government charged the whole of the salaries of the
medical men to the Fund and also raised the export levy to the maximum
32fixed by the law.' Nevertheless, the deficit in the estate medical budget
persisted and the Government's share to meet the deficit became an annual
feature. The amount the Government had to meet out of the general revenue
also increased annually with the increase in the total medical aid bill.
Thus, though the original theory was that the 1880-2 scheme should pay
its own way, the cost of the medical care of the labourers, in fact, came
to be shared by the Government with the planters.
Whereas the planters paid a portion of the medical aid bill, they
succeeded in recouping at least a part of that cost from the labourers
with the profit they made on rice issued to the labourers as part-payment
3 3
of the labourers' wages. ' In fact, when the medical scheme was debated 
in the years 1880-2, the possibility of such an outcome was put forward 
as an argument to get themselves exempted from the financial liability
30. Twenty-ninth AnR of PAC, PPAC 1883, p- xx.
31. Gov. to S of S., No. 259 of 9 July 1884, Minute by Wingfield,
C.O. 5/l/554»
32. Gov. to S of S., No.47 of 6 February 1886, C.O. 54/5^3•
33. DiNlC,Proceedings, Cey. SP II of 1893, p. 20.
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of the medical care of the labourers.
We turn how to an examination of the medical arrangement itself 
and itg working. The Ordinance No. 17 of i860 detailed the scheme as 
follows. The planting area was divided into medical districts, each -under 
the charge of a Government medical officer with one or two Ceylonese 
medical assistants. Each district was to have a District Hospital with 
one or more outdoor dispensaries attached to each hospital. The medical 
officer was expected to visit the hospital daily. The planters were obliged 
to send their sick labourers to the hospitals,and the estates were liable 
to pay at the rate of 30 cents per day up to a maximum of thirty days 
towards the maintenance of each sick labourer in the hospital. When 
required by the estate superintendent the District Medical Officer was 
obliged to visit the estate and for each such visit the estate had to pay 
Rs.2.50. In default of the payment of these fees, the movable property
of the estate was liable to be seized and auctioned to recover the arreas.*
Superintending Medical Officers were to be appointed, whose duties were 
to visit the "coolie lines" on the estates at least every six months and 
draw the attention of the estate superintendents to any defect in the 
sanitary conditions of the "lines". Besides those indicated above, the 
scheme placed several other duties on the planters. They had to maintain 
the "coolie lines" in a fair sanitary condition; to inform themselves of 
all cases of sickness among the labourers and to take steps for their 
immediate relief; to inform the district medical officer of all births 
and deaths on the estates within 48 hour's of their occurrence; to maintain 
a register of immigrant labour employed, their arrivals and depatures; 
and also to supply every mother with food and lodging for a fortnight 
after the birth of her child and not to permit her to work for a month 
unless the District Medical Officer certified to the contrary. The kanganies 
were required to report all cases of siclmess in their gangs to their
34* Deputation of PAC to the Gov., 9 February 1882, PPAC 1882? p. 146.
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employers. Failure to discharge the above responsibilities made the planter 
and the kangany liable to prosecution and conviction, the former for an 
amount not exceeding Rs .50 and the latter up to Rs.20.
The scheme was undoubtedly an improvement on the 1872 scheme. The 
number of hospitals available increased from seven under the pre-1880  
system to fifteen in I883. The Medical Aid Bill increased annually. The 
Principal Civil Medical Officer took great care and interest to organise 
the new scheme.*^ A system of sanitary inspection of estates was inaugurated. 
There were severe] vigilant medical officers who took an interest in the 
working of the scheme. The employment of Ceylonese medical practitioners 
helped to cut down costs.Besides, they obviously understood the language,
%(L
the customs and nrejudices of the labourers better than the European
A
medical men. The inauguration of the new scheme was accompanied by a regular 
system of vaccination of labourers on the estates in order to eradicate 
smallpox. Unlike the former scheme in the 1870 ,^ the new scheme was not 
overstrained in the first few years of its existence because the flow of 
labour immigration declined during the early 1830" • Above all, the manage­
ment of the medical welfare of the laboureis was removed from the unskilled 
hands of the planters and was now placed in the skilled hands of the 
Government medical department— a major development from the earlier set-up.
It is. however, difficult to gauge the actual impact of the scheme 
on the health of the labourers,and the only reliable index available on 
the issue, namely, the district hospital mortality rates of the labourers,
35* The seven District Hospitals organised under the 1872 scheme were 
taken over and the eight CiMl Hospitals in the planting districts 
hitherto used exclusively by the indigenous population were also 
thrown open for the treatment of the immigrants.
36. Gov. to S of S., ITo. 320 of 30 June 1883, enclosure I, FCMO to 
Col. Sec., 20 June 1833, C.O. 54/547-
37* Under the 1872 scheme there were 22 European medical officers and 
Ceylonese were not employed as medic'? 1 men in the scheme. Under the 
1880-2 scheme, the number of European medical men were reduced to 
15* They were placed on a salary sc le of Rs.4000/= per annum and 
the Ceylonese medical assistants on a scale of Rs.1000-Rs.1500.
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which we have already seen in chapter VI* reveal that the rates continued 
to he as high as before and at any rate higher than the mortality rate of 
the "mixed races" who were treated in the same hospitals. Throughout the
c»
l880k , the Colonial Office drew the attention of the Colonial Government
■50
to this feature in an effort to find the cause and a remedy for it*
It is abundantly clear from all available evidence that the basic
cause of the heavy hospital death rate among the immigrants was the late
admission of the sick to the hospitals, in an advanced stage of the illness
from which it was found difficult to recover. The first inquiry into
this problem under the new medical scheme was held in I885. Every one
of the twenty one medical men working in the planting districts gave
evidence at this inquiry and all of them attributed the heavy death rate
to the moribund condition of the sick at the time of admission to the 
39hospitals. The following excerpt from the evidence of one them is typical,
••• many of the fatal cases were brought in when the disease was in 
its last stage, and the vital powers of the patient were at their 
lowest ebb from want of proper attention and nourishment. It is 
worthy of note that no less than 16 patients died within the third 
day of admission ... a very large number of the fatal cases were 
not sent to Hospital till the disease had become chronic and 
incurable.40
Throughout the l330‘J the officials and the planting community concurred 
with the above view, and finally it was confirmed by the District Hospitals 
Mortality Commission of 1893 which reviewed the working of the 1880-2 
medical scheme.^
The planters and the medical men were, however, at variance about 
their respective roles in bringing about this situation. There were at 
times sharp conflict of views between them, the planters blaming the 
medical arrangement as a factor dissuading the labourers from going to
38. 5 of S. to Gov., No. 133 of 19 June 1886, C.O. 54/564.
S of S. to Gov., No. 167 of 23 May 1892, C.O. 54/600.
39. Gov. to 3 of S., No. 264 of 19 June 1885 > enclosure III, PCMO to
Col. Sec., 9 June 1885, annexure, reports of medical officer, C.O. 5^/559
40. Report of 0. Bartholomeusz of Haputale hospital, p. 8 , ibid.
41. DHI1C, Report end Proceedings, Cey. SP II of 1893.
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the hospitals and the medical men accusing the planters of not carrying 
out their duty in sending the sick to the hospitals at an early stage of 
the disease.
There is no doubt that the average immigrant plantation worker 
was reluctant to go to hospital. This attitude was partly due to his 
ignorance, prejudices, and lack of appreciation of western medical treat­
ment. Besides, there was the strong desire to live with his 
family and relations in the hour of distress.^ It was alleged that the 
caste distinctions among the different low caste labourers played an 
important role in deterring them from going to hospitals.^ The labourers 
on the whole disliked the food cooked by men of those castes which they 
considered to be inferior to their own. However, the hospital authorities 
allowed the relations of hospital inmates to prepare the latters* food by 
giving them food-stuffs and also by permitting them to use the hospital 
compound for cooking purposes.
The available evidence strongly suggests that the reluctance of 
the labourers to go to hospital became a decisive factor mainly under 
certain circumstances— circumstances in which the medical scheme, the 
kanganies, the planters, and the plantation labour system played important 
roles. It cannot be ignored that the labourer’s attitude was partly 
influenced by the past record of the hospitals as a place with a heavy 
death rate— a dreadful place where, in the eyes of the sick labourers, they 
were destined to die.^ It is pertinent, however, to note that where the 
estates were situated in close proximity to the hospitals both the planters 
and the medical men found a favourable response from the labourers towards 
hospital treatment. Thus, J. C. Dunbar whose plantation was only two
4 2. Ibid., p. 14*
43. Ibid., pp. 2, 7, 11.
44• Ibid., pp. 6, 21.
45* Ibid., pp. 2-4, 9~10*
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and a half miles away from the hospital stated that his labourers
appreciated hospital treatment and he concluded that "when the hospital
46is within reasonable distance they are willing to go." On the other her.
W. II. Walker whose estates was sixteen miles away from the nearest
hospital found "... very great objection because they say that the hospit
A 1
is so far away that their friends cannot g o and see them." The distance 
between the estate and the hospital was therefore a crucial factor. I-Iost 
of the estates were situated at a long distance from the hospitals and
A O
in some cases about thirty miles a way. j The operation of the sick from
friends and relations was not a deterrent where the hospitals were sited
near the estates. Besides, the mode of transporting the sick to the
hospital in a cunbly strung in a pole— a primitive method most irksome
to the sick— did not turn out to be so bad when the hospitals were not
49 < district
too far. The fa.ct is that even in 1893 there were only thirteen/hospital
to serve nearly 1300 estates spread mostly over the hilly central Ceylon.
Throughout the 1880° there were frequent complaints that the available
accommodation in the hospitals was inadequate and the medical staff 
50..insuff icient. • The district hospitals taken over from the planters in
1883 were said to be in a dilapidated state. During the 1880s very little 
extentions to the existing hospitals were carried out and no new hospital 
were constructed due to the depleted state of the colonial treasury. As 
a result hospitals were subjectedto overcrowding and at times only the 
bad cases were admitted.
Within this general framework of inadequate medical facilities 
there were other factors which deterred the labourers from seeking early
4 6.'Ibid., p. 22.
47* Ibid., p. 20.
Ibid., pp. 4-5•
49. Gov. to S of S., No. 237 of August 1394, enclosure I, FCN0 to
Col. Sec., 16 January 1394, 0.0. 54/616.
5 0. Gov. to S of S., No. 196 of 24 Nay 1834, enclosure, Hospital Return:
for 1833, C.O. 54/593.
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hospital treatment. The plantation wage system had a discouraging effect.
As seen earlier on, the worker was reckoned as a day labourer and was
paid according to the number of days he actually worked. Absence from
work meant no wages and no rice. Besides, the kanganies1 "head money"
depended on the strength of the daily turn out of his labour gang for work,
and if a labourer was on the sick list the kangany lost his commission.
Moreover, the kanganies were always afraid that their labourers would run
away. Thus, the kanganies* influence had the effect of discouraging the
51labourers having recourse to the hospitals'. The pressure on the labourers 
to t u m  up for work was heavy particularly in the peak seasons of work­
load in the estates. The above stated factors exerted some degree of 
compulsion on the labourers to work even under condition of physical 
debility and in times of convalescence. Evidence suggests that the average 
labourer normally continued to work till he was too weak to carry on.
This naturally made his illness serious by the time he sought relief and 
medical care.
Due to the operation of the above factors some pressure had
invariably to be applied on the labourers for then to seek early hospital
treatment. It is precisely for this reason that Ordinance No. 17 of i860
imposed certain obligations on the planter and the kangany in this respect.
But the available evidence suggests that these obligations were not
82satisfactorily carri’ed out. The labour force was organised in gangs 
under the immediate control of the kanganies^and the relationship between 
the labourers and the estate superintendent was a relatively remote one.
51. DHNC, Proceed!?!gs, Cey. SB II of 1893» PP* 5> 9*
District Court, Badulla, case No. 22196, UCO, 14 June 1880.
Gov. to S of S., ITo. 264 of 19 June I885, enclosure III, PCMO to 
Col. Sec., 9 June I885, C.O. 54/559*
52. Report of the Medical Assistant, Dimbull-a Hospital, ibid.
Gov. to S of S., No. 48O of 30 November 1890, enclosure III,
Memo by Col. Sec., C.O. 54/590*
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There were three ways in which an employer could find out if a labourer
was sick. There was the labourers* absence at daily muster. But this was
not effective in a labour force where absenteeism due to various causes
occurred between twenty and thirty per cent of the total labour force on
53the estate Check-roll. Besides, in the planter-labour jargon "sick" was
the usual word used to report any kind of absence. As a planter pointed
out, "...’sick* is just another word for ’absent*", and he continued that
when a labourer is reported sick he would take it to mean either that the
labourer had gone away to see a friend or was simply loafing about the 
54"coolie lines." Usually the estate superintendent relied solely on the
kangany for information about the illness of a labourer in the Arcp94qy '■£
55gang. On the kangany*s response to this legal obligation, the available
56
evidence from the planters is conflicting. It is pertinent to recall 
that it was in the kangany*s immediate interest to prevent a labourer 
going to hospital at an early stage of his sickness. The third method 
was the failure on the part of the labourers to collect their weekly rice 
issue, When a labourer absented himself continuously for a number of days 
and did not turn up for the rice issue the average superintendent began 
inquiries. The following account of a planter is typical of the overall 
set-up.
Every Saturday night when rice is issued if a cooly has not been 
working for a week we immediately institute inquiries. If it is 
a case where the kangany deliberately does not wish the cooly to 
go to hospital, of course he will say that the cooly has either 
gone working in contract or has gone on a visit to his friends.
That is frequently done, and in that way vie would not know. Our 
only means of ascertaining is through the kangany,and vie depend 
upon the information vie get from the kangany, I could not go to 
the lines and find out about every individual cooly.57
There were humane planters who followed up when their labourers were absent
53. See above, p. 279*
54. DIIUC, Proceedings, Gey, SP II of 1393? p. 10.
55. Ibid., Proceedings.
56. Ibid., pp. 5> 7*
57* Ibid., p. 14.
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for two or three days and "who even did visit the "coolie lines." But 
evidence suggests that this type of planter was an exception. Apart from 
all other deterring factors, the average planter of the 1880“ hardly found 
the time to pursue every individual case of illness in the labour force.
He had therefore necessarily to depend on the kangany.
The above discussion shows that a labourer could be sick for several 
days without the superintendent knowing; and in fact the consensus of the 
planter opinion at the time was that a cooly might be absent a week before 
it was discovered that he was sick.^ It is pertinent to recall that the 
average labourer absented himself from work due to sickness only when he 
could no longer work and when the sickness had advanced to a certain stage. 
Even after a superintendent discovered the sick labourer, there were 
several factors which had a restraining influence on him from taking 
immediate steps to despatch the labourer to the hospital. Apart from the 
reluctance of the labourers, mainly due to the distance to the hospital 
and also the reluctance of the kangany to part with his debtors, there 
was the problem of cost which the estate was bound to incur for the hospital 
treatment of the labourers. Moreover, even if the planter did see a 
labourer at the early stage of the illness, there was the problem whether 
he would, unskilled in medical matters as he was, be in a position to judge 
whether the labourer in fact required immediate hospital treatment or not.
On discovering a sick labourer, the immediate reaction of those planters 
who kept medicine on the estate or the few who had estate dispensaries
was to treat the sick on the estate.^ But this "paternal attitude" depended
primarily on the whims of the planter. Further, this attitude was undoubtedly
58. Ibid., p. 5*
Ibid., pp. 9, 14, 19•
60. Ibid., pp. 5, II, 22.
The problem of finding out the sick labourers was most difficult in 
seasons of "short work" on the estates. These were also the seasons 
when sicknrss among the labourers was on the increase due to bad 
weather.
61. Ibid., pp. 2, 6-7, 47*
on the wane in our period, for the planters asserted, not without justice,
that the Government had taken over the management of the medical cere of
6 ?the labourers besides charging the planters with a levy. ' The average 
planter normally made the kanganies responsible for taking the sick labourer 
to the hospital and it was only the most humane planter who took immediate 
steps to press for the removal of the sick.
The law no doubt provided for the prosecution of kanganies and 
planters for the evasion of their duties. Table 7«1 which sets out the 
available evidence on the breaches of the Ordinance and the number of 
prosecutions reveal that prosecution was resorted to only on a minor scale 
though the breaches of the law were in fact numerous. Besides, the 
prosecutions against the planters appear to have been confined to the 
violation of the relatively insignificant clauses of the Ordinance and the 
violations of those clauses which had a greater practical bearing on the 
health of the labourers appear to have been overlooked.
The Colonial Office repeatedly questioned whether the extremly 
sm?„ll proportion which the number of prosections bore to the number of 
breaches indicated any laxity in the administration of the law.^ But the 
fundermental cause for that laxity was deeply rooted and appeared almost 
irremediable in the context. The prosecutions of the kanganies depended 
on the planters but the latter dependent as they were for the supply and 
the discipline of the labour force on these middlemen-overseers normally
refrained from taking legal action against them. A leading planter pointed
out that it was unreasonable for the Government to expect the planters 
to co-operate with the Government in prosecuting "... our own kanganies— the
64men, practically, whom we depend on for our labour supply."
62. Ibid., pp. 4-5, 17•
A. M. Ashmore, a member of the BKMC pointed out that, "In the old days 
we had a regular sick muster every day, ... but that has been abando­
ned since the introduction of the Medical Aid Ordinance". Ibid., p. 5*
63. S of S. to Gov., No. 250 of 16 August I884, C.O. 54/554.
S of 3. to Gov., No. 183 of 3 December I885, C.O. 54/560.
64- Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 February 1887, PPAC 1888, p. 28.
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TABLE 7*1 Available evidence on the breaches and procecutions under 
the Medical Wants Ordinance No. 17 of 1880
Clause
1883 1884 I885
of
Ordinance
Brea­
ches
- Prosec­
utions
Brea­
ches
Prosec­
utions
Brea­
ches
Prosec­
utions
Clause 20. Planters* 
failure to
(a) maintain sanitary 
conditions of lines 1120 1 2209 nil 1272 nil
(b) inform himself to 
illness and talcing 
relief measures 424 2 200 nil 151 nil
(c) send sick labour­
ers to hospital when 
required by Medical 
Officer 49 nil 1 nil nil nil
(d) call Medical Off­
icer in serious 
cases 1624 10 74 nil 151 nil
(e) inform Medical 
Officer about births 
and dea-ths 971 1 115 6 I65 nil
(f) keep a register 
of labourers employ­
ed and also of births 
and deaths 7936 nil 158 2 552 nil
(g) supply post-natal 
food and lodging nil nil 3 nil nil nil
Clause 21. Kanganies’ 
failure to report 
cases of sickness 
in the gang 661 41 274 6 701 27
Total 13889 55 3074 14 2992 27
Sources: Gov. to S of S., No. 259 of 9 July 1884, enclosure,
Report on the working of the MW0 during 1883, C.O. 54/554*
Lt. Gov. to 3 of S., No. 90 of 9 September 1885, enclosure,
Report on the working of the HWO during 1884* C.O. 54/560.
AR of PCMO, CAR 1885, p. 139B*
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The prosecution of the defaulting employers was hindered "by several 
practical problems. The Superintending Medical Officers on their rounds 
of inspection of estates had necessarily to be guests of the planters.
The consequent situation was described by the Principal Civil Medical Office:
as follows.
The Medical Officer who hrs (most improperly in my opinion) been
compelled to accept the odium and responsibility of becoming a public
prosecutor is dependent on the planter for his nights lodging; in 
many cases planters have even under the present system refused to 
entertain the Medical Officer, but owing to the leniency with which 
the law has been enforced the better disposed among the planters 
have hitherto provided accommodation, and this accommodation it would 
be impossible to obtain from any other source, as there are hardly 
any hotels or rest-houses in the coffee districts. It cannot be 
expected that the planters should offer, or Medical Officers should 
accept hospitality when the not improbable result of the visit will 
be that the guest should take out a summons against his host.65
Besides, the slim prospects of obtaining convictions discouraged the
medical men from taking cases to courts. It was found extremely difficult
to marshal evidence either from the kanganies or from the labourers who
were under the strong influence of the planters. The labourers frequently
contradicted their own evidence. Consequently, even in those cases which
vrere taken to courts, the verdict was either a nominal sentence or an
acquittal. This outcome, as the Principal Civil Medical Officer pointed
out, was "... far from being deterrent... is an incentive to disregard it
(the law)" and "... does not tend to encourage the policy of increasing
largely the number of prosecutions*1. Of the total of 135 cases instituted
between 1883 and 1888, there were 43 acquittals while the convictions
66
"... were hardly in-a single instance such as to be deterrent". There was
also the fear that any attempt at rigorous enforcement of the law would
incite intense hostility from the planters and would eventually disrupt
67the entire medical scheme— a view shared by the Governor himself. The 
planters were in a position to disrupt the medical scheme by combining
65. PCMO to Edward Wingfield, Under S of S., 30 July 1888, C.O. 54/581.
66. Ibid.
6 7. Ibid.
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themselves to make numerous calls, all at the same time, on the District 
Medical Officer to visit the estates or hy flooding the hospitals with 
sick lahourers. Some hostile planters did, in fact, at times adopt the 
first course. Besides, the medical staff in the planting districts v.Tas 
inadequate. They were heavily tied down to their medical duties and it 
was difficult without jeorpadizing their medical duties for them to 
frequently attend the law courts which would have been necessary if prose­
cutions were to he earnestly carried out.
The ultimate result of the overall situation was that the medical 
men took care not to take all cases of breach of the Ordinance before the 
courts. From among the cases submitted by the Superintending Medical 
Officers, the Principal Civil Medical Officer selected a few cases for 
prosecution— a system which he himself later described a.s "... invidious, 
unjust and unsatisfactory to the highest degree”, but a system he was
compelled to undertake on the grounds of expediency because of the
6 oimpossibility of prosecuting all the cases of. breach of the law.
By 1887 both the Principal Civil Medical Officer and the 
Attorney-General had rea.lised that it was useless to prosecute because 
the law could not be adequately enforced even when the planters were guilty 
of the worst abuses. Their reaction to the following two cases illustrate 
their attitude. In 1887? Dr. H. Thornhill, a Superintending Medical 
Officer, on one of his rounds of inspection reported regarding one estate 
that
... the whole of the lines are utterly unfit for human habitation, 
owing to the filth and Unsanitarinesj? •••• I must refer to the note 
made by me in my report no. 93 of 1 u June 1886. Neither Mr. Hornby 
(superintendent) nor Carenpulle (kangany) were prosecuted so far I 
know and to this I attribute the present still worse sanitary 
condition of the lines. I have no alternative but to recommend 
presecution at cnce.69
Again, regarding another estate the same Officer wrote that he had for 
68. Ibid.
69* 0©V. to'3 of s;, IT a. 125 °f 14 March 1888,_ enclosure III,
C.O. 834/168. . .
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5 years reported the insanitary conditions of the ’'lines'* and recommended
prosecution hut that his recommendation had not been carried out and as a
result the sanitary conditions of the "lines" had become worse. Pie concluded
that the "... state of the lines is now disgr- ceful and dangerous, and I
70again recommend a prosecution". The Principal Civil Medical Officer 
agreed that these statements were perfectly accurate but he and the 
Attorney-General refrained from undertaking any prosecution.
Finally, in 1887, the posts of the Superintending Medical Officers 
had to be abandoned and with it went practically the entire system of estate 
inspection by medical men. The main reason was the opposition of the 
planters. The planters had throughout resented the presence of the
71Superintending Medical Officers on the estates as "inspectors of nuisance"•
The latent hostility of the planters erupted into virtually open warfare
with the publication of the reports of estate inspection for the year I885.
The most energetic of the Superintending Medical Officers, Dr. Griffin,
referring to a case of neglect of a .sick female labourer who ultimately
succumbed to death, wrote that it appeared that "... apathy, if not neglect
12on the part of the superintendent, was present in this case".
It was unfortunate for the Superintending Medical Officers that 
Dr. Griffin directed the above criticism against Abbotsford estate owned
73
by A. M. Ferguson, the son of the most powerful press magnate of the day.1' 
The entire wrath of the pro-planter press animated with personal indignation 
fell on the Superintending Medical Officers and the Principal Civil Medical
70. Gov. to S of.S., No. 125 of 14 March 1888, enclosure III, C.O. 384/168.
71. A general meeting of PAC, 17 October 1885, PPAC 1886, pp 
Annual general meeting of PAC, PPAC 1887, pp. 6-13.
72. Deport by PCMO, CAD 1885, p. 144D.
73* Fergusons owned the Observer which was the leading group of
newspapers and journals in the Island at the time.
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Officer. ' The planters saw in the issue a way out to end the irritating
presence of the Superintending Medical Officers. The local press, speaking
for planters, called for the removal of Drs. Griffin and Thornhill; and
the Planters' Association resolved that it saw "... no prospect cf
effectual co-operation ..." with the inspecting officers in carrying out
7 5the Medical Ordinance. They pointed out, not unreasonably, that the
appointment of three well qualified and highly paid European medical men
solely for estate inspection was a waste of money and medical skill at a
time when more medical men were required for the medical treatment of
the labourers. The planters unanimously called for the abolition of the
posts of the Superintending Medical Officers and suggested that the work
of inspection of estates be handed over to the District Medical
Officers— a move which, as an Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office noted,
was bound to practically put an end to the system of estate inspection
because the resident District Medical Officers had little time besides
7 f)
their medical duties to itinerate inspecting "coolie lines" • But in
the face of unanimous opposition and avowed non co-operation of the
planters it was useless to retain the Superintending Medical Officers.
Governor Gordon himself felt that the system of inspection of estates by
these Officers was too costly; and as far back as I884 he wrote that "a
77reconsideration of the system is necessary to cut ao\m costs". Besides* 
Gordon had his own misgivings on the efficacy of the entire medical 
arrangement of 1880-2 and was himself thinking of remodelling the structure. 
He conceded to the demands of the planters and scrapped the posts of
74* Series of editorials in COO in 1886. For instance, see the 
editorial of 6 November 1886.
75* Gov. to S of S., No. 375 of 6 September 1887, enclosure I,
Resolution adopted by PAC, C.O. 54/572*
Annual general meeting of PAC, 17 February 1887, PPAC 1888, pp. 35”44*
76. Gov. to S of S., No. 375 of 6 September 1087, Minute by C. P. Lucas,
C.O. 54/572.
77. Gov. to S of S., No. 259 of 9 July 1384, C.O. 54/554.
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of Superintending Medical Officers. But once the immediate excitement 
over this particular issue quietened down he was soon involved in drafting 
a fresh medical welfare ordinance.
3• The attempts at reform, changes of l893rg-nd the aftermath
In 1889? Gordon submitted his draft bill with a view to change
the basis of the 1880-2 medical scheme. Gordon was one of the strongest
critics of the existing arrangement. He never found the system working
satisfactorily and as early as 1887 he wrote
... I have long entertained doubts as to the expediency of maintaining 
in force the existing legislation with regard to the medical treatment 
of Indian immigrants ... , and that I find these doubts only grow 
and strenghten with the lapse of time, and theaquisition on my part 
of greater knowledge and experience of the system. I believe that 
the time is not far distant when it will be found necessary to 
reconsider the Ordinances which relate to it . 78
In the following year Gordon made his views clear to the Colonial Office
79and the Legislative Council. He attacked the existing arrangement as
one exciting great irritation without effecting good results, sufficient to
compensate for the friction caused. The scheme had worked imperfectly and
its provisions had not been fully observed. Gordon felt that it was
inequitable for the Government to devote more care and attention to the
immigrant plantation workers without adequately fulfilling its duty towards
the rest of the population in the country. His idea was to abolish the
existing Ordinance and introduce a new scheme with a view to increase
the medical aid available throughout the Island "... by a law of far wider
application.making provision for the medical care and sanitary condition
80
of the entire population in the Island"• The Colonial Office wholeheartedly
78. Gov. to S of S., Ho. 375 8 September I887, C.O. 54/57?«
79. Gov. to 3 of S., Ho. 125 of 14 March 1888, C.O. 384/168.
CLC, Governors* Addresses, Vol. Ill, 31 October 1888, pp. 284-288.
80. Ibid.
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01agreed, with Gordon on the need for a new approach.
Gordonfs draft Ordinance proposed a general medical scheme covering 
all classes of agricultural labourers on monthly contract, both immigrant
O p
and indigenous, working in estates under any type of cultivation.~ ' The exoart 
levy vras to be abolished. The employer was to pay at the rate of fifty 
cents per day for each sick labourer treated in the hospital and twelve 
and a half cents for each attendance of a labourer in a dispensary 
including the cost of medicine. The cost of construction and extention 
of hosrjitals was to be equally shared by the Government and the planters 
and the latters' share was to be collected on an acreage assessment of 
cultivated land in each estate. The obligation of the employer to send to 
the hospital or dispensary any labourer appearing to him to require 
medical treatment was made absolute and unconditional whereas in the existing 
system the obligation was made subject to the willingness of the labourer 
to go to the hospital. The rest of the duties of the planters and the 
kanganies remained practically the same as under the old scheme. The estate 
medical visits were to be abolished and the treatment of the sick was 
confined to the hospitals and the dispensaries.
The financial arrangement in the draft Ordinance was acceptable 
to the planters. The Government had modified its stand on the fundermental 
liability of the planters for the medical care of the labourers. Contem­
porary estimates predicted that under the new financial arrangement the 
planters would pay less than under the existing scheme. The planters, 
however, opposed the clause which made it compulsory for them to send 
the labourers t o  the hospital and also the abolition of the estate medical
O T
visits. The planters had, in the past, found the estate medical visits
81. S of S. to Gov., hTo. 253 of 13 August 1888, C.O. 384/168.
C.O. felt that the MU0 had become a dead letter. Ibid., Minute by 
C. P. Lucas.
82- CH 1889-90, 23 Kay I89O, p. I84.
83. A general meeting of PAC. 8 August I89O, PPAC 1801, pp. 86-00.
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useful and economical. It was possible to get a whole batch of sick
labourers treated on a single visit of a medical man. Besides, the system
enabled the sick planters to obtain medical treatment on the estates
without themselves having to undergo the trouble of travelling a long
distance to the hospital. The Government conceded to the first request and
agreed to subject the obligation of the employer (of sending the.labourer
to the hospital)to the willingness of the labourer to go to hospital. But
Gordon insisted on the abolition of the estate medical visits on the
ground that such visits would amount to a special privilege to the tea,
coffee, and cocoa estates under a general medical scheme meant for the
entire labour population of the Island.^
While the bill was half way through the Legislative Council Gordon
was replaced by Sir Arthur Havelock as Governor. On the controversial
question of the estate medical visits the new Governor was influenced by
the local officials, especially the Principal Civil Medical Officer who
insisted that the medical officers would be relieved of the estate
visits, which would leave them with more time for hospital treatment.
Havelock sought a way out of the impasse by suggesting that while the
medical visits be kept out of the Ordinance, the planters should be at
liberty to privately arrange with the medical men to visit the estates on
85the payment of a fee. The planters, however, steadfastly stuck to the
demand that provision should be made in the law for such visits.
On the whole, Havelock, having recently assumed the governorship,
was not keen to entangle himself in such a thorny problem as the medical
welfare of the labourers. He agreed with Gordon on the need for wider
medical facilities but felt that the draft Ordinance did not go far enough to
86meet satisfactorily this demand. Havelock wished for more time and
8 4. GH 18?0-91, 5 November I89O, pp. 2 6 - 2?.
Gov. to S of S., No. 48O of 30 November 1890, C.O. 54/590*
85* CLC, Governors* Addresses, Vol. IV, 15 October 1890, p. 9*
86. G6v. to S of S., No. 48O of 30 November 18°0. C.O. 54/59O.
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opportunity to enquire and observe the working of the existing medical
arrangement. His wish was not unreasonable, for the times were changing
with the revival of the prosperity of the plantation sector. There was
the likelihood, as Havelock saw, of a subsidence in the weaknesses of
the existing arrangement with the progress of prosperity. Havelock was
therefore willing to drop the draft bill if such a step was acceptable 
87
to the planters. The planters themselves preferred to maintain the
status quo than let the estate medical visits be abolished under a new 
88scheme. The bill was accordingly withdrawn and the attempt at reforms
89ended m  a fiasco.
But the episode is significant in revealing the development of a
new attitude among the planters towards the existing medical arrangement
and its financial basis— an arrangement which they had assiduously opposed
less than a decade ago. Their opposition to the export duty was no longer
to be seen and in fact the planters’ representative in the Legislative
Council argued that the duty was "... in theory objectionable— in practice
90it is not felt and it is easily collected." The change in the attitude 
of the planters can be explained on three grounds. First, the growth of 
the tea industry and the remunerative tea prices enabled the planters 
of the early I89O to view their problems in different a light than 
during the years of the depression. Secondly, there was the Colonial 
Office view that Ceylon tea was asserting a monopolistic position in the 
British tea market and that this meant that the export duty was in fact 
paid by the consumer. Fairfield, at the Colonial Office, minuted that
OH 1890-91» 5 November 1890, p. 26.
Col. Sec. to Sec. of PAC, 22 October I89O, PPAC I89I, Correspond­
ence, p. ciii.
88. CH 1890-91, 5 November 18?0, p. 26.
89. Ibid., p. 32.
90. Ibid.
Editorial, COO, 27 April 1888.
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Explanation for the novel indifference of the planters to the 
Export duty is probably that "Ceylon Tea" has acquired a monopoly 
value in the market, and that as a consequence the duty falls on 
the English consumer, whilst Ceylon tea was competing on equal 
terms with other teas this would have not been the case. 91
Thirdly, those features of the 1880-2 medical scheme which were objec­
tionable to the planters had disappeared by I89O and the scheme itself 
had therefore become acceptable to them.
Nevertheless, the status quo could not go on. The high hospital 
mortality among the immigrant labourers persisted and the Colonial 
Office was not ready to let things continue under the circumstances. 
Besides, the Colonial Office had backed Gordon's reforms to the hilt. It 
now gave into the unanimous decision of the Colony to shelve the bill,
but on the clear understanding that Havelock would report further when
92he had time for inquiry on the subject. But Havelock, deeply involved
in spearheading the abolition of the controversial paddy tax paid by the
peasants— the abolition of which was the most remarkable of Havelock’s
achievements in Ceylon— paid scant attention to the question of immigrant 
93labour. But the incessant pressure from the Colonial Office on the 
need for action to curb the high hospital mortality rate among the 
immigrant labourers led Havelock to appoint the District Hospital
Mortality Commission of 1893 to investigate into the problem and recommend
reforms.^
The Commission reviewed the working of the existing medical 
arrangement and in the process developed the guide-lines within which 
it was necessary to make its recommendations so that they may be accept­
able and workable. First, there was the recurring problem of finance.
91. Gov. to S of S., No. 48O of 30 November I89O, Minute by 
Fairfield, C.O. 54/590.
92. S of S. to Gov., No. 30 of 30 January 1891, ibid.
93- Havelock sent the Hospital Returns of I89O and I89I without any 
comment on the working of the KWO.
94* S of S. to Gov. No. I67 of 23 May 1892, C.O. 54/600.
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The planters had settled doirn to the export duty and were not prepared 
to bear substantial additional cost." Though the planters cf the 1880 
recouped a part of the labourers medical expenses with the profit on rice 
issued to them, during the years 1892-3 when the Commission was sitting, 
there was an abnormal increase in the price of rice anla consequent loss 
to the planters. They emphasised this loss to . avoid additional 
taxation. The Colonial Government having settled down to meet an annual 
deficit of nearly one-third of the estate medical bill out of the general 
revenue was not prepared to burden the treasury with further substantial 
expenses on this accord. Besides, the total bill itself was increasing 
and was bound to increase further with the increasing inflow of immigrant 
1 -bour consequent on the progress of the tea industry. Thus, economy 
became a primary guide-line of the Commission.
Secondly, there was the fundermental problem of how to remedy the 
situation under which the bulk of the labourers entered the hospital in 
a moribund condition which naturally augmented the rate of hospital 
mortality among them. The basic weakness of the 1880-2 medical scheme was 
the lack of satisfactory medical treatment for the labourers within easy 
reach of the plantations at the early stage of their sickness. In form­
ulating the 1880-2 scheme, the Government had expected that need to be 
met by the planters but did not make any legal provision to that effect. 
In factjLongdon*s view had been to evolve an overall scheme where the 
"paternal system" of medical treatment on the estates by the planters for 
simple ailments would work in combination with the central hospitals and 
dispensaries attending to the major cases. But while the latter facility 
was inadequate, the former was almost extinct in most estates in 1880’ . It 
befell on the Commissioners to suggest a scheme to fill this void.
To meet both guide-line, the Commission recommended in addition 
to the existing hospital complex a system of estate dispensaries whereby
95* DH11C, Proceedings, Cey. SP II of 1893.
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an estate or a group of estates would set up a dispensary and employ a 
dispenser paid by-the estate or the group, and the medicine and equipment 
for the dispensary would be supplied by the Government out of the Medical 
Aid Fund. Therefore, the cost was to be divided between the Government 
and the planters.
The planters objected to the Commission's ideas and reiterated their 
view that the entire cost should be met out of the general revenue. But 
their opposition to the financial arrangement underlying the 1893 Dispensr y
c*
Scheme was nothing like the scale of their campaign in the lSSCf and it
went on record merely as a dissident voice. The Dispensary Scheme was
accepted by the Government and the Colonial Office*, and the planters
9 6eventually became reconciled to it. The low cost of the new scheme, the 
changing times in the plantation agriculture, and the realisation of the 
need for some arrangement for the early treatment of the sick were the 
decisive factors. Besides, the system of dispensaries had been already 
experimented in a few estates by several humane planters and had beer.
Q7
found to work satisfactorily. ' The system had the merit of early medical 
attendance by a medical man, though semi-skilled. The dispenser was expected 
to treat the simple cases and despatch those cases which required proper 
medical treatment to the hospital before the sickness became serious. The 
system also met the labourers' grievance of distance and their prejudice 
of being cut off from their relatives. In approving the scheme, the 
Colonial Office made two additional recommendations, viz., the improvement 
of ambulance appliances to transport the sick labourers to the hospitals 
and the appointment of visiting committees of planters for district
98 . . QQ
hospitaJs. Both suggestions were accepted by the Colonial Government.77
9o. Gov, to S of S., No. 378 of 5 November 1893, C. 0. 54/810.
S of S. to Gcv., No. 329 of 8 December 1893, ibid.
97* DHMC, Proceedinp;s, Cey. SP II of 1893, pp. 2, 20. 47*
9 8. S of S. to Gov., No. 329 of 8 December 1893, C.O. 54/610.
99. Gov. to S of S., No. 287 of 7 August 1894, C.O..54/616.
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The period up to 1893 saw a rapid growth of the number of estate 
dispensaries. The increasing prosperity of the plantation sector and 
the heavy demand for labour were the basic factors. In the context of 
competition for labour between estates,especially at the peak crop 
seasons, the estates with better medical facilities found it relatively 
easier to attract labour. Besides, the estate dispensers relieved the 
busy superintendents of the trouble and time of personally attending 
to the sick labourers.^ ^
There were several defects in the working of the estate dispens­
ary scheme. It was found difficult to get the services of suitably 
qualified dispensers especially at the low rates of wages paid by the 
e s t a t e s.Besides, there were frequent complaints about the inadequacy 
of medical supplies in the dispensaries. Medicine in the dispensaries 
was confined to the barely elementary ones and often only to quinine. 
Nevertheless, the estate dispensary scheme was a big step forward.
In the District Hospital Scheme the period after 1893 witnessed 
further improvements. The planters themselves clamoured for new hospitals and 
the expansion of the existing ones. The number of hospitals available for
the treatment of the immigrant plantation labourers increased from 26
in 1893 to 39 hy 1910. The existing hospital buildings were renovated
and extended. The medical staff multiplied from 47 in 1893 to 102 by 1910
102
and the total medical bill trebled during the same period.
It is not possible to find out how far the planters and the
kanganies co-operated in sending the labourers to the hospitals in the 
years after 1893* Available evidence does not show any appreciable increase 
in the number of sick labourers treated in the hospitals in proportion
to the increase in the absolute size of the labour force on the plantations.
On the other hand, the availability of dispensaries to treat the sick
100. DID'C, Proceedings, Cey. SP II of 1893? P» 19*
101. Cey. Sab. lab. Con. 1915? para 36.
102. See Table 7*3*
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at the early stage of their illness would have abated the need to resort
to hospital treatment. However, even in 1906 it was found that a large
number of labourers died without having been seen by medical men especially
103
m  the low-country planting districts. There is nothing to show that
the evil influences of the wage system and the kangany declined in any
appreciable measure. On the contrary, casual evidence only points towards
a further strengthening of these influence in the years after l8 9 0 .^ 4
The problem of inadequacy of the medical facilities persisted and
most of the hospitals in the plantation districts continued to be
over-crowded. These problems , however, were less acute in the up-country
tea plantation districts than in the low-country rubber plantation districts
of Kalutara, Kegalle, and Ratnapura. These latter districts were effectively
opened up for planting only with the growth of the rubber industry after
1904* The climate of the low-country with its heavy rainfall together
with the fact that the rubber estates were new clearings carved out of
the forests made the low-country planting districts unheadthier than the
105up-country districts. The medical aid programme which was hitherto,
by and large, concentrated in the up-country districts had therefore to
be extended to the newly opened up low-country districts.
Besides, the medical welfare facilities were not sufficiently
far-reaching as to manifest themselves in the available vital statistics
lOoon the health of the labour population. The hospital death rates did 
not show a marked downward trend. The increase in the medical facilities 
could not out pace the increasing tide of immigration and the growth of 
the plantation labour' population in the period from I89O to 1910. The 
per capita expenditure on the health of the labourers appears to have
103. Mortality on Estates in I!atrle, hiiruneaala, and Melani Valley 
Districts during April to August, 1936, Cey. SP LVI of 1$0?.
104. The rise in cost of living, static wage rates, and the strengthening 
of the kangany*s hold over the labourers due to indebtedness in the 
years I89O-I9IO meant more pressure on the workers to turn up for work.
105 . Editorial, COh, 11 January 1907.
AnR of LI orawak Morale DPA for 1986, ibid., 6 February 1907*
106. See Tables 6.1-6.3.
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TABLE 7*2 Medical Aid Budget: Revenue and Expenditure, 1883-1910
Year
Total
expenditure
Government
share
1883 134,032 104,002
1884 118,614 20,202
I885 132,439 31,719
1886 138,274 51,402
I887 148,859 53,150
1888 160,270 61,643
1889 176,568 77,317
I890 170,507 58,813
1891 185,567 55,932
I892 224,798 89,643
1893 273,767 119,756
1894 289,553 136,350
1895 306,839 135,947
I896 361,736 138,070
1897 374,939 139,944
I898 423,773 165,096
1899 514,690 253,294
1900 591,766 264,543
1901 617,205 308,282
1902 518,615 178,970
1903 523,164 196,628
1904 538,007 210,235
1905 576,044 168,617
1906 631,208 233,407
1907 623,080 238,328
1908 631,387 255,461
• 1909 716,531 326,171
1910 1,084,927 473,294
Source: ARb of PCMO, (series 1883-1910), CAR,
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TABLE 7*3 The progress of medica.1 welfare facilities for plantation 
labourers, 1884-1910
District
Medical Medical District Civil Government Estate
Year Officers Assistants Hosspitals Hospitals Dispensaries Dispensaries
1884 N N 6 8 N N
1885 N N 6 8 N N
1886 8 17 6 8 . 28 N
I887 8 II 6 8 29 N
1888 N N 8 8 N N
I889 N N 10 10 N N
1890 N N 10 ]0 N N
1891 N N 11 N N N
1892 15 30 11 10 23 11
1893 27 20 13 13 27 15
1894 28 28 13 13 34 33
I895 28 30 15 13 34 47
1896 26 30 15 12 N 66
1897 26 30 15 12 N 84
1898 25 28 17 12 N 96
1899 25 28 17 12 N 102
1900 25 28 17 12 N 103
1901 25 25 17 13 27 N
1902 25 28 20 13 29 117
1903 24 28 20 13 29 126
1904 24 28 20 13 29 131
1905 25 28 20 13 29 142
1906 25 28 20 13 29 143
1907 29 28 20 13 29 N
1903 29 62 21 14 29 N
1909 30 67 21 14 30 N
1910 34 68 21 18 29 N
Source: ARs of PCMO (sseries 1880-1910), CAR.
N:- No information available.
TABLE '7*4 Treatment of estate labourers under the medical welfare 
schemes, 1884-1910
Year
Number 
treated 
in hospitals
Number treated 
in Government 
Dispensaries
Humber treated 
on estates by 
medical men
1884 3,450 N N
I885 3,278 17,070 9 ,028
1886 3,317 16,095 11,785
1887 3,878 19,747 18,790
1888 4,212 26,883 33,005
I889 4,324 35,836 23,215
1890 4,584 38,448 30,342
1891 4,897 43,711 31,080
1892 6,727 46,959 38,993
1893 8,381 56,070 25,584
1894 7,636 65,929 39,156
1895 7,858 72,651 44,195
1896 8,754 72,167 40,234
1897 10,106 69 ,669 35,678
1898 12,140 76,096 43,547
1899 10,975 71,585 31,964
1900 11,967 74,990 43,567
1901 12,017 78,047 34,255
1902 10,995 44,726 17,344
1903 9,158 73,455 25,265
1904 8,299 38,987 10,527
1905 12,410 35,659 12,841
1906 18,427 43,753 17,157
1907 15,590 40,647 11,807
1908 • 17,091 70,605 34,169
1909 16,829 73,320 34,659
1910 26,854 111,575 59,237
Source: ARs of PCMO, (series 1880-1910), CAR.
N:- No information available.
remained static. At best, the medical welfare programme appears to have 
maintained the vital statistics pertaining to the health of the labourers 
at a constant percentage rate in a period of heavy migration and a heavy 
growth of the plantation labour force. This, however, was a no mean 
achievement during a period when the labour force increased about four-fold. 
There were of course other contributory factors such as the closing of 
the North Road for labour migration, the inauguration of the Ragama Camp, 
and the svstematisation of the quarantine procedure which helped to improve 
the health of the immigrant labourers. But the medical welfare programme 
had a wider impact on the labour force than these other changes.
To conclude, the period 1880-1910 witnessed a striking progress 
in medical welfare facilities in the plantation sector. From being 
virtual I}*- a private arrangement of the planters financed by themselves 
a comprehensive two-tier structure evolved— -one under the complete 
management of the Government and the other under the planters and both 
jointly financed by the Government and the planters. Thus, a combined 
state-private scheme developed. '»
The planters' behaviour reveal a noticeisb.it change in their 
attitude to the question of medical welfare during the 1890°. Their vigorous
c- n  S .
opposition of the 1880° to the export duty subsided in the 1890". Besides, 
they showed a greater concern for the health of the labourers by multiplying 
the number of estate dispensaries and by clamouring for more hospital 
accommodation. While the change in attitude was partly at least due to 
the disappearance of those features of the 1380—2 medical scheme which 
were disagreeable to them, the primary factors were the revived prosperity 
of the plantation sector and the increase in the demand for labour in the 
1890s as against the depression and the conditions of surplus labour 
of the 1880s.
Nevertheless, the initiative came mainly from the authorities— the 
Colonial Government and the Colonial Office due to the concern for
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improving the health of the labourers and the desire to make the planters
face up to their obligation to a labour force imported by them primarily
for plantation work. In the formation, the management, and the financing
of the welfare schemes, the Colonial Government played an impressive role*
As with labour recruitment, so also with the medical care of the labourers
107the role of the Indian Government was negligible,
4* Public health
A notorious defect of the labour welfare schemes was the utter
lack of provision to regulate the conditions of public health on the
estates. We nave already seen that the only scheme of Government sanitary
inspection of estates inaugurated in 1883 with a view to draw the attention
of the employers to the defects in the sanitary conditions of the "coOlie
lines” was abandoned after four years without achieving any good results
due to the strong opposition of the planters.
Towards the end our period the question of public health in the
estates came to the limelight again. The problem of insanitary conditions
in the estates and their baneful effects had been repeatedly stressed
for the past several years by the medical officers working in the plantation
districts. However, the widespread interest in the question in the early
years of the present century was largely due to the initiative of the
Colonia.1 Office. The revived interest in the question was part and parcel
of the empire-wide interest taken by the Colonial Office on the question
of public health of the labour population mainly in the British tropical 
108colonies,  ^ At the turn of the century it was realised by the medical 
advisers of the Colonial Office that anchylostomiases wag widely prevalent 
in these colonies mainly due to the insanitary conditions under which the 
people lived. The realisation that the heavy incidence of this disease
107, For the overall policy of the Indian Government towards labour 
immigration to Ceylon, see above, pp. 37-50*
108. Discussion on Sanitation in reference to Anchylostomiases in the 
Tropics- PRPAC, 5P XV of 1910* PP* 6-15*
S of S. to GovI, ho.' 53 of 4 February 1909, ibid., pp. 16^17
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held ill-effects on the growth and the efficiency of the labour population 
in the tropical colonies led the Colonial Office to press the Colonial 
Governments to bring about measures to improve the sanitary conditions 
of the labour population. Inspired by the Colonial Office and the local 
medical officers^ the Colonial Government in Ceylon took up the issue.
The initial move of the Colonial Government was to draw the attention 
of the planters to the gravity of the problem and to encourage them to 
move voluntarily to combat the disease by improving the sanitary conditions 
in the plantations. A pamphlet was distributed among the planters 
recommending several remedial measures, viz., the proper disposal of excreta 
by the construction of latrines, the protection of legs and feet of the 
labourers, providing facilities for obtaining puiu drinking water, and the 
segregation of all serious cases of anchylostomiases. The Government
requested the planters to "... spend a little money to improve the conditions
■ • ,  109of their coolies..." in return for "... a more efficient labour- force."
The response from the planters was, however, not favourable and the
Principal Civil Medical Officer wrote that the leaflet
... was severely criticised and made fun of, but no action was taken 
by the planters (as fan as I know) to improve the health of their 
labour force along any of the preventive lines indicated in my 
pamphlet .110
After the failure of the initial attempt to win the voluntary 
co-operation of the planters, the Government appointed the Committee on 
the Sanitation of Ssta.tes in 1907 to probe into the issue and recommend 
remedial steps. The Committee called for urgent improvements. It pointed 
out that some method for the disposal of excreta, on the estates on 
sanitary principles was "... urgently necessary", and that the protection 
of water supplies and the soil from pollution would materially improve
109. "The Disease Anchylostomiases ", PCMO to Co. Sec,?No. 413 of 
29 September 1906, enclosure 3, ibid., p. 916.
110. PCIIO to Col. Sec., No, 153 of 8 February 1909? ibid., p. 15.
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the sick and the death rates among the immigrant plantation labourers.'1'1'3'
The recommendations of the Committee were comprehensive. It
called for the setting up of a legal sanitary authority over the estates
to inform the employers about the rudimentary principles of sanitation
especially on problems pertaining to pure water supplies, healthy "coolie
lines" and general cleanliness. It made detailed proposals regarding the
schemes for the disposal of excreta, for the supply of pure water, and
improvement of drainage around "coolie lines". Finally, the Committee
recommended that the District Medical Officers should be empowered to
inspect the estates and that their recommendations for the sanitary
improvement of the estates should be enforceable by law. Thus, it came
to be increasingly felt that some sort of compulsion was necessary to get
the employers to move in the matter of sanitation. The Principal Civil
Medical Officer clearly revealed the attitude of the authorities when he
wrote that "... nothing short of an Ordinance will force the hands of the
11?employers to introduce latrines" for the use of their employees.
The planters, however, objected to compulsion in the matter of 
113
latrines. But Colonial Office pressure caused the Colonial Government 
to pass the Ordinances No. 9 and No. 10 of 1912 which provided for the 
sanitary inspection of the estates by the District Medical Officers.11^
The latter were also empowered to inspect the health of the estate population 
and recommend remedial measures to the employers to improve the general 
state of health on the plantations. Besides, the Government empowered 
itself to make rules to get latrines constructed and also to get the 
drainage near "coolie lines" and the water supplies improved. The working 
of these Ordinances lay outside the perview of the present study.
111. Cey. Lab. Com. 1908, Appendix UU, p. 657*
112. PCMO to Col Sec., 8 February 1909, PHPAC, Cey. SP XV of 1910, p. 15.
113. Sec. of PAC. to Col. Sec., 27 May 1909, ibid., p. 19.
114. For the Ordinances, see C.O. 56/17? Ceylon Ordinances, 1910-1916t
5• Maternity and infant care
We have already seen that the only form of maternity care provided
by the law of 1883 was for the employer to supply food and lodging for the
mother for a period of 14 days after child-birth and to relieve her from
estate work for one month unless a medical officer certified that she
is physically fit to resume work an3r time before that period. But "... tho
rice
she is not required to work for a month she gets no/after a fortnight and
13 8consequently after that time she has to work or starve. The Colonxal
Office therefore drew the attention of the Colonial Government as early
as 1885 to the need to make it obliga/tory for the employers to provide
1 “| ^
food and lodging for the mothers for one month after child-birth. ' But
no immediate action was taken and it was only in 1912 that this
117recommendation found its way into the statute boon.
Infant health was a totally neglected aspect on the estates in 
our period. The hospital treatment on the estate bill under the medical 
welfare scheme was virtually confined to the labourers on the estate 
Check-roll. The only treatment which the infants were given by the 
Government medical men was when the latter were requested to visit the 
estate by the superintendent. Such visits were usually requested when the 
adult labourers were seriously ill on the estate and the occasions of such 
visits were made used of for showing the sick infants to a doctor.
As a result of the negligence of infant health and maternity care 
the rate of infant mortality was heavy on the estates. At time infants 
died on the estates even without the superintendent knowing about such
occurrence. It was only towards the end of our period that there was even 
any casual discussions on remedial measures. But these did not bring 
about any decisive action and the rate of infant mortality continued to
115. Lt. Gov. to Bof S., No. 90 of 4 September 1885, Minute by C. P.
Lucas, G. 0. 54/560.
116. S of S. to Gov., No. 183 of 3 December 1385, ibid.
117. Glause 12 Ordinance No. 9 3.912, Legislative Enactments, Ceylon.
Vol. Ill, (revised, 1923). :---
swell throughout our period. Interest in the question revived when the
entire estate medical scheme was reviewed in the years 1910-2. In the new
Medical Aid Ordinance No. 5 1912 for the first time it was made
obligatory for the employers to see that all estate children below the age
ll8
of one year received proper care and nourishment. The District Medical 
Officers were expected to undertake periodic inspection of all such 
children.
The gross negligence of the question of infant mortality by the 
employers was partly a reflection of the state of the plantation labour" 
market. Labour gangs shifted between estates according to the machinations 
of the kanganies, Chetties, and the estate superintendents. The latter 
consequently had no abiding permanent interest in the labour gangs on the 
estates. Even on the estates where the gangs had become resident, the 
employers looked mainly to South India for the future supplies of labour 
and not so much to the off-springs of the of the gangs resident on the
estates. The following comment was rare to come from a planter even as
late as 1910. Referring to the high rate of infant mortality he pointed 
t hat
It all depends upon that whether we get our labour supply in the 
future. A great drawback would be removed in solving the question of 
our labour supply if vie could get over that.... VJe should not have
had trouble*if we had done that twenty years ago.119
The high rate of infant mortality was not only a source of misery; it
was also a source ox waste. But given the context of the labour market
with its lack of an acute shortage of labour except periodically, the
overall migrant character of the labour force, ana the availability of a
pool of surplus labour in South India from which the employers could draw
additional supplies, the lack of an abiding interest in a question such
as infant mortality is not surprising.
118. C.O. 56/l7» Ceylon Ordinances, 1910-1916.
119• Anchylostomiases Committee, Proceedings, FPRPAC, Cey. SP XXXI 
of 1910, p. 12.
6. Education
The available data on the facilities for schooling of estate
children during the late nineteenth century is fragmentary. For the first 
time, in the years 1904 2-nd 1905, two surveys were carried out respectively 
by the ex-Director of Public Instructions, S. M. Burrows and the Director
In 'the schools given in the above Table the children were instructed 
in reading, writing, and arithmetic in the vernacular up to fifth standard. 
Available evidence reveals that the attendance in these schools were, 
by and large, confined to the children of the kanganies and sub-kanganies. 
Apart from the above schools, rudiments of instructions were given to 
the children on a self-help basis by the literate older members of the 
community in classes held in tlic "coolie lines". In 1905, "the planters
of Public Instructions, J. ^arward on the facilities available on the
estates for the instruction of children. These surveys presented the
following picture
TABLE 7*5 Facilities for schooling of estate children, 1904-5
1904 1905
No. of estates
No. of estates in the survey 
No. of Government schools 
No. of schools started by planters 
No. of Mission schools
1320
725
2
5
36
43
893
2
)
) 58
)
Total No. of schools 
No. of boys of schools going age 
No. of girls of school going age
60
- Total children of school going age 
No. of boys attending schools 
No. of girls attending schools
21,045 23,690 
22,510  
46,200
Total attending schools
Sources: Report by S. M. Burrows, PEITCC, Cey. SP IV of 1.905 ♦
pp. 7-13.
RCE.EC, Gey. SP XXVIII of 1905» P« H *
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reported, in face of criticism that the education of estate children was
being neglected, that such "line schools" were conducted in 299 estates
either in the "lines" or in rooms provided by the estates. In I9O4,
Harward found that 7607 children out a total of 46,200 estate children of
school-going a.ge received instructions in the 60 registered and 299 "line 
120
schools". However, it was found that in the "line schools" teaching was
unorganised, spasmodic, and virtually useless. Besides, it was pointed
out that these schools organised by the kanganies were virtually confined
to the children of a particular caste or a gang of labourers and that
children of a different gang or a caste were not permitted to attend.
After a survey of the facilities available for the instruction of estate
children, the Director of Public Instructions concluded in 1903 that
there was hardly any proper educational provision for the children of the
121Tamil estate labourers.
The impediments to the progress of literacy were mani/o^*
There was the basic indifference to the question of education on the part
of the illiterate immigrant labour community who migrated solely for the
purpose of finding employment and returning home with some savings. The
want of education was not seriously felt by them. The migratory character
of the labour force was a major hindrance for the progress of education
among them. There was a.lso the economic restraint that the children on
estates, especially those above ten years of age, supplemezited the family
earnings by participating in relatively light work such as tea plucking 
122and weeding. Regular schooling was therefore viewed as an interference 
with the wage earning potentiality of the family. The idea cf evening 
schools was often tried but there was the practical problem of obtaining 
a satisfactory response from the children who were too tired to attend
120. RCEEC,Cey. SP XXVIII of 190h, p. 11.
121. Quoted in A. G. H. Wise to Under-S of S., 2 May 1904? PEITCC, Cey.
SP IV of 1903, p. 12.
122. See above, p. 192.
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school at the end of their working clay.
Nevertheless, in a relatively few estates where schools were
maintained for a considerable period of time, and the tine schedules so
organised as not to interfere with children’s estate work and where the
labourers were encouraged to send their children to schools, the superin-
123tendent found a favourable response. At any rate there was always 
an initial lack of interest among the parents and it was found necessary 
to run a school for some time and apply constant pressure, particularly 
at the initial stage to get the school going. Towards the end of the first 
decade of the twentieth century, however, there was general acknowledgement 
from the planting community that the response from the children was good 
where schools were available.
The overall Government policy throughout the late nineteenth 
century was to leave the work of inauguration and maintenance of estate 
schools in private hands and confine itself to financial assistance to 
those schools which satisfied certain requirements stipulated by the 
Government in its Code for Aided Schools promulgated in 1870. This 
grant-in-aid policy explains the existence of a relatively larger number 
of mission and planter-run schools compared with the number of Government 
schools in the plantations. The grant -in-aid to estate schools was part 
and parcel of the overall Island-wide education policy of the Government. 
The Government, however, in view of the difficulties of obtaining 
continuous school attendance by estate children held out exceptionally 
liberal conditions for estate schools to qualify for grants. The Code for 
Aided Schools specified that in order to qualify for grants an estate
123. Editorial, CON, 23 June 1903*
Delta, Hansteville, Kahadora,and Bloomfield estates cited in A. G.
H. Wise to Under-S of S., 7 July 1904> PEITCC, Cey. SP IV of 19851 
pp. 13-14.
124. CH 1906-07, pp. 72-74.
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school should have a suitable class room and the elementary facilities 
for teaching- an average attendance of fifteen students for a period of 
three months, give instructions in reading, writing, and arithmetic in 
vernacular up to the fifth standard, and provide a session of three hours.
Estate schools were not required to have certified teachers hut only
125 . . someone competent to teach, Where these conditions were fulfilled, the
grants were given on examination restiltsjand a child qualified for a
grant to the school if he had attended the school for three months and
had made twenty-five attendances. It was acknowledged by the officials
and the planters that if the aforesaid conditions were fulfilled, the
Government grant was adequate for the school to pay its way.*^
But the response to the grant-in-aid system was poor in the estate 
127sector. The Christian missionary societies made inroads into the 
estates but their efforts among the plantation labourers were minute 
when compared with their progress among the other communities in the 
Island. The missionaries aimed at evangalization and concentrated their 
efforts on the permanently resident population in the Island where they 
could hope for more lasting results than in the case of the migratory 
population on tiie estates. Furthermore, the activities of the missionaries 
in the estates were dependent on the whims of the planters, and the 
reception accorded by the latter was not always cordial. The Tamil 
Coolie Mission organised in 1854 to work it\ the estate sector depended 
on the planters for financial assistance especially at the initial stage 
of setting up schools during which the schools had to qualify for
125* Code for Aided Schools, 1901» Cev. S XXIX of 1900. para 43.
For the rest of the population in the Island, the Code laid down the 
following conditions to qualify for grants. An average attendance of 
45 students for a period of 9 months; a certified teacher; session 
of 5 hours and 100 attendances for a period of 9 months for a child 
to qualify for a grant. On the estates where this last mentioned 
condition was fulfilled a child was eligible for a double grant.
126. Report by S. M. Burrows, PEITCC, Cey. SP IV of 1905. p. 6.
A. G. H. Wise to Under S of S., 7 July 1984? ibid., p. 14.
127. Gov. to S of S., No. 291 of 12 July 1904, PEITCC, Cey. SP IV of 1905,
pp. 1-2.
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Government aid. But throughout the nineteenth century, the Mission found
only a feeble support from the planters and the Mission itself made very
123
slow progress in our period.~ u But it stands to the credit of the
missionaries that the mission schools on the estates substantially
outnumbered those of the Government and the planters.
The response of the planters to the Government grant in-aid system
was even weaker than that of the missionary societies. In fact, when the
question of estate education came to be openly debated in 1903, the
Governor discovered from the Chairman of the Planters* Association that
the vast majority of the planters were not even aware of the facility
afforded by the Government to encourage tne establishment of estate 
129schools. A few liberal planters were, however, cognisant of the system 
of grants and did in fact make use of it to impart rudiments of reading 
and writing in the vernacular to the children in the estates. They were 
mainly the proprietor-planters who usually had a closer personal link with 
their labour force. The bulk of the superintendents were, however, 
absolutely indifferent to the question. In fact, they regarded any attempt 
at imparting learning among the labour community as an exercise that would 
be eventually inimical to the labour supply. A. C. Kingsford, the Chairman 
of the Planter's Association, wrote that "universal education has in 
England denuded the'agricultural districts of labour' and a too rapid spread
of education among the same class in Ceylon, might bring about a similar
. ^30 result.
Again, the planters feared that schooling would affect the amount 
of labour performed in the estates and they disliked children being
128. Editorial, COM, 20 February 1907.
AnR,J of the Tamil Cooly Mission (series published in UCO, COO.,and COW).
129. Gov. to S of S., No. 291 of 12 July 1904, PSITCC, Cey. SP IV of 
1905, PP. 1-2.
130. Chairman of PAC to Col. Sec., 30 July 1903, PPAC 1904, Correspondence, 
p. xxiv.
Proceedings of the East India Association, Asiatic Quarterly Review, 
January-April, 1904, P» I84.
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"taken away from the f i e l d . I t  is no wonder therefore that the grant-in-aid
system remained in cold storage as far the great majority of the planters
were concerned. During the 1880° and i890“J neither did the Government
make any attempt to arouse the planters from their lethargy.
The earliest widespread interest in the question of estate
education began with the turn of the century and culminated in fresh
legislation in I9O7. These we re years when the wider issue of the need.
for a comprehensive system of vernacular elementary education for the
132
entire population in the country as a whole was seriously debated. ~ In
fact, the legislations of 1907 covered urban, planting, and rural Ceylon.
The interest in the education of estate children was therefore part and
parcel of this wider issue. The question of estate education came to be
drawn into the orbit of the wider issue primarily because of the interest
desiderated on the plight of the estate children by an enlightened opinion
of several individuals and organisations in London. Prominent in the
movement in London were C. H. Schwann, Sir Ilancherjee Bhownaggree, Herbert
Roberts, and G. H. Weir— all members of British Parliament} and A. G. H.
133Wise— an ex-planter from Ceylon. They found support from the East India 
Association, the Aborigines Protection Society, the National India 
Association, and the Royal Colonial I n s t i t u t e . T h e  issue was repeatedly 
raised in British Parliament. The Colonial Office was lumbered with 
correspondence drawing its attention to the paucity of schools on the 
plantations and the need for fresh legislation to provide adequate facilities, 
Their motives were primarily humanitarian. Their objectives were restricted 
to providing simple and elementary facilities for the teaching of reading,
131. Ibid., p. 186.
CI1 1906-07, 5 March 1907, pp. 72-73.
132. Education in Ceylon, 1969, chaps. 42 & 43*
133. The moving spirit of the movement in London was A. G. H. Wise who had
been a planter in Ceylon for about four years. His critics attributed 
his interest in the question of education in Ceylon to a personal 
motive to gain an appointment in the Ceylon Education Department.
134. Proceedings of East India Association, 7 December 1903, Asiatic 
Quarterly Review, January-April, 1904, pp. I8l~l87«
'Journal of the Royal Colonial Institute, March 1904. No, 4.
writing, and arithmetic in the vernacular so that the new generation of
labourers would be literate and thereby be capable of maintaining their
own accounts with the kanganies and the Chetties without being subject to
extortion. The protagonists of the movement pointed out that a bare
knowledge of reading and writing would not encourage the labourers to give
up their traditional occupation on the estate^but that such a policy,
contrary to the fears of the bulk of the planters, would contribute toward
135
building up a healthy labour force. Throughout the years from 1903 to
1907, the pressure groups in London succeeded in maintaining the issue
in the limelight.
The pressure exercised by these groups found, its way to Ceylon
136
through the Colonial Office. The latter felt that the pressure groups 
in London were concentrating on the relatively less significant issue of 
the education of the estate children than the wider issue of the need to 
disseminate literacy among the resident Ceylonese population. On the 
whole, the Colonial Office standpoint was that in the case of the children 
of the "... floating population... an average institution was sufficient
137in view of the prior claim of the Ceylonese."
The immediate reaction of the Colonial Government to pressure
from London was to seek the co-operation of the planters to provide wider
facilities under the existing policy of grant-in-aid. Governor Ridgeway
in consultation with the Chairman of the Planters' Association and the
Director of Public Instructions thought that
... the facilities already offered under the Government code would 
suffice'and would be more frequently used by the planters if the 
scope of the existing regulations were clearly explained.138
135* This view was supported by a few planter#. Editorial, C 0. I, 9 March 198
136. S of S., to Gov., Telegram of 7 August 1983, C.O. 54/683.
S of S. to Gov., No. 33 of 22 January 1984, PDITCC, Cey. SP IV of 1?Q5
P.
137. Gov. to S of S., No. 6 of 5 January 1986, C.G. minute, C.O. 54/699-
138. Gov. to S of S., No. 291 of 12 July I9O4, C.O. 54/689.
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All that the Government did at first v.7as to distribute among the planters
a circular setting forth the concession offered for estate schools under
139the existing arrangement* This was the first serious attempt on the 
part of the Government to implement the grant-in-aid system in the estate 
sector. In the next year, the Government made a further concession of 
reducing the duration of the school session to qualify for a gTant to two 
hours (for children above eleven years only). But these moves failed to 
exert any appreciable effect on the planting c om m u n i t y . A p a r t  from the 
widespread indifference of the planters, the grant-in-aid system appeared 
to suffer from several shortcomings from the point of view of the planters* 
It involved an initial expenditure by the planters because the grant 
depended on the school fulfilling certain conditions. The employer had 
therefore to wait for a year or more before he got his initial out la?/ 
back in the shape of the grant and this too was uncertain, for the grant 
depended on the success of the school at examinations. Until such time 
as he got the grant, the planter had not only to provide building and 
furniture but also had to pay the teachers. For the first two or three 
years the grant was invariably small for the children had to make some 
progress for the school to obtain a higher grant. Besides, the grant was 
rendered precarious by the possibility that a whole gang of labourers 
including children might unexpectedly give notice and depart just before 
an examination was due to take place*
Within months of the Government’s efforts to popularise the 
grant-in-aid system among the planters it became clear that the system 
would not find widespread support from the planters. The result was an 
attempt to search for alternatives acceptable to the planting community. 
And in this process it was discovered that the planters’ non-co-operation 
was directed not only at the grant-in-aid system but at any scheme
139. Circular dated 17 December 1Q03 issued by the DPI, Correspondence 
Pie. Estate Schools, PPAC 19Q3-19Q4*
140. Report by S. M. Burrows, PSITCC, Cey. SP IV of I9Q5* P* 9*
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meant to set up estate schools on the basis of the minimum requirements
in the Government educational Code; and that compulsion was necessary
141to push the planters into action. ‘
The first of these alternative suggestions emanated from the 
Director of Public Instructions, J. Harvard. He submitted a scheme with a 
view to cut down the cost to the planters by grouping estates and erecting 
a school in the centre of each group, with the estate providing the 
building and furniture and the Government bearing from the beginning a 
definite proportion of the cost of maintenance of the schools. But the 
suggestion suffered from the shortcoming that it did not pay due attention 
to the inconvenience of the children to attend group—estate schools 
which were bound to be at a distance from most of the !lcoolie lines". 
Besides, the scheme did not meet with the approval of the planters because 
it would obviously result in the children absenting themselves from the 
estate during school hours and a possible interruption of the amount of 
estate work performed by the children. Governor Blake himself eventually 
considered that group-estate schools would not work satisfactorily. The 
additional cost which the scheme held out for the Government no doubt 
influenced Blake’s attitude.
The Governor’s next move was to commission a special officer, the 
ex-Director of Public Instructions, S. Burrows, to go about in the 
estates, examine the requirements on the spot, and recommend a suitable 
scheme. Burrows felt that both the system of grant-in-aid schools and 
Harvard’s 5dea of group-estate schools were unduly costly to the Government 
and the planters and were also unsuitable to the circumstances existing 
in the estates. He suggested the extention of the low cost system of "line 
schools". Burrows argued that the "line school" was the type required 
for the estate labour community; that this self-evolved system might be 
benficially encouraged by judicious end from the Government and the
141. Gov. to S of S., No. 291 of 12 July 1904, C.O. 54/689.
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planters. The idea of "line schools" did net find favour with the 
pressure group in London. However, Burrow’s idea found support from Elake 
and the Colonial Office, the latter in addition favouring Harvard's
142group-estate schools where such schools could he conveniently set up.
Ho action was, however, immediately instituted on Burrow's report 
because the wider issue of venacular elementary education for the 
population of the Island as a whole was approaching towards a climax 
which found its manifestation in the appointment of a broad based 
Vernacular Elementary Education Commission to investigate and recommend 
reforms for the entire Island. The question of estate education was also 
placed under the purview of the new Commission.
The Commission Report as far as the estate sector was concerned 
was a poralisation of the various views expressed on the subject during 
the two preceding years. The Commission enunciated three main principles 
as regard education of estate children. First, it recommended against "... 
any rigorous system of compulsory school attendance during fixed hours". 
The Commission held, not unreasonably, that the time was not ripe for 
compulsory education in the plantation sector, that such a step would be 
resented by the planters as well as the labourers. Throughout the debate 
on the education of estate children, the consensus of opinion both in 
London and in Ceylon was against compulsory education. Thus, the above 
recommendation of the Commission was well in keeping with the contemporary 
views of the planters and authorities.
142. S of S. to Gov. Ho. 321 of 16 September I9O4 , Cey. SP IV of 1905, pe 17.
143* RCEEG, SP XXVIII of 1905* cm estate schools, pp. 10-13.
The Commission was composed of K. Uace, GA. HP; J. Harvard, DPI;
J. N. Cambell, ex-unofficial member of the CLC; R. H. Highfield, 
Principal, Lesley College (later his place in the Commission was 
taken by Rev. J. Cooreman, Vicar-General, Galle) and D, B. Jayatilaka, 
Principal, Ananda College.
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Secondly, as regards teaching institutions, the Commission 
recommended a three-fold system, namely, the grant-in-aid scheme for large 
estates, the grant-in-aid group-estate scheme for groups of smaller estates, 
and "line schools on estates v.There the two above categories: were not 
immediately feasible. Thus, the recommendation meant a combination of the 
original grant-in-aid policy and the systems advocated by Harvard and 
Burrows. These were schemes hitherto approved either by the Colonial 
Government or the Colonial Office and there was nothing novel in the 
recommendations in this respect.
Thirdly, the Commission recommended a measure of Government 
interference to compel the planters to provide elementary facilities for 
the instruction of estate children and also for the Government to undertake 
periodic inspection of such facilities. This recommendation was the outcome 
of past experience which unmistakably revealed that any attempt to depend 
solely on the planters to provide educational facilities on a voluntary 
basis would not bring about overall satisfactory results— a view clearly 
expressed in the previous year by the Director of Public Instructions.
He pointed out that he would not "... anticipate that a very large number 
of schools will be started voluntarily by individual planters.
The above recommendation was the only new feature pertaining to 
estate schools in the Report of the Commission and that was also the 
only feature disliked by the planters. But the planters offered little or 
no resistence to this recommendation because the overall policy underlying 
the scheme recommended by the Commission was acceptable to them. They 
viewed compulsory education on the plantations with distaste and repeatedly 
argued that such a polic2/* would seriously disturb the supply of labour.
As the editor of the Ceylon Observer, Weekly Edition pointed out,
144. Report on Estate Schools, by DPI, 10 March 1904? PEITCC,
Cey. SP IV of 1905? P« 4.
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compulsory education was "... far ahead of current planting opinion".
The planters were glad that the Commission had recommended the exemption
of the estate children from compulsory school attendance which it
recommended for the children of the rest of the population in the Inland.
Besides, though the estates were to compulsorily provide facilities for
instruction, the Commission accepted the "line schools" as sufficient
for this purpose. It pointed out that where
... local circumstances render such combination impossible or 
at any rate incompatible with the employment of children as 
workers it is sufficient if the planter encourages the work of 
classes held either in the cooly lines or in a room provided by 
himself for the purpose and sees that all children, so far as is 
reasonably possible, receive some instruction in such classes ....
We think it extremely likely that when the matter is definitely 
placed in the hands of the planter the lines school on a large 
majority of estates will rapidly be replaced by arrangements 
under which instruction will be given in a more methodical manner 
and in better surroundings. •.. We consider then that the nature.l 
line of development is to encourage the grant-in-aid schools, but 
to accept the lines school as sufficient, leaving it as far as 
possible to the planter to make his own arrangements.146
Thus, while the estates were'to provide facilities, the Commission
accepted the basic idea that schooling should not disrupt child-labour
on the estates. The organisation 6f schools wets to be left in the hands
of the planters and there was to be no formal inspection of the "line
schools", though all estate superintendents were to be expected to
maintain school attendance registers. On the whole, the Commission appears
to have advocated a "go slow" policy towards the question of education
of estate children.
Part V of the Elementary Education Ordinance No. 8 of 19^7 devoted
to legislation on estate schools is virtually a wholesale adoption of
147the scheme detailed in the Commission Report. ‘ The object, as the
145. Editorial, COW, 23 June 1903.
146. RCEEC, Cey. SP XT/I 11 of 1909» p. 12.
147. For pt. V, See Col Sec. to Sec. PAC, August 1907, PPAC 1907 ^ 
Correspondence, pp. 143-145.
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Attorney-General pointed cut, was to provide a room and a teacher 
where the children can be taught to read and write. The planters were to 
compulsorily provide suitable buildings for schools and also provide 
teachers for the education of the children between the ages of six and 
ten years. Instructions were to be provided in reading, writing, and 
arithmetic in the vernacular up to the fifth standard, in a daily session 
of two-hour duration. The teacher was not required to be qualified. The 
superintendents of all estates were required to forward regular returns 
to the Department of Public Instructions giving the number of boys and 
girls of school-going a.ge on the estates, those attending schools, the 
the number of days the schools were held, the average school attendance, 
and a description of school buildings. Finally, where an estate failed 
to make a school available for the education of the estate children, the 
Government was empowered to step in, set up a school, and levy a rate 
on the estate to defray the cost incurred.
schools" because of the low cost and the absence of formal inspection of 
"line schools". Table 7*6 below compiled from the information available 
in the annual Administration Reports of the Director of Public Instructions 
reveals a gradual increase in the number of registered schools on the 
estates after 1908.
TABLE 7.6 The number of estate schools registered in 1908-10 under 
the Elementary Education Ordinance No. 8 of 1907*
The immediate reaction of the planters w; to extend the "line
Year Do. of schools
1908
1909
1910
162
185
227
Source: AR of DPI for 1Q1Q-11, GAR 1910-11, p. Al6.
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It is not possible to know the nature of the facilities provided
in these schools. The Ordinance of 1907 is significant in that it
1 A.8
remained as the basis of the estate school system up to 1947* '
To conclude, it was only towards the end of our period that a 
substantial step was taken to solve the problem of illiteracy among tlee 
estate children. Even if the limited scheme of 1907 was to produce 
results, these would have been felt only by the next generation of 
labourers. It could be safely concluded that a general state of ignorance 
and illiteracy pervaded the labour community throughout our period—  
largely the outcome of the conditions of the community from which they 
were drawn and the lack of adequate educational facilities on the 
estates.
148. Education in Ceylon, 19'39> P* 753.
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION
The period we have covered in this study was one of remarkable 
economic changes in the Island— changes which laid the foundation of the 
tea-rubber export economy of the Island, This economic expansion was 
brought about by foreign capital and enterprise, organised end managed 
mostly in the form of limited liability companies. These enterprises 
progressed under the protection and the administrative stability provided 
by the British imperial hegemony in the Island, The economic expansion 
was much the work of foreign labour as it was of foreign capital and 
enterprise. The response of the unskilled immigrant labourers to the 
employment opportunities in the plantations was striking. The trail had 
been already laid in the coffee era (l830--80). The increase in labour 
immigration and the preponderance of immigration over emigration in our 
period resulted in a heavy net gain to the Island*s population. The 
estate population which approximated 200,000 in 1880 rose to approximately 
475>000 by 1910, thus mailing the period one of the heaviest in the 
immigration of labour to the Island, More important, the immigrant labour 
population in the Island took more of a resident character in response to 
the regular* and continuous demand for labour in the tea industry in 
contrast to the high seasonality of the labour demands of the coffee 
estates.
The rapid expansion of both tea and rubber took place under 
relatively favourable labour market conditions. The supply was unrestricted 
by the Indian Government unlike in case of most other countries which 
imported labour from India, The inflow was actively encouraged and 
assisted by the Colonial Government though it did not participate in 
labour recruitment directly. The most potent of the Indian economic
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factors inhibiting the rapid flow of labour relatively good agricul­
tural seasons— did not occur frequently in our period. In fact the 
unfavourable agricultural seasons were quite common; and at times 
created conditions of famine. The relative proximity of the Island to 
South India and the system of family migration helped the flow. The 
latter together with the kangany system of recruitment helped to 
minimise the influence of the social factors which operated in the 
South Indian society in inhibiting labour mobility. Because of the 
availability of a potential surplus of labour in South India, the 
planters concentrated on publicising working conditions, in intensyfing 
recruiting activities, and improving transport facilities for the 
labourers to get to the estates. To attain these aims, they set up the 
Ceylon Labour Commission, utilized the Tin Ticket System and also 
obtained concessionary rail fares for the labourers. All these factors 
contributed to increase the inflow.
The planters1 main problems were the poor turn-out and the heavy 
turnover of the labour force. The problem of labour turn-out was 
fairly successfully tackled by the technique of making the estate issue 
of rice dependent on the weekly turn-out of the labourers and also by 
making the kanganies* "head* and ■pence* money dependent on the 
turn-out of their labour gangs. •
Instability and high labour turnover continued as the planters* 
major problem throughout the period. Basically, the problem of instability 
was closely interwoven with the immigrant plantation labour system in 
the Island. There was no indenture system in Ceylon. The labourers 
were on monthly contracts. The labour demands on the estates fluctuated 
seasonally. The planters required extra hands in some months of the 
year whom they could pay off at the end of the peak season. An extra 
pool of surplus labour for casual work during peak season would have 
been the ideal condition from the point of view of the planters. Bat
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the "bulk of the labour force, both casual and permanent, had to be
imported at an expense of an initial outlay, and it was obviously
uneconomical for the planters to maintain all such gangs on the estates
throughout the year. The planters therefore evolved the "tundu system”
to transfer gangs from estates with surplus labour to estates in short
supply without themselves having to forego the outlay they had incurred
in importing labour. But the "tundu system" eventually became the
instrument of high labour turnover, largely because of the hold the
kanganies and the Chetties had over labour gangs. They used their power
and influence over labour gangs to shift gangs between estates to suit
their own interests. Because the problem of instability was closely
related to the labour system a radical change of the latter was necessary
to tackle the former. But the problems poised by labour force instability
so
did not turn out to be/critical as to persuade the planters to bring 
about a radical change in the system of recruitment and organisation 
of the labour force. The problem of labour instability was, by and large, 
confined to 2-3 months of the year and the plantations, on the whole, 
had an overall adequate supply of labour, except during the season of 
peak work load. Besides, those who were instrumental in bringing about 
seasonal instability on the labour force, viz., the kanganies and the 
Chetties, did otherwise play roles useful to the planters. The kangany
9
was important in the recruitment and the management of the labour gangs. 
The Chettie was important as the main supplier of consumer goods of 
the labourers, besides being the sole "outside" financier of the labour 
force— a role which, in the peculiar context of the immigrant labour 
system in our period, virtually meant that the Chettie was in a sense 
contributing towards the working capital necessary to maintain the labour 
force.
The fundaM ental question arises as to how the planters suceeded 
in obtaining a large increase in immigrant labour so as to adequately
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meet the overall heavy demand on the estates on a low and stagnant wage 
scale— a scale which turned out to dwindling in terms of the labourers* 
real income as the tea period progressed. This is the central question 
which ties up the two basic aspects of our study— the supply of labour 
and the labour conditions on the plantations.
The obvious explanation is that the immigrants found the level 
of living on the plantations in the Island superior to that in their 
villages in South India. The estates offered work for the family and 
also offered prospects of continuous employement. Besides, rice, which 
was the staple food of the economically better off sections of the 
population in South India, was regularly available to the labourers on 
the estates. While these superior attractions were basic factors for 
the general inflow of immigrants, this explanation leaves many questions 
pertaining to the immigrant labour market in the Island unanswered.
Prom the point of view of the labourers, the wages on the estates 
were inadequate to meet even the cost of their basic necessities,
g
especially in the years after the late I89O . Yet the labourers not only
migrated in large numbers and subsisted on their earnings; they also
indulged in gambling and consumption of alchohol and even remitted money
to South India from time to tirae.^ Prom the point of view of the
planters, the question arises as to how they maintained an equilibrium
«
between the demand and supply of labour on a stagnant wage scale.
The crucial fact is that the wage scale played a less significant 
role in the immigrant labour market of our period than the role it plays 
in the labour market of today. The role which the wage scale play 
in the latter was actually played by the "cash advances" in the case of 
the former. It was an "advances dominated" labour market than a "wage 
dominated" one.
Not only did the cash advances helped the planters to import 
labour. More important, advances ma.de the labourers indebted to the
1. The immigrant labour population appears to have been a. main source 
of excise revenue of the Colonial Government.
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estates and therefore gave the employers a hold over the labour gangs.
A substantial portion of the advances turned out to be irrecoverable.
But even so,they preferred to compete for labour with the offer of 
higher cash advances than with the outright payment of higher wages 
which ensured them no such hold over the labour gangs*
What did the system mean to the labourer?. The advances enabled 
him to bridge the gap between the low wages and the rising cost of living. 
But in return he got himself into debt-bondage. It was mainly in the 
months of peak work load on the estates that high advances were procurable 
from the estates. When estate advances were not forthcoming or were 
found to be inadequate, the labourers turned to the kangany and the 
Chetty for advances. Thus the system eventually placed the labourer in 
debt-bondage to a three tier monopolistic structure of the estate, the 
kangany, and the Chetty. Because the advances obtained from the kangany 
and the Chetty carried high rates of interest, the system deprived the 
labourer of a portion of his earnings which went to enrich his 
creditors. The working of the system therefore not only explains the 
debt-servitude and the absence of economic progress among the working 
class in a period of striking prosperity in the industry in which they
worked; but it also helps to explain the rise of the Chetties and the
, labourers
Kanganies as economic elites in the plantation region. The/acceded to
the set-up because they were drawn from the poverty-stricken and illiterate
sections of the population in South India who were quite used to a life
of indebtedness, which was repaid by them.with their manual labour.
It was only the Governments— the Imperial, the Indian, or the 
Colonial— which could have brought about a change in the labourer’s 
relationship vis-a-vis the employer, the kangany, and the Chetty. The 
policy of the Indian Government was one of non-interference towards the 
entire question of labour migration to Ceylon. In the context of tlie 
immigrant labour market in Ceylon this policy meant the total neglect
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of the immigrant labourers* The Colonial Government and the Colonial
Office steered clear of the strictly planter-labour industrial relations,
except for a brief attempt in the mid-1830 . There was no legislation on
aspects such as minimum wage rates, hours of work, and child-labour.
Where some legislation was framed to cover the method of calculation of
monthly wages and the method of wage payment, there was no adequate
administrative effort to enforce the lav;. However, both the Colonial
Office and the Colonial Government paid a substantial degree of attention
•<
into other aspects of plantation labour life, especially labour welfare
measures and the method of conveyance of labourers. In these spheres,
undoubtedly,'some progress was seen.
The expansion of the plantation sector with foreign capital and
foreign labour meant the growth of a foreign enclave in the Island, There
was large-scale capital investment but there was less progress by way of
capital formation in the Island. So also, x-jhile there was a heavy increase
in the immigrant working class, their earnings apart from their expenses
on basic consumer good3 did not remain with them to raise their own
standard of living on the estates. Being an immigrant population, such
earnings went to South India either through the kanganies, the Chettiss,
or the labourers themselves. The Island’s economic structure was changed
by coffee, tea , and rubber plantation enterprises from a basically
«
peasant subsistence economy to a dual economy. The planting sector sector 
contributed to the Colonial treasury by the payment of numerous taxes 
and duties. These sources of revenue enabled the Colonial Government to 
launch public works projects, particularly road and railway construction 
and port development. The immigrant labourers’ share to the Colonial 
treasury came by way of the payment of the duty/i^iported rice, duties 
on other consumer goods, their contribution to the excise revenue and 
the rail freights. Hue to the presence of a large immigrant population 
in the Island there was one main point at which the tx;o sectors of the
dual economy could have got merged to bring about an overall composite 
economic growth in the Island, The immigrants who formed a truely 
landless proletariat created a huge market for certain consumer goods, 
particularly food-stuffs. But this market remained unexploited by the 
peasant agricultural sector in the Island and the heavy market, particul­
arly for rice, came to be dominated by imports from India,
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APPENDIX A
I
Total plantation labour immigration (men, women, and ohildren) 1880-1910
[j
Tear
By North Road By Tuiioorin-Colombo Route
(IRANI)
TOTALMen Women Children Total Men Women Children Total
1880 16,580 3,737 537 20,854 N N N N 20,854
1881 21,777 5,033 613 27,423 N N N N 27,423
1882 21,071 4,858 649 26,578 N N N N 26,573
1883 12,587 2,617 353 15,557 N N N N 15,557
1884 16,240 3,701 610 20,551 N N N N 20,551
1885 18,546 4,468 895 23,909 N N N N 23,909
1886 14,085 3,371 6 37 18,093 N N N N 18,093
1887 18,975 3,877 1,167 24,019 N N N N 24,019
1888 40,011 9,998 1,829 51,838 N N N N 51,838
1889 25,910 6,859 1,362 34,131 3,188 952 830 4,970 39,101
1890 29,121 9,657 1,923 40,701 3,915 2,718 3,388 15,021 55,722
1891 34,228 10,998 2,552 47,778 15,509 4,961 5,547 26,017 73,795
1892 31,751 10,696 3,186 45,633 21,583 7,381 8,344 37,308 82,941
1893 23,946 7,719 2,799 34,464 12,235 4,015 4,165 20,415 54,879
1894 20,636 6,154 2,272 29,062 12,864 3,936 4,291 21,091 50,153
1895 22,477 6,822 2,146 31,445 28,519 9,717 11,946 50,182 81,627
I896 20,229 6,234 1,818 28,290 36,135 11,906 12,457 60,498 88,788
1897 19,922 5,784 1,777 27,483 56,895 18,320 20,392 95,607 123,088
1898 13,477 4,348 1,595 17,420 43,007 14,943 15,868 73,818 93,238
1899 82 39 22 143 15,527 4,610 3,540 23,677 23,820
1900 North Road closed 73,604 28,041 27,073 128,718 128,713
1901 28,891 10,216 9,654 48,761 48,761
1902 21,447 7,182 5,132 33,761 33,761
1903 29,986 10,087
lf\
COCOt*- 47,958 47,958
1904 38,762 12,684 10,028 61,474 61,474
1905 80,366 28,855 29,654 138,875 138,875
1906 52,199 18,693 18,053 88,945 88,945
1907 N N N N 55,701
1908 53,730 20,078 15,172 88,980 88,980
1909 48,230 18,440 14,048 80,718 80,718
1910 N N N N 118,613
Sources: ARs of AGA, Mannar Distriot, (annual series, 1880-1900), CAR,
Monthly Statistics of Arrivals and Departures of Coolies, by 
the Prinoipal Collector of Customs, Colombo, COG.
Returns of Immigrants in the Port of Colombo, shovfing their destination. 
trade, and occupation, published bi-annually, by Superintendent of 
Immigration, CGG.
Nt- No information available.
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APPENDIX B
Specimen "Tin Ticket", "Labour Federation Tundu", 
"Discharge Note", and "Kangany *Af Form"
270
No.
l a b o u r  f e d e r a t i o n .5
s  —
w  ............  Estate ( D ate)
O F G E Y LO N . 
T U N D U .
On
Labour Federation of Ceylon..
TUNDU.
  ... 190
day o f   1'.».... B e a re r.................
.Estate.
19U
N A M E S . -
9  K ang any  a u d  ..Coolies w i l l  he paid o ff
|  fro m  the  E state  on b rin jriup ; Rs ( I ls  )
9
0 Th is  note ho lds -rood u n t i l  day o f  on ly .
1« w hen i t  m u s t he re tu rned fo r  renew al i f  necess-
I
§ ary.
NAMES.
A o r r .T s . C I I l l .D K  UN.
.Males.
.
Females .Males Females.
X N. B .- I f  any Sinhalese are in the san^, 
 ^ the num ber and sex of these should be 
noted.
l a b o u r  f e d e r a t i o n  j?  LABOUR FEDERATION OF CEYLON.
OF C E Y L O N .
D is c h a r g e  N o t e .
a
y
(S)
;*>Cf)
t-(J)
DISCHARGE NOTE.
No.
Date
. Estate f/>
*3>
.190 fj)
Date
.... E sta te  
. . . . 1 9 0  .
K a n g a n v
............. Kangany {>>
w ......
a n d  Coolies have th is  £? .0
day been pa id o ff tin?above ^  a n ‘* ................Coolies have th is  day been pa id  o ff
{7,
Estate. C/) l " e a^'>ve Estate.
Sighed.   ..
M anager.
S igned.
M anager.
A. F o r m .
E state   ................................... Post Office.......................................
T in  T icke t N o ................................  Head K angany...............................
D ate............................ ......................  S ub-K angany.................................
The Ceylon L a b o u r C o rrm iiss ione i, T r ic h in o j/o ly .
Pay bearer  5 ‘S y .  ,Son o f....................   a" e.............
C aste ..............................................V illa g e ...................................................
T a lu k .......................P. O ................................D is tr ic t . . . ................ Rupees
........................................ and Rupees....................................fo r every cooly
he brings, exclusive of ra il fare and batta to the   ........................
Agency.
Yours fa ith fu lly ,
Superintendent.
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APPENDIX D 
Tota,l tea and rubber acreage 1880-1910
Year
Total tea
acreage
planted
Estimated tea 
acres in 
full bearing 
(5 years 
and upwards)
Tot al 
rubber 
acreage 
planted
Rubber 
acreage 
in bearing
1880 13,500 1,750
1831 22,000 2,720
1882 32,000 4,700
1883 70,000 6 ,5 0 0
I884 102,000 9,274 A
I885 150,000 13,500
1886 170,000 22,000
I887 183,000 32,000
1888 200,000 70,000
1889 205,000 70,000
1890 220,000 102,000
1891 250,000 150,000
I892 262,000 170,000
1893 273,000 183,000
1894 289,000 205,000
1895 305,000 220,000
1896 330,000 250,000
1897 350,000 262,000
1898 364,000 288,000
1899 378,000 305,000
1900 334,000 330,000
1901 387,000 345,000
1902 383,000 369,000
1903 380,000 375,000
1904 386,000 380,000 25,000 600
1905 390,000 378,000 40,000 1 ,000
1906 386,000 379,000 100,000 2 ,000
1907 390,000 382,000 150,000 2 ,500
1908 392,000 382,000 180,000 4 ,0 0 0
1909 395,000 383,000 184,000 „ 5,500
1910 385,775 385,000 203,000 20,000
Sources: Ferguson's Ceylon Handbook and Direct017/,
1913-14.
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